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Abstract 
The causes of operational failure remain unclear to those tasked with both delivering 
projects and managing operational assets. Greater awareness of the owner and their 
supply network capabilities to mitigate failure could reduce significant quality costs that 
can amount to many millions of pounds. This thesis investigates why assets handed over 
to the owner have failed during operation, and proposes new ways that capabilities can be 
integrated to reduce and prevent potential operational failure from arising. An abductive 
reasoning with a grounded theory approach was used over a three-year period, and 
involved quarterly expert research steering group meetings to validate the iteration 
between literature and empirical observation to obtain new insights. The first workshop 
and questionnaire phase of the study created a Cost of Quality (COQ) framework; this 
was then tested on five multi-case study and subsequently developed within a single 
expert owner organisation using semi-structured interviews, card sorting and a Delphi 
review. The results show that the owner and the multi-organisational supply network 
capabilities are fragmented in addressing operational failure. By identifying and 
measuring quality cost failure, owners and their supply network will learn and be able to 
procure more integrated capabilities in failure mitigation for reducing quality cost failure. 
This will be achieved with better understanding of the relationship between owner’s 
strategic requirement, technical project delivery and functional operations management 
capabilities, which is summarised in a capabilities cycle model. The model illustrates the 
need for a strategic project and quality management approach to integrate capabilities 
within each phase of a project’s lifecycle. An integrated capabilities approach is proposed 
for the owner and its multi-organisational supply and operator network to integrate and 
collaborate in relation to the capabilities required to equally share project risk and quality 
cost in mitigating the failures.  
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Impact statement  
Not many people are aware of the impact of operational failure in construction projects. 
This multi-case study describes how research in Construction and Project Management at 
University College London has contributed to innovative new project and quality 
management; this includes a new process and a new organisation and network structure to 
improve the operational delivery of a project. The new strategic approach has directly 
contributed to the project and quality management approach in failure mitigation. The 
research has shown that there is a need to integrate owner’s strategic requirement, 
technical project delivery and functional operations management capabilities in failure 
mitigation. Using the measurement of cost of quality measure, owners and their multi-
organisational supply network can address the problem of capabilities distribution in a 
project’s lifecycle. The research supports the construction industry in the development of 
a new strategic approach to better understand the operational failures in reducing quality 
cost failure. Research contributions to project-based organisation delivery include a cost 
of quality framework that is suitable for construction scope to support the understanding 
of failure mitigation. The research ascertains what could be done to share knowledge of 
failure throughout the supply network, and to create a shared culture of quality between 
all partners. This research provides greater transparency of where costs lie within the 
owner and its multi-organisational supply network.  
Wider dissemination routes have been through conventional publications and 
presentations (conferences, seminars) as well as a steering meeting to promote benefits of 
the cost of quality measure (workshops). Through the very close collaboration with 
industry partners (the Chartered Quality Institution working group), research outputs have 
provided practical implications for the organisational impact. The work has been 
published in Quality World Magazine to address the failure and cost of poor quality in 
construction. The collaboration work with the cost of quality working group has increased 
the interest in the research area, attracting new staff, students and researchers to 
contribute to the new integration model in supporting the reduction of operational failure 
in construction. This research benefited from the working group and has been directly 
supported by one of the UK’s leading construction owner organisations in providing 
significant data. Wider benefits of this impact have led to the owner organisation forming 
new capability to focus on and highlight changes in the organisational structure and the 
development of a new Knowledge Transfer Partnership application. 
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Glossary 
Applying capability: Capability that is 
applied during project execution to fit 
operational needs and requirements. It is 
the capabilities that are applied during 
the execution, establishment and 
coordination to meet the operational 
environment. This capability is shaped 
according to the earlier transferred 
capability by the project team to shape 
the later development of operational 
capabilities. This capability will allow a 
development for the operations ability to 
operate the assets or projects. 
Capability: The distinctive managerial 
knowledge, experience and skills located 
within a single organisation (a firm) of 
either it is an individual experience or as 
an organisation ability to provide the 
desire knowledge and skills. In which 
are required to establish, coordinate and 
execute a project. This includes a distinct 
behavioural pattern, which is complex in 
nature, involving both formal and 
informal processes.  
Cost of quality: This is an approach that 
allows an organisation to determine the 
extent to which its tools and resources 
are used for activities that prevent poor 
quality, that appraise the quality of the 
organisation’s products or services, and 
that result from internal and operational 
failures. The information will allow an 
organisation to determine the potential 
savings to be gained by implementing 
process improvements.   
Failure: Failure is defined as the 
condition or fact of not achieving the 
desired end or ends. Failure is an 
unacceptable difference between 
expected and observed performance; 
also the termination of the ability of an 
item or system to perform an intended or 
required function. Failure usually results 
from a combination of conditions, 
mistakes, oversights, misunderstandings, 
ignorance and incompetence, or even 
dishonest performance.   
Functional operations management: A 
proactive system of business function 
responsible for managing the operations 
of an asset through a collaborative 
process of the creation of the goods and 
services. The management is concerned 
with designing and controlling the 
management of the production and 
redesigning the business operation to 
control and ensure the deliverability of 
its capability to meet the functional need. 
Multi-organisational supply and 
operator network: An extension 
of supply chains with the operational 
team, it involves different capabilities 
that is seeks to accommodate and 
construct the commercial complexity 
associated with the creation and delivery 
of the goods and services. This involved 
different organisations from the delivery 
of raw materials to the completions of 
project that meet end-user satisfaction 
and towards the operations of the asset. 
Operating (Operational) costs: These 
are the expenses related to 
the operation of a business, or to 
the operation of a system or asset. These 
are the cost incurred due to the day-
today operating works such as fixed cost 
(e.g.: rent or mortgage) or variable cost 
(e.g.: maintenance or insurance).  
Operational capabilities: The ability to 
align critical processes, resources and 
technologies according to the overall 
guiding vision and owner-focused value 
propositions coupled with the ability to 
deliver these processes effectively and 
efficiently. It is the capability to fully 
employ and maintain the asset/system to 
meet an operational need.  
Operational failure: This is the 
inability of a system to meet a specified 
performance standard. A complete loss 
of function is clearly one type of 
operational failure. However, the term 
also includes the lack of capability and 
inability to function at the level of 
 xiii 
performance that has been specified as 
satisfactory during project operations. 
Operational failure can lead to corrosion 
and catastrophic damage to the system 
that will have a cost in relation to 
quality. 
Owner capabilities: This is a complete 
set of capabilities that an organisation 
requires to executes its business model 
or fulfil its mission. It is an 
organisational level of skills imbedded in 
people, process and/or technology. 
Owner strategy and requirement: 
Owner’s initial planning in initiating a 
new project, a structure for defining, 
approving and implementing the project 
scope within an organisation or funding 
programme. It provides a strategic 
requirement for procuring capabilities.   
Owner: Entity that initiates a project, 
finances it, contracts it out and benefits 
from its output(s). 
Project capabilities: These are the 
knowledge, tasks and structures that 
organisations require to design and 
produce complex products and systems 
as one-off units or in small, tailored 
batches to address the requirements of 
large businesses, governments and 
institutional owners. The capability 
includes different sources of skill and 
knowledge in delivering a project. This 
includes the activities and structures 
required to manage the project through 
its life, from the front-end engagement 
with owner and sponsors, through 
tendering and project delivery, to the 
back-end handover to the owner and 
provision of on-going support. 
Project failure: Any project that fails to 
meet time, budget and quality targets is 
considered a failure. Project failure is 
when a project cannot attain its aims and 
causes a negative impact for the owners, 
contractors and others. This includes 
insufficient capabilities to deliver the 
desired function of a project and further 
resulted in quality cost of failure. 
Quality cost failure: This is costs 
arising from failure to achieve specified 
quality within the organisation or the 
quality specified for the project. It deals 
with identification of problem areas and 
analysis of quality costs. Quality cost 
failure includes all the cost incurred due 
to the occurrences of the failure be it 
either before the project is complete or 
after its handover. 
Quality failure: A lack or deficiency of 
a desirable quality or a nonfulfillment of 
the agreed specifications or 
requirements.  
Quality management: The act of 
overseeing all activities and tasks needed 
to maintain a desired level of excellence.  
Recognising capability: Capability that 
is recognised and captured for the 
owner’s future project(s). It entails 
ability to capture the operational 
capability that consists of the set of new 
routines to be combined with the 
existing operating environment or to add 
to the owner’s operating environment. 
This is further developed as an 
improvement to the owner’s capability 
for existing and future business. It is 
recognised as a new set of capability for 
owner and multi-organisation based on 
the learning that is obtained from the 
previous failure.  
Stakeholder: A person or group of 
people who own a share in a business or 
project that has an interest in a company 
and can either affect or be affected by 
the business.  
Technical project delivery: A 
temporary organisation that undertakes a 
design process to deliver the desired 
outcome that meets the business needs. 
The organisation provides the initiative 
from a concept through to a concrete 
deliverable as a project with specialist 
technical knowledge by utilising the 
allocated resources within a pre-defined 
timescale. 
 xiv 
Total quality management: A 
management approach to long-term 
success that views continuous 
improvement in all aspects of an 
organisation as a process and not as a 
short-term goal.  
Transferring capability: Capability that 
is transferred from owner’s strategic 
planning towards the project execution. 
This was later developed by the project 
team as a project capabilities to execute 
the intended business goal. It consists of 
different sets of capabilities to suit the 
project scopes and aims. This capability 
is own by the owner and its multi-
organisational supply and operator 
network that need to be integrated 
throughout the project life-cycle. 
 1 
1 Introduction  
1.1 Overview of the thesis  
This thesis presents knowledge on appraising the cost of quality (COQ) allowing an 
understanding of the causes of operational failure in project management (PM). It seeks 
to understand the key elements that contribute to the growth of operational failure and to 
provide an integrated model that can help owners to better manage their multi-
organisational supply and operator network in reducing the COQ. This chapter addresses 
the research scope and problem, research question, research aim and objectives, 
significant contribution to knowledge, research design, research structure and chapters, 
and, finally, the significance of this study. It explains how the research was carried out 
based on the root problems to achieve the underlying aim and objectives.  
1.2 The research problem and need 
The complexity of construction today and the sophisticated demands contribute to the 
pressurised environment that makes it difficult to obtain a successful Total Quality 
Management (TQM). Industries are now seeking a better resolution in regards to the 
failure costs (Krishnan, 2006; Ahsen, 2008; Love & Li, 2000). The exact nature of these 
costs and their root cause are not understood (Miguel & Pontel, 2004). As such, there is 
limited control and management of these costs. The introduction of Cost of Quality 
(COQ) in TQM was first propounded to help many organisations in various sectors to 
better understand the distribution of quality cost in regards to the reduced failure costs 
(Figure 1.1). However, despite the general classification of COQ that is widely used in 
various industries, studies have shown many difficulties in applying COQ (Abdul-
Rahman, 1993; Low & Yeo, 1998; Love & Li, 2000; Hall & Tomkins, 2000; Aoieong et 
al., 2002; Rosenfeld, 2009; Love & Irani, 2002; Jafari & Rodchua; 2014). 
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Figure 1.1: Traditional cost of quality (Adapted from Juran, 1951) 
 The innovation of TQM today has become a challenge to the above traditional 
view of COQ (Basu, 2015). A more dynamic model needs to be integrated (Snieska et al., 
2013) to support the reduction of failure costs. Although there is no doubt various 
applications of the COQ in the construction industry have demonstrated tangible savings 
(Abdul-Rahman et al., 1996; Love & Irani, 2002; Love & Li, 2000) failure cost is still 
highly recurrent (Taggart et al., 2014). COQ is now highly prioritised and is a key part in 
managing business strategy (Tye et al., 2011). Studies show COQ can average 10% - 
12.4% of the total project cost (Rosenfeld, 2009). It is believed that the use of COQ can 
increase profitability by reducing the operating costs incurred from poor-quality 
processes and project failures. Operational failures (failure cost during operational 
performance) are considered as the most significant (Snieska et al., 2013) but were mostly 
found to be hidden in the process (Love et al., 2002). In ISO9000, quality is described as 
a managerial issue that must be embedded in the production process. In this sense, there is 
an increasing necessity to understand the implementation of COQ and to resolve the 
misalignment of incentives that work against the achievement of quality.  
Given the difficulties in quantifying the COQ in construction projects, studies 
show that the implication of quality failure does not only occur at project handover; it has 
further implications throughout the lifecycle of a building (Josephson & Saukkoriipi 
2005; Josephson & Saukkuriipi 2007). The difficulty of quantifying the COQ in a 
construction project may be a challenge but emphasises that the opportunity for saving a 
substantial part of construction quality cost is extremely beneficial. However, this has not 
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been well articulated in how COQ could improve the project performance. Hence, 
sophisticatedly capturing and balancing project quality cost could be more of an 
imperative (Rosenfeld, 2009) with a new integrated and dynamic model (Snieska et al., 
2013) that combines both the project and operation management (Pena-Mora et al., 2008) 
in reducing the quality failure costs. The main importance of appraising COQ is thus to 
see beyond what its capability is in improving quality performance. Organisations must 
see beyond normative tools and techniques, which includes soft-systems approaches. The 
complexity of the multi-organisational supply and operator network in the operational 
environment is seen as the core in supporting the Quality Management System (QMS) of 
measuring COQ and thus reducing failure.  
An organisation must first synchronise its internal departments, if it is to 
implement a successful QMS (Jafari & Rodchua, 2014). There is a need to promote 
quality costing systems in improving the operational performance (Shah, 1999) as a 
quantification to reduce failures (Omar & Murgan, 2014). Currently, the successful 
completion of a construction project is no longer judged simply according to its meeting 
the targeted time and budget; it includes the quality performance after its post-
completion. However, there is little evidence from the literature showing how 
construction projects manage quality within their processes (Delgado-Hernandez & 
Aspinwall, 2008) while many studies have shown the increasing numbers of projects with 
quality failure (Willis and Willis, 1996; Barber et al., 2000; Hwang and Aspinwall, 1996; 
Teo and Love, 2017), and cost overrun and delays (Adam et al., 2017; Invernizzi et al., 
2018). Industries are now seeking a better resolution in regards to failure (Krishanan, 
2006; Ahsen, 2008), specifically in responding to its impact on project operations (Slack, 
2005). The link between cost incurred after the project completion with overall project 
performance in general has not been well understood; with an interchange of 
understanding the causes of failure with defect or rework (Jingmon & Agren, 2015 ; 
Josephson, 1998; Miguel & Pontel, 2004). As such, there is limited control and 
management of these costs of failure.  
Despite the enormous amount of cost in delivering infrastructure development 
projects, surprisingly little systematic and reliable knowledge exists regarding the 
performance of these investments in terms of the actual cost and its operational 
performance. Existing studies of cost, benefit and uncertainty in infrastructure 
developments are few, especially in looking at the operational side of complex 
infrastructure projects. Most large capital projects have failed to live up to expectations, 
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with the majority being abandoned after a few years (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002). Some 
examples of well-known projects that experienced operational failures are Heathrow 
terminal 5 (Caldwell et al., 2009), Berlin Brandenburg airport (Nieto-Rodriguez, 2017) 
and the ‘Millennium Dome’ in London that had to be closed only a year after opening due 
to the failure to sustain the operations (Bourn, 1999). Recently, the industry was alerted 
by the Grenfell tower incident which resulted in many fatalities. An independent report 
by Hackitt (2017) revealed the use of a regulatory fire system does not fit the operational 
purpose. The report stated:  
The primary motivation is to do things as cheaply as possible rather than to 
deliver quality homes which are safe for people... there is a cultural issue across 
the sector which can be described as a race to the bottom caused with through 
ignorance, indifference or because the system does not facilitate good practice. 
There is insufficient focus on delivering the best quality (Hackitt, 2017; p.6) 
All too frequently projects deliver failures in critical operational outcomes, put 
operations at risk, constrain future investments and jeopardise innovation. Without 
knowledge and incentive to change, a project can be expected to have poor-quality 
outcomes (Brookes, 2013); projects are seen as lacking in identifying functional 
requirements, which needs more emphasis in project management. Although construction 
organisations acknowledge that it is essential to deliver high-quality products and 
services, the consequences of failure are growing even more significant in today’s world 
of increasing customer and stakeholder expectations. There are still many quality failures 
that cause damage to reputation (Love et al., 2018) and waste money (Miguel, 2015) in 
construction projects.  
Quality failures at any scale are becoming increasingly unacceptable and there are 
many construction professional membership bodies, such as the Chartered Quality 
Institute (CQI) and Institution of Civil Engineers (ICE); the latter recently formed the 
Infrastructure Client Group (ICG), which is working actively in sharing experts’ 
experience to support and highlight the opportunity for improving the delivery of major 
infrastructure projects. The organisations are strongly promoting optimisation of 
operational effectiveness to avoid the potential catastrophic consequences of getting 
things wrong. Their aims are to articulate a clear vision for quality to sustain the delivery 
of high-quality products and improve the commissioning and delivery of projects. Those 
procuring construction projects are mostly aware of the need to improve. At every level 
of the construction supply network, the prices tendered by companies include allowances 
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for the management, overheads and corrective cost of failures, all of which are avoidable. 
Delivery to time, cost and quality has perhaps remained the mantra of the construction 
industry, although failures post-completion are still highly recurrent (Razak et al., 2016), 
and few studies are focusing on the failure implications (Hall & Tomkins, 2000; Barber et 
al., 2000). 
The construction profession needs to ensure it is capable of avoiding the 
consequences of poor governance, ineffective quality assurance, inertia to change and 
subsequent quality failure. There is an increasing need for improvement and 
transformation in how quality is delivered (Olawale & Sun, 2015); and particularly in 
understanding the magnitude of different factors that cause quality failures (Josephson, 
1998) and of how cost has impacted the delivery of the project based on retrospective 
views (Adam et al., 2017). Studies suggest top management support is the most critical 
success factor for project success (Pinto & Selvin, 1983), and literature highlights the 
need to call for improvement from capable public owners (Adam et al., 2015) and owner 
project capabilities (Winch & Leiringer, 2016) that would help top management to 
support the mitigation of potential failure. This shows that the owner may play a 
significant role in developing a new strategic approach to project and quality management 
to integrate the capabilities in mitigating failures. However, it is neither practical nor 
desirable for top managers to be overly active at the project level in ensuring the quality 
is delivered. Projects may need to get the right input at the right time to prevent quality 
failures but the industry’s commonly understood view of quality is frequently defined by 
the owner and is set at the beginning of the project; thus, projects do not always deliver 
the right quality.  
Capable owners assume projects will integrate with operations. Some place 
significant weight on the capabilities of contractors and suppliers in understanding how 
this is done, but research perhaps shows that the owner’s projects and operational 
capabilities are the key (Davies et al., 2016). Although these capabilities are frequently 
held by their supply network and distributed across an inter-organisational network, they 
need to be simultaneously managed (Davies & Brady, 2016). Recent project studies 
acknowledge that project capabilities are either embedded or unique in an organisation, 
but can be transferred through the project lifecycle of actors participating in delivery of 
the project across the domain of projects and programmes, project-based firms, and 
owner-operator organisations (Winch, 2014). It is agreed that owners can enact project 
and operational capabilities through different cycles of a project to achieve a balance 
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between confirmation of establishing delivery expectations and the negative expectation 
of service outcomes upon project handover (Zerjav et al., 2018). However, although there 
is a great deal of project and operational management literature on capabilities, there is 
currently no research looking at how these capabilities that are distributed within the 
project lifecycle influence the ‘operational delivery’ in reducing quality failure.  
The diversity of capabilities involved within the multi-organisational supply 
network may be another challenge for the owner to undertake effective project-
operational management. Management actions need greater examination at the strategic 
and operational level (Pena-Mora et al., 2008), where the multi-organisational project’s 
operational capability will be embedded through the transmission of resources and people 
(Davies & Brady, 2016). Although the importance of the operation’s strategy and 
capability has been conveyed (Slack, 2005; Hobday et al., 2005), the nature and scope of 
how the owner could mitigate failure have not been widely addressed, whilst capabilities 
theory suggests a strong relationship between project process and operational 
management (Davies & Brady, 2016) and the importance of owning the operational 
capability throughout the project supply network (Thoo et al., 2015). It has been 
explained how knowledge embedded within different projects should provide competitive 
capabilities as part of an organisation’s assets to capture lessons learned (Flynn et al., 
1990; Brady & Davies, 2004) and which are useful for the owner to reduce the failures.  
These forms of capabilities must be advanced if projects are going to deliver 
operational outcomes that do not fail. The application of these capabilities in failure 
mitigation needs further clarification. Therefore, this research seeks to fill the gap in 
quantifying the COQ within complex construction projects to provide a better 
understanding of how the owner could reduce failures. By appraising and understanding 
quality cost failure, owners will learn lessons and be more able to distribute operational 
capabilities across the project supply network.  
1.3 Research questions 
Based on the research problems identified, this section makes explicit the research 
purpose and defines the core aim, objectives and research questions.  
1.3.1  Aim 
The aim of the research is to investigate why assets handed over to owners have failed 
during operation and how the complex interrelationship of an owner and its multi-
organisational supply network members may influence the existence of operational 
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failure and its quality cost, to further develop a new strategic project and quality 
management approach in mitigating failures. 
1.3.2 Objectives and research questions 
In achieving the research aim, the following objectives and research questions (Table 1.1) 
are addressed through this thesis.   
Table 1.1: Research objectives and questions 
Research Objectives Research Questions Supporting 
Evidence/ Chapters 
To explore the existing 
COQ and investigate its 
empirical application within 
an overarching TQM 
system.  
•What is COQ and it’s significant in 
supporting the mitigation of operational 
failure? 
Literature review 
(chapter 2) 
To investigate the status of 
quality cost and the 
occurrence of COQ within 
the construction supply 
network. 
•What are the quality cost elements of 
operational failure in the construction 
industry?  
 
Literature review, 
data collection 
(workshop, 
questionnaire and 
survey) (chapters 2, 4 
& 5)  
To investigate the causes of 
operational failure within 
the owner and its multi-
organisational supply 
network capabilities. 
•What are the causes of operational failure 
and how does the diversity of capability 
influence the occurrences of quality cost at 
operation? 
Literature review, 
data collection 
(interviews, case 
study and workshop) 
(chapters 3, 5 & 6) 
To develop a new strategic 
project and quality 
management approach in 
failure mitigation to 
integrate capabilities 
between the owner, multi-
organisational supply and 
operator network.  
• How can COQ be integrated with project 
management as a new approach to mitigate 
operational failure and reduce quality cost? 
 
Discussion and 
recommendation 
(chapters 7, 8 & 9)  
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1.4 The scope and field of study 
1.4.1 The field of contribution  
As described earlier, there are only limited studies that quantify the COQ within 
construction projects, although many have agreed on the challenges of applying a quality 
cost system to the dynamic nature of the construction project. Research therefore focuses 
on exploring the COQ within the construction industry at the initial stage. The research is 
intent on understanding the empirical application of quality within the complex and 
emerging construction process as a way to reduce failure. However, understanding this 
concept in isolation and within the quality management perspective would not help to 
develop an integrated measure for reducing the failures. The research further investigates 
the causes behind operational failure within a multi-organisational supply network 
capabilities perspective to better understand the relationship of cost incurred and 
operational failure. Although the project management field has defined a lot of sub-fields 
and approaches, none have helped owners, multi-organisational supply and operator 
network to mitigate failure and reduce quality costs. The outcomes of this thesis address 
this gap and contributes to a strategic project and quality management approach to 
address problems in Project-based Organisations (PBOs), project capability and 
operational capability to directly build integrated capabilities in failure mitigation (Figure 
1.2).  
 
Figure 1.2: Thesis field, domains and contribution areas 
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1.4.2 Making a contribution to practice  
The initial consulting phase of this research was supported entirely by the industrial 
research parties who are experiencing operational failure (this includes owner, contractor 
and consultants). The organisations involved in this work are doing so because, primarily, 
they want to understand why COQ is highly recurrent and the reason behind operational 
failure in order to mitigate this failure. The research does not identify exactly the 
technical details behind every operational issue, but focuses on the situations where they 
happen, that are known and to what extent they are influencing the occurrences, and this 
is what helps the author to understand the cause of operational failure. The final output is 
to better understand the root cause of failure within the owner and complex multi-
organisational supply network as the way to improve the distribution of capabilities in 
mitigating operational failures. The research provides a new perspective that combines 
the principles of organisational structure, project quality process and quality performance 
outcomes in developing a strategic project and quality management approach to integrate 
the diversity of capabilities in the complex supply network that will help to mitigate 
failures. 
1.4.3 Complexity inherent in researching failure  
An interpretive approach to project failure helps to reveal the nature of what constitutes 
project performance (Sage et al., 2013) and research shows many interdependencies in 
complex projects have long been associated with failure (Holgeid & Thompson, 2013). 
However, in investigating operational failure, an important issue in the present study is 
the quality culture (Barber et al., 2000), and how the construction environment can be 
adapted to deliver optimal quality (Ethiraj et al., 2005; Castillo et al., 2010; Snieska et al., 
2013) to reduce failure cost. This is because cost is one of the success criteria by which 
the success or failure of a project is judged (Cooke-Davies, 2001) and is also known to be 
an effective tool to help management to visualise and understand the different technical 
languages used in projects (Hwang & Aspinwall 1996). This is why the measurement of 
COQ in the manufacturing industry is well advanced and effective (Tang et al., 2004) but 
the use of COQ in the complex construction environment is still limited (Castillo et al., 
2010). This may be due to many factors, such as ineffective decision-making (Love & 
Irani, 2002), design errors, poor communication, construction deficiencies and 
uncertainty about ground conditions (Love & Li, 2000; Krishnan, 2006; Castilo et al., 
2010, Hwang & Aspinwall, 1996); most of all, it is because each construction project is 
unique.  
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1.4.4 Moving from failure quantification to failure capability qualification   
A vital challenge is the insular way relating to how quality is to be quantified (Love & 
Irani, 2002) that leads to uncoordinated project management (Dale & Plunkett, 1995) in a 
complex environment. Hwang and Aspinwall (1996) stress that the difficulty is due to 
difficulties in collecting time-indexed data during a practical process. Others mention that 
service industries are difficult to define and collect quality cost from, as such industries 
involve human-related interaction that is diverse in nature (Asher, 1990; Asher, 1988) but 
the management of people needs a combination of the ability to manage people capability 
and project and operational capabilities (Bredin, 2008). Consequently, capabilities are 
embedded in an idiosyncratic social structure that is frequently presumed to be 
organisational resource allocation (Schreyögg & Kliesch-Eberl, 2007), but it is still 
difficult to explain the use of heterogeneity in resources and capabilities (Helfat & 
Peteraf, 2003) in mitigating failure. Thus, the identification of social and behavioural 
features of resources and capabilities in relation to failure and quality cost implication 
may be beneficial, as most organisations do not realise that costs of poor quality are 
included in many of construction activities (Josephson & Saukkoriipi, 2003) including the 
resources and capabilities (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003) that are encapsulated within the 
capabilities cycle of a project.  
1.4.5 Operational failure in a broader management of projects environment  
While in project management failure is often assumed to be due to the deficiencies in 
management (Sage et al., 2014), a different theoretical position is required to gain better 
understanding of its causes (Pinto & Mantel, 1990). In the main, construction project 
owners tend to choose the procurement route with which they are familiar, and yet many 
projects suffer with variations in cost affecting one or another actor (Osipova & Eriksson, 
2011). However, the combination of methods in procurement seems to be another 
problem in addressing the quality cost (Al-Tmeemy et al., 2012) that needs managerial 
awareness (Jafari & Rodchua, 2014; Olawale & Sun, 2015). Many have suggested that a 
well-established standard procedure is an important attribute in the cost control system 
(Jafari & Rodcua, 2014; Olawale & Sun, 2015) to overcome the challenge, while others 
believe that a comprehensive model is a necessity in judging the causes of its occurrence 
(Porter & Rayner, 1992, Abdul-Rahman et al., 1996, Low & Yeo, 1998; Yang, 2008; 
Hwang & Aspinwall, 1996), which will help in improving project performance.  
Research on project and project performance management has a long history, but 
there is still a gap within the many project management approaches in understanding 
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project failure, especially as it relates to operations. The interest in the concept of project 
capability development is relatively recent (Ahern et al., 2015). Above all, it is important 
to see how the assembly of project capabilities towards the project’s operational need will 
help owners to better understand the diversity of capabilities in mitigating operational 
failures. Therefore, it is then imperative to advocate a comprehensive study with regard to 
these challenges to establish a new integrated capability model that includes a more 
routinely collaborative environment for COQ as a way to mitigate failures. This thesis is 
thus based on the concept of COQ, appraising the existence of operational failure and its 
quality cost to further understand the causes of operational failure. This concept is then 
further mapped with the emergent findings upon wider project management literature 
and, finally, through understanding the concept of capabilities, the research explores how 
the capabilities concept in the PBO was developed. The outcome of this thesis will 
address this gap and contribute to directly build the strategic project and quality 
management approach in failure mitigation. An integrated approach will be developed 
focusing on how integration of capabilities across owner and multi-organisational supply 
network could be developed to mitigate the occurrence of failure and thus reduce the 
quality failure costs.  
1.5 Thesis structure and research phases  
To begin with, this research aims to understand: (i) how COQ occurs and is absorbed in 
the construction industry; (ii) the causes of operational failures; and (iii) how failures can 
be congenially described and generalised across the complex supply network. To achieve 
these aims and objectives, three research phases will be applied. These are framework 
development, workshop and questionnaire (Phase 1); five project multi-case study using 
interviews, card sorting and a Delphi review with a single expert owner organisation, its 
multi-organisational supply and operator network (Phase 2); and, finally, analysis of data 
and theory building (Phase 3).  
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1.5.1 Thesis structure 
The study comprises nine chapters; the chapter structure is shown in Figure 1.3.  
 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 2 
Quality management, COQ and failure 
literature 
 
Chapter 3 
Project-based, project failure and 
capability literature 
 
 
Chapter 4 Research Design and Methodology 
 
 
Chapter 5 
Understanding COQ 
(Phase 1 – framework development) 
 
 
Chapter 6 
Exploring the operational failures 
(Phase 2 – framework developed) 
 
Chapter 7 
The capabilities cycle 
(Phase 3 – theory building) 
 
 
Chapter 8 
Conclusion and contribution to knowledge 
 
 
Chapter 9 
Recommendations 
 
Figure 1.3: Research structure 
1.5.2 Research Phases  
The three research phases of framework development, developed framework and theory 
building are described in a Research Map (Figure 1.4) and reflect the methodology. They 
are summarised as follows: 
Phase 1 – Literature review, workshop and questionnaire  
The first phase used the COQ literature and empirical analysis to develop a primary 
framework that expands the theory and language of the complex supply network in 
understanding operational failures. This framework development is described in chapters 
1-5 and addresses objectives 1 and 2, which combine the following research questions: 
What is COQ? What are the categories of COQ? How is COQ being applied? Does the 
TQM system support COQ? What is operational failure quality cost? What are the quality 
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cost elements of operational failure in the construction industry? What is the perceptions 
of the project supply and operator network in relation to operational failure and its quality 
costs? 
A literature review was conducted to build up this knowledge and to understand 
the problems. The review begins first with the COQ in the construction industry, focusing 
on the operational failure and its quality cost, then moves on to the area of project 
management, examining collaborative working with practical practices. At this stage, the 
COQ literature is extensive while that on the complex supply network is more modest. 
The first stage involved a critical review in these two fields; workshops and a 
questionnaire were used to support the development of the new COQ framework. The 
COQ model (Chapter 5) developed from the literature and steering group discussion 
shows quality cost elements in each category of Prevention, Appraisal and Failure. This 
model is further defined and categorised in each phase of this study.  
Workshops were conducted within the steering group. This helped to further 
classify the categories, maturity and ownership of each cost element. The result of the 
workshop shows the complexity and interrelation of the supply network with most of the 
cost elements. The insight of this relationship may be dependent on organisation type, 
roles, contract and project-related factors. It highlighted the multi-organisational 
complexity that shows why measurement is hard, understanding is often lost and that 
such costs are today expected overheads. The opportunity for these costs to be the basis 
for supporting long-term relationship building in construction projects is becoming 
apparent. The alternate view – that operational failure quality cost is only born by owners 
– is therefore challenged.  
The questionnaire was constructed to generally understand the maturity of each 
failure quality cost element. It helps to characterises and define the wider industry context 
for comparison with the responses from the case study. Data was collected from a range 
of construction industry stakeholders and experts. The population of this study is 
comprised of professionals working in construction projects in the United Kingdom, 
ranging from operations and asset managers, owner quality directors and managers, 
contractor and consultant project/commercial managers to designers and 
technical/specialist supply network members. Data from the questionnaire will provide 
statistical evidence of relationships (Fellows & Liu, 2012) to determine the direction of 
operational failure and its quality cost element causalities when combined with theory 
and literature.  
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Phase 2 – Five project multi-case study from a single owner 
During this second stage of the study, the author worked closely with a Quality Manager 
to acquire and participate (e.g. through action research) in project data collection. All 
multi-case study was undertaken within the owner organisation’s projects. The 
retrospective research on selected multi-case study helped to investigate the COQ nature 
in the construction industry and to give an insight into the project-specific nature of the 
complexity of the supply network in relation to failure elements (to build an in-depth 
qualitative examination). This provides a comprehensive analysis of how COQ is 
implemented. Thus, the case study included note-taking activities (Taggart, 2014), semi-
structured interviews and workshop discussion. Data was collected from a cross-section 
of project participants to gain understanding and opinions (Fellows & Liu, 2008). All 
activities including informal conversations were summarised and recorded in field notes 
and a research diary.  
The multi-case study provides relevant information in constructing a theory for 
reducing the operational failure quality cost. All samples have been selected based on the 
author’s assumption that they will provide a rich source of information (Gay et al., 2009). 
Taking into consideration the viability of the case, earlier informal interviews (through 
pilot studies) that were conducted with key participants in the owner organisation 
demonstrated participants’ willingness to share experience and knowledge of the COQ 
phenomenon. This supports full understanding and commitment. In qualitative research, 
the case study data will be collected to answer ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions (Gay et al., 
2009) where qualitative data can be difficult and laborious to analyse and must be 
systematically handled (Fellows & Liu, 2008). Therefore, during this stage, definition and 
selection of cases and units of analysis will be fully justified (Yin, 2003). However, the 
concept and content including level of analysis will emerge during the last phase of the 
research. 
Phase 3 – Analysis of data and theory building 
Further qualitative data analysis took into consideration the complex nature of the case 
study interviews. A flexible design approach has been selected to manage the data. The 
author rigorously examined both the qualitative and quantitative data and adhered it to the 
grounded theory methodology. The method involves ‘assessment from experiences’ and 
‘the use of calculations’ (Olawale & Sun, 2015). In analysing multi-case study, cross-site 
analysis will be used (Gay et al., 2009). Through the thematic analysis method, a series of 
coding is used to analyse and interpret interview transcripts for all participants. The 
 15 
importance in conducting this kind of cross-case synthesis is that it relies strongly on 
argumentative interpretations (Boblin et al., 2013). The quantitative medium of the case 
study strengthened the breadth of the data and analysis.  
The contribution to knowledge is stated in this final phase. The distribution of 
capabilities influence on operational failure within the capabilities cycle is addressed to 
develop a strategic project and quality management approach in failure mitigation. 
Integration across the owner’s strategic requirement, technical project delivery and 
functional operations management capabilities is proposed for the owner, its multi-
organisational supply and operator network to mitigate failure and reduce quality cost. 
Figure 1.4 shows the research map of the study and thesis, which is used at the beginning 
of each chapter as a signpost to guide the reader.  
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1.6 Academic significance and value 
1.6.1 Project management and the application of COQ 
This study searches for capabilities held by owners, tier 1 contractors and suppliers on 
how to mitigate failure. While the measurement of COQ has been explored in the 
construction sector, its application within complex project environments and across 
supply and project management capabilities has not. The importance of quantifying COQ 
is known (Juran, 1951), but the required sophistication in measurement (Branca & Lopes, 
2011) has often created drawbacks that have led to criticism (Schiffauerova & Thomson, 
2006), and questions on the applicability of COQ to the construction industry (Abdul-
Rahman et al., 1996; Barber et al, 2000; Love & Li, 2000; Love & Irani, 2002; Yang, 
2008; Schiffauerova & Thomson, 2006; Jafari & Rodchua, 2014). COQ failure has yet to 
be quantified in the construction industry. Schiffauerova and Thomson (2006) stressed 
the importance of an improved model for a project management context. Currently, no 
empirical work exists that focus on operation. Previous studies show only partial work in 
addressing COQ without transmitting its causes and the influence of a complex project 
supply network on operational failure. Many have considered a single project, but none 
have looked at the capabilities employed by an owner across a number of projects. 
Measurement by way of an organisational performance excellence model has been 
the current focus (Miguel, 2015), but this has not defined the complex array of owner 
capability for failure mitigation needed in managing the supply network of a multi-project 
network. Some have identified the need for a robust quality management system, 
management structures and tools (Barlow, 2009), but these need elaborating to ensure 
quality in a project-based context (e.g. contractor quality performance) and beyond that to 
ensure the delivery of operational quality and thus owner satisfaction (Yasamis et al., 
2002; Basu, 2015). This study will show how owner organisations deploy COQ 
measurement capabilities alongside traditional project management approaches to better 
ensure that they can prevent and mitigate the operational failure. In so doing, it will 
explore new and inventive ways of promoting COQ quantification (Barlow, 2009) and 
provide better understanding of its concept, system, tools and culture to suit the 
construction environment (Rosenfeld, 2009), and, more specifically, a single capable 
owner with a complex multi-project environment. Thus, the academic significance of this 
study is in defining and characterising the capabilities for failure mitigation typified by a 
large-scale project-supporting organisation and its project-based supply network.  
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1.6.2 The existing COQ and its relationship to operational failure quality cost  
In the current absence of a comprehensive COQ framework in the construction industry 
(Hall & Tomkins, 2000; Schiffauerova & Thomson, 2006; Jafari & Rodchua, 2014), the 
development of a reflective framework of an improved COQ approach is believed to be a 
basis in further appraising the occurrences of failures in construction projects. It combines 
principles, process, a framework and structured methods, as suggested by Schiffauerova 
and Thomson (2006), and uses a focus on failure cost as the test case to understand the 
implementing of COQ (as operational failure is the highest contributor when ignored, 
according to Ahsen (2008) and Lari and Asllani (2013) and to see the causes of the 
occurrences of quality failures; and so provides the greatest opportunity for efficiency 
improvement, according to Miguel and Pontel (2004). At the beginning of the research, 
this COQ framework is used to understand the relationship of the costs incurred within 
the project organisation and will be extended into the values, systems and culture of the 
business environment that link COQ elements and multi-organisational supply network in 
PBO and the occurrences of operational failures (Figure 1.5). The use of the COQ 
framework is then further developed during the research process in further developing the 
understanding in a project management context. The future COQ framework (resulting 
from this work) will then support dynamic decision-making towards the integrated 
capabilities by the owner, multi-organisational supply and operator network in mitigating 
failures.  
 
Figure 1.5: COQ links towards project-based organisations and operational failure 
(Source: Author’s own) 
COQ
elements
Project-
based 
organisation
Operational 
failures
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The COQ incurred within each operational failure is believed to be linked with 
how project-based organisations are managed. Dahlgaard et al. (1992) have highlighted 
the importance of quality measurement, as a continuous improvement to diminish failures 
(Taggart, 2014). Quality costs exist in any type of organisation, regardless of function 
(Özkan & Karaibrahimoğlu, 2013), although ineffective and unsystematic capture 
throughout the whole construction process is seen as problematic (Miguel & Pontel, 
2004). Each failure may be quite different from one to another, and so the causes of 
project failure may be contingent on the project lifecycle (Pinto & Mantel, 1990). 
Therefore, project management literature has suggested the need for a better 
understanding of the organisational structure and project-based management in managing 
capabilities (Söderlund & Tell, 2011) and the quantification of quality cost (Hall & 
Tomkins, 2000).  
Currently, quality management systems (BS EN ISO 9000: 2000) mostly 
corresponded to the processes of creating the product (Lari & Asllani, 2013). However, 
today the complexity of the construction industry is creating deviation, and highlighting 
the inadequacy of this partial view. Quality in product and services, after delivery to 
owner (Feigenbaum, 1956), has had little attention; neither has the complexity of the 
multiple supply network capabilities involved in complex infrastructure projects. 
Focusing on failure through quantifying its cost could demonstrate the root cause of its 
occurrence and create solutions to the intangibility of its high occurrences. Taggart (2014) 
indicates that supply network participants can help identify the root causes and could 
suggest possible cost-effective solutions. It is believed that operational failure quality 
costs are incurred during and after the operational process that is shared within the supply 
network. This is, however, yet to be explored and explained. In most cases, a quality 
standard (British Standards Institution ISO 9001, 2000) helps in determining the 
improvement effort but little attention is paid to its impact on failure costs (Dror, 2010).  
No mechanism has been found to be effective (Miguel & Pontel, 2004), while most 
studies only indicate that basic guidelines are needed for control over failure cost (Dror, 
2010; Snieska et al., 2013) and none have explored the supply network relationship in 
achieving cost reduction in existing COQ. This complexity further generates uncertainty 
and ambiguity. It is therefore necessary that an evaluation of these quality costs should be 
initiated with the identification of potential failure and causes embedded within the 
organisational capabilities of the project lifecycle. By far, it is acknowledged that the 
quantification of failure cost is frequently used to transfer the effects of poor quality into 
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monetary terms (Hwang & Aspinwall, 1996); this should be used to assist owner 
management in preventing future potential failure. The result of this study could have a 
considerable impact on mitigating failure in complex projects.  
1.7 Significance and relevance of this study (the practicability of the 
research) 
1.7.1 Why quantifying COQ failure is important to mitigate failure in project 
management enterprises 
There are strong relationships in the organisational supply network, the culture, the 
operations process and the failure cost. Therefore, these relationships will be sought to 
enrich the boundary of existing knowledge to achieve a fair distribution of capabilities 
that includes quality culture in mitigating failure and thus reducing failure cost. 
Understanding the project management enterprises may be important in explaining the 
uniqueness of project failure, project environments, project supply network and form of 
contract, but it is also important to understand the existing application of COQ in order to 
create improvement as a way to mitigate failure. The lack of an integrated approach in 
understanding COQ is perceived as a challenge for reducing the failure costs. As 
suggested by Love and Josephson (2004), knowledge about the causes is needed to 
reduce construction errors, and this can only be achieved by examining the chain of 
events and its relation to costs. However, project management practice is still lacking 
when it comes to using costing to support wider decision making (Ludvig & Gluch, 2010) 
that will support the change and willingness of construction participants to take 
comprehensive responsibility.  
Measuring COQ shows the financial consequences of adopting a quality 
improvement programme (Omar & Murgan, 2014), and creates a healthy business 
environment (Jaju et al., 2009) that leads to lower costs, less failure, and better use of 
time and material resources. Some suggest that a traditional accounting system approach 
may no longer be adequate (Omar & Murgan, 2014). This research will provide valuable 
insights into the behaviour of the different components that constitute the existing 
approach to COQ in mitigating failures. The occurrences of operational failure quality 
cost will be explored through understanding the maturity and awareness of the 
construction supply network in dealing with the quality cost elements. This study will 
further elaborate on the causality of COQ application within the organisation’s 
managerial and project team by looking into their projects.   
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Quantifying COQ will help organisations to quantify and minimise internal losses 
(Snieska et al., 2013) that contribute to unsustainable performance (Isaksson, 2006), and 
indicate where high COQ measure might show low quality and profitability (Zairi, 2002). 
Systematic visualisation through this study will help the attainment of sustainable quality 
programme implementation (Krishnan, 2006; Jaju et al., 2009), and provide a reliable 
process by which to portray intangible and complex data that can respond to rapid 
technological and market change (Jafari & Rodchua, 2014, Al-Tmeemy et al., 2012). 
Dynamic measurement will support cycles of change in quality, which are never-ending 
(Juran & De Feo, 2010), and provide a balance between efficiency, economy and quality 
of the product and production (Borri & Boccaletti, 2006). From a philosophical 
perspective, COQ categories of prevention, appraisal and failure are intimately connected 
and a full understanding of one category cannot be achieved without taking the other 
category into account. As explained by Love and Li (2000), processes improve over time; 
prevention cost is expected to rise at the beginning of the project and thus reduce the 
appraisal and failure cost during construction.  
For a wider adoption of an advanced project management approach, this research 
looks at the operational side of construction projects. It is suggested that there is an 
advantage in linking the financial performance to show the direction for action and results 
(Ludvig & Gluch, 2010). By looking at the adaptation, coordination and alignment that 
emerge around the operational side of a construction project, this will help to accrue the 
value for the project user and operator (Zerjav et al., 2018). Continuous investment is 
needed to build new resource configurations, and to respond and adapt capabilities to the 
external environment. Comparatively little attention has been devoted to how distribution 
of capabilities will impact project operational failure in managing complex projects. A 
study by Davies and Brady (2016) acknowledged the importance of owner requirements 
and capabilities integration role. This is because project participants are often focused on 
their own interests and on managing their own project risks, rather than on the operational 
realisation of the owner’s objectives (Hughes & Murdoch, 2001). This can lead to the 
misalignment of project capabilities that increases the risk of operational quality failures.  
In achieving an innovative project, capabilities need a continuous routine that is 
shaped and adapted differently by different organisations (Flynn et al., 2010) to response 
to the operational advantage. Currently, the owner’s capability role is unclear, particularly 
as suppliers move to operate and maintain facilities (Davies et al., 2016); thus, the 
balance between owner and supplier operational capabilities needs further investigation. 
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First understanding the quantification of COQ failure could help provide a greater 
understanding of the linkage of cost incurred, responsible parties and the chain that 
constitute the event. In this way, operational failure can be better understood, to enable 
stronger project management to provide a high-quality performance in developing the 
integrated capabilities for failure mitigation. 
1.8 Chapter summary  
This chapter has introduced the aim, objectives, research questions and significance of the 
research. The following chapters first review the COQ literature before generating a new 
COQ framework as a base to further clarify its relation to operational failures, which in 
later chapters is applied within the context of project management.  
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2 Cost of Quality (COQ)  
2.1 Introduction   
This chapter discusses how COQ is being developed as a quality management tool and 
how it contributes to an organisation’s overall performance. It also looks at many other 
imperative elements of COQ, the history, the different categorisations, the fundamental of 
its application and finally its relation to failures. The range of COQ is also explained to 
provide an overview of how COQ has impacted construction projects. This chapter also 
focuses on the COQ failure in construction projects, and the impact as well as the causes 
of failures in construction.  
2.2 The COQ background 
During the past few decades, the poor performance and lack of productivity of the 
construction industry have been heavily criticised (Love & Irani, 2002). Many of the 
management practices in supporting construction organisations have been challenged. 
Owners in the industry are moving forwards with the increased demand for improving 
service quality, faster building and innovations in technology (Hoonakker et al., 2010). 
Many organisations have started to fully implement quality management to achieve 
continuous improvement and owner satisfaction. In the United Kingdom (UK), all 
government suppliers are mandated to perform quality management in the form of 
ISO9000 (Thorpe et al., 2004), with more than 20,000 companies certified (McGeorge & 
Palmer, 2002). However, although the application of quality management is now 
acknowledged, the capital expenditure of poor-quality projects or savings from good-
quality ones have been ignored by the industry. Advanced quality management has now 
increased the need to achieve the balance between the level of end-product quality and its 
concomitant expenses (Jafari & Rodchua, 2014). A lack of appreciation for a different 
perspective on quality may be the most limiting factor in improving the quality, but there 
is also a lack of attention paid to the unknown and unquantifiable COQ in construction 
projects. Aoieong et al. (2002) stated that, to quantify the benefits of quality management, 
quality must be measureable.  
Many studies have looked to improve quality in construction, but there are 
remarkably few that have quantified the COQ. This is surprising when the quality-related 
cost is substantial and cannot be ignored (Jafari & Rodchua, 2014; Yang, 2008). 
According to Aoieong et al. (2002), various tools for measuring COQ have been 
introduced since its introduction by Crosby (1984) and Juran (1989), but most of the 
implications of measuring the real COQ within construction organisations are doubtful. 
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Due to the success of implementing COQ in the manufacturing industry, some authors 
have emphasised the need for it to be applied in the construction industry (Aoieong et al., 
2002). However, most of the literature concludes that construction is different and that it 
is difficult to translate the principles, practice and techniques of COQ to make them 
specific to the construction industry (Jafari & Rodchua, 2014). There is no 
comprehensive system in the construction industry in defining, collecting and analysing 
COQ. Subsequently, most construction companies measure quality costs based on their 
own quality costing programme (Hwang & Aspinwall, 1996). 
Despite the benefits and substantial amount of research found in addressing COQ, 
construction quality failures are still a concern, with no methodology allowing calculation 
of all failure costs that are incurred post-project (Snieska et al., 2013). Currently, failure 
costs are highly recurrent, with limited studies addressing failure costs in relations to 
quality of the process (Castillo et al., 2010). It is agreed that failure cost may arise due to 
many factors along the project lifecycle that need advanced understanding. These are 
mainly addressed as a management problem by Castillo et al. (2010), but further 
exploration of the links is required, particularly on COQ application, measurement and 
the causality behind its existence. In doing so, this chapter will first theoretically explore 
the development of quality management and the role of COQ in supporting the quality 
systems that further led to the focus on failures.    
2.3  Understanding quality  
2.3.1 What is quality? 
Simply defined in the Oxford Dictionary, quality is “the standard of something measured 
against other things of similar kind; the degree of excellence of something”. It is often 
used to signify ‘excellence’ of products or services, but quality may also include human 
factors. From the management perspective, quality is simply defined as ‘meeting the 
customer requirement’ – the need and the expectations (Oakland, 2003). Thus, in 
construction projects, ‘quality’ has been expressed differently by different parties 
depending on one’s perspective. Consequently, the construction industry has continually 
struggled with the term quality, with many organisations devising their own definition. 
Accordingly, in construction, quality should be defined as the “degree to which a set of 
inherent characteristics fulfils requirements” (ISO 9000:2000 Quality Management 
Systems in Hoyle & Thompson, 2002), which is set differently in every element on a 
project. With this definition, there is a need to integrate different quality meanings by 
different organisations in different projects.  
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2.4 Quality management (QM) and total quality management (TQM) 
2.4.1 From QM to TQM in construction  
The adoption of QM in construction projects is important for an organisation in 
determining the standards needed for a project. Oakland and Marosszeky (2006) describe 
QM as a strategic decision where the objectives set out in the implementation of the 
quality policy are to be accomplished by the organisation. QM is thus to understand and 
organise all the suppliers of products or services according to the quality need of the 
owner. It is frequently adopted by construction companies as an initiative to solve quality 
problems in meeting the required needs (Kanji & Wong, 1999) and also to maintain or 
improve the quality of an organisation’s products and services (Dahlgaard et al., 1992).   
In QM, International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) standards and control 
procedures are essential in meeting the quality requirements, which includes 
environmental and safety management (Hoonakker et al., 2010). The overall investments 
in QM in an organisation should increase the performance of the overall organisation 
rather than – as is traditional – focusing only on the project level (Landin & Nilsson, 
2001). Deming (1986) long ago introduced the concept of continuous quality 
improvement known as ‘The Deming Cycle’ Plan-Do-Check- Act (PDCA) to help focus 
the company’s attention and resources on continually meeting the owner’s needs. 
Deming’s main concept is to reduce variability in achieving conformance to 
specifications, which requires higher quality and productivity in reducing cost, as a result 
of competitive advantage.  
Conversely, in construction projects, the supply network procures materials and 
services from different professions which are brought together at various points of a 
project to fulfil the customer’s requirements. This raises different problems where every 
decision affects the other (Delgado-Hernandez & Aspinwall, 2008). In addition, the 
nature of construction projects (Walker, 2000) can adversely impact the quality and 
customer satisfaction; such as site conditions, weather and project time, different teams 
and organisations, and different arrangements for each project. Due to this variability, as 
Vrijhoef and Koskela (2000) explained, apart from quality problems, the industry faces 
many performance difficulties. In responses to this, the use of TQM has been suggested 
by numerous literatures as a method of management that responds to competitive 
advantage not only in reducing the cost but also as a comprehensive way to improve total 
organisation performance and quality performance (Yasamis et al., 2002). It is believed 
the application of TQM can only thrive through strong support from the top management 
 27 
with commitment and understanding (Arditi & Gunaydin, 1997) as it may be affected by 
different elements, as shown in Figure 2.1.  
 
Figure 2.1: Elements of TQM in the construction scope (Adapted from: Arditi & 
Gunaydin, 1997)  
Therefore, the TQM approach has been increasingly introduced into construction 
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tolerance levels are rejected’; which requires constant questions to be asked about the 
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Clearly, applying ‘quality’ in construction is extremely difficult and potentially 
needs multiple meanings for terms that can be applied to various aspects of the 
construction process. Yasamis et al. (2002) stated that quality-conscious companies 
normally have a strong quality culture, which is helpful for achieving owner satisfaction, 
while Hoonakker et al. (2010) showed that the overall motivation for implementing TQM 
has remained static over recent years. The classic TQM literature in Eskildsen and 
Dahlgaard (2000) stated that, according to Deming (1986) and Juran (1989), employee 
involvement and satisfaction are stressed as the most important drivers of continuous 
improvement and owner satisfaction. With this, construction organisations have now 
moved from a closed system of looking at what QM is within their own organisation to a 
more open system of linking QM to the practicality of quality in project management. 
This includes a careful balance between the owner’s requirements of project costs and 
schedule, desire operating characteristics and construction materials, and the designer’s 
need for adequate time and budget to meet those requirements during the design process 
(Stewart & Waddell, 2008). 
This perspective has led to the need of a wider management approach in looking at 
‘quality’ as central to the owner’s value, contributing to loyalty, profitability and 
differentiation (Branca & Catalão-Lopes, 2011). Therefore, an organisation should be 
concerned about the level of quality provided to the market, which would probably be the 
‘project’ in the construction perspective. As quality is known to carry benefits, involved 
costs and any other influence on management decision, the TQM practice is believed to 
have a strong and positive relationship with quality performance (Hassan et al., 2012). 
The quality literature has shown that quality must be measured and evaluated (Love et al., 
2018). Based on this, researchers have argued that, in a complex and broad environment, 
there is a need for more competitive tools to enhance TQM application in the construction 
industry (Aoieong et al., 2002; Thorpe & Sumner, 2004). The complexity of the interplay 
between the nature of the construction project and its lifecycle needs further 
understanding as to how quality could be successfully embedded in managing projects.  
2.5 Cost of quality (COQ) as a quality management system   
2.5.1 What is COQ? 
The concept of COQ was first introduced in Juran’s quality control handbook as “gold in 
the mine” (Juran, 1951, p.34) as a part of the fundamental quality management process. 
COQ was implied as the cost resulting from defects and was a ‘gold mine’ in which 
profits could be made. COQ then was well known as the price of not creating a quality 
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product or service. According to Krishnan et al. (2000), quality costs are the costs 
incurred to prevent a shortfall in quality and failure to meet customer requirements. COQ 
is simply a cost absorbed due to the work require in achieving targeted quality in a 
project; it is either the cost to achieve the quality or a cost due to quality failure (Hwang 
& Aspinwall, 1996). Many authors have attempted to define COQ, with one definition 
being the ‘cost of poor quality’ (Ali et al., 2010). It is said to be the cost associated with 
preventing, finding and correcting defective works (Mukhopadhyay, 2004). It has also 
been summarised as a classification of cost collected in quantifying a quality in a project 
(Barber et al., 2000; Ali et al., 2010; Love & Irani, 2002) 
2.5.2 The early classification of COQ 
As mentioned earlier, the term quality cost was first propounded by Juran (1951) and later 
developed by Crosby (1979, 1984), where quality was first known as the conformance 
with the requirements, but it was Crosby (1979) who elaborated on quality cost to see it 
as both the price of conformance (cost invested to comply with requirements) and the 
price of non-conformance (cost of poor quality). Feigenbaum (1991) later redefined these 
categorisations as the cost of control (cost of conformance) and cost of failure of controls 
(cost of non-conformance) (see Figure 2.2). According to Schiffauerova and Thomson 
(2006), the cost of conformance includes cost invested in the process of preventing and 
appraising the quality, while cost of non-conformance is additionally a cost due to failure 
in achieving customer requirements (such as correcting, reworking or scrapping). All 
costs are simply costs that are avoidable, if quality costs are effectively managed (Al-
Tmeemy et al., 2012). Further, Ali et al. (2010) differentiated between internal failure 
quality cost (cost incurred before delivery to owner) and operational failure quality cost 
(after delivery to owner). 
 
Figure 2.2: The early classification of COQ (Source: Author’s own) 
Consequently, COQ has previously been consistently classified into three main 
categories: prevention, appraisal and failure (Feigenbaum, 1956), according to the timing 
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of its occurrence. This categorisation is better known as the ‘Prevention-Appraisal- 
Failure’ (PAF) model by most of the quality-related cost researchers (Abdul-Rahman et 
al., 1996; Low & Yeo, 1998; Love & Li, 2000; Hall & Tomkins, 2000; Aoieong et al., 
2002; Rosenfeld, 2009; Love & Irani, 2002; Jafari & Rodchua; 2014). As explained in Ali 
et al. (2010), prevention costs are associated with the costs expended in provision of the 
process of gaining quality; appraisal costs, on the other hand, are the costs expended in 
measuring the level of quality attained by the process; while failure cost is the cost 
incurred to correct quality issues either before or after delivery. Further, internal failure 
costs are costs resulting from products or services not conforming to requirements or need 
which occurred prior to delivery to the owner, while operational failure quality costs are 
costs resulting from products or services not conforming to requirements or need after 
delivery to the owner, and during or after furnishing of a service to the owner (Kiani et 
al., 2014). Operational failure quality cost can also include loss of failure through 
customer dissatisfaction (Tsai, 1998; Kazaz et al., 2005), in which is recognised as 
operational failure quality cost in this thesis. 
Despite the implementation of a general classifications model of COQ, some 
authors have expressed scepticism as to the overall coverage of this traditional 
categorisation (Yang, 2008; Dahlgaard et al., 1992), with those such as Yang (2008) and 
Krishnan (2006) referring to failure category as the ‘hidden’ nature of failure costs that 
frequently difficult to identify. Although there are sceptics in confirming these 
classifications, no better alternatives have yet been found. While the quantification of 
COQ will almost certainly help to benchmark and show the causality between costs 
incurred, it is believed that the increased and controlled cost of prevention and appraisal 
will lead to a decrease in internal and operational failure quality costs (Kiani et al., 2014). 
Thus, the central tenant of the P-A-F model is an investment in prevention and appraisal 
activities which will reduce failure costs, and further investments in prevention activities 
thus resulting in a reduction of appraisal cost (Roden & Dale, 2001). However, this needs 
better confirmation on how different costs are classified, defined and measured according 
to the nature of complex projects that involve multi-organisational networks to reduce the 
failure costs.  
2.5.3 The different earliest COQ models 
From the initial classification of COQ, several models were developed by some of the 
earliest research on COQ; and it was initially developed widely in five categories, which 
are: prevention-appraisal-failure (PAF), process cost, cost-benefit, Taguchi loss function 
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and activity-based costing (ABC). COQ models are frequently initiated to deliver the 
quality dimensions in dealing with deficiencies of production processes (Freiesleben & 
Freiesleben, 2005) and to depict the development of the total COQ for a change in quality 
level. These models were developed as part of an initiative to establish quality and to 
capture the range of quality costs. Table 2.1 below shows different classifications of 
COQ.  
Table 2.1: Generic earliest cost of quality models 
COQ models Concepts  Authors  
PAF Capturing prevention, appraisal and failure 
costs 
Juran (1952), Feigenbaum 
(1956) and Masser (1975)  
Process cost Price of conformance and non-conformance Crosby (1979, 1984) 
Cost-benefit Dynamic system based on individual quality 
product 
Porter and Rayner (1992) 
Taguchi loss 
function 
External quality losses into a loss function base Taguchi (1987) 
ABC  Value added + non-value added with a two-
stage methodology: assigns activity resources 
and different cost driver for each activity. 
Cooper and Kaplan (1988)  
 
Accordingly, the first concept of quality costing as described in section 2.5.2, the 
economics of quality and the graphical form of the COQ model developed by Joseph 
Juran (1951), was well accepted by many. This was later classified as the PAF model 
(Feigenbaum, 1956) as an approach to quality costing that was almost universally 
accepted (Plunkett & Dale, 1987), in which all the categories are linked. The second 
model is a process cost model which was originally developed by Crosby (1979, 1984) 
and has a similar classification to the PAF model (Schiffauerova & Thomson, 2006). The 
process cost model groups quality cost into price of conformance (POC) and price of non-
conformance to quality (PONC). Crosby (1984) described POC as necessary spending to 
make things right; this includes professional quality functions (e.g. prevention efforts, 
quality education and training, and procedure or product confirmations), while PONC is 
described as all the expenses involved in doing things inaccurately, which includes all 
costs incurred due to not getting the quality right the first time (e.g., rework, warranties 
and other claims). Despite the existence of these two models, Taguchi (1987) developed 
the Taguchi loss function method model, which was based on his own industrial 
experiences (Hwang & Aspinwall, 1996). This model combines the experimental design 
techniques with quality loss considerations, which is the conventional approach in off-
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line quality control (Tang et al., 2004). However, this model has not been widely used in 
the construction industry. Not much research was found clarifying the success of this 
model; only a few studies have been conducted testing the model in manufacturing 
industries and none have been performed in the construction industry.  
Further to this, Porter and Rayner (1992) suggested a simple cost-benefit model to 
monitor the effect of Total Quality Management (TQM) without reflecting the dynamics 
of the quality activities. A simulation model has been developed over time with system 
dynamics in specifying different costs and benefits relating to prevented activities. The 
dynamic flow system has been developed with the inclusion of complaints and 
managerial pressure in measuring quality costs (Hwang & Aspinwall, 1996). 
Additionally, an activity-based costing (ABC) model was initially developed by Cooper 
and Kaplan (1992) and may be a better solution in providing an accurate way of 
calculating product costs. However, Schiffauerova and Thomson (2006) mentioned that 
an activity-based costing model is not a cost of quality model; it is an alternative 
approach that can be used in identifying, quantifying and allocating the quality cost 
throughout the product, in which it helps to manage quality more effectively by collecting 
accurate data on various cost objects. The activity-based costing traces both individual 
cost activities and the total cost of activities in producing the object, which is the process 
(Schiffauerova & Thomson, 2006).  
Specific model has not been recognised and developed as a successful model for 
the COQ specifically in the construction industry. Some models may have focused on 
quality-related activities fundamentality as a part of quality cost, but not all have 
considered the interrelated activities within the construction process. A review by Jafari 
and Rodchua (2014) showed that variations of quality systems have also been developed 
in recent years, but they are neither popular nor widely used. An organisation may 
develop and adopt its own classifications of quality costing due to limitations in existing 
systems or for practical reasons. The different sets of models as elaborated above are seen 
as the complexity in manging and capturing COQ, which comprises different individual 
or professional groups’ perceptions in defining their ‘compliance or conformance’ to 
quality. This may be more difficult in construction projects that involve different units of 
organisation, in which construction projects may well include other institutional 
influences that will form the whole project climate. It is worth highlighting the different 
methodologies for classifying and capturing quality cost, as it shows the non-existence of 
a single reliable model to quantify the total COQ in construction. However, in referring to 
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the most sustainable concept in the COQ literature, the concept of PAF will be used to 
facilitate the flexibility of quantifying the diversity of quality elements in construction as 
well as representing the most suitable model in appraising the COQ within this research.  
2.5.4 The fundamental nature of cost of quality  
Today’s competitive market is driving the necessity to understand COQ to achieve a 
balance between quality and costs in construction projects (Yang, 2008). Traditional 
literature shows that quality may affect an industrial organisation’s economy in two ways: 
the effect on costs (quality is used mainly in the sense of conformance to specification) 
and the effect on incomes (quality is used mainly in the sense of fitness for use) (Juran, 
1951). Given this, the fundamental nature of quality may not be achievable without the 
consequences of cost in managing projects. Fundamentally, the concepts of COQ and 
total cost of quality have become the most powerful management tools for the 
measurement of quality performance (Tye et al., 2011). A COQ measure is used not only 
to acquire the highest quality but to provide cost diminution in achieving quality 
performance. COQ has now been widely accepted in many organisations and has largely 
become a priority for top management in managing business strategy (Tye et al., 2011).  
COQ is frequently used to transfer the effects of poor quality into a monetary term 
that can be visualised and assist the management and employees to have an awareness of 
how costs are incurred (Hwang & Aspinwall, 1996). This could help in monitoring 
project flow together with the cost monitor as an assessment of project management. 
Porter and Rayner (1992) described the application of COQ as providing information for 
continual improvement and eliminating waste. They described that quality costing 
analysis information in an organisation’s management quantified the non-value adding 
activities and ascertained the activities that needed to be improved, in order to reduce or 
eliminate reworking. Additionally, the use of COQ measures by the quality professionals 
in an organisation provides data upon completion of their quality assessment and cost 
quantification (Roden & Dale, 2001). By focusing on poor performance areas, corrective 
action can be taken to prevent failure costs emerging (Jafari & Rodchua, 2014).  
 Love and Li (2000) showed that a lack of quality focus during construction affects 
the project performance and results in operational failures during production. Ineffective 
and unsystematic capture of quality cost also leads to time and costs overruns in 
construction projects (Love et al., 2002). Therefore, quality costing is essential in gaining 
management commitment to prepare for quality management initiatives that will act as a 
tool to highlight areas for improvement and to provide an estimate of the potential 
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benefits to be gained through quality improvement (Porter & Rayner, 1992). This 
recognises the dynamic development of quality improvement plans in guiding the 
elements that make up the process of institutional construction organisation projects. In 
this sense, capturing and understanding COQ based on the project cycle is believed to 
better suit and complement the argument about difficulties and non-standardisation of the 
evolutionary dynamic nature of construction projects.  
Substantially, every segment of the construction industry could benefit from 
quantitative analysis of quality-related efforts that is moreover vital in determining the 
overall COQ in design and construction. Jafari and Rodchua (2014) listed the benefits of 
the implementation of quality costing as derived from various authors, as shown in Table 
2.2 below.   
Table 2.2: The benefits of implementing quality cost 
Benefits Authors 
 It could be used as a means for providing estimates of the 
potential benefits to be gained through quality improvement. 
 
Porter and Rayner (1992) 
It could also help project the monetary benefits and 
ramifications of the proposed changes. 
 
Sirvastava (2008) 
It helps evaluate quality programme success and points to the 
strengths and weaknesses of a quality system.    
Johnson(1995); Sirvastava 
(2008) 
It alerts management about the potential impact of poor quality 
on the financial performance of the company. 
Aoieong et al. (2002) 
It helps organisations to determine where quality costs have 
been incurred and where problems exist, and serves as well as 
a tool for focusing on areas of poor performance in need of 
improvement. 
Johnson (1995); Yang (2008) 
It provides corrective action to prevent the occurrence of non-
conformances. 
 
Aoieong et al., (2002); 
Johnson (1995); Love and Li 
(2000) 
It helps identify and eliminate organisational activities that do 
not provide or enhance quality, and helps management to 
determine the types of activities that are more beneficial for 
reducing quality costs. 
Abdelsalam & Gad (2009); 
Tye et al. (2011); Aoieong et 
al. (2002) 
It transfers lessons learned to other areas. Love and Li (2000) 
It focuses attention on the origin of failures and their costs, 
making those responsible aware of and accountable for 
incurring such costs, thus helping them to become more 
efficient in their jobs. 
Johnson (1995); Plunkett and 
Dale (1998) 
It helps to reduce reworks and thus reduces claims.  Hoonakker et al. (2010) 
It motivates employees to work towards pursuing quality goals  Tye et al. (2011) 
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Thus, the absence of such COQ systems may cause many organisations to develop 
insular ways to gain control over their own area of improvements, as a result of time and 
cost overruns in construction projects (Love & Irani, 2002). COQ is considered to be a 
process of activity that includes information gathering, reporting, and coordinating design 
and key information, which is to manage the transformation of inputs to outputs (Aoieong 
et al., 2002). This ultimately assists an organisation to function effectively, either within 
its individual process or with its interaction with other processes. Thus, it clearly shows 
that QM efforts, if expended by construction organisations, will have a significant effect 
in reducing COQ in all aspects of the construction process (Barlow, 2009).  
2.5.5 The development of quality costing systems in construction environments 
The development of an adequate quality cost collection and measurement system is 
central to the establishment of a quality cost system. Many previous studies have been 
centred on the manufacturing industries rather than the construction industry; however, 
the application of COQ in the construction industry has recently received much attention 
(Tang et al., 2004). Quality costing management systems have also been developed and 
implemented to determine quality costs (Love & Irani, 2002) that are transferable within 
the same industry (Hwang & Aspinwall, 1996), but organisations should create a unique 
quality cost of projects for a project that could also be useful for future projects. 
However, although some agree that common structures and measures almost certainly 
exist within construction organisations (Barlow, 2009), the application of COQ is still 
unclear, with many organisations set in their individuality, rather than integrating the 
quality system within their projects.  
Previously, the Construction Industry Institute (CII) Quality Management Task 
Force developed a Quality Performance Management System (QPMS) to track quality 
cost in design and construction (Jafari & Rodchua, 2014). It was used by Willis and 
Willis (1996) and showed less than 2% of deviation on correction costs. This confirms 
that the application of quality costing systems may result in the reduction of COQ, which 
suggests that an improved system needs to be developed to achieve better results. Davis 
(1987) extended the system, creating a Quality Performance Tracking System (QPTS) 
(Jafari & Rodchua, 2014) as an extensive costs coding system that classifies the various 
items used to ensure that the cost data captured is compatible with the works breakdown 
of a project. This system showed better capture of quality costs during the different cycles 
of a project. Abdul‐Rahman et al. (1996) also developed the Quality Cost Matrix (QCM), 
due to some challenges faced in capturing the cost of non-conformance during 
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construction by other systems. However, despite all the different methods in capturing 
COQ, quality management systems are still in their infancy.   
Regardless of the different approaches, Low and Yeo (1998) proposed the 
Construction Quality Cost Quantifying System (CQCQS) to collect data. It uses a coding 
system to categorise and represent various components of the system (Low & Yeo, 1998) 
that shows a detailed analysis of COQ. Aoieong et al. (2002) developed a quality cost 
tracking system in the process cost method (QCPCM) to capture the quality cost for a 
process instead of the quality costs of the total project. This system is used to trace each 
component of the quality coding system and its deviations to quantify costs. However, it 
is said to be incomprehensive, as projects require longer periods and involve many 
processes at a time. Dale and Plunkett (1995) developed a quality costing method that 
focuses on identifying non-conformance elements in specific departments, and it was 
reported by Roden and Dale (2001) that departmental quality costing was the most 
suitable method.  
The American Society of Quality Control (ASQC, 1987) showed good coverage 
of quality costing but offers no mechanism for building and maintaining the relevance of 
these costs. Despite all of the systems that have been developed for quality costing in the 
construction industry, no comprehensive system has been found for defining, capturing 
and analysing the quality-related cost; since the standard structure for quality costing 
depends on each organisation’s unique environment. In most cases, a quality standard 
(ISO 9001, 2000) has helped to determine the efforts of quality improvement, but this 
pays limited attention to the impact of failure costs. Thus, only a few construction 
companies use a COQ system in measuring and capturing quality cost. It is apparent there 
is limited knowledge in understanding COQ in construction organisations.  
Table 2.3 shows studies conducted using the developed quality cost system in 
capturing the quality cost of construction projects. None have tried to capture the 
operational failure quality cost. Consequently, a limited number of studies have been 
found that look at construction projects, as researchers only show a few construction 
companies that use a COQ system in measuring and capturing quality cost due to the 
sensitivity and effort needed to identify every cost detail (Low & Yeo, 1998; Snieka et 
al., 2013). It is thus clear that there is limited knowledge in understanding COQ within 
construction organisations. A broad development of quality costing systems is needed to 
provide better understanding and to achieve an effective model for quality in construction 
(Delgado-Hernandez & Aspinwall, 2008) that should be considered in order to achieve 
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quality. A framework should not only present such quality elements but also present ways 
of how the framework could be used in construction practice. 
Table 2.3: Summary of developed quality cost systems in construction projects 
Authors/ 
References  
Aims  Methodology  Model 
Developed  
Types of 
projects 
tested 
Findings  
Abdul- 
Rahman et 
al. (1996) 
The use of a 
quality cost 
matrix to 
capture cost of 
non-
conformance.  
Case study, 
interviews  
 
(QCM) 
Quality Cost 
Matrix 
Water 
treatment 
plant and a 
bridge 
The case study 
found costs of 
non-conformance 
incurred 5-6% of 
the tender value. 
The study stated 
that the costs of 
preventing failure 
are significantly 
low compared 
with the cost of 
rectification.  
Love and Li 
(2000); 
Love and 
Irani (2002) 
The paper 
quantifies 
causes, 
magnitude and 
costs of 
rework 
experience in 
two projects 
that were 
procured using 
different 
contractual 
arrangements 
in Australia. 
Interviews, 
observations, 
documentary 
sources 
(PROMQACS) 
Project 
management 
quality cost 
information 
system 
Construction 
projects 
including 
apartments 
and industrial 
buildings  
Finding reveals 
that the cost of 
rework for the 
case project was 
3.15% and 2.40% 
of their projects’ 
contract value. 
The primary 
cause of rework 
was due to change 
initiated by owner 
and end-user 
together with 
errors and 
omissions in 
contract 
documentation. 
Hall and 
Tomkins 
(2000) 
 
 
 
The paper 
presents a 
methodology 
for assessing 
the ‘complete’ 
cost of quality 
for 
construction 
projects. 
Case study   
 
 
 
- New 
construction 
office 
building in 
the UK 
The finding 
shows quality 
failures are small 
where prevention 
and appraisal 
costs are much 
higher. Failures 
are 5.84% and 
prevention and 
appraisal cost 
only 12.68% of 
contract sum. 
Tang et al. 
(2004) 
The paper’s 
objective is to 
report the 
finding on two 
case studies 
using PCM to 
capture costs 
on two 
construction 
projects. 
Two case 
studies – by 
recording 
numbers of 
defects 
(PCM) 
Process Cost 
Model  
One 38-
storey 
building 
project and 
one civil 
engineering 
project in 
Hong Kong.  
The case study on 
the 1st project 
shows a reduction 
in non-
conformance cost 
from 0.48% of the 
total process costs 
to 0.43%, while 
the 2nd project 
shows the cost of 
non-conformance 
fell dramatically 
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from 3.55% to 
0.03% upon the 
last cycle. The 
case study 
illustrates that the 
process shows 
continual 
improvement as 
the improvement 
of a process 
within a project.  
Low and 
Yeo (1998) 
The paper 
explains the 
proposed 
quality costs 
system 
developed in 
helping to 
capture quality 
costs for 
construction 
projects.  
Proposed 
documentation 
matrix for site 
staff to code 
quality costs. 
(CQCQS) 
Construction 
Quality Costs 
Quantifying 
System 
Not tested Proposes that 
future works 
related to 
construction 
quality costs 
should focus on 
testing the costs 
system in a 
further study.  
Aeoing et 
al. (2002) 
The paper 
aims to 
investigate the 
suitability of 
the PAF 
model in 
capturing 
quality cost 
and propose 
an alternative 
approach to 
facilitate the 
fundamentals 
of TQM. 
Interview has 
been held with 
professional 
involve in 
construction 
industry.  
(QCPCM) 
Quality cost 
tracking system 
based on PAF 
Not tested Alternative 
process cost 
model is more 
feasible than the 
traditional PAF 
model because the 
resource level of 
quality cost 
measurement will 
be more flexible. 
The performance 
indicates that 
straight 
implementation of 
the PAF model 
might not be 
possible due to 
the complexity of 
the structure of 
the construction 
industry.  
  
2.5.6 The need to measure COQ  
Özkan and Karaibrahimoğlu (2013) give two steps in reporting COQ: classification and 
measurement. They further clarify that it is necessary for each organisation to determine 
its definition of COQ in providing the right model and categorisation to quantify the 
quality costs, but this does not help in quantifying the COQ for a project. Despite the 
general classifications model of COQ being implemented in the industry, many 
researchers have expressed scepticism regarding the overall coverage of the traditional 
categorisations towards quality-related cost (Yang, 2008; Dahlgaard et al., 1992) in 
understanding the quality failure cost for a project. It seems that, with a lack of evidence 
for the flourishing impact of traditional approaches on the existing concepts of COQ, 
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many researchers have developed new methods of combining and exploring innovations 
towards measuring the COQ in the construction industry. Thus, no standard COQ 
documentation could be found that was applicable and replicable within the construction 
scope.  
Measuring COQ assures its benefits in providing financial information about the 
financial consequences of adopting quality improvement programmes (Omar & Murgan, 
2014), because measuring COQ requires precision in all cost information records. 
Although some say this may be an easy matter, several costs have been incorrectly 
reported (Yang, 2008). The traditional cost accounting systems have failed to provide 
accurate cost information to management and hence there is failure in measuring COQ 
(Ozkan & Karaibrahimoglu, 2013; Yang, 2008; Tsai, 1998). Table 2.4 illustrates some of 
the works looking at COQ in the construction industry, where only two pieces of research 
were found that focus on failure costs.  
Table 2.4: Summary of COQ literature in the construction industry 
Developed 
methods and 
systems for 
capturing and 
controlling 
quality costs 
Quantifying poor 
quality cost and 
identifying their 
associated causes  
To increase 
awareness and 
consciousness 
about the poor-
quality issues 
Definition and 
implementation 
of COQ  
Focusing on 
failure costs 
Construction 
Industry Institute 
(CII) (1989); 
Davis et al. 
(1989); Abdul-
Rahman (1993); 
Willis and Willis 
(1996); Low and 
Yeo (1998) 
Construction 
Industry Institute 
(CII) (1989); 
Buriati et al. 
(1992) 
Abdul-Rahman 
(1993); Josephson 
and Hammarlund 
(1999)  
Construction 
Industry 
Institute (CII) 
(1989); Abdul-
Rahman (1997) 
 
Barber et al. 
(2000); Hall and 
Tomkins, (2000); 
Aoieong et al. 
(2002); Tang et al. 
(2004); Kazaz et 
al. (2005)  
Love and Li 
(2000); Barber et 
al. (2000); 
Josephson and 
Saukkoriipi 
(2003); Rosenfeld 
(2009) 
Barber et al. (2000) Ali et al. (2010); 
Al-Tamey et al. 
(2011); Jafari 
and Rodchua 
(2014) 
Barber et al. 
(2000); 
Castillo et al. 
(2010) 
 
Consequently, there is still a lack of proof in explaining the quantification of COQ 
in its measurement in relation to the operational failure quality cost and the mitigation of 
failure cost. Many organisations have urged for and struggled in reducing the COQ to 
achieve better quality with less loss but none has successfully shown the cost relationship 
to the management of the project. Due to this, firms may have attempted to develop their 
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own methods to capture the quality costing, but there is a huge variability in the standards 
and guidelines for quality costing (Jafari & Rodchua, 2014). Barber et al. (2000) stated 
that investments in recruiting and providing training in knowledge and skills are needed 
for a successful COQ measure that requires circumstantial consideration in different 
project stages of the construction process. Some go so far as to say measuring COQ is 
dynamic and constantly changing over time (Srivastava, 2008). Thus, construction 
organisations need an integrated measure where standardisation in measurement may be 
the key in quantifying COQ.  
Nevertheless, to be effective, an organisation’s controllable efforts have to be 
considered in conjunction with its quantification of failure cost (Dror, 2010) where basic 
guidelines are needed for an individual company. Previous research shows there is a link 
to how failure is a consequence of the ‘quality’ that is executed during the front end of the 
project (Josephson & Hammarlund, 1999). Equally, the core concepts and focus area of a 
company’s business environment should be understood to successfully measure COQ 
(Hall and Tomkins, 2000) in reducing failure cost. The foundations of quantifying quality 
failure cost should therefore be defined first at an organisational level rather than at a 
project level. As described by Pursglove and Dale (1996), existing quality management is 
complex and cumbersome, with much documentation frequently overlapping with 
procedure and work instructions, which may be the reason for the failure to address the 
overall direction in quantifying quality.  
2.6 The focus on failure 
2.6.1 What is failure?  
Generally, failure is a lack of success, a neglect or omission of expected or required 
action and the action or state of not functioning (Oxford Dictionary). It is a state or 
condition of not meeting the desirable and intended objective. Failure can be interpreted 
differently in different fields (Pretorius, 2009), but is usually measured through 
predictions on a financial basis. Most research that focuses on failure appears to be 
problematic, with many struggling to define the failure and the ways in which failures 
have been measured in the past (Castro et al., 1997). In construction projects, Pinto and 
Mantel (1990) have agreed that the concept of project failure is nebulous and that only a 
few people agree on how to define failure. However, a mutual understanding of failure is 
still needed in mitigating the occurrences of failure to improve the quality delivery and to 
reduce the quality costs. Castillo et al. (2010) described failure as either product or 
process failure, or a combination of both, that will consequently result in the additional 
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usage of resources. Product failure can be an error, defect or non-conformance which 
leads to reworking, repairing, retesting, replacing or rejecting the product, while process 
failure is derived from inefficient processes that require additional resources.  
Based on this definition, some researchers only consider specific elements in 
construction projects to better understand change and rework (Love & Irani, 2002; Barber 
et al., 2000; Love & Edward, 2004) or defects and non-conformance of products 
(Josephson & Hammarlund, 1999; Josephson, 1998; Atkinson, 1999; Love & Josephson, 
2004; Jingmond & Agren, 2015; Love et al., 2018) as a classification of failure. Janney 
(1986) defined construction failure as failure that occurs during construction, either the 
collapse or distress of a structural system to such a degree that it does not achieve the 
level of safety required to serve its intended purpose. However, Atkinson (1999) 
differentiated failure as a departure from good practice that is either corrected or not 
corrected before the asset is handed over; while defect is described as a shortfall in 
performance once the building is operational. Either way, this definition shows that 
failure is distributed between the construction process and the finished product (Hall & 
Tomkins, 2000), whether the process is interrupted or the product goes awry in some 
way. A failure, for instance, can also be described as if and when the firm’s quality of 
design does not contain the necessary qualities to maintain or improve customer 
satisfaction, or quality of production that fails to live up to the design quality as specified 
(Barber et al., 2000). 
From the project management perspective, projects are considered a failure when 
completion time exceeds the due date, if there are budget overruns and the outcomes do 
not satisfy the performance criteria or stakeholders’ expectations (El-sokhn & Othman, 
2014). However, there is an uncertainty with regard to how project management 
processes may cause problems in construction (Atkinson et al., 2006), either towards the 
process or the system. Some have tried to describe failure as mismanagement in business 
that affects the operation (Assaf et al., 2015), poor performance management (Miguel, 
2015), or by looking at quality performance (Willis & Willis, 1996) and non-
conformance to owner needs and requirements (Sower et al., 2007). This has prompted a 
reflection on how construction projects with problematic sources might be characterised 
and defined as failures. Thus, failure is a lack of success, a falling short, omission or 
inability to operate any further, either during the process or in the final product of a 
construction project.  
 42 
2.6.2 What is the range of failure cost in construction? 
Failure is highly recurrent in construction projects (Castillo et al., 2010), but there has 
been limited empirical investigation. The Standish Group report (2014) shows that 31.3% 
of projects are cancelled before completion, while 52.7% of project costs are 189% of the 
original cost estimates. In the United States, it was reported that 20 civil infrastructure 
projects in 17 states experienced significant cost increases with poor construction 
performance ranging from 40%-400% (GAO, 2002), while, in Europe and Asia, cost 
escalation is no longer a new phenomenon, but has persisted over 70 years with 90% of 
all mega projects facing cost overruns (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003), for example, among major 
problems in construction projects, cost overruns and delay with cost overruns commonly 
range from 25%-33% (Marshall, 2007; Flyvbjerg et al., 2002) Morris and Hough (1987) 
found that 63% out of 1778 projects had experienced significant cost overruns. 
Substantially, many projects end with either dispute or litigation (Levin, 1998). 
 Therefore, the construction business is recognised as having the second highest 
failure rate of any business (Clough et al., 2000), with many projects often failing to meet 
the end user’s expectations in operation (Basu, 2015). According to Love and Irani 
(2002), it is believed that failure costs could be 25% of the total construction process, 
while Taggart et al. (2014) suggested that failure costs range from 2% to 6% during 
construction, and additionally 3% to 6% during the maintenance period. A study from 
Hall and Tomkins (2000) showed that the COQ in construction projects was an average 
of 18.52% of the project contract sum, while Josephson and Hammarlund (1999) 
estimated post-project quality failure to be as high as 4% of actual project production 
cost. Conversely, another study found that 50-90% of total COQ was failure cost after the 
project was operational (Snieska et al., 2013). Thus, operational failure costs are 
determined as one of the most significant quality costs (Snieska et al., 2013), and have 
been said to be the most difficult to evaluate among all quality costs in construction 
projects (Sower et al., 2007), as operational failure costs was classified by Feigenbaum 
(1991) as a cost of failure control (Figure 2.3). Many have now questioned how to 
calculate and estimate the failure cost to maximise benefits from COQ to reduce the 
failures. However, cost development matters may be held back by the project owners, as 
failure cost is often considered as reputation elements towards the owners (Flyvbjerg et 
al., 2003) but establishing reliable cost data is often highly time-consuming or even 
impossible. Thus, many projects may not quantify and clarify failure costs; as a result, 
failure costs are still highly recurrent (Taggart et al., 2014), not understand and are not 
learnt from one project to another.  
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Figure 2.3: Quality costs: cost of control and failure (Source: Feigenbaum, 1991) 
 Nonetheless, examples of post-project failure are still widespread. In the United 
Kingdom (UK) an air traffic control centre was 10 years over schedule and still required 
reworking a year after opening (BBC, 2002). Berlin’s Brandenburg airport was not 
functionally fit for its intended purpose, resulting in significant cost overruns and time 
delays from its 2011 opening. Heathrow terminal 5 had a disrupted opening, costing 
British Airlines (BA) $31 million in the first five days (Davies et al., 2009). Seventeen 
schools in Edinburgh were closed after 10 years of operation with a £870,000 cost of 
failure, found an independent report undertaken by Edinburgh city council (Hackitt, 
2017). Within these examples, many projects are still continuously being built despite the 
numerous records of poor performance (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003); this shows the significant 
need for greater quantification and understanding as a way of improvement.  
2.6.3 How failures have impacted the industry  
The construction industry is unique and this relates to the fragmentation of the project 
economic cycle and political environment. Thus, failure impacts the construction industry 
differently in different aspects according to the nature of the project. Osmani et al.'s 
(2008) research shows that construction, demolition and excavation is impacting the 
wider environment, such as through waste production, with an estimated 91 million 
tonnes being produced in 2003. Typically, the consequences of failure could come in 
several forms, such as construction fatalities, injuries, structural damage, damage to 
contents, loss of functionality or environmental damage, which should be defined clearly 
at the time of the consequence was notify. In some cases, failure in construction also 
relates to occupational health and safety (Yates & Lockey, 2002) or design for 
construction safety (Behm, 2005) that involves the labour as well as all professional 
stakeholders. In 2006, the UK and US construction sectors showed a 3.7 and 4.1% fatality 
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rate respectively, while Singapore had 39% of the total of 62 workplace fatalities which 
contributed to problems in construction (Ling et al., 2009). The study further highlights 
worker safety as a contributor to construction failures that impact on the construction 
safety. Therefore, failures in construction may affect a project throughout its lifecycle 
(Josephson & Saukkoriipi, 2007), which negatively impacts the effectiveness of many 
construction projects and causes financial losses (Weinstein et al., 2009). 
 Further to that, failure in construction projects, as mentioned by Assaf et al. 
(2015), will impact the growth rate of the sector, with rework being identified as the most 
significant factor that contributes to project cost increases and schedule delays (Love at 
al., 2002; Hwang & Aspinwall, 1996; Love & Sing, 2012). The changes that occur during 
project development may have significant and often unpredictable impacts on an 
organisation and its management which have not been clearly identified. It is difficult to 
determine the nature or cause of some failure (Love & Sing, 2013) that predominantly 
involves human errors (Love & Jospehson, 2004). Frequently, reworks are associated 
with defects that include a lack of quality workmanship, poor design, manufacturing, 
fabrication or construction that may have impacted the operations and maintenance (Love 
et al., 2018). 
In some cases, failures involve bankruptcy of construction companies (Kangari, 
1988), and impact on an organisation’s reputation (Baloi & Price, 2003; Teo & Love, 
2017) and management performance (Miguel, 2015). Thus, construction participants are 
still unaware of the appropriate action they need to take; the construction industry needs 
further understanding to influence the behaviour of project systems (Love et al., 2002). 
Without good management, owners suffer compensation liabilities (Abdul-Rahman et al., 
1996), which could be lessened if more details of project performance could be monitored 
and forecasted to better obtain quality and efficiency. Findings from Mir and Pinnington 
(2014) showed that the management of employees is directly related to the project 
environment and has a greater impact on achieving project success; thus, failure in 
construction also impacts low motivation in an organisation’s learning, which then 
prevents the retention of learnt knowledge (Cooper et al., 2002) to be incorporated into 
the next project (Kotnour, 2000). Project organisations may lose knowledge when key 
persons leave the organisation (Aert et al., 2016). The project processes stop while the 
new person learns about the project, and this prevents the establishment of trains of 
thought. Hence, the failure in construction will impede project innovations to increase 
business competitiveness (Holt, 2013), which needs further managerial rigour in an 
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approach that has more of a practitioner-oriented focus rather than only looking at 
technical tools (Davies et al., 2016) to reduce project failure rates. The impact of failure 
in construction management may be acknowledged by construction stakeholders but to 
what extent failure may impact a project’s owner and its multi-organisational network 
needs grater clarifications in terms of its cost and implications to project management.  
2.6.4 What causes failures in construction project management? 
Failure in the construction business is among the highest in business. Although the 
precise cause of construction business failures is hard to define, most are related to 
financial management problems (Kangari, 1988). Rework usually arises out of 
incomplete and erroneous information (Love & Li, 2010) which later became failures. 
Thus, failure can be the result of missing activities, lack of product analysis or inadequate 
control of the development function. Additionally, Josephson and Hammarlund (1999) 
suggested that most failure are attributed to the poor skills of site management which are 
caused by defective workmanship, defects in products, insufficient work separation, 
inadequate construction planning, disturbances in personnel planning, delays, alterations, 
failures in setting out and coordination failure. The study quantified these failures as 
either design related, poor installation of material or material failure. Additionally, in 
other studies, managerial factors were identified as the predominant cause leading to 
defect, with communication issues as the most significant cause (Atkinson, 1999). Two 
case studies by Andi and Minato (2003) agree that information and low motivation are 
the predominant causes of defect. Lack of information about the project causes sub-
optimisation and results in a lack of understanding of how specific tasks could be 
incorporated into the project and their relevance to the end-product (Love & Josephson, 
2004).  
 Generally, the causes of quality failure and defect in construction projects are 
manifold. As mentioned earlier, failure can be associated with the internal production of a 
product, or construction of a building (Jingmond & Ågren, 2015), or they can be external 
causes related to the work of different actors, environmental changes or organisational 
issues (Newton, 2003). Tam et al. (2000) found that cultural factors or global factors were 
the major cause of quality issues, while Fyvbjerg et al. (2003) identified that mega 
projects fail due to underestimated costs, overestimated revenues, unvalued 
environmental impacts and overvalued economic development effect. In construction 
projects, non-integration of different organisation quality-focused may correspondingly 
result in quality deviations (Love et al., 2002). Similarly, Love and Li (2000) concluded 
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that a lack of quality focus by design consultants significantly affected project 
performance, with no prevention of poor quality, which that resulted in operational 
failures during production. Dahlgaard et al. (1992) explained that many quality failures 
can be found in all departments and functions, and that some potential failures post-
production are due to failures originating in the service departments.  
 Consequently, quality-related issues are frequently ascribed to organisational 
conditions (Josephson, 1998) including changing the key person, which leads to project 
organisations losing important knowledge. Several studies have indicated that many 
failures are influenced by various types of human errors, which include knowledge not 
being currently available, delayed communication in acquiring knowledge, ignorance of 
recently acquired knowledge, misunderstanding of accepted knowledge, and outright 
ignorance or incorrect procedures (Levy & Salvadori, 1992). However, human errors are 
always caused by the actions of individuals; thus it is individuals who are acting wrongly 
that may cause the failure. Thus, failure may occur when the worker is forgetful or 
careless (Styhre et al., 2004), but individual action is usually influenced by how the 
organisation is designed, so that many causes are found to be within organisational 
aspects.  
Due to this, with regard to the causes of failure, many researchers are highly 
idiosyncratic, either specifically to one organisation or project (Morris & Hough, 1987), 
only focusing on reworks or defect (Barber et al., 2000; Love et al., 2018), on complex 
projects (Ivory & Alderman, 2005; Robertson & Williams, 2006) or generally on poor 
performance (Wakchaure & Kumar, 2011). Others have developed an operation system to 
identify companies’ failure (Kangari, 1988; Russell & Jaselskis, 1992) and look at 
managerial problems (Pinto & Mantel, 1990). Some factors are intrinsically related to the 
construction organisations that are solely responsible for managing them, whereas others 
are somehow closely related to how the organisation operates in terms of the socio-
cultural, economic, technological or political environment (Baloi & Prince, 2003). It is 
understood that there is a common link between failure to produce and failure during 
process in how they will affect both cost and management.  
 Edward Deming has long suggested that most quality failure in a Western firm is 
attributable to management paying little or no attention. The UK industrial society 
showed that companies whose projects failed had no project management infrastructure 
(Amyas, 2015). Typically, the construction industry depends on successful project 
management to manage project success (Munns & Bjeirmi, 1996) as the success of 
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project management has often been associated with the final outcome of the project. Yet, 
failure occurs as a consequence of multiple interactions, internal coordination and 
complex system of the nature of projects (Ivory & Alderman, 2005). Ika et al., (2012) 
demonstrated that completing a project within cost, scope and time is still not enough and 
the project can still fail, thus suggesting the necessity to investigate failure beyond the 
above-mentioned criteria.  
 Stakeholders’ interest, project functionality, learning potential and value added to 
the organisation all need to be accounted for as standards for understanding project failure 
(Nelson, 2005). Research by Davies et al. (2016) shows that many complex projects fail 
because of unsuccessful transition from project to operations when organisations involved 
fail to adapt to plans and provide innovations during execution when facing an 
unexpected change or new opportunity. Although Sun et al., (2017) showed team 
diversity is the most important enabler of innovation performance in gaining process 
success, many professions in construction remain trapped in their functional discipline 
(Munns & Bjeirmi, 1996), which prohibits the integrative multi-disciplinary process. 
However, the interrelationship of these causes with failure is yet to be studied and 
quantified, which would be helpful in providing a better understanding of the operational 
interaction of the causes and in providing better learning, design, construction and 
functionality of a project (Wakchaure & Kumar, 2011). 
 The industry’s problem in developing its economy was categorised by Ogunlana 
et al., (1996) as problems of shortages or inadequacies in industry infrastructure, 
problems by contractor’s incompetence, or inadequacies or problems caused by owners 
and consultants. Olomolaiye and Ogunlana (1989) indicated that major problems faced by 
contractors in developing countries have been classified as problems imposed by the 
industry’s infrastructure, inaccurate information and frequent changes in instructions and 
failure to meet obligations. This indicates that a strong relationship is required between 
the contractor and the owner which requires the owner to have a stronger management 
role Although construction failure can never be completely eliminated, the construction 
environment could always be improved (Yates & Lockley, 2002). Lessons learned from 
multi-case study of failures can obviate the occurrence and reduce the risk of future 
failure. Much literature shows the fundamental problem with identification of cause and 
effect of project failure but does not examine the relationship between process activities 
(Love et al., 2002), thus failure is not learned from. 
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 While much of the project management literature defines critical success factors 
and even identifies the causes of project success or failure, most research does not 
satisfactorily explain the reasons behind the causes (Davies et al., 2016). Typically, 
projects find difficulty in visualising all problems that are involved until the business 
concept is turned into a specific project brief; failure is only realised when there is a 
mismatch between budget expectations and proposed project costs. In which case, most 
projects continue to completion with resulting failure during operation, but most studies 
on quality failure tend not to differentiate among those parties responsible for the cost 
incurred (Love et al., 2002). Many failures, in this viewpoint, are the management’s 
responsibility. Therefore, improving the failure investigation process would produce 
results to provide insight into the behaviour of organisation structure in construction. 
Although research by Love et al. (2018) shows that contractors are reluctant to share 
quality failure costs because of issues of commercial confidentiality and the potential 
impact on their reputation, Morris (2013) emphasised the importance of understanding 
cost besides scope, schedule and stakeholder management in achieving successful 
management but there are currently few references available in the pertinent literature. By 
knowing more about the causes of failures, or performance, and quality problems, with its 
relationship to cost incurred, it will provide management with information about process 
failure and how to prevent any future occurrences.  
2.7 Chapter summary  
It is clear that COQ has not been widely applied in the construction industry and has 
some limitations. The emphasis must be on the application and capabilities of the owner 
to mitigate the occurrence of quality failures, which requires an understanding of the 
skills beyond mere COQ measurement. Chapter 3 focuses on the capabilities for failure 
mitigating literature, including the introduction of project-based organisation (PBO) in 
managing the different capabilities within the multi-organisational construction supply 
network. It also introduces the dynamic nature of failure in complex infrastructure 
projects. 
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3 Capabilities in complex projects   
3.1 Introduction   
This chapter focuses on the literature pertaining to complex infrastructure projects, 
particularly the development of the project-based organisation (PBO) as an advance in 
project management development. This includes further exploration and explanation of 
the diversity of capabilities of a PBO to generate the understanding of failure-related 
capabilities. Also, literature that is relevant to knowledge on capabilities for failure 
mitigation is also described. This includes the definition of capabilities, how it can be 
developed, and the potential problems that can arise in doing it.   
3.2 Failure in the dynamic nature of construction projects 
Given the view of the previous published and limited literature in understanding COQ in 
construction, specifically looking at operational failure and its quality cost, whether 
within the construction project management or general organisational context, it is 
important to review the functions and operations of complex organisations to further map 
the context of the study. As emphasised by Morris (2013; p.6), “Understanding history is 
a sign of maturity. Where today history is rarely view as objective, disinterested enquiry 
but rather social constructed”. He took a view of how every project may follow the same 
generic development cycle: from feasibility to operations, but the development lifecycle 
of each project is what distinguishes it from all the others. Recently, the research of 
Zerjav et al. (2018) looked into the assembly of project capabilities in the temporal inter-
organisational setting of project delivery, and has recognised the relation of failure with 
poor management of capabilities.  
 Generally, the nature of a construction project has been long known to be a 
complex and a dynamic process. Frequently changing technology has often required a 
bespoke design, to address rapidly changing market needs (Turner & Keegan, 2000). 
Mulholland et al. (2016) described technological obsolescence within the operating 
system as a high risk to systems failure, and will lead to unforeseen and unplanned 
operational costs. A successful project management, as recognised by Davis (2017), is 
dependent on the recognition of both internal and external factors that will influence the 
final outcome; thus, any discrepancy between project expectations may influence the 
successful delivery of a project’s operations. Project managers in the construction 
industry have recognised the importance of operational performance, beyond delivery to 
project time, budget and compliance, to technical and quality specifications (Aubry et al., 
2007). From this viewpoint, project managers must create value for the benefit of the 
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business, which requires human, budgetary and technical capabilities beyond those 
required by the projects themselves (Pinto & Prescott, 1988).  
The fragmentation and inefficiency of creating value within the complex 
connections amongst multi-organisationals needs collaboration between owner, 
contractor and supplier alliances to align the diversity of capabilities in managing 
projects. Literature acknowledges that construction participants are also known as 
construction project firms who are unique entities that are created through a complex 
integration of capabilities, with interdisciplinary information and knowledge, 
responsibilities and objectives (Hu, 2008). However, little is known about how they 
mitigate failure and the capabilities that are needed for construction participant to 
mitigate the failures.  
 While all projects are acknowledged to be different from one to another, 
construction project management is also a multi-phase process that is frequently divided 
into decision and concept, design, construction and implementation, as well as 
maintenance and demolishment phases (Hu, 2008), so that each project experiences a 
unique process on its own. Winch and Merrow (2012) argued that failure to achieve an 
efficient and effective construction lifecycle will lead to heavier and long-term 
implications for other assets in the economy and for society; thus, preventing the value of 
project’s capability to be recognised. Most projects frequently deliver failures in critical 
operational outcomes, creating risky operational readiness, thus constraining future 
investments. In this sense, the characteristic of the industry’s activities are distinct in that 
every project should be treated as separate with its individual settings, where each 
construction project is discrete and temporary (Rosenfeld, 2009). By distinguishing these 
characteristics, Jaafari (1984) suggested that performance and failure issues are more 
effectively addressed in understanding the functioning of the project itself as well as its 
benefits to the broader economy. Therefore, capabilities to mitigate failure are clearly a 
significant concern.  
 Project management studies have now moved from the classic view of the project 
management structure towards how organisations are managing projects. The term 
project-oriented is well acknowledged as project-based organisations responding to 
organisations whose strategic business objectives rely on the results of projects or 
programmes (Gareis, 2007). However, within the project-based organisation (PBO) 
literature, distribution of capabilities needs further understanding in relation to how 
temporary project organisations can create a lasting performance that collates and 
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integrates different knowledge and skills (Brady & Davies, 2004; Pryke & Smyth, 2006; 
Winch, 2010). The meaning of organisation, management and construction project 
management within PBOs in general is significant to further understand how this process 
is influencing operational failure in construction projects. As the operational failure is the 
focus of this research, both project process and management are viewed as dynamic, 
operating from the view of the processes embedded in both project management and 
organisational levels. As such, the research agrees with the need for a stronger owner 
management view of the multi-organisational project environment and the need for the 
owner and multi-organisational supply network to advance their capabilities (Winch, 
2014; Winch & Leiringer, 2016), both strategic and operational capabilities (Helfat & 
Peteraf, 2003; Pena-Mora et al., 2003), to achieve project quality (Bubshait, 1994) and, 
more importantly, to mitigate operational failures.  
Thus, this chapter defines the PBO and capabilities in complex projects. This 
includes how complex construction projects are managed in PBO and how capabilities 
are defined within the owner and multi-organisational supply network. There is a clear 
articulated theory of capabilities in this chapter. This is to initiate some underpinnings 
and intricacies of the concept and context that are compared and discussed to address the 
benefits of understanding the concept in the construction industry and the lack of 
attention to it in responding to operational failure.   
3.3 The project-based organisation (PBO)  
3.3.1 What are they?  
Project-based management is used in adapting to the changing environment (Lundin & 
Soderholm, 1995; Hobday, 2000; Turner & Müller, 2004) such as new products, 
processes, technological or market changes (Teece & Pisano, 1994). According to 
Melkonian and Picq (2011), the complexity in current construction projects has increased 
the level of uncertainty as well as risk, thus promoting the introduction of PBO. This is 
understood to be ideally suited in dealing with the dynamic, unstable and discontinuous 
environment of construction projects (Huemann, 2015). However, failure in many project 
still regularly occurs. The complexity of a project can be explained as a ‘temporary 
coalition’ which extends beyond the boundary of the single firm (Hobday et al., 2005) 
that is no longer sufficient for a firm to create a long-term and sustainable performance. 
Firms are forced to advance from single to multiple project management (Söderlund et 
al., 2008). As a result, failure mitigation must be understood beyond a single firm and 
project. 
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 Some studies have suggested the PBO is a natural organisational form of a CoPS 
(Complex Product System) producer, typically when several supplier partners are 
engaged with the owner through various stages of innovation and production (Hobday, 
2000; Gann & Salter, 2000). Consequently, the PBO (Figure 3.1) is an alternative to the 
matrix-based organisation (Aubry et al. 2007) (Figure 3.2); it is an organisation that may 
stand alone or be a subsidiary of a larger firm, in which the majority of the products (or 
services) are developed against a bespoke design for either internal or external customers 
(Turner & Keegan 2001). According to Turner and Keegan (2001), if the end product is 
bespoke, the intermediate product is also bespoke, and thus the processes required to 
produce the project will be novel on every project. This requires integrated capabilities 
(Davies, 2004) in responding to the bespoke intermediates to mitigate failure; this is 
different to the matrix-based structure, which may require one-off failure mitigation 
within each stable process, although this has not been explored within the context of 
project management in failure mitigation. Customer requirements frequently change with 
different competencies and technology required. As a result, the nature of the project is 
unpredictable and complex (Turner & Keegan, 2000; Morris, 1994; Winch & Merrow, 
2012) and perhaps increases the risk of failure during operations. 
 
Figure 3.1: Project-based organisation structure (Adapted and developed from: Turner 
and Keegan 2001) 
 
Project-based 
organisation 
Function Function Function 
Novel Process Novel Process
Bespoke Input Bespoke Product 
Failure mitigation 
Bespoke Intermediate 
Novel Process
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Figure 3.2: Matrix-based organisation structure (Adapted and developed from: Turner and 
Keegan, 2001) 
 The PBO is inherently flexible and reconfigurable and enables the combination 
and transfer of different knowledge through multi-organisational and stakeholders in a 
complex product-solving process (Soderlund & Tell, 2011), and quasi-permanent intra-
organisational coordination (Sydow et al., 2004; Bredin, 2008a). The PBO must develop 
project capabilities to create lasting performance based on multiple short-term projects 
(Davies & Brady, 2000) that collate and integrate different knowledge and skills during 
the ‘temporary project’ (Pryke & Smyth, 2006; Winch, 2010). This form of organisation, 
which mainly operates on project forms as a domain (Hobday, 2000), embedding 
different projects into their permanent organisational context, helps to address the 
dynamics of management in a more adverse environment. However, with the absence of 
management of capabilities within the PBO, the remaining phase of a project or future 
endeavours will continue with less development of crucial business insight (Aerts et al., 
2016), which could lead to operational failure.  
 Davies and Brady (2000), extending Chandler (1992), explained how suppliers of 
CoPS build the capabilities required in the concept of construction project activities (e.g. 
bidding, project design, implementation and de-commissioning). Within the changing 
environment, the PBO needs the ability to reconfigure multi-organisational supply 
network capabilities by linking supplier integration with the performance outcome 
(Vanpoucke et al., 2014). The challenge is that it can be a rather perpetual and cyclical 
process that requires constant re-evaluation and change from one project to another 
(Zerjav et al., 2018), in which each cycle needs management in putting in place the 
organisational changes, routine and learning processes (Davies & Brady, 2000) for the 
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owner and multi-organisational supply network to provide the capabilities to mitigate 
failure. This study acknowledged how the concept of a ‘repeatable solution’ by cycling 
experience from one bid project to another could help owners in capturing valuable 
capabilities, thus leading to a better management in reducing quality cost that further 
mitigates the operational failure.  
 It is argued that, within the nature of complex projects, owners and operators play 
the most important roles in keeping and advancing the range of capabilities (Winch & 
Merrow, 2012) that is generated through different individuals and expertise across the 
organisations (Hobday et al., 2005). This perspective, brought by Winch and Leiringer 
(2016) and Winch and Merrow (2012), showed greater linkage to how owners in the 
permanent firm will impact its project organising and the operational sides of the project 
(Winch & Leiringer, 2016); thus, suggesting the role of capable owners to better manage 
capabilities in mitigating failure. With the temporary nature of projects (Lundin & 
Soderholm, 1995), a repeatable solution needs to be captured by concentrating on 
operational impacts (Slack, 2005) and involving a diversity of capabilities from 
professional managers to technical engineers. This may be achieved through 
understanding the right distribution of capabilities in a complex project. Integrating the 
strategic and operational capabilities (Bredin, 2008) may be needed, but attention needs 
to be focused on the capabilities of failure mitigation. This will help to generate 
systematic integration that combines both front-end and post-project details of 
perspective in identifying potential process improvement (Peña-Mora et al., 2008) to 
mitigate failure.  
3.4 Complex product system (CoPS) as a PBO 
3.4.1 The CoPS – How are they formed? 
According to Hobday et al. (2005), PBO are more suitable to manage CoPS but require 
strong integration between the owner (often as a source of innovation) and other 
collaborating companies, which will provide the opportunity for the owner to manage 
different capabilities to mitigate failure. Accordingly, Hobday et al. (2005) have 
suggested that CoPS are high-technology and high-value capital goods, such as 
telecommunications systems, flight simulators, high-speed trains, air traffic control 
systems, intelligent buildings, weapon systems and baggage-handling systems. Gann and 
Salter (2000) mentioned that CoPS are usually supplied as one-off items or in small 
batches for individual business users that require systems management in the project and 
business process. According to Hobday (2000), each of the CoPS is designed in a 
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hierarchical manner and tailor-made for a specific customer; they are high cost and made 
up of many interconnected systems that often involve customised parts (e.g. control units, 
sub-systems and components). Due to the high cost, physical scale and composition, 
CoPS are frequently produced by projects or small batches, which allows for a high 
degree of direct user (sometimes owner-operator) involvement in the innovation process 
(Hobday, 2000). Consequently, this requires the capabilities from the owner, multi-
organisational supply and operator network to achieve the desired innovation for the 
CoPS to avoid operational failure, and yet these capabilities are not well described in the 
literature of how they could mitigate failures.   
 Each CoPS is a highly innovative form that makes different demands on 
innovation of the product. This is frequently experienced in the forms of project 
management in the PBO, which acquire cycles of creating and re-creating organisational 
structures and processes around the needs of each product and customer (Davies & 
Mackenzie, 2014). In some cases, as explained by Hardstone (2004), firms that once 
produced stand-alone products have the opportunity to increase the degree of complexity 
of managerial choice and have more opportunity to become ‘system companies’. System 
companies can operate from a considerable diversity of strategy and structure that would 
appear to give a considerable scope for strategic variety in the industry in re-forming the 
emergence of CoPS (i.e. due to technological changes) (Porter, 1980; Bonaccorsi et al., 
1996). Bonaccorsi et al. (1996) further elaborated that the interaction between 
components cannot be solved through a fixed set of physical parameters at the beginning 
of the design process, but changes over time during the process. Therefore, CoPS are 
those products that result from: 
 …a great variety of components and subsystems with high technology content, 
are realized in small series or as single models, present high levels of 
customization, and are normally realized through a project-based organization 
and a wide range of inter-organizational relations (Bonaccorsi et al., 1996, 
p.540).  
 In summary, CoPS are product components that by themselves are a complex 
system composed of subsystems or components (Hardstone, 2004); the system exhibits a 
high degree of customisation, reflecting the huge heterogeneity of user requirements. This 
is due to the fact that systems are, in most cases, pieces of capital requirement, whose 
physical characteristics reflect a wide variety of requirements and operational conditions 
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(Pellegrinelli, 1997). According to Hobday (2000), the characteristics of CoPS can be 
summarised as:  
 Multifunctional and involve multi-disciplinary skill/knowledge inputs. 
 A system lifecycle that may last for decades and has a large product or system 
breakdown structure. 
 Using many customised components and equipment often involving long delivery 
lead times. 
 System requirements analyses that are owner-operator driven. It involves high 
levels of people-embedded knowledge in systems engineering, design and 
development.  
 Its success depends on a high level of core competencies in systems engineering 
and integration and complex programme management. 
Therefore, inherent complexity (Hardstone, 2004) is created from large product 
components, tasks and human interactions that could possibly be a major source of 
project risk and uncertainty in contributing to project challenges, failure and impairment. 
Ahern et al. (2015) emphasised that CoPS are different to traditional projects (that may be 
very complicated but fully specified), where they can be defined as projects that cannot 
be fully specified and planned in advance. Typically, the goals of complex projects and 
the initial assumptions can often only be specified in outline or in part, which entails 
incomplete project plans at the start (Pitsis et al., 2003); this requires a ‘discovery-driven’ 
planning approach for complex projects in promoting continuous learning over the 
lifecycle based on the project end goals (McGrath et al., 1995).  
 Accordingly, the complexity of CoPS and the organisational arrangements for 
their design, development and commissioning are capable of supporting a wide variety of 
firm structures, strategies and capabilities that will enforce the CoPS (Davies & Brady, 
2000) to build the capabilities required to successfully expand the new product or services 
(Söderlund et al., 2008). However, these capabilities frequently can only be specified 
after the project is delivered and this thus impedes the innovations. Ethiraj et al. (2005) 
argued that the interactions between these components in a product system condition the 
research and design that will incentivise firms, which means the incentives are also 
increasing prior to the investments in the capabilities. Yet, this logical problem of 
incomplete pre-given knowledge together with its practical implication for developing a 
capability for production and learning in CoPS are not fully understood by the 
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construction stakeholders. Although management of multi-organisational alliances and 
owner institutional arrangements to facilitate system implementation is common in 
undertaking innovation for production (Hobday, 2000), CoPS requires the mobilisation 
and management of a wide range of capabilities (Gann & Salter, 2000) that are rarely 
found within the sphere of control and ownership of a single enterprise (i.e. the owner). 
Rosenbloom and Christensen (1994) concluded that incumbent success or failure is 
independent of the technical capabilities that are required or made obsolete by 
innovations. However, owners differ greatly in their ability to transform the generic need 
into the detailed specifications of the required product, thus what factors will enable the 
CoPS to be more effective in dealing with mitigating failure capability, both foreseeable 
and emergent, are still not fully understood.  
3.5 Capabilities in project-based organisations  
3.5.1 What is capability? 
Generally, capability is the ability to perform a specific task (Oxford Dictionary). Thus, 
capabilities may come in many forms and variations, such as: individual, managerial, 
operational, marketing-based or technological. In organisational capability theory, 
capabilities are embedded in idiosyncratic social structures that are developed through the 
context of organisational resources (Schreyögg & Kliesch-Eberl, 2007); thus, capabilities 
are complex in nature, involving both formal and informal processes that are conceived as 
a distinct behavioural pattern (Dosi et al., 2008). In achieving superior performance and a 
unique historical development, the ability to recognise, sense and shape the developments 
of capabilities is needed to build the foundation for sustainable competitive advantage. 
However, the ability to recognise opportunity differs depending on the individual 
capability and extent of knowledge or according to the knowledge and learning capacities 
of the organisation to which the individual belongs (Mayer & Salomon, 2006). 
Specifically, in projects; the ability refers to meeting the owner’s need and requirement 
for functionality, quality cost and schedule.   
 In the literature of organisational capability, Richardson (1972) made an early 
observation on how co-operations arrangements have influenced many studies in various 
definitions of ‘organisational capabilities’. The co-operative arrangement will not be 
successful without the elements of organisation, knowledge, experience and skills. He 
elaborated that large numbers of activities carried out by a firm have to be carried out 
with appropriate capabilities, which are, in other words, appropriate knowledge, 
experience and skills. He further mentioned: “organisations will tend to specialise in 
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activities for which their capabilities offer some comparative advantage” (Richardson, 
1998, p.888). Within this, organisational capabilities were later identified and defined by 
others as ‘organisational routines’ (Spender, 1996; Nelson & Winter, 2002), as ‘strategic 
and functional’ (Chandler, 1992), as ‘architectural and component knowledge’ (Rebecca 
& Kim, 1990), as ‘a source of organisational synergy’ (Chandler, 1992), and as ‘a high-
level routine’ that represent a repository of historical experience (Zollo & Sidney, 2002; 
Winter, 2000), and recently many studies have started to acknowledge capabilities as 
‘organisational learning’ (Winter, 2000; Davies and Mackenzie, 2014; Ahern et al., 
2015). These different definitions of capabilities make it difficult for the owner and multi-
organisational supply network to align expectations about the project’s outcome, as it is 
frequently assessed with multi-dimensional measures of operational performance (Peng et 
al., 2007) that include cost, quality, flexibility and delivery measures. Thus, this may lead 
to consequences of failure at its final output.   
Capabilities are seen to be evolving and developing through the pursuit of 
business objectives. This may be through the innovation cycle of goal, practices, 
learnings and developments or through reflection (Davies & Brady, 2000). Although 
every organisation may uphold specific specialty in certain activities, the organisational 
industry may also adapt itself to the fact that activities may be complementary from one 
to another (Graham, 1999); this also applies to the capabilities. Capabilities are observed 
as evolving activities through an iteration of doing, learning and repeat doing, in which 
each sequence will expand knowledge and enrich core competencies (March & Levinthal, 
1993). However, in Ahern et al. (2015), capability development is described as uncertain 
in terms of its outcome, as capability learning that is poorly understood can lead to 
enactment of poor execution or learning that is forgotten. Capability emerges with better 
managerial discipline alongside its development in a complex project as long as the 
combination of these capabilities and its interchange is well understood by the multiple 
parties that are involved (Peng et al., 2007). However, subsequent change has to be 
communicated and coordinated through the project lifecycle in order to mitigate failure.      
In project capability building, Penrose (1959) described a resource-based theory 
of firm growth and capability building as a ‘learning theory of the firm’, and has 
suggested capabilities as a source of firm resources. However, Chandler (1992) argued 
that resources alone do not create value, but need to draw upon the knowledge and 
experience – or the ‘organisational capabilities’ – in working together to control both the 
use of resources and the performed activities that create competitive advantage. This 
requires specific knowledge, creative activity, and the ability to understand user and 
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customer decision making and practical wisdom (Nonaka & Toyama, 2005). Given the 
numbers of different organisational entities, one common assumptions associated with 
capability is that capabilities are inherently complex, causally ambiguous and difficult to 
replicate (Barney, 1991; Teece, 2007). This prescription is therefore relatively 
straightforward for areas in which an organisation has relatively weak capabilities: Mayer 
and Salomon (2006) suggested it is more efficient for this organisation to use different 
forms of governance to gain access to the skills and capabilities that it lacks, because it 
will be very difficult, costly and time consuming to try to develop those capabilities from 
scratch. Accordingly, the capabilities differentials holds important applications for the 
identification of ‘mistakes’ and will only help firms mitigate some contractual hazard 
(Wu et al., 2010).  
Capabilities are tacit in the nature of social process; they emerge gradually over 
time, and need to be explored, experienced and innovated through dynamic interplay 
between a firm’s internal capability and the changing nature of the project (Leonard-
Barton, 1992; Davies & Brady, 2000), which will influence a new set of services (Davies 
& Mackenzie, 2014) in gaining learning for future inter-organisational-network 
capabilities to mitigate failures. Davies and Brady (2000) later introduced the additional 
concept of ‘project capabilities’ in referring to the core activities of firms that design and 
produce complex product in low volumes. They have further referred to ‘project 
capability’ as the ability of project-based organisations to deliver ‘complex product 
systems’ by managing the organisation, processes and procedures for bidding for and 
delivering projects to customer specifications. This needs to be developed with the project 
management capabilities to conceive, design and coordinate the development of large-
scale systems that include multiple disciplines and many participating organisations 
(Sapolsky, 2007) at strategic, project and functional levels of multi-level approach 
projects. Many still wonder how the functional level may be defined in the project 
capability. For example, for a purchasing owner organisation, the functional level is 
almost always dynamic because they extend the resource-base of that organisation, but 
not its ‘core business’ (Kay, 1993). Therefore, Winch and Leiringer (2016; p.272) have 
proposed the owner project capabilities as:   
…the dynamic capabilities required by the owner organisation for the acquisition 
of infrastructure assets in order to extend or improve its operational capabilities 
in distinction to the operational capabilities deployed by the project-based firms 
which supply those assets.  
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Within all the different contexts of how capabilities are defined, it is envisaged that there 
is a need to advance the capabilities definition in relation to failure mitigation. This thesis 
will consider the underlying definition of capability theory, as the distinctive managerial 
knowledge, experience and skills located within an organisation which are required to 
establish, coordinate and execute a project. This includes a distinct behavioural pattern of 
content and structure that supports the construction business, project-programme process, 
and the diversity of stakeholder involvement in developing a better understanding of an 
organisation’s capabilities.  
3.5.2 Why is it important to understand capabilities in mitigating failure?  
Capability priorities are often tacitly held by individuals, and are frequently embedded 
within the wider business organisation and strategic context of the firm (Brady & Davies, 
2004). In project management, Jugdev et al. (2007) explained that not all assets 
constructed with the input of interest (either tangible or intangible) will generate 
competitive advantages. Consequently, the outcome obtained from the project 
management process determines the degree of competitive advantage. Thus, it is 
important to improve the understanding of these tangible and intangible elements as 
project inputs that are used as the project management capability of the firm in mitigating 
failure at the output of a project outcome. Firms vary systematically with the availability 
and allocation of resources that are rare and superior in use, through the unique historical 
development, thus capturing capabilities leads to a greater configuration of resources 
(Schreyogg & Kliesh Eberl, 2007) and facilitates problem solving (Dosi et al., 2008). 
However, multi-organisational capabilities are acknowledged to be embedded within 
projects around the transmission of resources and people (Davies & Brady, 2016). These 
capabilities are believed to be nesting in different projects, and stronger management is 
needed to capture and acknowledge their value in improving project management (Flynn 
et al., 2010). However, the understanding of capturing the diversity of capabilities for 
capable owners to generate competitive improvement has not been widely addressed, 
specifically in mitigating failure.  
 For a firm to compete in a fast-moving construction project environment, it 
requires continuous creation, extending, upgrading, protecting and maintaining the 
relevance of the capability towards the project objective; the firm also needs to embrace 
its capacity to shape the ecosystem it occupies and capture sufficient value (Teece, 2007) 
to deliver superior long-term financial performance and assist in mitigating failures. This 
is significant because different capabilities have different costs and benefits associated 
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with their development or acquisition (Ethiraj et al., 2005), and this needs management 
attention in making such investments in the capability development to improve the 
establishment of project competence and project capabilities (Davies & Brady, 2000; 
Soderlund, 2005). For Colotla et al. (2003), capabilities are a primary source of profits, as 
most empirical and theoretical findings have shown how certain capabilities have 
impacted performance in various ways (Brady & Davies, 2004; Rangi, 2014), but more 
work is needed to develop practical advice from the operational perspective (Whyte et al., 
2016) and particularly pertaining to operational performance and failure mitigation. 
Typically, the capabilities emphasised organisation, management, coordination and 
governance (Kogut & Zander, 1992), but the set of these activities need organisation and 
coordination of distinctive competencies (Soderlund, 2005). In line with Rungi (2014), 
different activities impact different outcomes; thus, project capability changes when the 
surrounding environment changes. Reasonably, disaggregating capabilities into several 
measures may create difficulties as capability is a social construction (Ethiraj et al., 2005; 
Peteraf et al., 2013) but, as the capabilities are specialised and are complementary to the 
output of a project, the deployment of these sets of activities is essential in generating 
value for owners to mitigate operational failure.   
 There is still scepticism as to how capabilities are generated or as to how 
investment of money, time and managerial effort is required in building them in relation 
to failure mitigation. Ethiraj et al. (2005) emphasised that the development of capabilities 
requires deliberate and sustained investment of both financial and managerial resources. 
Each has alternative uses and it is important to understand the costs and benefits of such 
investments. In other words, it is believed that different capabilities may entail different 
financial and managerial costs and yield dissimilar performance benefits (Barney, 1991) 
that are needed in addressing the uncertainty and the ambiguity of operational failure 
through the integration of capabilities for failure mitigation. The systematic 
understanding of such trade-offs should promise the enrichment of the theory and practice 
of strategy for owners to increase operational capability performance (Winch & 
Leiringer, 2016), and to reduce the construction operational failure cost (Love & Irani, 
2002; Barber et al., 2000). Yet, this has not been clearly explored. Given the strength of 
these arguments, capturing integrated capabilities across a multi-organisational network 
should be addressed in expanding the knowledge of project-operational capabilities that 
could assure operational success.  
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3.6 Capabilities in failure mitigation 
3.6.1 The project and capabilities to mitigate failure in reducing quality cost 
failure 
Building upon the organisational capabilities literature (Chandler, 1992) which explains 
firms are a collection of capabilities that range from routine, knowledge, skills and 
experience (Davies & Brady, 2004), it is critical to exploit the potential cost saving of 
future development by understanding the diversity of capabilities in managing projects. 
Hence, looking at CoPS in PBOs, the projects are more tailored to the unique 
environment of each asset, as according to Morris (1994) and Winch (2014); thus, it is 
assumed that capabilities are not only resources but rather represent the way of allocating, 
coordinating and deploying the resources (Schreyögg & Kliesch-Eberl, 2007). The 
importance of these capabilities is to create, extend and modify the ways in which a firm 
operates, which are embedded within the processes; this includes coordination, learning 
and transformation in project organising (Söderlund et al., 2008). Therefore, it is agreed 
that the capabilities have become central in the competitive advantage of complex 
infrastructure projects (Davies & Brady, 2000; Brady & Davies, 2004; Davies & Hobday, 
2005) that incorporate the management of each capabilities deployment in mitigating 
failures and reduce the quality cost of failures.   
 Capabilities are influenced by the acts of an organisation’s decision makers 
(Flynn, 2010), and need important distinctions between organisational and managerial 
processes, procedure, systems and structure that undergird each class of the capability 
(Teece, 2007). The higher the strategic importance of capabilities management to the 
PBO, the more likely the failure mitigation will be performed either by the owner or by 
the multi-organisational supply network in delivering the project. Davies and Brady 
(2000) explained that an organisation needs to create and utilise its capabilities through 
experience to distinguish and determine its capabilities and adapt its ability with different 
organisations in the project. Therefore, in different projects, an organisation needs to 
acquire sustained performance (Melkoniaq & Picq, 2010) that is aligned with the project 
objectives to foster evolution and respond to a changing environment. This requires 
sustained integrated measure of different organisations’ capability to measure the project 
quality cost in mitigating failure.  
The emerging working practices resulting from the constantly changing 
environment of a project have now forced organisations to manage capabilities (Flynn et 
al., 2010) that will improve decisions in preventing failure. Through the iteration process, 
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organisations expand their knowledge and enrich their core competencies (March & 
Levinthal, 1993), which helps them gain a better understanding of how future failure 
could be prevented; thus reducing the quality cost failure. Although the unique embedded 
sets of capabilities are known by most researchers, these distinctive dimensions of 
capabilities are rooted in values which are established but often overlooked (Leonard-
Barton, 1992), especially in relation to failure mitigation. There is a need to enhance 
emerging theory by examining the way capabilities inhibit failure as well as enable 
development, to deepen the description of the nature of core capabilities and detail 
evidence of how capabilities is related to the development of projects.  
Recently, there has been growing concern that a project may not perform in the 
long term to satisfy the project owner, and this means construction performance relies on 
different dimensions of project management. Studies have shown that an integrated 
approach in conceptualising, planning and implementing large, complex projects is 
needed (Jafari & Rodchua, 2014); this is beneficial to developing capabilities in 
mitigating failure generated from the diversity of capabilities in different projects. It is 
understood that the structure of the organisations operating within construction projects is 
different to those of the functionalist and traditional view of the theory of the firm. The 
differences of these organisations operating in projects is not only diverse in nature owing 
to the internal and external environments surrounding them, but also due to the dynamic 
factors influencing the processes of the construction project lifecycle (Kusuma, 2016) and 
thus is believed may cause the occurrence of failures. Thus, from the above, to understand 
capabilities, there is a need to distinguish the differences between the owner and multi-
organisational supply network capabilities in accordance with how their capabilities 
influence failures in the project lifecycle. This will enable a more strategic approach to 
managing capabilities to mitigate failures and reduce quality costs.  
3.6.2 Owner’s and multi-organisationals’ programme and portfolio  
Complexity in construction projects generates uncertainty and ambiguity in defining 
failures. Mostly, owners are responsible for the operationalisation of an asset (Hughes & 
Murdoch, 2001), in managing and reducing the quality cost to mitigate and make good on 
problematic assets. Although resources and inputs are available within the supply 
network, the ‘capability’ to deploy them productivity is not uniformly distributed (Ethiraj 
et al., 2005), and demands a more active and supervisory role in response to failure. 
Turner and Keegan (2003) elucidated the use of programme management from owner to 
managed project in PBO. They described how the owner forms a network in which 
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individual companies fulfil different roles in the operational process. Effectively, an 
isomorphic network is created project by project to meet the individual customer’s 
requirement, the product and process (see Figure 3.3), while in an isomorphic project 
team structures are created with a bespoke command and control structure.  
 
Figure 3.3: Programme delivery of multiple projects in a PBO for the owner (Source: 
Turner & Keegan, 2000) 
 In a large project, wider stakeholders will be involved in judging whether the 
output, input and impact have achieved the desired objectives (Turner & Zolin, 2012); 
this gives the owner the opportunity to identify the divergence of capabilities in aligning 
project objectives. Therefore, as a new way of managing projects, Hobday (2000) 
explained that PBO is able to cope with emerging properties in production and respond 
flexibility to the changing needs of owners, and in integrating different types of 
knowledge and skills. PBO is organised to cope with project risk and uncertainty 
commonly found in complex projects (Bourne et al., 2003); however, this does not reduce 
the occurrence of failure. There is a need for more advanced organisational structures 
designed to comprehend the uncertain context of project operations (Hagström et al. 
1999). It is believed that the dynamic process of organising and strategising in the new 
forms of organisation within the project-oriented organisational forms (Aubry et al., 
2007) could develop capabilities for failure mitigation that are significant for an owner 
and its multi-organisationals in CoPS.  
 Projects are now seen as a portfolio, which introduced the new idea of managing 
the organisation by projects (Pemsel & Wiewiora, 2013), and has also been proposed as a 
corporate view of project management (Dinsmore & Associates, 1999). However, in most 
PBO organisations, capable owners assume that projects will integrate with operations. 
Some place significant weight on the capabilities of contractors and suppliers in 
understanding how this is achieved, but research perhaps shows that the owner’s project 
and operational capabilities are key (Davies et al., 2009). Different projects are adopting 
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different approaches and strategies through programmes development in responding to 
operations management (Turner & Keegan, 2000). Turner and Keegan (2003) suggested 
that organisations utilising a PBO approach need to recognise the differing approaches 
and when they are appropriate for different businesses to adopt. As stated by Davies and 
Brady (2016), although capabilities are frequently held by the project supply network, 
and distributed across an inter-organisational network, they need to be simultaneously 
managed (Davies & Brady, 2016) and, most importantly, recognised by the owner. This is 
because the choice of mechanism or interface for the governance of an owner and its 
multi-organisational network relationships critically relates to the subsequent 
performance (Caldwell et al., 2009). In this way, capabilities for failure mitigation must 
be understood at the critical intersection between providers and the focus should be on the 
relationship between project and quality management approaches.  
 The owner’s ways of managing a project may have substantial positive or adverse 
effects on the achievement of project objectives (Bresnen & Haslam, 1991). Currently, 
the nature of temporary project has forced construction organisations to foster their own 
capabilities as a project management strategy in expanding their core competency and 
moving from a traditional-based view in focusing on developing capabilities at the front-
end of the project towards development of capabilities to operate and maintain facilities 
(Davies et al., 2009). Currently, it is understood that capabilities which apply during the 
strategic stage of a project later become a part of project operations (Winter, 2003), but 
the acquisition of these dynamic capabilities towards operational capabilities needs 
further investigation (Chin et al., 2014). Accordingly, these capabilities need stronger 
capability on the part of the owner (Winch & Leiringe, 2016) to coordinate the process, 
resources and capabilities across the organisation as whole. Owners should be aware of 
their own capability as well as the multi-organisational capabilities. Lindahl and Ryd 
(2007) suggested that looking at the owner’s perceptive will lead to an integrated 
approach that enhances innovation and improves managerial competency and will 
stimulate the reformed management of construction. By knowing the capabilities required 
to mitigate failure, owners will be better able to drive continuous improvement to reduce 
failure cost throughout the owner and multi-organisational supply and operations 
network.  
3.6.3 Integrating capabilities within PBOs to mitigate failures 
The impact of integrating capabilities on improving project values is a central issue, but 
one yet to be understood in relation to mitigating failure. Davies and Brady (2016) 
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suggested that capabilities based on multiple short-term projects need to be integrated to 
continuously add value to a competitive project. The development of project capabilities 
thus requires deliberate and sustained investment of financial and managerial time, as 
different capabilities could impact performance differently (Ethraj et al., 2005). A study 
by Bredin (2008) suggested the integration of people capabilities with project and 
functional capabilities will enhance the people’s competencies. The organisational 
process factors and the desired target outcome are key managerial decision variables 
(Tatikonda & Montoya-Weiss, 2001) that need greater understanding on the integration 
between the operations and strategic development. Project integration will generally have 
a positive influence on project performance (cost, time, quality, environment impact, 
work environment and innovation) with a more collaborative effort (Eriksson & 
Westerberg, 2011) within the project portfolio. The connections between owner and 
multi-organisational supply network capabilities integration in improving operations 
performance (Frohlich & Westbrook, 2001) is still unclear. There has been limited 
consideration of the challenges, in that capabilities may create complex integration for an 
owner and their multi-organisational supply network when they need to address 
unanticipated failure mitigation.  
Although the owner is generally known as the primary consumer of a construction 
project, the source of project finance and, in many cases, the end user of facilities (Huang 
& Hinze, 2006), owners are not a simple system (Cherns & Bryant, 1984), but complex, 
with different interests and influences (Teece, 2007). This requires capabilities that need 
to be tailored according to different project environments (Morris, 1994; Winch, 2010). 
Research by Davies et al. (2016) shows that the role of integrating project requirements 
and capabilities relies on the owner. Within this, the relationship of how owners could 
have managed these capabilities in responding to operational failure is still not clear. 
Most participants in the construction process will usually focus on their own 
responsibilities rather than on the realisation of the owner’s objectives (Hughes & 
Murdoch, 2001), which leads to misalignment of project capabilities. Therefore, in 
different projects, an organisation needs to acquire sustained performance to carry out 
capabilities (Melkonian & Picq, 2011) that are oriented to the overall project objective. 
There is a need for the owner to be more knowledgeable by developing their own 
organisation through the use of project managers and other professional roles (Lindahl & 
Ryd, 2007) in increasing communication about understanding the quality needed to 
mitigate failures. 
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 Strategic project management analyses the outcome of the overall project 
performance behaviour, while operational project management undertakes detailed 
analysis of how time, cost and resources meet the determined target (Pena-Mora et al., 
2008). Within this, the capabilities distributed during the strategic stage play a significant 
role, albeit they are necessary but not sufficient (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000) to build new 
resource configurations, and to respond to the external environment that has adapted 
capability or resilience in gaining operational success. Although the PBO research view 
provides insight into the view that integrating capabilities is likely to generate value, 
comparatively little attention has been devoted to address the problem in capabilities 
distribution during the project lifecycle that influence the project, especially at the 
operational delivery.  
 Research by Davies et al. (2016) shows that the role of integrating project 
requirement and capabilities relies on the owner. Most participants in the construction 
process focus on their own responsibilities rather than on the realisation of the owner’s 
objectives (Hughes & Murdoch, 2001), which leads to misalignment of project 
capabilities. Sustained firm performance is required to carry out capabilities that are 
oriented to the overall project objective. Although literature discusses capabilities that are 
path dependent, integration of capabilities in a project could, if fairly distributed by the 
owner, reduce the occurrences of operational failure. However, the relationship of how 
owners could have managed these capabilities in responding to operational failure is not 
clear. Construction perceptions of value, system integration and integrated solutions that 
suggest the concept of built environment solutions are still at an early stage of 
development (Brady et al., 2005) in understanding the capabilities, although the choice of 
mechanisms or interfaces within this relationship is critically related to subsequent 
performance (Caldwell et al., 2009). Currently, it is understood that capabilities applied 
during the strategic stage of a project and later become a part of project operations, but 
the acquisition of these dynamic capabilities in relation to operational capabilities needs 
further investigation.  
3.7 Resource-based view in managing capabilities to mitigate 
operational failure 
3.7.1  Supporting the operational capabilities for failure mitigation   
Capabilities are explored in terms of delivery and feedback mechanisms linking one 
firm’s technical capabilities with those of other enterprises with whom the firm 
collaborates, in order to produce one-off projects (Gann & Salter, 2000). For a firm to 
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expand its capabilities, it needs to gradually acquire the knowledge and experience from 
the people and resources involved in its projects. Operational capabilities may not be 
easily obtained, as these are also a firm-specific sets of skills, processes and routines that 
are developed within the operations management (Flynn, 2010) as a continuation from the 
project’s capabilities. The distinction of each capability in the project may not be well 
ascribed by most of the literature. The extant theoretical work on project organisations 
has emphasised the importance of ‘project capabilities’, as shown in Figure 3.4 (Brady & 
Davies, 2004; Davies & Brady 2016; Winch & Leiringer, 2016); these studies recognise 
the importance of the operational side of a project which is where the operational 
outcome between inter-organisational settings is recognised (Zerjav et al., 2018).  
 
Figure 3.4 Organisational capabilities in CoPS (Adapted from: Davies and Brady, 2000) 
It is understood that an operation’s capabilities are regularly used in solving the 
problems faced by the departments that impact on operational failure. Nonetheless, the 
identification of the gap in operations drives the implications for project improvement 
(Whyte et al., 2016) in the context of PBO system lifecycle approach. The consideration 
of integrating strategic delivery and operational considerations through understanding the 
cost impact (Ethiraj et al., 2005) has provided a basis to support the understanding of 
integrated capabilities to mitigate failure in a multi-organisational setting. Thus, 
operations management could provide integration and direction to resources and 
operational practices in dealing with the uncertainty of projects, as a way to reduce the 
quality costs. Construction capabilities must be a two-way process that simultaneously 
supports the project process (Melkonian & Picq, 2011) and should also include 
operational needs and prevent operational failures.  
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  The importance of an operation’s capability is not only as a repetitive routine to 
support the operation but as an initiative taken to achieve defined project strategy (Lee et 
al., 2006). The operation’s capability, hence, needs to be involved at the project level and 
identified as continuous elements of the project, to align the organisational aim and the 
temporary nature of construction projects (Hedlund, 2007). This capability should be 
taken as a mechanism for transforming various organisational aims in deploying different 
resources through customised ways of manging a project to mitigate the occurrences of 
operational failure; in other words, operational capability can serve as a critical mediating 
factor (Thoo et al., 2015) to align ambitious supply network practice to reduce the 
occurrences of operational failure and in mitigating failure. It is agreed that the owner 
should own the capabilities to integrate the acquisition of the project (asset) in supporting 
the extent of its operational capabilities (Winch & Leiringer, 2016), which consists of the 
whole lifecycle of the project elements. Consequently, these capabilities can be validated 
(Flynn, 2010) through their application during the project process as well as their 
deployment when operating the asset.  
3.7.2  Learning and capturing capabilities for failure mitigation in complex 
networks  
Projects are fundamentally network-based organisations (Styhre et al., 2004) that consist 
of different capabilities. These capabilities, transferred within projects, should be 
captured and managed (Pemsel and Wiewora, 2013) in improving, renewing and 
reconfiguring resources into new capabilities and competences (Teece et al., 1997). Due 
to the unique and temporary nature of projects, complex projects face substantial 
challenges in harnessing the capabilities to exploit lessons learnt from previous projects 
(Bellini & Canonico, 2008) to prevent repeat failures. However, projects may be referred 
to as similar when the same capabilities and routines are required for their repeated 
execution (Davies & Brady, 2000). This gives owners a great opportunity to recognise 
these valuable capabilities as a way to improve (Winch & Leiringer, 2016). However, this 
may not be achieved if project objectives are different from one organisation to another in 
completing specific projects (Kwak et al., 2015). To achieve common project objectives, 
the supply network needs to temporarily reconcile the differences in aims and cultures 
amongst the teams (Hobday et al., 2005), as learning can only be reconciled through 
group activities rather than individuality (Styhre et al., 2004). In construction projects, 
learning emerges as the firms cooperate and generate trust in major collaborative works 
(Wu et al., 2010) as a network of learning capabilities (Styhre et al., 2004) that may help 
organisations to manage and prevent possible operational failure.   
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 Establishing networking learning capabilities may reduce the firm’s capability to 
innovate (Styhre et al., 2004) and the firm may lose its value over time (Coates & 
McDermott, 2002). Therefore, the interaction process in learning capabilities is critical as 
a mechanism guide to the evolution of dynamic capabilities (Easterby-Smith & Prieto, 
2008) and as a nourishing ability to learn from project to operations (Whyte et al., 2016) 
in extending the opportunity for knowledge coordination. Ahern et al. (2015) argued that 
complex project capability is developed through dynamic organisational learning that 
continuously creates knowledge over the lifecycle of complex projects but cannot be fully 
planned at the outset. The greatest challenge is thus how learning and capturing 
capabilities could be passed from one project to another, as learning is always seen as 
dissipated and lost to future projects by repeating the same mistakes (Winch, 2014).  
  Despite a large body of literature on project management and organisational 
design, little research has been found on how a firm builds links between operations at the 
project level, portfolios of projects, and its central, routine activities in responding to 
learning and mitigating failure. Love et al. (2002) suggested that learning should be 
coordinated with quality management to better visualise the total COQ and quality cost 
failures. It is believed that the visualisation of these costs could assist in advancing 
learning about the prevention of project failure, but this need better clarification. 
Organisations frequently learn from projects that have been completed (Kerzner, 2009), 
which needs an interplay of commanding and enabling strategies to integrate project 
innovations (Pemsel & Wiewora, 2013), which is expected to improve quality in 
construction projects. This is similar for owners (Winch, 2014) to identify and acquire 
externally generated knowledge to be able to analyse, process, interpret, understand and 
act on information needed to support the operational capabilities in mitigating failure. 
Therefore, poor capture of capabilities leads to enactment that is poorly executed or 
learning that is forgotten and would be valuable in failure mitigation. Capturing 
capabilities through experience helps an organisation to make sense of the environment to 
configure its resources at various levels (Schreyogg & Kliesch- Eberl, 2007) that then 
facilitate problem-solving decisions under conditions of uncertainty (Dosi et al., 2008).  
 Hence, capabilities that lie under the dynamic nature of a project need to be 
combined with the operational capabilities (Davies et al, 2016) to comprehensively 
respond to the changing nature in providing greater innovation. In addition, there is a 
need for an innovative approach that develops the roles of the relationship to satisfy the 
owner’s business objective (Lindahl & Ryd, 2007), and provide a stronger role in dealing 
 72 
with operational failure. This innovation should include integration of capabilities that 
need to be managed and aligned not only to respond to the temporary nature of a project 
but to be captured, used and improvised by the owners in extending the capabilities 
(Winch & Leiringer, 2016) to fit the operational needs. This is because a capable owner 
relies on its resources to deliver the project-based outcomes.  
3.8 Chapter summary  
This chapter has provided an overview of the elements that constitute complex 
infrastructure projects. It has shown that capabilities within the PBO have a strong 
influence on the occurrences of failures. What is of particular significance is the 
capabilities distributed across the project lifecycle within the PBO that may be adopted by 
the supply network to mitigate failure and may reduce the quality cost failure. Within the 
existing literature, little is known about how capabilities impact project outcomes, cost or 
quality costs. The next chapter considers what methodology might inform a better 
understanding of the failure-related capabilities that an owner and their multi-
organisational supply network requires to ensure operational success. 
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4 Research design and methodology  
4.1 Addressing the complexity of the problem  
The complex nature of the construction industry has led to significant problems in 
quantifying quality cost, with fragmentation of supply networks leading to intractability. 
As a result, there is a need to apply a grounded and action-based study to investigate the 
ontological and epistemological knowledge assumptions (Crotty, 1998).  
A mixed-method abductive with grounded theory approach was taken to provide 
flexibility in data collection and theoretical sampling was used to explore the 
generalisability of the complex construction process (Creswell, 2009). This includes 
qualitative and quantitative methods.  
This chapter presents and discusses the research philosophy, methodologies (design, 
approach and strategies) and methods (Figure 4.1) used to achieve the research aim and 
objectives. It provides a brief summary of the overall research methodology and the 
philosophical underpinning. This is followed by the research process, approach and 
description of the data collection methods utilised in each research phase further to the 
emergence of a new theoretical integrated measurement of the cost of quality in the 
construction supply network. The chapter ends with a reflection on the research reliability 
and validity, and a mention of the ethical considerations. 
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Figure 4.1: The methodological pyramid (Adapted and developed from Quinlan et al., 
2015) 
4.2 Research philosophy – ontology and epistemology  
4.2.1  Ontological views 
A research philosophy is vital (Holden & Lynch, 2004) for the researcher to develop the 
nature of knowledge that is of benefit to the research, in turning the data into tangible 
outcomes. It is the belief that data relating to a particular phenomenon should be 
gathered, analysed and used. By using an appropriate methodology, researcher will gain 
both enrichment of skills and enhancement of confidence (Holden & Lynch 2004).  
Ontology is a branch of philosophy that focusses on the assumption or theories about 
the nature of the world and of reality. Ontology describes the basic relationship of entities 
(i.e. the product, process and people) and asks the question: “What is the nature of what 
we know?” However, it is not possible to describe the ontological reality using static 
terminology or a paradigm of thought; rather, reality is to be viewed as emergent, 
dynamic and temporary (Holden & Lynch, 2004). Within this thesis, the relevant 
ontological questions include:  
 What is the cost of quality? 
 What is the quality cost elements incurred due to operational failure? 
 What is the nature of COQ and how is it related to the occurrence of failure?  
 What are the capabilities for failure mitigation? 
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 What is the influence of the capabilities distributed in the project lifecycle in 
mitigating failure? 
Consequently, there are many different ontological starting points in how a researcher 
should acknowledge COQ in developing capabilities for failure mitigation as: (i) there 
has been relatively little exploration of how it is measured in the construction industry; 
(ii) or how it is defined in the construction industry; and (iii) there are many difficulties in 
applying the COQ (Jafari & Rodchua, 2014) in mitigating failures. Literature shows the 
interrelationship of quality cost and failure, where quality cost is not easy to eradicate 
without widespread changes in attitudes and norms of behaviour within the owners and 
multi-organisational supply networks’ management. The key to understanding failure in 
construction is human nature, processes and the outcomes, which involves various 
interactions of the construction context from initiation to its delivery and operation of an 
asset. What is needed therefore is an understanding of this interaction to define and asses 
the cause of failure. This interaction is critical in this thesis to an emergent view of 
quality cost, as a capability which does not consider its embedded nature within people 
and their values in shaping the quality process and behaviour is likely to result in an 
operational failure outcome.  
Thus, how the researcher perceives and views the world relies on this early 
ontological perspective of the subject matter (Saunders et al., 2009), followed by why the 
specific research approach or method was chosen (Guba & Lincoln, 1994), which is 
explained later in this chapter.  
4.2.2 Ontological objectivism and constructionism 
As ontology is sought to describe the nature of reality and asks fundamental questions 
about how the world operates (Fellows & Liu, 2008). It challenges the system of beliefs 
and interpretations of individuals about what constitutes a fact. In doing so, the social 
entities that were involved during the construction process were perceived as both 
objective and subjective (Saunders et al., 2009) and helped to create a universal 
understanding for both ‘realism’ or ‘relativism’ (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012) and to what 
constitutes failure.  
In this study, ontology describes the nature of the construction supply network 
itself with regard to the concept of COQ in developing capabilities for failure mitigation 
(the process, organisation and services). COQ elements that fall under the traditional 
categories of Prevention- Appraisal- Failure were included to raise the operational failure 
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quality cost in understanding what was done during the project process that further 
developed the integrated capabilities approach for failure mitigation. This helps to 
elaborate the fundamental nature of the quality costs that exist in the project, and for 
which it offers a different kind of perspective in mitigating failure for different entities 
depending on their role, position and background.  
What had caused the occurrence of operational failure was explored through a 
selection of multi-case study appraising the COQ and this provides clearer understanding 
of capabilities in failure mitigation. How the project organisation was structured 
(Jospehson, 1998) was questioned to see how this influences the operational failure. The 
position of where social entities (people and organisations) exist in reality to where the 
existence of that social entities in the construction project was considered as independent 
of the social actors (Bryman, 2012). Objectivism says that social phenomena have an 
existence that is independent or separate from the researcher’s mind, and the phenomena 
of that object are measurable and testable. Therefore, to further see this relationship of 
these consequences, it was explored through the research process. Data was used to 
construct meaning and interpret reality (Guba & Lincoln, 1994) and was then concluded 
to provide a contribution to the existing knowledge of project and quality management.  
In contrast, constructionism asserts that social phenomena are created through 
ongoing social interactions (Bryman, 2008). It shows how culture evolves as the product 
or service is developed. The nature of social and political perspectives is thus also 
considered in describing the social entities. An organisation as a tangible object, with 
rules, regulations and procedures, with different jobs for people under a division of labour 
with a hierarchy, mission and vision (Bryman, 2012) were considered as the nature of 
reality. The diversity of project procurement routes was taken into consideration to see 
how organisational structure and process and divergence of supply network capabilities 
later impact on project outcomes. 
Differing from the relativist positions, the assumed complexity of gaining direct 
access to the reality encourages multiple perspectives to be adopted (Easterby-Smith et 
al., 2012) through both triangulation of methods: the surveying of views and experiences 
of large samples of individuals (Gay et al., 2009). Within this, the difficulty is where to 
investigate the relationship between an individual’s perceptions and actions, and the 
effect of external factors (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012) that evolve during the occurrence 
of these quality elements during the project process. With regard to operational failure, 
this thesis takes the position that within each project there is a universal list of quality 
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cost elements that are used as a starting point for defining, assessing and demonstrating 
the cause of operational failure. This position is taken to see how each organisation 
responds to and is responsible for the operational failure quality cost and is later 
incorporated into the project management-related theories.    
4.2.3 Process epistemology  
While epistemologically helps the researcher to understand the questions of ‘What do you 
know?’ and ‘How do you know it?’, this research means to appraise the COQ in the 
construction supply network by understanding the project processes by which information 
or materials are flows and are channelled in the desired direction as they are handed from 
team to team (Winch, 2010). Thus, as referred to by Branca and Lopes (2011), 
ascertaining what level of quality is provided by an organisation is a major challenge. 
Therefore, this research views and explores where quality stands in between this process 
to see its relationship to understand how quality carries benefits and costs as well as 
failures. As such, the meaning of the project process with COQ categories takes an event-
driven approach to lead the author to the development of the way(s) (in acquiring and 
justifying) where the quality cost subsists and how to eliminate operational failure quality 
cost with an understanding of the ontological behaviour of the entities undertaken in this 
study.  
To explain further, a process epistemology is concerned with how things evolve 
over time and why (Langley, 1999). The ‘process’ chosen in this study helps the 
combination of quality issues (‘failure’) to be fully understood through supply network 
involvement. The process epistemology helps articulate the research design and case 
study selection as a starting point to appraise the operational failure quality cost. Thus, 
the information gained counts as acceptable knowledge in the COQ field, affecting its 
evolution and how it should be acquired and interpreted in the construction supply 
network management field. 
Differing from positivism, epistemology interpretivist ideology requires a strategy 
in determining differences between people and objects of the natural sciences ( Love et 
al., 2002); thus, it requires an understanding of the subjective meaning of social action 
(Bryman, 2008). However, it is essential to maintain the understanding that there are 
differences between the actions of social actors (Fellows and Liu, 2008). This allows a 
subjectivist view in the way of both reality and truth (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011) of what 
constitutes quality issues or ‘failure’. The challenge for interpretivist researchers is to 
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adopt an ‘empathetic stance’, which requires them to enter the social world of the 
research subjects and make sense of what is found (Saunders et al., 2009).  
In this research, quality issues or ‘failure’ are the core beginning. Thus, in 
exploring these quality issues, extensive discussion with each participant is required to 
achieve agreement on the representation (description) of their truth and reality (Fellows 
and Liu, 2008). However, the difficulty is the finding of an interpretivist approach which 
cannot be generalised to a larger group of people as different people may interpret things 
differently in different social settings (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012) such as in different 
organisations.  
4.2.4 Epistemological perspective taken in this thesis  
Taking the epistemological subjectivism perspective, this thesis relies on a constructivist 
grounded theory basis that allows the theory to reshapes the process between the 
interaction of the participant and the researcher (Mills et al., 2006) and the co-
construction of meaning (Hayes & Oppenheim, 1997). It involves both deductive and 
inductive methods that allow the understanding of what constitutes valid knowledge and 
how to obtain it. Therefore, it is difficult to pin down or rather clarify in a precise manner 
to what extent subjectivism was used in exploring the quality cost in this thesis, as it is 
used in a number of different ways by different authors (Bryman, 2008). In this thesis, 
quality cost elements were used as a tool to help the participants understand the concepts 
of what existing knowledge is before it is developed through their knowledge and 
experience, and thus developing the knowledge of what constitutes operational failure 
quality cost. Thus, although through the positivism lens the social world is measureable, 
in the construction industry, the individual’s behaviour, culture and process are believed 
to be interconnected and need to be understood together with the rigours of observation. 
4.2.5  Constructivist grounded theory  
Research needs to address four elements of epistemology, theoretical perspective, 
methodology and method (Crotty, 1998). Taking the universal and robust underpinning in 
understanding the existence of high operational failure quality cost in construction, an 
abductive with grounded research design was built in accordance to constructivist 
grounded theory philosophy. It was first proffered by Charmaz (2006) as an alternative to 
the classic grounded approach of other authors (Strauss & Corbin 1997; Corbin & Strauss 
1990; Glaser & Strauss 1967). Bryant and Charmaz (2007) considered neither data nor 
theories are discovered either as the data or the analysis: it offers an interpretive portrayal 
of the study not an exact picture of it; while the classic grounded theory introduced by 
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Glaser and Strauss (1967) talks about discovering theory as emerging from data. For 
Charmaz (2006), research that is conducted with grounded theory has implicit meaning 
and experiential views, and thus provides the construction of reality (Charmaz, 2006). 
Charmaz (2014) explains constructivist grounded theory as: 
 …it takes the middle ground between postmodernism and positivism, and offers 
accessible methods for taking qualitative research into the 21st century (p.250).  
As grounded theory focuses on data, it allows the possibility for the construction of 
multiple meanings (Charmaz, 2014) that requires research to go beyond the surface to 
search for and question more tacit meanings in a subject, and, because constructivists see 
facts and values as linked, they need to acknowledge what was seen and what was not 
seen. It creates individuals that interact with and interpret these objects rather than relying 
on dormant information within objects waiting to be discovered (Crotty, 1998). 
Constructivism thus challenges the belief that an objective truth can be measured or 
captured through research inquiry (Crotty, 1998). 
In taking this perspective on the nature of reality, researchers needs to immerse 
themselves in the data (Mills et al., 2006) in a way that embeds the narrative of the 
participants in the final research outcome and be naturally critical to discover latent 
patterns of behaviour within the data (Charmaz, 2006). Therefore, in this thesis a careful 
and critical exploration of constructivist grounded theory is explained in every section of 
the method undertaken during the research study. This requires the author to combine the 
different data sets that is collected during the whole research process in making the 
interpretation towards the final contributions.  
4.3 Research approach  
4.3.1 Overview of the research approach 
This section describes the research approach taken in addressing the research aim and 
objectives. There are three major methods of reasoning: deductive (where theory guides 
research); inductive (where theory is an outcome of research); and abductive (where 
theory and knowledge are developed concurrently) (Bryman, 2008; Fellows & Liu, 2008; 
Creswell, 2009). These research approaches can be used either independently or 
concurrently and will lead to the decision-making for constructing the research design 
and data collection method (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012) as well as better consideration of 
research strategies (Fellows & Liu, 2008); greater understanding of the research questions 
is thus embodied. The main characteristics and differences of deductive, inductive and 
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abductive forms of reasoning are discussed in the following sub-sections followed by the 
selection of the research approach undertaken in this thesis.   
4.3.2 Deductive, inductive and abductive approaches 
The deductive mode moves from a general statement towards a specific one, informally 
called a ‘top-down’ approach (Fellows & Liu, 2008). It starts with the general theory or 
known fact (drawn from the literature) towards making a specific hypothesis related to 
that theory or fact (Figure 4.2). However, the deductive mode involves intuitive aspects in 
testing the prediction, where its inference strongly depends on the initial step of 
generating hypotheses from general theories (Love et al., 2002).   
Deductive reasoning is where “laws present as the basis of explanation, allow the 
anticipation of phenomena, predict their occurrence and therefore permit them to be 
controlled’’ (Saunders et al., 2009, p.124). This shows science is seen to be proceeded by 
trial and error (Fellows & Liu, 2008) but within the boundaries of existing knowledge 
(Love et al., 2002). Mainly, a deductive mode employs quantitative research strategies 
and empirical observation to validate or reject the generated theory or to modify it 
through replication in the study (Bryman, 2012; Creswell, 2009). Figure 4.2 below shows 
both deductive and inductive approaches in illustrating the research process.  
 
Figure 4.2: The deductive and inductive research processes (Source: Author’s own) 
With the inductive form of reasoning, the researcher moves from specific observation to 
broader generalisations and theories, informally called a ‘bottom-up’ approach (Fellows 
& Liu, 2008) see Figure 4.2. Inductively, theory is developed or generated as the outcome 
of data analysis (Saunders et al., 2009). Data collection is obtained through specific 
observation of certain social phenomena and either interviews or pilot studies are then 
analysed to generate new theory or develop a conceptual framework (Bryman, 2012). It 
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involves clear selection of data (Love et al., 2002) to ensure its applicability in achieving 
a robust conclusion.  
Theories that are developed inductively move towards discovery of a binding 
principle, hence it is more likely that these theories will be useful, plausible and 
accessible (Partington, 2000). Inductively, they attempt to extract implicit knowledge, 
patterns and meanings through a process of data collection and analysis (Gray, 2004). In 
the main, the inductive mode applies to qualitative studies rather than quantitative ones. 
Differing from deductive reasoning, the inductive mode needs a relatively small sample 
of research subjects (Saunders et al., 2009) as it deals with issues and events that have 
already taken place (Love et al., 2002). This form of reasoning thus provides a better 
understanding of the meanings of participants’ actions and behaviours (Creswell, 2009), 
avoids misunderstanding in different theoretical perspective (Hyde, 2000), and offers a 
low risk that the data will not be useful when the researcher is confident about the sample 
selected (Saunders et al., 2009).  
Most researchers assume there is a rigid division between both types of reasoning 
(Saunders et al., 2009); thus, they are used independently. However, an integrated 
combination somehow provides increased advantage (Miles and Huberman, 1994). It is 
explained as a ‘theory-forming or interpretive inference’ that is more profound than 
inductive or deductive approaches (Saunders et al., 2009) and which leads to deeper 
understanding of the data (Sandelowski, 2000). It is also referred to as the process of 
studying facts and devising a theory (Peirce, 1995; Cunningham, 1998) in providing an 
explanation for observed facts. This process is therefore an essential concept within 
pragmatism (Richardson & Kramer, 2006). It was originally meant to capture the nature 
of scientific progress as in finding new explanations for phenomena (Peirce, 1995). As 
explained by Saunders et al. (2009), abduction starts with a real-life observation (through 
literature), followed by explaining patterns, discovering themes and examining 
phenomena, and finally producing or changing a theory. This approach moves back and 
forth between both deductive and inductive approaches (Figure 4.3) to integrate them and 
to gain more theoretical insight through the use of both approaches.  
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Figure 4.3: The abductive research process (Source: Kovács & Spens, 2005) 
4.3.3  Research approach taken in this thesis 
This study uses an abductive approach to continually appraise and refine the COQ failure 
elements within the construction supply network to understand and develop strategic 
project and quality management approach to failure mitigation. This form of reasoning 
allows an iterative, pragmatic and dynamic approach in dealing with research data 
sampling (Creswell, 2009). This study uses a mixed-method research design to 
understand the occurrence of operational failure within the multi-organisational network 
of complex construction projects. At the initial phase, in order to understand the current 
status of operational failure and its quality cost in the construction industry, a deductive 
approach was used to investigate the perceptions of construction stakeholders and the 
influences of the supply network based on a few hypotheses of the need to clarify COQ 
(Jafari & Rodchua, 2014; Tye et al., 2011) in developing the capabilities for a failure 
mitigation approach: 
1. The dynamic nature of the construction project that involves numerous parties, 
non-standardisation and the uncertain nature of the bidding process (Honnakkera 
et al., 2010), which has created inconsistency and misconception. 
2. Lack of an appropriate system and incorrect methods of collecting quality cost 
categories. 
3. Lack of support from the senior leadership team (improper management) such as 
in the accounting and finance departments; thus, managers and employees are 
deficient in their knowledge of COQ and capabilities in failure mitigation.  
4. There is inconsistency among the various plans and ineffective process standards 
that lead to a lack of clear instruction and inadequate information for proper 
design and implementation.   
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The inductive approach was then used to obtain a more generic picture of the status 
and to appraise how and who compensates for operational failure quality cost throughout 
the project supply network, as the inductive mode explains ‘why’ and ‘how’ rather than 
describing ‘what’ (Creswell, 2009). The existence of operational failure quality costs is 
known to be intangible within the construction supply network (Taggart, 2014), and yet 
failure costs are still highly recurrent in construction projects (Snieska et al., 2013). This 
required a spiral (constantly going back and forth) flow (Figure 4.3) by the author to 
move from deductive to inductive mode to allow the best explanation of the hypothesis or 
theory developed (Josephson & Josephson, 1996), as it captures advantages and systemic 
character of data both empirically and theoretically (Saunders et al., 2009) in further 
clarifying and understanding the operational failure and its quality cost. 
Thus, the abduction approach is seen as an appropriate method in making sense of 
new (or unknown) situations (Richardson & Kramer, 2006) to obtain better insight into a 
situation. Furthermore, as an integration of induction and deduction approaches, the 
abductive reasoning used in this research allowed the researcher to creatively break out of 
limitations to obtain and compile more data before the theory was developed at the end of 
this thesis. The result of this provides clearer framework of COQ elements that suits the 
construction scopes, which is then to subsequently develop further understanding on 
operational failures. There is also considerable discussion on how the abductive approach 
allows more explanation and investigation to be conducted around the research area of 
cost of quality and how it links to the construction project supply network, thus providing 
deeper understanding in achieving the research aim.  
4.4 Research process  
4.4.1 The research methodology  
This section details the research methodology used in achieving the research aim and 
objectives. The methodological framework was developed as emerging from a conceptual 
framework (Quinlan et al., 2015). The research process was divided into three phases 
(Figure 4.4). The first phase was a framework development phase which attempted to 
identify the link between the COQ and capabilities for failure mitigation literature, the 
position in the industry participants’ view and the research gap. The second phase was a 
developed case study phase, which detailed a sample of multi-case study in confirming 
the status of operational failure quality cost within construction company participants and 
then further examined the causes of operational failure. This included refining the 
understanding of COQ and capabilities for failure mitigation in its integration with 
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project and quality management to mitigate failure through a series of workshops with 
Delphi experts. Finally, the third phase provides a discussion of the findings and 
evaluation of theory development.  
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Figure 4.4: Methodological framework (Source: Author’s own) 
Study C (iii) - Identifying the causes and operational outcomes of issues 
Phase 2 interviews (n = 19)
Aim and objectives
Quality management, COQ and failure literature 
Study C -Infrastructure client case studies 
Operational quality issues within single client organization 
Conclusions and contributions
Draw cross-case conclusion, comparison with existing theory 
and development of new theory
CHAPTER 1 - Introduction, background, aim 
and objectives
CHAPTER 4 – Methodology 
CHAPTER 5 – COQ framework 
development and application
Conforming the status of knowledge 
about COQ failure in the 
construction participants based on 
participants views
CHAPTER 7 – Discussions 
CHAPTER 8 – Conclusions
Phase 1 –Framework development
Phase 2 –Developed case study
Phase 3 –Findings and theory building
CHAPTER 2 and 3 - Literature review and 
acknowledgement of gap
Study A- Categorising and defining 
external failure quality cost elements
Workshop (n=5)
Steering group discussions (n=6-12)
Research philosophy, design and methodology 
Study B (i) - Call to action on major 
project quality failure 
Trial survey (n=25) 
Project based, project failure and capability literature
Study B (ii) - Measuring cost of quality in major construction projects 
post-handover 
Industry-based questionnaire (n=17) 
Study C (i) - Exploring the operational issues sample 
Delphi review:
Quality manager (n=1)
Operational team project selection  (n=2)
Detail knowledge on specific projects (n=4) 
Advance knowledge on potential projects (n=2)
Final cases selection workshop (n=3)
Study C (ii) - Identifying project sample within specific projects 
Phase 1 interviews (n=7)
Project managers across projects A-E
Project A 
(n=4)
Project B 
(n=2)
Project C
(n=5)
Project D
(n=2)
Project E
(n=6)
CHAPTER 6 – Infrastructure client 
case studies
Study C (iv) - Advancing finding from project operational failure 
Phase 3 - workshop 1 (n=2)
Workshop 2 (n=2)
Study B (iii)- Quantifying quality cost failure in major construction 
projects post-handover 
Projects multi-case study  
Understanding the COQ within 
owner organisation and its links 
to operational failure projects 
Exploring the emergence causes of 
operational failure 
Validating and generalising the 
extent of operational failure in 
capabilities cycle model–
developed framework
Acknowledging existing 
knowledge and identifying 
practical problems 
Developing external failure 
COQ framework for 
construction scope 
Quantifying the range of 
COQ failure in construction 
projects 
Proposed new strategic approach of 
project and quality management to 
failure mitigation and 
recommendation for future studiesCHAPTER 9 – Recommendations Recommendations
Reflect 
 87 
The research was designed and supported by the Chartered Quality Institute (CQI 
ConSIG group) with the aim of understanding Cost of Quality in the UK construction 
industry to reduce the operational quality costs. A case study protocol was used in 
generating data to help ensure reliability (Yin, 2003) with the use of an abductive mixed-
method grounded theory approach. It provides greater benefits to best deal with 
construction complexity and considers human factors and social context (Quinlan et al., 
2015) to further explore COQ and elaborate on the empirical application within an 
overarching view of the complex inter-organisational network. The case study research 
method included a workshop, surveys, interviews and various data analysis methods, in 
which the author worked closely with one of the experts who has great involvement in the 
owner organisation and the project environment. An expert Delphi review has been used 
in selecting all samples for both survey and interviews.  
4.4.2 Phase 1 – Framework development  
The initial concept guiding the research process was the cost of quality in the construction 
industry focusing on operational failure quality cost and, secondly, on the area of the 
construction supply network examining collaborative working with practical practices. As 
a starting point, this phase involved a critical review in these two fields with a 
combination of literature review, steering group discussions, workshop and trial 
questionnaire conducted by the author with the Chartered Quality Institute (CQI ConSIG 
group) to develop the new COQ framework that links quality cost to the organisation 
system and knowledge. This literature and the steering group discussions have 
demonstrated the initial model of COQ presented in Chapter 5 and informed how this 
may be perceived by the construction industry. In appraising the operational failure and 
its quality cost, the COQ model developed has been used in validating the operational 
failure quality cost elements. Thirteen operational failure quality cost elements have been 
identified, used and tested throughout the study (Figure 4.5). During this phase, quality 
elements in the model were used to categorise the operational failure and its quality cost 
in extracting data. The model was further defined and categorised in each study stage.  
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Figure 4.5: The COQ field and classification of quality cost elements (Sources: Author’s 
own)  
In this phase, Study A consisted of a workshop conducted with CQI group 
members (n=5). A card-sorting methodology (Jahrami, 2012) was used to classify the 
quality cost elements (e.g. to show dependence and interrelatedness). Participants were 
first asked to indicate (through sorting) which organisation positions accrued costs related 
to each operational failure quality cost element (based on their experience), then think 
about how groups could be categorised. Different categorisations were then discussed and 
notes were taken.  
Study B (i) involved a web-based survey that investigated the respondents’ 
experience of operational failure and its quality cost and their perceptions on COQ, and 
was used to gain an understanding of various owner and supplier influences on 
operational failure quality cost. The survey was distributed to a selected sample within 
the industry-based experts. Data was collected from 25 respondents – advisors (n=2), 
suppliers (n=4) main contractors (n=9) and owners (n=10) – in the UK construction 
industry who mainly had responsibility for multiple assets (rather than a single one-off 
project), and the value of these assets ranged from £400m to £5billion per annum. 
Study B (ii) included a second questionnaire which was then sent to 17 quality 
managers selected from amongst the industry-based experts, both owners (n=10) and their 
supply and operator network (n=7), who had experience with operational failure to test 
and validate the constructed elements. This pilot study is to show the various 
categorisations of operational failure quality cost elements and explore the complex 
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nature of the measurement of operational failure quality cost through the construction 
supply and operator network. The perception and influence of construction participants in 
relation to operational failure and its quality cost elements were analysed.  
4.4.3 Phase 2 – Developed case study  
Following on from the first phase, samples were characterised and re-defined within the 
wider industry context for comparison with the responses from the case study. A range of 
construction industry stakeholders and experts were selected and classified according to a 
supply and operator network framework to suit the interviews.  
In the second phase, this research involved one of the most well-known, 
intelligent owner in the UK infrastructure sector to look at how complex product system 
capabilities are managed in capturing and reducing operational failure quality cost. 
During this phase, the research methodology process was summarised into three phases: 
first to understand and appraise the operational failure quality elements; second to explore 
the causes of operational failure within specific projects; and lastly to develop a strategic 
project and quality management approach to integrated capabilities in failure mitigation 
(Figure 4.6). 
 
Figure 4.6: The study C methodology process (Sources: Author’s own) 
The sample population ranged from operations and asset managers, owner quality 
directors and managers, contractors and consultant project/commercial managers, to 
designers and technical staff/specialists. Infrastructure owner multi-case study were 
conducted with three sessions of Delphi review (n=9) to select the most appropriate 
projects with operational failure, final selection of projects with operational failure 
workshop (n=3), stage two interviews (n=7) in identifying the project sample within the 
specific projects and, during the third stage, semi-structured interviews with the project 
supply and operator network (n=19). The Delphi reviewed selection helped to identify 
five projects that had costs incurred within all operational failure quality cost elements 
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and seven project managers from each project were interviewed to understand the 
operational quality issues and costs incurred as a result of the operational issues. During 
the second stage interviews, using the card-sorting method, interviewees were asked to 
select the cost elements which they believed to be incurred in each specific case, the 
estimated cost of those selected elements and others who were involved with the 
operational issues. This was to see how the project context and structure influenced 
operational delivery and quality, and finally to understand the cause of operational quality 
issues (failures). This method was then repeated with the interviewees during the third 
stage of interviews. 
A retrospective perspective was abstracted from all five of the projects in the 
multi-case study in appraising the nature of COQ in the construction industry and thus 
provide insight into the project-specific complexity of the supply and operator network in 
relation to failure elements (in building an in-depth qualitative examination) to develop 
the strategic project and quality management approach for integrated capabilities for 
failure mitigation. The first stage of interviews led to a snowball sampling to find 
additional expert project participants. The occurrence of quality issues (operational failure 
and its quality cost elements) was explored during the initial stage of interviews to gain 
understanding of the characteristics and the relationships with quality cost elements. 
Thus, the author used unstructured observation and note-taking activities during the semi-
structured interviews with a cross-section of project participants to gain understanding 
and opinions (Fellows & Liu, 2008). All activities, including informal conversations, 
were summarised and recorded in field notes and a research diary.  
The multi-case study thus provided relevant information on the development of 
capabilities for failure mitigation theory relating to the existence of quality issue, quality 
cost, capabilities in project and operations, and their relevance to the construction 
collaborators. This was gathered on the basis of the author’s assumption, with rich 
information gained through the expert consultations (Gay et al., 2009). With 
consideration of the viability of the case, earlier informal interviews showed strong 
willingness, experience and knowledge of the cost of quality phenomenon, which 
supports their full understanding and commitment during the multi-case study. 
Qualitative research multi-case study offer a useful means of answering ‘how’ and ‘why’ 
questions (Gay et al., 2009) that require systematic arrangement. Therefore, following 
Yin (2003) during this phase, the definition of the key elements and the selection of cases 
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together with clear units of analysis was justified. However, the concept and content 
including level of analysis emerged during the justification of findings phase. 
4.4.4  Phase 3 – Findings 
In the third phase, the author conducted rigorous multi-case study and collected data to 
answer the how, what and why questions. This study was built on multi-case study (Gill 
& Johnson, 2002) relating to projects with different characteristics. In research, the 
majority of multi-case study rely on confidentiality to persuade participants to disclose 
information (Gill & Johnson, 2002). During this phase, a reflection on the whole data 
collection was thought to contribute to the practical concerns within the organisation 
(Taggart, 2014) in terms of how learning from quality issues can further integrate project 
and quality management to improve collaboration, thus mitigating operational failures.  
Phase 3 involved two workshops (n=4) which each lasted between two and three, 
in validating and generalising the overall findings from phases one and two. The expert 
was used to help in generalising the findings into the broader project context. Steering 
group discussion was also used throughout the whole research process in advancing, 
confirming and generalising the data gathered within all phases of study. This provided 
the opportunity for the author to compare and advance the findings to provide greater 
clarification to elicit further project context or situation-specific details in defining the 
new, emergent empirical data.   
Data analysis was carried out to synthesise the substantial amount of diverse 
qualitative data produced. A flexible design approach was selected to manage the data. 
The author rigorously examined both the qualitative and quantitative data in adherence to 
the grounded theory. The method involved ‘assessment from experiences’ and ‘the use of 
calculations’ (Olawale & Sun, 2015). In analysing multi-case study, a cross-site analysis 
was used (Gay et al., 2009) to provide interpretations on the data and to make comparison 
of arguments (Stake, 2006). The quantitative medium of the case study was to strengthen 
the breadth of the data and analysis in addressing the research questions on the 
investigation of COQ, as an advanced project and quality management approach to 
develop integrated capabilities in failure mitigation and to make a contribution to 
knowledge.  
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4.5 Research Design  
4.5.1 The selection of the research design 
Research design allows framework development (Bryman, 2012) to provide guidance 
about all facets of the study (Creswell, 2009), beginning with philosophical ideas towards 
the data collection and analysis procedures. Mainly, research design is the decision-
making about the data required (Naoum, 2013), to suit the data selection technique and 
the decision about the data analysis method. This research was influenced by many 
factors, including the context of quality cost, quality management, supply network 
practicality and its management with philosophical perspectives to design the research 
method and data collection. Usually in social qualitative research, quantitative and mixed-
methods are the command methods used (Creswell, 2009). The following table provides a 
summary of the quantitative, qualitative and mixed-methods before they are further 
elaborated. 
Table 4.1: Quantitative, qualitative and mixed-method procedures 
Quantitative Method Qualitative Method Mixed-Method 
Pre-determined  Emergent method Both pre-determined and 
emergent methods 
Instrument-based 
questions 
Open-ended questions Both open- and closed- 
ended questions  
Performance data, 
attitude data, 
observational data and 
census data 
Interview data, 
observation data, 
document data and audio-
visual data 
Multiple forms of data 
drawing on all 
possibilities  
Statistical analysis Themes, patterns 
interpretation 
Across-database 
interpretation 
Source: Creswell (2009, p.17) 
4.5.2  Quantitative and qualitative  
Quantitative methods are often used when the information is not abstract, hard and 
reliable (Naoum, 2013). This includes uses of post-positivist claims (Creswell, 2009) in 
understanding the application of COQ in construction. Quantitative research thus 
typically undertakes an objective approach to focus on measurement of quantity, the 
analysis of numerical data and the causal relationships between variables (Creswell, 
2009). In this research, a questionnaire was used to quantify the perceptions of industry 
participants in relation to each operational failure quality cost element. A deductive mode 
was used to develop and validate the questionnaire with initial hypotheses concerning 
why COQ was ignored and difficult to apply in the construction industry, and helped to 
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clarify the relationships amongst all operational failure quality cost elements. Yin (2009) 
stated that the findings from a quantitative study are easily understood and presented. 
Quantitative research is thus defined by Kerlinger (1977) cited in (Rowell, 1997 p.125) 
as: 
…the theory and method of analysing quantitative and obtained from samples of 
observations in order to study and compare sources of variance of phenomena. 
In contrast, qualitative research is said to be ‘subjective’ in nature (Naoum, 2013) 
and focuses on the qualities of entities as well as the meanings and interpretations of 
words (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). It can be classified into two areas (Creswell, 2009), 
which are exploratory and attitudinal research. Exploratory is used when knowledge is 
limited while attitudinal is used subjectively in evaluating a person’s opinion, view or 
perceptions of a particular object (Naoum, 2013). In qualitative research methods, the 
initial process focuses on exploring and collecting data through various techniques 
(interviews, case studies and ethnography) followed by analyses of data inductively and 
so towards a holistic understanding of the subject (Fellows & Liu, 2008). Thus, the 
placement of the theory can be at the end of the research process as it emerges during the 
data collection and analysis process (Rowell, 1997).  
Qualitative data is said to be attractive (Miles & Huberman, 1994); it provides 
well-grounded, rich descriptions and explanations of processes in a local context. Thus, 
researchers are allowed to preserve chronological flow, assess local causality and derive 
fruitful explanations. To simplify, qualitative research is defined in (Strauss & Corbin, 
1998, p.11) as: 
 … Nonmathematical process of interpretation carried out for the purpose of 
discovering concept and relationship in raw and the organizing these into a 
theoretical explanatory scheme.  
4.5.3  Mixed-method design  
A mixed-method design is a combination of both quantitative and qualitative approaches 
(Creswell, 2009). It is best used to generalise the findings into a population for the 
development of a detailed view of a phenomenon or concept for individuals. The study 
usually begins with a broad survey to generalise the results (to a population and 
determine the focus), and then, in the second phases, detailed qualitative, open-ended 
interviews will be used to collect detailed views from participants (Creswell, 2009). Gay 
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et al. (2009) state that this approach is used not to replace either of the two approaches 
but rather so that they can complement each other, by drawing from strengths and 
minimising the weaknesses of each single research study. A mixed-method was used to 
contextualise the relationship between the two; thus, at the exploratory stage it was used 
to first establish a number of propositions which were later tested in the quantitative stage 
(Naoum, 2013) of the multi-case study. This has been seen as exploratory (Plano Clark & 
Creswell, 2008) or, on the other hand, the researcher may use a parallel study design, 
which is both qualitative and quantitative and is carried out concurrently (Creswell, 
2009).  
  The use of mixed-methods in construction research is currently gaining in 
popularity (Creswell, 2009) and has proven to improve validity and reliability of the 
research outcomes (Zou et al., 2014). It is further explained in Zou et al. (2014) but is 
subject to criticism, in which critics argue that this method carries different 
epistemological commitments and may not be merged. Some have also suggested that 
both quantitative and qualitative methods are not rooted in separate paradigms and thus 
should be used separately. If the findings are contradictory, it may also lead to confusion 
(Dainty, 2008), yet Creswell et al. (2008) suggested that collecting additional data or 
reanalysing the original data may be useful to achieve satisfactory results. Thus, the 
researcher can gain benefits from both techniques, instead of being restricted by the use 
of a single one (Plano Clark & Creswell, 2008; Bryman, 2012).  
4.5.4 The selected research design  
In this research, a mixed-method was used combining both qualitative and quantitative 
methods to understand the COQ approach in relation to construction projects and thus to 
appraise the existence of operational failures. This has further helped the development of 
a strategic project and quality management approach for the owner and multi-
organisational supply and operator network to mitigate the occurrences of failure. As 
noted in Zou et al. (2014), greater use of mixed-methods provides benefits particularly as 
it is oriented towards human factors and the social context of management within the 
construction sector. To explain the complexity of the construction industry dealings with 
COQ and the capabilities to mitigate failures, a mixed-method approach helped establish 
the research aim in understanding the interrelationship of the construction supply network 
with the existence of operational failure quality cost. The research objectives are then to 
be further elaborated in an empirical application within an overarching framework of 
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current quality and project management, thus allowing more comprehensive data to be 
obtained through two approaches.  
However, the use of qualitative and quantitative arms can also be applied either 
sequentially or concurrently (Griensven et al., 2014). In this study, an exploratory method 
was first used to deal with various elements in COQ to understand the status and nature of 
operational failure quality cost within complex projects. The quantitative approach 
quantified the perceptions of construction participants towards the operational failure 
quality elements within the quality cost area. The use of this quantitative concept helped 
to reinforce the later qualitative research (Creswell, 2009) in further investigating the root 
cause behind operational failure and its quality issues, and thus led to the development of 
new integrated and collaborative management of capabilities in mitigating failures. 
Therefore, the aim of Phase 2 of the qualitative research was thus used to understand, 
represent and explain where and who is responsible for the operational failure quality cost 
in responding to the main research aim and objectives.  
4.6 Research methodology  
4.6.1 Overview of the research methodology 
There are many different methodologies in social research (Quinlan et al., 2015), as per 
Table 4.2. The methodologies are used to show how the research was conducted and what 
philosophical assumptions underpin the research. The research strategies selected in this 
thesis are survey, case study and grounded theory, which are explained in the following 
sub-sections.   
Table 4.2: List of research methodologies 
Survey Life history 
Case Study Phenomenology 
Experiment design Narrative analysis 
Ethnography Semiotics 
Action research Attitude research 
Grounded theory Image-based research 
Content analysis Archival analysis 
Discourse analysis Textual analysis 
Documentary analysis Meta-analysis 
Historical analysis Feminist research 
Source: Quinlan et al. (2015, p.145) 
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4.6.2 Survey 
Surveys tend to be either quantitative research projects or largely quantitative research 
projects that are quantitative with some qualitative elements (Quinlan et al., 2015). 
Quantitative research that includes qualitative elements gives additional information that 
needs interpretation of meanings and explanations from words and images to develop an 
understanding of social constructs (Ahmed et al., 2016). Largely quantitative research 
depends on measurement with numbers and analysis with statistical procedures (Quinlan 
et al., 2015). This strategy uses exploratory and descriptive research with a deductive 
method (Plano Clark & Creswell, 2008). As mentioned earlier, this thesis used a survey in 
combination with quantitative and qualitative questions at the beginning of the research to 
achieve the initial objectives in the exploratory stage to help ascertain the COQ and the 
capabilities for failure mitigation approach in construction quality and projects.  
However, in conducting a survey, there are two major errors, random sampling 
and systematic error (Quinlan et al., 2015), that need to be considered during the research 
design stage. The questionnaire used probability sampling that was established through 
the members of the steering group (CQI ConSIG group) to permit statistical inferences 
for the subsequent phases. The questionnaire was discussed with the experts from the 
steering group to ensure clarity of the questions and gain information about any 
deficiencies and suggestions for improvement (Gay et al., 2009). As explained in Quinlan 
et al. (2015), random problematic sampling could lead to statistical error by chance 
variation in the sample selected. Thus, probability sampling is oriented to the 
development of idiographic knowledge, as a generalisation from samples to populations 
(Sandelowski, 2000). In this way, the use of quantitative data was to measure quality 
elements’ perspective descriptively around the construction supply network and 
consequently to validate COQ within the existing literature.  
Accordingly, in order to answer the research questions (who, what, why, how and 
where?), it is important that the content and structure of what is being measured is being 
considered. Qualitative research is thus best used with the aim of understanding the 
population’s emotion, as attitudes and perceptions exist within the knowledge that is 
measured. Initially, a questionnaire and interview survey was used to understand the 
divergence of COQ knowledge and help to develop and clarify the sample, thus 
narrowing the subject. A follow-up questionnaire was then used specifically with quality 
managers in industry and with the case study specifically to provide robust insight into 
the status of operational failure quality cost.  
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4.6.3 Case study 
This methodology is an extensive examination that is conducted in a single or few 
instances of a phenomenon within a real-life context (Yin, 2009). Case study research can 
be located in a bounded entity, specific space or place, or in a particular incident (Quilan 
et al., 2015). Moreover, it is used to generate in-depth understanding of a situation, 
relationship, experiences or processes, and other sets of issues occurring in an 
organisational setting (Yin, 2009). The use of a case study will draw on qualitative or 
quantitative data, or on a mixture of both (Gay et al., 2009). The strength of using a case 
study is that the author will be able to use various techniques in collecting data, such as 
documentation, interviews, direct observation, archival records and questionnaires 
(Saunders et al., 2009) to generate more empirical data.  
 This thesis used a case study as explanatory (when real-life is too complex for a 
survey or experimental strategies), exploratory (those situations in which the intervention 
being evaluated has no clear, single set of outcomes) and descriptive (to describe an 
intervention or phenomenon and the real-life context in which it occurred) work to 
investigate the problems. Based on Figure 4.7, a case study can be conducted either in 
simple single-case (holistic) design, single case (embedded) design, multiple-case study 
(holistic) design or multiple-case (embedded) design. 
 
Figure 4.7: Basic types of case study design (Source: Yin, 2003) 
 This study adopted a single case organisation with multiple projects for the multi-
case study. The study provides cases from a UK infrastructure single-owner organisation, 
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and comprises buildings, a water treatment plant and a runway project within the airport 
construction industry. Multi-case study was selected based on a number of reasons, with 
one most important element being the ease of access. As one of the major owners in the 
UK construction industry, this organisation provides a significant sample of operational 
failures involving a multi-tier network organisation with the supply and operator network 
and complex processes for the operational programmes. Engagement with this will thus 
better illuminate the existence of operational failure and provide sufficient articulation 
across the project process including execution. 
Once the case had been determined, it was important to consider the additional 
components such as the application of the conceptual framework (Miles & Huberman, 
1994); development of research questions (‘how’ and ‘why’); logic linking data to 
propositions; and the criteria for interpreting findings (Yin, 2003) that will lead to the 
obtainment of explanations for the complexities of real-life situations (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). Although the projects are operated within the same organisation 
structure, different failures occurred. The failures occurred with different contexts that 
involved massive cost, systems and people. Thus, multiple cases provide a stronger effect 
(Yin, 2003), yet each case must be carefully selected. This methodology and the case 
study characteristics are further described in Chapter 6.   
4.6.4 Grounded theory 
Grounded theory is used when the specific research aim is to build a theory from the 
emergence of data (Quinlan et al., 2015). As a main methodology for this research, this 
thesis began with an inductive approach (when little is known about the research 
phenomenon) to appraise the COQ during construction post-handover, which is also 
known as operational failure quality cost. Although the COQ field has long been 
introduced in the construction industry, the high occurrence of failure raises the important 
questions of why, how and what contributes the most to its existence. Generally, grounded 
theory focuses on social processes or actions (Sbaraini et al., 2011); it asks about what 
happens and how people interact. The research aimed to understand why failures mainly 
occurred post-handover, considering the unique and complex construction projects; the 
research thus explored what had happened and how the construction supply network 
responded to the failure. The research later developed a strategic project and quality 
management approach to failure mitigation to understand how different capabilities were 
distributed in different phases of a project lifecycle.  
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In grounded theory, the literature review is either short or absent. A short 
literature review may be acceptable as little is known about the phenomenon under 
investigation (Quinlan et al., 2015), yet sometimes it is difficult for the researcher to find 
a relevant literature review in the specific area (Charmaz, 2014). Studying the literature 
review gives researchers preconceived ideas about what is to be found in the data. In this 
thesis, a narrow literature review of the COQ was conducted, followed by a focus on 
failure specifying operational failure quality cost, which was then further explored within 
the multi-case study investigation to develop the strategic approach of integrated 
capabilities for failure mitigating. This allowed theory to be generated from data and thus 
led to the concluding chapter that is theoretically rich.  
Creswell (2009, p.14) declared that grounded theory helps a researcher to “derive 
a general, abstract theory of a process, action, or interaction grounded in the view of 
participants”. There is also a strong relationship between data collection, analysis and 
eventual theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). In this strategy, there are two central features: 
development of theory out of data and an iterative approach (repeated back to data and 
engaged with the process of continuous meaning-making and progressive focusing 
inherent to analysis processes). Grounded theory was developed by Barney Glaser and 
Anselm Strauss (1967), who later split on their understanding of the methodology. Glaser 
and Strauss sees grounded theory as quantitative and qualitative or a mixture of both, 
while Strauss and Corbin (1997) only presented qualitative as the methodology within the 
research strategy. Despite these two variants, Kathy Charmaz later introduced 
‘Constructivist Grounded Theory’ and argued that: “neither data nor theories are 
discovered either as given in the data or the analysis” (Charmaz, 2014, p. 17). In other 
words, to make grounded theorising visible and to keep it flexible and heuristic, abductive 
inference is accepted as the means of grounded theory (Coffey & Atkinson 1996; Kelle 
1995). 
The application of abduction in grounded theory is that it helps: 
…to explain new and surprising empirical data through the elaboration, 
modification, or combination of pre-existing concepts. Within this context, the 
theoretical knowledge and pre-conceptions of the researcher must not be omitted. 
(Kelle, 1995, p.34). 
Referring to Charmaz’s (2006) principle, the concept provides a place to begin 
rather than ending the research; thus, it is not necessary to have hypotheses early in the 
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process. With this concept, abductive iterative-grounded theory was adopted to allow 
more flexibility within the hypothetically deductive research, theoretical knowledge and 
pre-conceptions of high recurrence of operational failure quality cost within the 
construction supply network. This thus serves as a heuristic tool for the construction of 
concepts which then can be elaborated and modified on the basis of empirical data (Kelle, 
1995). This includes understanding how to reduce the existence of operational failure 
quality cost, where the cost lies, and who is associated with the costs, which leads to a 
more pragmatic approach in deriving measure and metrics and applying them in a specific 
setting to evaluate to what extent the quality cost can be measured and reduced if the 
occurrences are to be universally understood.  
The complexity in the construction supply network project ascribed to non-
standardisation of the quality cost definition, system and its quantification is understood 
to be related to the uniqueness of each construction project. Thus, the research problem 
can only be understood with an investigation into the social process that allows the 
development of theory within the study of the phenomenon itself. Table 4.3 below lists 
the fundamental components of a grounded theory study and how these components may 
appear in different combinations in different studies, and these components were mostly 
adopted in this thesis. 
Table 4.3: Fundamental components of a grounded theory study (Source: Sbaraini et al., 
2011, p.3) 
Components Stage Description Sources 
Openness  
 
Throughout 
the study  
 
Grounded theory methodology emphasises 
inductive analysis. Deduction is the usual 
form of analytic thinking in medical 
research. Deduction moves from the 
general to the particular: it begins with pre-
existing hypotheses or theories, and collects 
data to test those theories. In contrast, 
induction moves from the particular to the 
general: it develops new theories or 
hypotheses from many observations. 
Grounded theory particularly emphasises 
induction. This means that grounded theory 
studies tend to take a very open approach to 
the process being studied. The emphasis of 
a grounded theory study may evolve as it 
becomes apparent to the researchers what is 
important to the study participants.  
Bryant & 
Charmaz (2007, 
pp.1-3, 15,16,43- 
46); Glaser & 
Strauss, (1967, 
pp. 2-6); Charmaz 
(2006, pp. 4-21)  
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Analysing 
immediately  
 
Analysis and 
data 
collection  
 
In a grounded theory study, the researchers 
do not wait until the data is collected before 
commencing analysis; rather, analysis must 
commence as soon as possible, and 
continue in parallel with data collection, to 
allow theoretical sampling (see below).  
Bryant & 
Charmaz (2007, 
pp.12,13, 301); 
Glaser & Strauss 
(1967, pp.102); 
Charmaz (2006, 
pp. 20)  
Coding and 
comparing  
 
Analysis  
 
Data analysis relies on coding – a process 
of breaking data down into much smaller 
components and labelling those 
components – and comparing – comparing 
data with data, case with case, event with 
event, code with code – to understand and 
explain variation in the data. Codes are 
eventually combined and related to one 
another – at this stage they are more 
abstract, and are referred to as categories or 
concepts.  
Bryant & 
Charmaz (2007, 
pp. 80,81 265-
289); Glaser & 
Strauss, (1967, 
pp.101-115); 
Charmaz, (2006, 
pp.42-7)  
Memo-
writing 
(sometimes 
also drawing 
diagrams)  
Analysis  The analyst writes many memos throughout 
the project. Memos can be about events, 
cases, categories or relationships between 
categories. Memos are used to stimulate 
and record the analysts’ developing 
thinking, including the comparisons made 
(see above). 
Bryant & 
Charmaz (2007, 
pp. 245-264,281, 
282,302); Glaser 
& Strauss (1967, 
pp. 108,112); 
Charmaz (2006, 
pp. 72-95)  
Theoretical 
sampling  
 
Sampling 
and data 
collection  
 
Theoretical sampling is central to grounded 
theory design. A theoretical sample is 
informed by coding, comparison and 
memo-writing. Theoretical sampling is 
designed to serve the developing theory. 
Analysis raises questions, suggests 
relationships, highlights gaps in the existing 
data set and reveals what the researchers do 
not yet know. By carefully selecting 
participants and by modifying the questions 
asked in data collection, the researchers fill 
gaps, clarify uncertainties, test their 
interpretations and build their emerging 
theory. 
Bryant & 
Charmaz (2007, 
pp. 304, 305, 
611); Glaser & 
Strauss (1967, pp. 
45-77); Charmaz 
(2006, pp. 96-
122)  
Theoretical 
saturation  
Sampling, 
data 
collection 
and analysis  
Qualitative researchers generally seek to 
reach ‘saturation’ in their studies. Often this 
is interpreted as meaning that the 
researchers are hearing nothing new from 
participants. In a grounded theory study, 
theoretical saturation is sought. This is a 
subtly different form of saturation, in which 
all of the concepts in the substantive theory 
being developed are well understood and 
can be substantiated from the data.  
Bryant & 
Charmaz (2007, 
pp. 306, 
281,611); Glaser 
& Strauss (1967, 
pp. 111-113); 
Charmaz (2006, 
pp. 114, 115)  
Production 
of a 
substantive 
Analysis and 
interpretation  
The results of a grounded theory study are 
expressed as a substantive theory; that is, as 
a set of concepts that are related to one 
Bryant & 
Charmaz (2007, 
pp. 14,25); Glaser 
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theory  another in a cohesive whole. As in most 
science, this theory is considered to be 
fallible, dependent on context and never 
completely final.  
& Strauss (1967, 
pp.21-43); 
Charmaz (2006, 
pp.123-150)  
 
4.7 Research sample  
4.7.1 Sample and sampling method 
The population and the sample selected from the population are fundamental aspects of 
this research framework. A sample is a subset of a larger population (Bryman, 2008) or a 
representative of the population (Quinlan et al., 2015). In general, a researcher does not 
possess complete information about the characteristics of the research population due to 
many factors such as confidentiality, lack of time, lack of access or cost, and the fact it is 
time consuming. Therefore, the determination of sample size is crucial (Fellows & Liu, 
2008). Sampling can be classified into two types, probability and non-probability sample 
(Bryman, 2008) – see Table 4.4.   
Table 4.4: Classification of sampling  
Probability 
sample  
 A sampling technique in which units of the population have a known, non-
zero probability of selection. The outcome is more likely to be a 
representative sample. 
Techniques: simple random sampling (the most basic form, where each 
sampling unit has an equal chance of being included in the sample), stratified 
sampling (simple random sub-sample that shared the same characteristic 
within the populations), systematic sampling (starting point is selected 
randomly followed by every nth number on the list selected) and cluster 
sampling (sampling is carried out by randomly selecting a sample of the 
clusters to study, rather than randomly selecting the population).  
Non-probability 
sample  
A sampling technique in which units of the sample are selected on the basis 
of personal judgement or convenience. Essentially, some units in the 
population are more likely to be selected than others.  
Techniques: include judgmental sampling (judgement or purposive sampling 
techniques where the researcher decides, or makes judgement on who or what 
to include in the sample), quota sampling (the researcher develops a sample 
of participants for the research using different quota criteria), snowball 
sampling (the researcher finds one participant in the research and that 
participant will lead to the next participant) and convenience sampling (the 
researcher engages those participants who are most conveniently available).  
Source: Adopted and developed from Bryman (2008) and Quinlan et al. (2015) 
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4.7.2 Establishing samples for Phase 1 and Phase 2  
This whole research was designed and supported by The Chartered Quality Institute (CQI 
ConSIG group). Phase 1 included a workshop, questionnaires and steering group 
discussion. The Study A workshop involved construction experts (both owner and their 
supply network: a quality manager, quality consultant, two contractors and owner) within 
different sectors of project-based firms (n=5) to show the various categorisation of 
operational failure and its quality cost elements, and explored the complex nature of its 
measurement through the construction supply network.  
 Study B (i) was a survey that investigated the respondents’ experience of 
operational failure quality cost and enterprise perceptions in COQ and to understand 
various owner and supplier influences on operational failure. Data was collected from 25 
respondents – advisors (n=2), suppliers (n=3) main contractors (n=2) and owners (n=7) – 
in the UK construction industry who mainly had responsibility for multiple assets (rather 
than a single one-off project) and the value of these assets ranged from £400m to 
£5billion per annum.  
Study B (ii) was a second, web-based survey, issued to quality managers (n=17) 
from owners and contractors in the UK construction industry who have experience of 
more than 50 projects ranging from PFI (n=10), private sector (n=5) and central 
government (n=2) projects. Half of the participants had experience within airport 
construction, and five others within railways and hospitals.  
In conjunction with study C, a case study protocol was used in generating data, to 
help ensure reliability (Yin, 2003) and provide greater benefits to best deal with 
construction complexity that consists of human factors and social contexts (Quinlan et al., 
2015) to further explore COQ and the capabilities for failure mitigation, and elaborate on 
its empirical application within an overarching owner organisation of the complex inter-
organisational network. The Phase 2 case study research method includes a workshop, 
survey, interviews and various data analysis methods, in which the author worked closely 
with one of the experts who has great involvement in the owner organisation and the 
project environment. Consequently, an expert Delphi review has been used in selecting 
all samples for both surveys and interviews.  
4.7.3 Establishing samples of project multi-case study 
In this thesis, with a combinations of non-probability sampling techniques, purposive 
sampling was used to find participants from owner construction projects who had 
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experience with operational failures. A sector-specific project was selected after expert 
consultation as well as the expert steering group recommendation at the beginning of the 
research stage. The sample was selected according to the project timeline, project 
relevance, participant support, access consent and explicit expertise available within the 
research area. A Delphi technique allows reliable consensus from experts (Okoli & 
Pawlowski, 2003) and was used in selecting the most eligible samples for case study 
purposes. The Delphi review involved experts who were interested in exploring and 
discovering what is actually known or not known about the operational failure quality 
cost. 
The aim of this Delphi review was to select the most eligible projects to form the case 
study sample. The author worked actively with a quality manager who was also a 
representative of the research steering group (a total of 15 meetings from May 2015- May 
2018). Her position in the project management office team provided information and 
supported the collaborative selection of the samples and the information for the case 
study. From initial enquiries, expert knowledge was most frequently found in the building 
control team. Therefore, a few meetings were set up with this team to identify and discuss 
projects that would provide the most insight for the research. These meetings are further 
described in chronological order:  
1. Two hours of meeting with the head of the building control team (n=2): the 
purpose of this meeting was to seek advice on the project selection. The aim and 
objectives of the study were explained and the signed non-disclosure agreement 
(NDA) was discussed.  
2. Variation of 1-2 hours’ discussions made with the building control team (n=4) to 
help obtain more knowledge about specific projects. The building control team 
provided a list of 18 potential projects and key contacts.  
3. A one-hour interview with the quality manager and a delivery director (n=2) who 
offered to share knowledge on one potential project. He further explained about 
the potential case and person to contact.  
Following these project identification and key contact identification meetings, the 
author worked with the quality manager to best classify projects into operational failure 
quality cost elements. A total of 15 emails, four meetings and three document reviews 
contributed to this. This was then validated in a workshop, as described below:  
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4. A two-hour workshop facilitated (n=3) by the author, the quality manger and one 
of the head building control managers was used to validate the findings, with the 
building control team using card sorting. This provided clearer information and 
classification of quality cost elements according to specific case study projects. 
The result of both categorisations for projects with quality costs was determined 
based on: (1) includes best involved experts (still and have been involved with the 
operational failures) and (2) is an excellent informant (has political influence with 
operational failures) samples for the selection of multi-case study.  
The five eligible case study projects were chosen for relevance, opportunity, expert 
availability, timeliness, strong support from top management and ease of access. These 
projects were also selected based on the reasons listed below: 
1. The similarities in organisational structure, yet there was a differential in team 
dynamics. This showed the divergence of each quality issue in relationship to 
similar operations in the organisation. 
2. Five projects were on the different organisational-specific models of tender with 
traditional contract award (no preferred supplier) and long-term partners (three 
years of contract). This showed the owner and multi-organisational supply and 
operator network relationship to the quality issues.  
3. All projects had a similar budget range, which showed that the cases were similar 
in size.  
4. All projects work under the same NEC contract. 
4.7.4  Identification of Study C (ii) Phase 1 interview – expert project 
participants 
Based on these selected projects, an initial sample of seven (n= 7) owner project 
managers for each project were selected for the Study C (ii) Phase 1 interviews – 
identifying the project and operation of commercial, supplier and operational participants 
in the project. This allowed theoretical sampling to address the research questions. This 
initial sample provided the starting point to characterise operational failures and to group 
them according to the operational failure quality cost elements as per the framework 
proposed in Phase 1 – framework development. Semi-structured interviews were 
employed to “learn the respondent’s viewpoint regarding situations relevant to the 
broader research problem” (Blumberg et al., 2008, p.386); thus, a snowball method was 
used to elicit further stakeholder- and situation-specific details when quality issues were 
explored to understand failure. This theoretical sampling (Charmaz, 2014) allowed for the 
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emergence of concepts from the initial data to reach saturation. It helped to delineate and 
develop narratives around quality issues at the operational stage of a project. 
4.7.5 Identification of Study C (iii) Phase 2 interview – expert project 
participants 
Following the above, the snowball sampling provided a series of possible samples and 
convenience sampling was then used to further select interviewees. The interviewees 
were asked about who was involved with specific operational failures to generate further 
insight into the link of operation issues, quality cost and construction supply network. 
Nineteen (n=19) interviews were then conducted within the identified project and 
operational team. Table 4.5 provides a list of interviewee roles. 
Table 4.5: List of participant roles and unique anonymous identifying participant codes   
Projects Project A –
Buildings 
(car park) 
Project B- 
Water 
treatment 
plant  
Project C- 
Infrastructure 
(track transit 
system)  
Project D – 
Building 
escalator   
Project E – 
Infrastructure 
(runway)   
Project and 
operational 
team 
participants 
Owner project 
manager (A1) 
Owner project 
manager (A7) 
Owner project 
engineer 
(A14) 
Owner 
commercial 
manager/ 
contract lead 
(A11) 
Owner 
project 
manager (B2) 
Owner 
maintenance 
manager 
(E18) 
 
Owner project 
manager (C3) 
Owner quality 
manager (C10) 
Contractor 
quality 
manager (C8) 
Contractor 
project 
manager (C9) 
Operation 
engineer (C19) 
 
Owner 
project 
manager 
(D4) 
Owner asset 
manager 
(D15) 
 
Owner project 
manager (E5) 
Owner project 
manager (E6) 
Owner airfield 
transformation 
manager (E12) 
Owner project 
engineer (E13) 
Owner airfield 
senior 
transformation 
led (E16) 
Owner airfield 
senior  
transformation 
led (E17) 
 
Total  4 2 5 2 6 
 
4.8 Data collection method 
4.8.1  Questionnaire 
A questionnaire is one of the most popular data collection methods, as it allows for a 
wider range of participants (Saunders et al., 2009). However, designing a good 
questionnaire is challenging (Love et al., 2002), and it influences the response rate and 
reliability of data collection (Fellows & Liu, 2008). This method was used through a 
highly-structured questionnaire where respondents were required to tick boxes and 
answer some open-ended questions in generating quantitative descriptive views of the 
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industry-based perceptions in relation to operational failure quality elements. In the 
beginning, in order to design the questionnaire, the author decided precisely what data 
was required (Quinlan et al., 2015), which required both time and skill (Gay et al., 2009). 
Generally, literature input was used to construct both structured and unstructured items. A 
pilot test was first sent out to the Chartered Quality Institute (CQI ConSIG) steering 
group members to discovered where questions were unclear or unnecessary, which led to 
information being gained about deficiencies in the questionnaire, as well as suggestions 
for improvement (Gay et al., 2009). Based on the pilot study, a sample was then 
determined using a stratified sample to later select for purposive sampling. This was to 
ensure that the questionnaire result would be generalisable to the population (Gay et al., 
2009).  
4.8.2 Interview 
Interviews are a deliberative discussion between two or more people (Saunders et al., 
2009) in which the researcher is seeking information from the interviewee(s). There are 
three types of interview, as explained by Saunders et al. (2009), which are structured 
interview (based on pre-determined and standardised questions which require short and 
precise answers); semi-structured interview (list of themes and questions that may change 
from interview to interview, used to understand the reasons for the behaviours, opinions 
or decisions of participants); and unstructured interview (informal and contain open-
ended questions; interviewees have the opportunity to express their opinion freely; 
produce rich and large data based on wider questions). Quinlan et al. (2015) classified 
interviews into five different types: the one-to-one interview, the group interview, the 
telephone interview, the online interview and the photo elicitation interview.   
In this study, a semi-structured interview was used in discovering and elaborating 
participant information to appraise the operational failures and discover causes, values, 
benefits and characteristics behind the whole supply network. This method requires the 
author credibility to explore interviewees’ views, attitudes and behaviours in developing 
ideas (Fellows & Liu, 2008), which later were used in shaping the research objectives and 
forming the framework through the grounded theory principle. This is rather appropriate 
when little is known about the study phenomenon or where detailed insights are required 
from individual participants (Gill & Johnson, 2002).  
4.8.3 Steering group discussion  
The steering group was usually conducted with six to 12 people around a table (Table 
4.6). There was one moderator who guided people around the table to focus on a 
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particular topic (Quinlan et al., 2015). In this research, the author was actively working 
with the Chartered Quality Institute (CQI ConSIG) during the whole research process. 
This consisted of 14 meetings of 2-3 hours each. The focus group members ranged from 
UK construction owners, to consultants and contractors. Every activity and data 
collection for the study was discussed, validated, generalised and elaborated upon during 
the meetings. This helped the author to gain advanced understanding of how data 
collected was a reflection of other construction organisations. All discussions and 
observations were noted and kept for data analysis.  
Table 4.6 : Steering group meetings with the Chartered Quality Institute  
Year of study  Date of steering group meeting No of people (n) 
1st year, 2015 13th May 2015  
8th July 2015  
8 
12 
2nd year, 2016 20th Jan 2016  
9th March 2016  
5th May 2016  
21st Sept 2016  
2nd Nov 2016 
7 
8 
8 
5 
7 
3rd year, 2017 18th Jan 2017  
17th May 2017  
21st June 2017  
13th September 2017  
29th November 2017  
9 
7 
6 
6 
8 
4th year, 2018 7th February 2018 
18th April 2018 
6th July 2018 
6 
5 
5 
 
The discussions were conducted on the basis that all information was confidential. 
The author needed to ensure the best quality discussion was obtained during the group 
sessions. A flexible format was used to encourage dialogue amongst the respondents 
during each steering group to ensure the most empirical information was obtained and 
would be helpful to the research. Data was gathered through participant-focused 
discussions (Quinlan et al., 2015) to then produce new knowledge and insight.  
4.8.4 Observation, documentation and other materials 
In addition to the above methods, observations were recorded whenever necessary during 
the research process to gain rich insight on a particular aspect, including directly 
monitoring and evaluating the actions and behaviours of the participants. Field notes or 
diaries were used by the author to keep memos. As mentioned in Table 4.3, in grounded 
theory, memos were used to stimulate and record analysis to developed further thinking. 
Other material, such as organisational management structures, project reports, working 
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programmes and strategies or approaches to procurement and other related materials, that 
increases knowledge concerning the operational failure and COQ within the project, 
system, process and supply network organisations were also studied. The documentation 
was all project specific and was used to support the formulation of framework 
development as well as for references purposes in articulating the findings of this thesis.  
4.9 Data analysis  
Grounded theory requires a coding scheme to enable relevant data to be grouped together 
and involves sense making and understanding of the data to emerge. Consequently, data 
analysis is the most difficult aspect during the research process and needs a mix of 
creative and systematic skills. There are different methods of analysing qualitative data 
depending on the type of data, the method used in collecting the data, the research 
subjects, and the research design and objectives (Saunders et al., 20009).  
Qualitative data can be analysed in four stages (Miles & Huberman, 1994): data 
reduction, data display, conclusion drawing and verification, in which analysis can only 
be completed when the volume of data is organised in a way that is manageable. This 
involves coding the data, dividing the text into small units, assigning labels and then 
grouping the codes into themes. Analysis involved both inductive and abductive 
inferences in a process that involves either subsuming data under existing categories, 
derived from previous research and current policy, or assigning new categories on the 
basis of surprising or unexpected incidents of data. Qualitative data is usually concerned 
with searching for the patterns of various types, to hypothesise relationships by either 
searching from the data or employing theory and literature (Fellows & Lui, 2008).  
In this thesis, the definitions of the COQ concept and operational failure quality 
cost content of the multi-case in this study were determined during the COQ 
categorisation workshop and quality failure framework development phase. The level of 
analysis later emerged during the framework development phases that contributed to the 
wider perspective of project and quality management in failure mitigation through 
integrated capabilities. By this, using the data to search for patterns provided an 
opportunity for the author to see the new and potentially important relationships in the 
data. Thus, the author has scrutinised all transcribed texts of discussions, statements and 
other documentation, looking not only at the content but also the linguistic context. This 
is to establish the meanings, intentions and interpretations of the people concerned 
(Fellows & Lui, 2008). 
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In this study, various methods have been used in analysing different sets of data. 
However, in general, three methods of qualitative data analysis were used. These methods 
are as follows:  
1. Content analysis 
This method is a form of qualitative study focusing on the explicit and implicit meanings 
that surround strategic communications. It provides a quantified analysis of recurring or 
persistent and easily identifiable parts of a text’s content (White & Marsh, 2006), and 
determines the main facets of a set of data by simply counting the number of times an 
activity occurs (Fellows & Liu, 2008). The content analysis method can be defined as 
systematic, using replicable techniques to make inferences about a text, where the notion 
of inference plays an important role in determining the purpose and object of 
methodological study (Krippendorff, 2004). A series of analytical constructs allows the 
researcher to go back and forth between these texts and context to describe the 
phenomena (Hayes & Krippendorff, 2007). Thus, once the data categories have been 
established, a content analysis will yield quantitative data for each content category 
(Fellows & Liu, 2008). Qualitative content analysis was used accordingly for most of the 
data collected during Phase 1 (studies A, B (i) and B (ii)). This yields numerical values of 
the categorised data by rating and ranking participant perception through different 
maturity level and influences of participants’ knowledge about COQ failures. 
Comparisons were later made on the basis of hierarchies of categories. The relationships 
between categories of data and between groups were later examined in answering the 
research aim. The statistical evidence from the qualitative study was used to determine 
the direction of the relationship (causalities) when combined with theory and literature 
(Fellows & Liu, 2008).  
2. Thematic analysis  
This method involves the identification of emerging themes through careful reading and 
re-reading of the data to form a pattern recognition within the dataset (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). Accordingly, assessments were made in face-to-face interviews and 
multi-representative workshops, and all interviews were then professionally transcribed. 
As suggested by Miles and Huberman’s (1994), data was collected, displayed, reduced 
and verified. The analysis used thematic methods that began with several rounds of 
coding transcribed interviews, case-by-case, to abstract and transform the data into 
emerging pattern codes and then into categories. The cases were then mapped through 
concept mapping to provide a clearer explanation of the events that constituted operation 
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failure. Comprehensive literature was ‘constantly compared’ during the coding cycle once 
the first open coding was conducted. This was to allow for the development of theoretical 
ideas in generating second coding that focused on the theoretical constructs. Selective 
coding was then used to generate the core categories from each case to then compare and 
further abstract into higher level of categories that incorporated instances from each case. 
Figure 4.8 summarises the process from codes to theory in performing thematic analysis. 
The development of theory is not always a necessary outcome in qualitative inquiry, as 
pre-existing theories may drive the entire research enterprise (Saldaña, 2016). Therefore, 
referring to Charmaz (2014), grounded theory codes require a cycle of coding to 
understand the analytic issues within each cycle of coding in providing direction to the 
researcher.  
 
Figure 4.8: Analysis process from codes to theory model for qualitative inquiry (Source: 
Saldana, 2016, p.14) 
3. Cross-case analysis 
These categories and their respective themes are further explained and analysed in the 
cross-case analysis to compare findings. Furthermore, pattern-matching, data displays and 
explanation-building analytical techniques (Yin, 2003) were used primarily during the 
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cross-case analysis. Pattern matching allows comparison of cases to be made in 
determining similarities and differences, and thus provides clearer explanation in making 
sense of the exploratory stage. This approach helps in drawing conclusion by searching 
for patterns, themes and verifying them against the literature (Miles & Huberman, 1994).  
4.10 Research quality 
Quality of research is important in presenting a logical set of statements; it pertains to 
judgement in balancing between questions and methods, subject selections, analysis of 
the outcomes, and protection against biases or inferential error. Thus, commonly, quality 
research is a precursor to quality evidence. This involves consideration of a sound 
methodology to show how well the research methods have been applied throughout the 
research design and how applicable the results are. Therefore, in achieving confidence of 
the research findings, it is important to be sure of the validity and reliability of the work 
(Fellows & Liu, 2008).  
4.10.1 Validity and reliability 
According to Yin (2014), four tests have been commonly used to establish the quality of 
social research, which mostly involves case study research. Yin (2009) categorised 
validity into construct (establishing multiple sources of evidence), internal (establishing 
robust and efficient causal mechanisms of data analysis) and external validity, which 
concerns the generalisation of the research findings. The final one of the four tests is 
reliability, which is the repeatability of the study, which is essential for the overall 
process (Yin, 2003). This is to ensure by the systematic description of the research steps 
that the next researcher, in using an identical research process, will obtain similar results 
(Yin, 2009). As in grounded theory, Charmaz (2014) stated the quality of the research 
relies on the data, as the depth and scope of the data shows credibility. Where reasoning 
is used in streamlining the data collection towards the relevance, workability and 
modifiability of the resolving problems. In justifying these, the method used, in which the 
case study occurs are described in Table 4.7 below. 
Table 4.7: Case study tactics for the four design tests  
Four tests Case study tactic Approach taken on which tactics 
occur 
Construct 
validity  
Multiple sources of evidence  
Establish chain of evidence  
Multiple sources of evidence were used 
in developing the COQ framework and 
were tested against case study findings 
and found to be robust. 
Internal validity  Pattern matching  
Explanation building  
Exploratory interview data was used 
with snowball sampling; all interviews 
were taped, then transcribed in real 
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time. 
External validity Use replication logic in multi-
case study 
Multi-perspective interviews were 
conducted during framework 
development (multi-tier project supply 
network) and validation with multiple 
owners. 
Reliability  Use case study protocol  
Develop case study database 
NDAs were signed with the 
organisation before data was collected; 
a consent form was given to all 
participants. 
Source: Developed and adapted from Yin (2009) 
4.11 Chapter summary  
This chapter has described the research methodology and methods adopted in this thesis. 
It has described the emergence of data through mixed-method and multi-case iterative 
cases using a grounded theory method. First, the ontological and epistemological 
standings of the research were explained, followed by a description of the research 
approach, process and research design as well as the research methodology. The methods 
of data collection and analysis were also described with a final reflection on the overall 
research quality which was presented in justifying the validity and reliability of the 
research.   
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5 COQ Framework Development and 
Application    
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter focuses on understanding the status of COQ in the construction industry. It 
will present, illustrate and describe the initial findings from the Phase 1 framework 
development (study A, B (i) and B (ii) data collection), with a focus on operational failure 
quality cost elements. The work was fully supported by the Chartered Quality Institute 
(CQI ConSIG group) which involved various stakeholders in steering the group meetings 
during the whole research period. The COQ is still fragmented within the construction 
industry and it is evident there have been many failures. In order to understand the 
application of COQ systems in the construction industry and investigate the current status 
of operational failure quality cost, Phase 1 explores the perceptions and influences of 
multi-organisational project supply network on operational failure quality cost. The aim 
of this phase is to generate clarification regarding the COQ in the construction industry to 
develop a consistent definition of operational failure quality cost elements that fits in with 
the construction scope.  
During Phase 1 of the study, data was collected through conducting workshops and 
surveys. The steering group discussion was used to assist and validate the data that arose 
from both the workshop and surveys. The research method involved at this stage 
included: 
1. Study A - Categorising and defining operational failure quality cost elements 
 A number of two-hour of cost of quality workshops (n= 5) 
 A number of two-hour of steering group discussion (n=6) 
 2. Study B (i) - Trial questionnaire survey: call to action on major project quality 
failure  
 Selective sample of industry experts (n=25) 
3. Study B (ii) - Focus questionnaire survey: measuring cost of quality in major 
construction projects post-handover  
 Selective sample of quality managers (n=17) 
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5.2 Defining and categorising the operational failure quality cost 
elements 
The underlying cost occurrences within the construction stakeholders remain unspecified. 
This is because it is easier to measure in a single organisation rather than in complex and 
unique construction projects that involve a multi-organisational supply network 
depending on the project situation. Although in COQ literature, most researchers have 
quantified quality cost using a quantitative method, data in this section is described in a 
more explorative way than previously seen to help the construction industry to better 
understand the operational failure COQ. Seven steering group discussions (from May 
2015 to November 2016) are presented within the qualitative measure of operational 
failure quality cost. It is hoped that these will better allow the systematic structuring of 
quality cost during the construction process, delivery and asset operation.  
5.2.1  Defining the operational failure quality cost elements  
Throughout the whole research process, the author has continuously discussed and 
defined the operational failure quality cost elements within the steering group meetings 
with the Chartered Quality Institute, which involved a sample of a number of experts (n= 
6-12) for a total of two hours per session, equivalent to 312 hours over a period of two 
years. The aim of this steering group was to define, quantify and understand the 
operational failure quality cost in the construction industry. Operational failure quality 
cost was perceived to be key in understanding the project failure. It was clear that project 
owners and their multi-organisational were unaware of the total COQ in every project, 
but did understand that COQ is part of their business cost. The diversity of definitions of 
failure amongst the project participants was the problem that needed addressing. The first 
model of COQ that was created through this working group emphasised the 
categorisation of the final output (Figure 5.3) which has been tested and validated across 
this research process. The first COQ model (Figure 5.1) identified the quality elements 
involved across the prevention, appraisal and failure (P-A-F) traditional model.  
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Figure 5.1: The COQ field and classification of quality cost elements 
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This study has focused on appraising the operational failure quality cost, as 
opposed to the historical focus on the prevention and appraisal phases. The classification 
of the operational failure quality cost helps to increase the maturity in understanding of 
the operational failure quality cost element to further integrate the COQ concept during 
project planning, design and construction. Figure 5.2 below shows the initial framework 
for 13 elements focusing on operational failure quality cost.   
 
Figure 5.2: The COQ field, failure category and classification of operational failure 
quality cost elements 
All elements of operational failure quality cost together with the definitions found 
in Table 5.1 were used in this research to understand the perception and influence of the 
project supply network. Most of the elements were understood by the participants but 
needed further definition and combinations of data through the case study phase. The 
steering group meeting was used to further clarify and validate the categorisation and 
definition of operational failure quality cost. Table 5.1 below shows a comparison of 
definitions used in the case study and definitions discussed and agreed by the steering 
group experts in comparison to the revised operational failure quality cost elements and 
their definitions. The revised quality cost elements were re-defined and arranged 
according to their significance. 
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Table 5.1: Operational failure quality cost elements and their definitions 
 
Definitions (v1- used in case study)  Definitions (v2- discussed and agreed by CQI steering group 
meetings) 
1. Insurance Costs 
 
An arrangement by which a company or the state undertakes to 
provide a guarantee of compensation for specified loss, 
damage, illness or death in return for payment of a specified 
premium. 
1. Safety Costs for 
Operators and 
Occupants 
Claims and legal consequences due to incidents, hazards, fire or injuries 
caused to occupants, users and maintainers. May be due to 
underperformance or incorrect selection of products or system failure or 
unforeseen outcome. This will cause a treatment, lost working time and 
remedial action and includes consequential costs for rectification. 
 
2. Latent Defect Costs 
 
Hidden defect in material and or workmanship of an item which 
may cause failure or malfunction, but is not discoverable through 
general inspection; or defects that are not apparent at the time of 
completion but which subsequently become apparent months or 
years later. 
 
 
2. Asset 
Availability & 
Functionality 
Costs 
A tangible asset's availability to be put to its intended use. When assets 
are available, work processes can operate more efficiently and cost 
effectively. The sum of costs due to the non-availability of an asset for 
beneficial use. It also includes the costs due to reduced functionality 
either by failure to specify or failure to deliver and any additional cost 
of rectification (new project). 
3. Safety Costs for 
Operators 
 
Insurance claims and legal consequences due to incidents, 
hazards or injuries caused to occupants, users and maintainers. 
May be due to underperformance or incorrect selection of 
products or system failure or unforeseen outcome. This will 
cause a treatment, lost working time and remedial action. 
 
3. Energy Use 
Costs 
 
Expense for generating, distributing and using energy, including 
monetary and non-monetary expenses. The additional costs of energy 
consumption incurred by the owner, compared to the specified energy 
requirements in the contract. 
 
4. Asset Availability 
Costs 
 
A tangible asset's availability to be put to its intended use. 
When assets are available, work processes can operate more 
efficiently and cost effectively. The sum of costs due to the 
non-availability of assets for beneficial use (loss of 
functionality). 
4. Maintenance 
Costs  
  
The cost incurred to keep an item in a good condition or good working 
order to deliver performance requirements throughout its lifecycle. 
Excess cost outside of the planned maintenance programme and design 
intent. 
  
5. Energy Use Costs 
 
Expense for generating, distributing and using energy, 
including monetary and non-monetary expenses. The 
additional costs of energy consumption incurred by the owner, 
compared to the specified energy requirements in the contract. 
 
5. Environmental 
Costs 
  
Costs connected with the actual or potential deterioration of natural 
assets due to economic activities. It is either costs caused (potentially 
causing environment deterioration) or costs borne (costs incurred by 
economic units independently who may have caused the environmental 
impacts). These include additional costs incurred to mitigate 
environmental failures in effluents, traffic, noise and natural habitat. 
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6. Maintenance Costs 
 
The cost incurred to keep an item in a good condition or good 
working order. Excess cost outside of the maintenance 
programme and design intent. 
 
6. Additional 
Operational 
Training Costs 
 
Additional cost incurred to train operators. This is usually caused by 
lack of training before handover and major changes after handover. 
7. Environmental 
Costs 
 
Costs connected with the actual or potential deterioration of 
natural assets due to economic activities. It is either costs 
caused (potentially causing environment deterioration) or costs 
borne (costs incurred by economic units independently who 
may have caused the environmental impacts). 
7.Early 
Obsolescence 
Costs 
  
Product or asset becoming outdated or no longer used earlier than its 
originally designed life. Includes new project costs to replace a product 
or asset earlier than originally planned due to failure or not having the 
ability to change. 
 
8. Lifecycle 
Performance Costs 
 
Excess cost of an asset or its parts throughout its lifecycle 
while fulfilling the performance requirement where specified. 
8.Reputation/Bran
d/Indirect 
Consequential 
Losses Costs 
  
Widespread belief about something due to a particular characteristic 
which has caused failure (indirect cost). It includes the loss of revenue 
caused by a well-publicised failure in the media and costs incurred to 
manage the goodwill of products and services, and loss of future 
contracts. 
 
9. Functionality Cost 
 
Cost of the production and delivery of the product. It includes 
price of parts, labour, overheads, etc., which means the value 
of the product. Sum of the costs due to reduced functionality 
either by failure to specify or failure to deliver. 
9. Insurance 
Claims Costs 
  
An arrangement by which a company or the state undertakes to provide 
a guarantee of compensation for specified loss, damage, illness or death 
in return for payment of a specified premium. 
Includes insurance claims made by any party post-handover due to 
defects during design or delivery. 
 
10. Unadaptable 
 
Costs of not having the ability to change or be changed in 
accordance with altered circumstances. 
 
10. Latent Defect 
Costs 
Hidden defect in design, material and or workmanship of an item which 
may cause failure or malfunction, but is not discoverable through 
general inspection; or defects that are not apparent at the time of 
completion but which subsequently become apparent months or years 
later. This includes loss of revenue, not claimed by insurance or any 
other category, caused by poor performance on less obvious defects. 
 
11.Early Obsolescence 
 
Product becoming outdated or no longer used.   
12.Reputation/ Brand 
Cost/Indirect 
Consequential Losses 
Widespread belief on particular characteristic which has caused 
failure (indirect cost) 
 
 
13. Operational 
Training/Readiness 
Cost 
Additional costs for training incurred due to inadequate or 
ineffective training and additional cost incurred to train 
operators. 
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Definitions in V2 summarise the final categorisation of all 10 operational failure 
quality cost elements as agreed by the Chartered Quality Institute (CQI ConSIG) during 
the two years of steering group meetings with the expert sample (n= 6-12), who were all 
involved in the operationalising of construction projects. A detailed review of all 13 
elements has been summarised and re-categorised into 10 final categories, as shown in 
the table above. This is an addition to the reduced and finalised operational failure quality 
cost elements, which include similar elements in one category and were then re-defined 
as a new combined statement of definition wherever necessary. The discussion was made 
from a combination of data collected from the initial workshop, two questionnaires, a 
preliminary review and what has been seen in the exploration of an in-depth case study 
review all conducted with industry-based participants.  
From each steering meeting, the feedback from each phase of the study was 
discussed until a set of final definitions was achieved and validated by all the Chartered 
Quality Institute (CQI ConSIG) members. The steering group agreed that ‘functionality 
cost’ needed to be combined with ‘asset availability’ as they provide the same meaning as 
to how assets need to function during the operational stage. Also, it was agreed to 
removed ‘unadaptable cost’ as it carried the same meaning as ‘asset availability and 
functionality category’; and ‘lifecycle performance cost’ has been combined with the 
element of ‘maintenance cost’, due to them having a similar meaning. All the other 
elements remained, although a few were re-defined into clearer definitions. For example, 
insurance cost was re-defined as insurance claim cost to include the insurance cost paid to 
cover the project as well as the insurance cost claimed due to any failure. Figure 5.3 
shows the final framework constituting operational failure quality cost with the 
construction COQ field.  
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Figure 5.3: The COQ field, final failure category and classification of operational failure 
quality cost elements 
 
5.3  Categorising the operational failure quality cost 
5.3.1 Cost of quality workshop 
As an initial step in the study, the workshop was set up to first categorise the operational 
failure quality cost elements within the construction scope. By means of categorising 
these quality elements, the adoption of a better understanding of each quality cost element 
was achieved. A workshop method was used to clarify, re-define and structure the 
categorisations of the operational failure quality cost. The categorisations demonstrated 
the importance of identifying the distinctive cost incurred within the construction industry 
supply network to allow for a bigger opportunity to understand in detail each individual 
element and its relationship to the construction process. The relationship of each element 
was justified and discussed within the steering group, as mentioned in the following sub-
section. This workshop realised the complexity in categorising these quality cost 
elements. Operational failure quality cost was then simplified, grouped and re-defined at 
the end of the study, as mentioned in section 5.2.1.  
5.3.2  The categorisations of operational failure quality cost elements 
A selection of individual opinions regarding the relationship of cost incurred by the 
supply network and each element is summarised in Table 5.2. Data was collected during 
the steering group meeting, and pictures and notes were taken for analysis. The workshop 
detailed the discussions about the relationship of parties who incurred cost and the quality 
cost elements. The early definitions of each element were provided for each participant 
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(Figure 5.4). Each operational failure quality cost element was then clearly defined and 
understood during the workshop. This was used as the starting point for defining and 
categorising individual expert statements in the workshop. Experts selected the 
relationship of cost incurred to the construction supply network before grouping the 
operational failure quality cost elements into categories with their own theme (Figure 
5.5). They were then displayed on the table to be shared and discussed, and were finally 
agreed by the whole steering group.  
 
Figure 5.4: Example of a card used during the workshops 
 
Figure 5.5: Participants’ card categorisations for operational failure quality cost elements 
Table 5.2 shows the lack of consensus about who pays for operational failure 
quality cost. Participants remarked that this outcome confirmed that the apportionment of 
the responsibility for cost is part of the problem, and observed that this can shift and 
change depending on the stage of the project and build of the asset environment. Looking 
Definition 
Quality cost element 
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at the table, it clearly shows all operational failure quality cost elements were incurred by 
the owner/operator, similarly to the integrator/main contractor and 
advisor/consultant/designer. The group discussed this situation, highlighting that 
ultimately it was the owner during the operation that carries the operations cost of failure. 
One outlaying expert perceived that costs are shared throughout the multi-organisational 
supply network, through either negotiations or claims. Owner/operators were seen to be 
the most impacted party, as they ultimately bear the operational failure quality cost, while 
integrator and designer costs were less frequently incurred. Suppliers/sub-contractors 
appear to have the least cost impact from all the failure cost elements. Although the 
workshop participants where mainly contractors and owners, they disagreed with the 
statement that sub-contractors have the least impact as mostly the supplier/sub-contractor 
would have some financial responsibility for the project. However, the experts agreed that 
designers/consultants were the least impacted by the costs incurred. Supplier 
responsibility was for discreet products, while all other cases were for the larger whole 
system impact. However, the unadaptable cost and obsolescence cost may not be affected 
by the integrator once the contract ends. This demonstrated the impact of non-quantifying 
quality cost in generating and stimulating benefits alignment across the project process, 
which needs to be stimulated by the construction industry.  
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Table 5.2: Relationship between organisation and operational failure quality cost elements 
  Quality Cost 
Elements 
Owner/operator Integrator/main contractor Advisor/consultant/designer Supplier/sub-contractor 
   P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
1 Insurance Costs  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   1 1 1 1   1 1 1 1 
2 Latent Defect Costs 1   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   1 1 1     1 1 1 1 
3 Safety Costs for 
Operators 
1 1 1 1 1 1   1 1   1 1   1        1   
4 Asset Availability 
Costs 
1 1 1 1 1       1         1        1   
5 Energy Use Costs 1 1 1 1 1     1 1         1        1   
6 Maintenance Costs  1 1 1 1 1       1         1        1   
7 Environmental Costs 1 1 1 1 1       1 1 1     1        1   
8 Lifecycle 
Performance Costs  
1 1 1 1 1       1         1        1   
9 Functionality Cost  1 1 1 1 1 1     1 1       1 1      1   
10 Unadaptable Costs  1 1 1 1 1           1     1            
11 Early Obsolescence  1 1 1 1 1 1         1   1 1            
12 Reputation/Brand 
Costs  
1 1   1 1   1 1 1 1       1 1      1 1 
13 Operational 
Training/ Readiness 
Costs 
1 1 1 1 1 1     1 1       1         1   
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Figure 5.6: Categorisation of operational failure quality cost elements – expert one (P1) 
Figure 5.6 shows the first expert’s (P1) opinion on how operational failure quality 
cost elements could be categorised. The figure shows four categories of operational 
failure quality cost element, which are: design & construct, business outcome/reputation, 
operational & maintenance, and business cost. The categories that emerged were based on 
the nature of the process of construction projects. The categorisation simplifies a more 
complex picture of where each element falls. The operational failure quality cost elements 
were classified in a clearer picture to place these elements by project process for the 
purpose of looking at the ‘root cause’ of operational failures. 
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Figure 5.7: Categorisation of operational failure quality cost elements – expert two (P2) 
Figure 5.7 shows the second expert’s (P2) opinion on how operational failure 
quality cost elements could be categorised. The figure shows only three categories of 
operational failure quality cost elements, which are: cost, environment impact and 
reputation. Most of the cost elements were placed under the cost category. Only 
environmental cost is categorised as environmental impact, and both reputation/brand 
costs and safety cost for operators were categorised in the reputation category. The cost 
category was classified as the major cost among all the quality cost elements and perhaps 
illustrates a major cost focus. This participant explained that all the major costs are 
project-based except environmental impact and reputation. 
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Figure 5.8: Categorisation of operational failure quality cost elements – expert three (P3) 
Figure 5.8 shows the third expert’s (P3) opinion on how operational failure quality 
cost elements could be categorised. The figure shows three categories of operational 
failure quality cost element, which are: owner/contractor risk, contractor-only risk and 
owner- only risk. These categories were mentioned based on the risk allocation by an 
organisation/organisation type. Each quality cost element was categorised according to 
risk allocation towards either owner or contractor. It was explained that the cost elements 
occurred through the indication of project risk, in which asset availability, functionality, 
maintenance, safety cost for operator, insurance and latent defect are all costs incurred by 
a contractor and owner. Reputation and brand cost are contractor-only risks while energy, 
un-adaptability, environmental, lifecycle performance, early obsolescence and operational 
training cost are all owner-only costs. This categorisation was agreed by most of the 
participants as risk could be used as an indication of cost incurred. However, there was 
scepticism on how each element should be grouped – into owner, contractor, both owner 
and contractor, or other members of the supply network.   
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Figure 5.9: Categorisation of operational failure quality cost elements – expert four (P4) 
Figure 5.9 shows the fourth expert’s (P4) opinion on how operational failure 
quality cost elements could be categorised. The figure shows three categories of 
operational failure quality cost element, which are: owner/operator & designer impact, 
mostly owner/operator impact and all parties’ impact. This participant explained that the 
categories were based on the impact of cost incurred upon responsible parties, which is 
similar to the previous categories. This categorisation shows that most of the elements 
were placed under the impact to owner/operator with only four elements impacting all 
parties.  
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Figure 5.10: Categorisation of operational failure quality cost elements – expert five (P5) 
Figure 5.10 shows the fifth expert’s (P7) opinion on how operational failure 
quality cost elements could be categorised. The figure shows five categories of 
operational failure quality cost elements, which are: defect, reputation, environment, 
operational/function and safety. The categories were categorised based on type of costs. 
Interestingly, this categorisation is similar to participant two’s (P2), who also classified 
these quality costs against the cost categories, which shows the attempt to re-groups all 
the costs into broader categories.   
Overall, through the five categorisations suggested by the experts, it was 
concluded that the operational failure quality cost element should be categorised either 
through its supply network or by the type of quality cost depending on the organisation. 
Table 5.3 shows the total selection of costs incurred by the construction supply network 
towards all 13 operational failure quality cost elements. The table illustrates that the 
highest total cost incurred is by the owner/operator. This differs from the cost categorised 
by the P3 and P4 experts, who only partially see the quality cost elements that have an 
impact on or risk to the owner/operator. In contrast, the Supplier/sub-contractor has the 
least cost incurred within the whole supply network. The table also shows that insurance 
costs were the cost that were both the most selected and the most incurred by the owner 
and integrator, followed by the latent defect cost, safety cost for operators and 
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reputation/brand costs. The cost that was least incurred by all parties is the unadaptable 
cost. Almost all quality costs are incurred by all owners and the supply network, except 
unadaptable and early obsolescence cost. This significantly contrasts with how 
operational failure quality cost was categorised by all the experts, who concluded that 
there is no better group of all operational failure quality costs as they are incurred by and 
may be the responsibility of all depending on project-based failures.  
Table 5.3: Selection of quality costs incurred by different organisations 
  Quality Cost 
Elements 
Owner/ 
operator 
Integrator/ 
main 
contractor 
Advisor/ 
consultant/ 
designer 
Supplier/ 
sub-
contractor 
Total 
1 Insurance Costs  5 5 4 4 18 
2 Latent Defect 
Costs 
4 5 3 4 16 
3 Safety Costs for 
Operators 
5 3 3 1 12 
4 Asset 
Availability 
Costs 
5 1 1 1 8 
5 Energy Use 
Costs 
5 2 1 1 9 
6 Maintenance 
Costs  
5 1 1 1 8 
7 Environmental 
Costs 
5 2 2 1 10 
8 Lifecycle 
Performance 
Costs  
5 1 1 1 8 
9 Functionality 
Cost  
5 3 2 1 11 
10 Unadaptable 
Costs  
5 0 2 0 7 
11 Early 
Obsolescence  
5 1 3 0 9 
12 Reputation/Brand 
Costs  
4 4 2 2 12 
13 Operational 
Training/ 
Readiness Costs 
5 3 1 1 10 
  Total: 63 31 26 18   
 
The analysis of this workshop shows two key findings in understanding the nature 
of operational failure cost within the supply network. Firstly, all operational failure 
quality cost elements are partially incurred by the owners/operator followed by the 
integrator/main contractor and advisor/consultant/designer. Discussion of these facts 
between the experts showed that there are difficulties in quantifying operational failure 
quality cost during the operation of an asset. This showed that most of the cost is 
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absorbed as part of the day-to-day operational cost. Although the main contractor, advisor 
and supplier are aware of the cost incurred and are responsible for reporting or 
confirming the cost that was partially incurred by them, it is frequently assumed to be 
only incurred by the owners. This is based on the assumption that owners are responsible 
for operating the assets. Therefore, frequently, the unquantifiable amount of operational 
failure quality costs was either anonymous or only carried by one party. Secondly, 
different categorisations of the operational failure quality costs shown earlier 
demonstrated of the non-standardisation of quality costs in construction, which further 
illustrates different attitudes towards the operational failure quality cost. Each expert 
(with their different roles) produced different categorisations of the operational failure 
quality cost elements, according to when they are involved or according to the risk owner 
(e.g. to the owner, supply network or shared). This illustrated the need for greater 
awareness by management and better communication in project chains that are linked to 
the quality culture and behaviour of the project stakeholders. Thus, the need for better 
management of these operational failure quality costs with closer integration throughout 
the supply network, as investigated in the next phase of the study, has shown the 
emergence of findings that are discussed in the next chapter. 
5.4 Call to action on major project quality failure 
A trial COQ questionnaire was sent to 25 professionals through a convenient and 
selective sample across the UK construction industry. Participants were found through the 
use of the Charted Quality Institution network. The respondents range from 
integrator/owner, supplier/ sub-contractor and advisor/consultant, who were mostly from 
the infrastructure sector. Most had 20-36 years of experience. The questionnaire analysed 
the perception of construction stakeholders in dealing with post-handover quality cost. 
The results reflect the maturity of organisations in dealing with operational failure cost 
elements. The organisations rated their measurement and management of quality cost 
elements to be insufficient, with most expressing low maturity.  
The results in Table 5.4 show how owners (O) and their supply network (S) judge 
their own maturity. There was a limited expression of maturity shown at the level of 
‘managed’ or ‘optimised’ experience. Most elements were judged to be understood at the 
‘defined’ level or lower. The insurance element showed a significant misalignment within 
the owners and suppliers, who show the highest level of maturity but also demonstrate 
that they are ‘unaware’. This shows a variance between owner and supply network 
maturity and that there are different levels of information for each element. There is 
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significant variance in how maturity about ‘safety’, ‘asset availability’ and ‘energy use’ is 
perceived, with responses that range from ‘unaware’ to ‘managed’. ‘Functionality’, 
‘unadaptable’, and ‘early obsolescence’ were scored highly at the lowest level of 
maturity. There was strong alignment between both owners and suppliers on ‘operational 
training’, ‘environmental’ and ‘lifecycle performance’ and there was a moderate level of 
awareness on ‘latent defects’ and ‘maintenance’. Overall, the table demonstrates that 
there is a low level of maturity among the supply network about COQ failure. 
Table 5.4: Owner (O) and supply network (S) perception in measuring operational failure quality 
cost elements 
  Operational failure quality cost elements 
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 O S O S O S O S O S O S O S O S O S O S O S O S O S 
Unaware 4 1 1   3 2 2 3 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 4 2 4 3 4 3 3   2 1 
Aware 1 2 4 5   2 2 2 2 2 3 4 2 3 4 3 1 2 2 1 2   2 3 1 3 
Defined   2 1 2 2 2 1 2 3 2 1 2 2 3 1 3 1 3 1 2   3   2 3 3 
Managed 2 3   1 2 2 1 1   3 1   1   1   1     1 1 1 1 2 1   
Optimising     1       1                                       
 
The following section in the questionnaire judged the perception of owners (O) 
and supply network (S) in influencing operational failure. Respondents frequently 
differed in how they rated their own maturity versus that of others, with the maturity of 
the supply network judged to be the lowest. Table 5.5 shows both owners and supply 
network saw their own level of maturity as above fair (either very low, low or fair). In 
judging suppliers, most owners and supply network participants indicate moderate 
maturity (ranging from fair, low to very low), although the supply network participants 
score themselves and other suppliers as good. The table also demonstrates that the level 
of maturity of the owner and supply network in dealing with quality cost elements is 
understood but not managed; however, there is a great confidence in the ability to 
influence operational failure. Thus, increments in the maturity towards quality cost 
elements will help greater management and measurement of the quality cost. This is 
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believed to depreciate the occurrences of operational failure quality cost trough more 
integrated system of quality costing.  
Table 5.5: The owner (O) and supply network (S) perception in influencing operational 
failure  
 
 
Own 
Enterprise  Customers Suppliers 
Overall 
ability to 
influence   
L
ev
el
 o
f 
m
at
u
ri
ty
 
  O S O S O S O S 
Very Low     1 1 1       
Low   2   1 2 2     
Fair 4 2 2 1 2 3 3 5 
Good  1 2 3 4 1 2 1 2 
Very good 1 1         2   
 
The owners and supply network participants commented there was a belief that 
the owner roles were unclear in dealing with failure cost, which supported the need for 
stronger owner leadership. COQ failures were perceived to be in low maturity and there 
was a lack of knowledge on what defines project value. Some presumed poor 
understanding of project context, and different acceptance levels in relation to non-
conformance costs. To improve operational failure, a rigorous assurance during design 
and construction is needed, to change and control project scope for a clear definition of 
operational requirements during the pre-project stage. In addition, better management in 
order to improve collaborate between supply network is necessary to provide knowledge 
transfer, to align awareness and to increase maturity in relation to COQ failure. Table 5.6 
illustrates some examples of qualitative comments in improving measurement and 
prevention or reducing the risk of operational failures. Clearly, there is a need to address 
COQ to prevent operational failure. The result of this is combined with wider perspective 
of construction participant from the case study in judging the overall maturity of owner 
and their supply network towards their perception in influencing operational failure. 
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Table 5.6: Examples of qualitative comments on improvements to reduce operational 
failure and its quality issues  
Question 13. How could improvements be made, or measures taken, to prevent or reduce 
the risk of operational quality issues?  
 
“Better measurement (data), GAP analysis and root cause analysis of issues.” 
 
“Better evidence needs to be sought/built in service of demonstrating need for spend up front to 
ensure connectivity/interface/fundamental rectitude of project rationale.” 
“…more rigorous assurance during design and construction.” 
 
“Focus on clear definition of operational requirements before projects are undertaken.” 
 
“Better management of changes to scope, etc.” 
 
“Collaborate and discuss issues before they happen…” 
 
“Fully integrated management system.” 
 
“Ensuring operational requirements are clearly defined to the project team.” 
 
 
5.5 Measuring cost of quality in major construction projects post-
handover  
To generate further understanding on the status of quality cost in the construction 
industry, a second questionnaire was sent to selected quality managers across the UK 
construction industry. Respondents consisted of 17 quantity surveyors selected by the 
Chartered Quality Institute (CQI ConSIG group) with experience of more than 50 
projects covering the PFI, private and government sectors. However, the quality 
managers’ experiences differed in terms of the type of project, where most have 
experience in the airport industry, a quarter have experience with railways and one has 
experience with hospitals. All projects have an overall annual capital ranging from £500 
million to £1 billion. This questionnaire further analysed the perception of quality 
managers through the level of maturity in dealing with operational failure quality cost. 
The findings demonstrate that quality managers understand and have managed the 
operational failure quality cost elements well. These findings show a significant contrast 
from the first questionnaire that showed low maturity of other supply network members. 
Table 5.7 shows a strong agreement between quality managers about maturity, 
with most elements perceived to be ‘managed’, with only one element, ‘unadaptable’, that 
was less well defined, with some who believed that they were unaware of this cost 
element. ‘Latent defect’, ‘asset availability’ and ‘lifecycle performance’ were perceived 
to be in between understood (at the level defined, aware and unaware) and matured (at the 
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level managed and optimised), while ‘insurance’ differed significantly, where most 
participants rated it as matured but some said least understood. The dissimilar rating of 
maturity level between quality managers and others in the supply network shows 
incoherence in terms of information transmission of the quality management system 
during the project process within the construction supply network.  
Table 5.7: Quality managers’ (QM) perceptions in measuring operational failure quality 
cost elements 
  Operational failure quality cost elements 
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M 
Q
M 
Q
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Q
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Q
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Q
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Q
M 
Q
M 
Q
M 
Q
M 
Q
M 
Unaware 1         1 1   
Aware 1  1  2 1 1 1 1 3 1 2 2 
Defined  3 2 3 2 1 2 3 2 2 2 2  
Managed 6 5 4 5 4 5 4 4 5 1 4 4 5 
Optimising   1 1  1 1      1 
  
The discrepancy of information transferred among the construction supply 
network could lead to wrong information being provided in different stages of 
construction (plan, build and operate); thus, different capabilities may cause limited 
ability to align the project aim to reduce operational failure. In judging the level of 
influence, quality managers were confident in their ability to influence operational failure 
but not with their tier 1 contractors and tier 2 and 3 suppliers’ ability, as shown in Table 
5.8. This finding demonstrates similar results to the previous trial questionnaire that 
showed the owner and the supply network members had a strong capability to influence 
operational failure.  
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Table 5.8: Quality managers (QM) perceptions in influencing optimisation, integration 
and continuous improvement of operational failures  
 
 
Tier 1 
contractors 
Tier 2 
and 3 
suppliers 
Overall 
ability to 
influence 
L
ev
el
 o
f 
m
at
u
ri
ty
 
  QM QM QM 
Unaware 1 1  
Aware  1  
Partial 
implementation  1 1 1 
Managed 2 1 2 
Optimising 1 1 2 
 
There was a strong agreement perceived in showing strong capability to influence 
the optimisation, integration and continuous improvement of operational failure. 
However, this responsibility to influence the implementation of a quality system was only 
further investigated during the detailed case study interview. Table 5.9 illustrates some 
examples of qualitative comments on how quality mangers could be of influence to 
improve operational failure. Quality managers agreed that they have full control over 
operational failure and have a strong commitment, with sufficient support from data and 
resources, and thus are able to influence the quality issues. Also, they are well aware of 
operations and maintenance problems at an early stage and have a well-
established/defined link of collaborative working with the project team in influencing the 
project context. However, the only reason that impedes quality managers’ ability to 
influence is when there is a lack of input at the early stage of the project, which is the 
project contract. This shows that there is a need to integrate information from operations 
up-front, in order to mitigate failure.   
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Table 5.9: Examples of qualitative comments on level of maturity to influence COQ 
Level of maturity to 
influence COQ 
The overall ability to influence the optimisation, integration and 
continuous improvement of operational failure.  
 
Managed and 
optimised 
1. “We have full control of operational issues.” 
2. “Commitment. Financially sound and willing to support with 
specialists, resources and training as needed.” 
3. “With being responsible for FM post-completion, we are aware 
of operation and maintenance problems early and design out.” 
4. “Well established/defined links of collaborative working.” 
Unaware, aware or 
partial 
implementation 
1. “Lack of input early in the project – current contracting 
frameworks.” 
 
 
This result provides significant evidence for the need to improve data analysis for 
each quality issue, with strong support and feedback from the supply network such as 
contractors and suppliers. Further, Table 5.10 illustrates quality managers’ perceptions on 
the need to improve technical awareness and support during the procurement and project 
planning stage. This is believed to enable better implementation of training programmes 
to enhance and support national initiatives in terms of improvising project capabilities. 
Thus, this resulted in the need to change the contracting framework by adding more 
operational input at the beginning of a project. Also, the result of this is combined with 
wider perspective of construction participant from the case study in judging the overall 
maturity of construction industry towards their perception in influencing in influencing 
optimisation, integration and continuous improvement of operational failures. 
Table 5.10: Examples of qualitative comments on ways that quality managers could make 
improvements to reduce operational failures.  
Question 15. How could improvements be made, or measures taken, to prevent or reduce 
the risk of operational failure?  
 
“Improve data analysis and feed back to contractors.” 
 
“Improved technical awareness/support during procurement and pricing activities. 
Implementation of training programmes to enhance and support national initiatives to grow and 
mature technical and trade skill capabilities.” 
“Better lifecycle considerations; 'minimum compliance' is the contractors attitude, quite rightly.” 
“Essential to have a robust tender/bid review process with the best available teams on both 
sides.” 
 
“Changing contracting frameworks. Getting more operational input at the beginning of 
projects.” 
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5.6 Understanding the perception of construction participants to 
measure and influence operational failures 
The perception of construction participants to measure and influence operational failure 
where judged through their perspective of their level of maturity and influence 
questionnaire. The results of these questionnaire provided a status of how quality cost 
was perceived by the construction stakeholders. Most quality cost elements were rated 
with a low level of maturity in capturing operational failure quality cost. This is in 
contrast with the quality managers’ perception. In the organisational management 
context, with statements refined as poor alignment of project and operation capabilities, 
the result demonstrates poor information delivered within the construction supply 
network as a factor leading to operational failure. The ability to influence was perceived 
to be significant and most participants were confident about their capability to influence 
the operational failure, but expressed a need for integration among all supply networks.  
Open-ended questions provided more specific understanding by showing the 
participants’ unfamiliarity with the operational failure quality cost elements. This perhaps 
demonstrates the equivocally captured quality cost that may be interchangeable/overlaid 
in between the incurred cost elements. This requires better collaboration between 
members of the project supply network to make clear which cost elements were incurred 
and borne by who. There is a need to align the project aim to increase similarity in 
awareness among organisations about the operational failure quality cost. This finding 
raised further questions of who influences the implementation of advanced quality 
systems in reducing operational failure and how different organisations could best 
collaborate in aligning the project goal. The subsequent stage of the study was conducted 
to gather more insight in understanding COQ by exploring its existence in the project and 
operational context. This is further discussed in Chapter 6.   
5.7 Quantifying operational failure and its quality cost  
5.7.1 Operational failure quality cost elements that contributed to the operational 
failure 
This study justified the need for a valid framework and mechanism to acknowledge and 
define COQ within organisations’ capability and their project structure. Based on the 
COQ failure framework developed in study A, a card-sorting method was used to further 
test and quantify all the 13 quality cost elements in the exploratory case study. During the 
interviews, the first 15 minutes were used to ask the participant to select quality cost 
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elements resulting from the operational failure within the specific project multi-case 
study. The participant was then asked to provide a cost estimate for the impact of this 
issue in each selected quality cost element in relation to their organisation. Table 5.11 
show the distribution of operational failure quality cost elements selected by the 
participants during the first phase of case study exploration – Study C (ii).  
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Table 5.11: Distribution of quality cost elements in operational failure 
 Project A Project B   Project D Project C Project E  Project F Total  
Interviewee  PM (1) PM (7) PM (2) PM (4) PM (3) PM (5) PM (6)  
Project Budget  £150m £150m  £30m-50m £30m £30m £30m  
Operational failures  I1 I2 I3 I4 I1 I2 I3 I1 I2 I3 I1 I2 I1 I2 I3 I4 I1 I2 I3 I4 I1 I
2 
I4  
Who was involved                          
a. Owner/operator                          
b. Integrator/main 
contractor  
                        
c. Consultant/designer                          
d. Supplier/sub-contractor                          
Quality elements                          
1. Insurance costs   ✓   ✓ ✓   ✓  saving     ✓    ✓   7 
2. Latent defect cost  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓    ✓    ✓    ✓  ✓ 11 
3. Safety costs for 
operators  
✓ ✓ ✓        saving  ✓    ✓       6 
4. Asset availability costs  ✓  ✓      ✓ ✓ saving saving ✓ saving  ✓ ✓ saving saving  ✓ ✓ ✓ 15 
5. Energy use cost  ✓          saving   saving     saving     4 
6. Maintenance costs    ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ saving saving ✓ saving saving  ✓ ✓ saving ✓  ✓ ✓ 19 
7. Environmental costs  ✓ ✓ ✓            saving         4 
8. Lifecycle performance 
costs  
 ✓ ✓ ✓    ✓ ✓  saving saving ✓ saving saving   saving saving   ✓ ✓ 14 
9. Functionality costs  ✓ ✓      ✓  saving saving   saving         6 
10. Unadaptable costs   ✓        saving   saving          3 
11. Early obsolescence 
costs  
            ✓    ✓ ✓      3 
12. Reputation/Brand 
costs  
  ✓   ✓ ✓    saving saving    ✓ ✓      ✓ 8 
13. Operational training/ 
readiness costs  
✓ ✓ ✓  ✓    ✓ ✓ saving  ✓ ✓      ✓ ✓   11 
Total 6 6 11 2 3 4 4 2 5 3 9 6 7 6 4 2 7 4 4 2 4 3 5  
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This table shows that different quality cost elements arise in different issues with 
at least two elements incurred in each operational failure. The table also demonstrates that 
not all operational failure resulted in quality cost failure, but it also provides the cost of 
quality savings. COQ is thus embedded and dynamic in the complex and evolving nature 
of project-based organisations. Among them all, ‘maintenance cost’, ‘asset availability 
cost’ and ‘lifecycle performance cost’ are what most frequently occurred across all five 
projects case study. Interestingly, the distribution of COQ at some point provides a long-
term saving for some other quality cost elements; thus, COQ is interlinked. As an 
example, one interviewee explained that the cost of correcting quality issues leads to 
bigger savings for the long-term ‘maintenance’ and ‘lifecycle cost’ of a project. However, 
there was no concrete mechanism to capture these quality cost savings that reflects the 
benefits; thus, it is difficult to realise what needs to be done. In other savings, change of 
project specifications leads to longer functionality of an asset, thus providing cost 
savings. For poor quality, interviewees mainly referred to it as revisiting work where 
ultimately costs were based on actual cost as in the contract; thus, cost was captured by 
either the responsible contractor or supplier. In a complex system, cost was split into a 
different system; cost of poor quality or savings that was then not realised. This finding 
showed that the distribution of COQ is significant as it could have impacted the overall 
COQ failure differently based on project conditions.  
Following this activity, participants were asked about the estimated cost of each 
selected quality cost element. However, not all participants were able to provide an 
estimated cost, although most were aware of the costs. Table 5.12 shows that almost all 
operational failure quality cost elements were captured and able to be quantified during 
the multi-case study. All figures mentioned by the participants were tabularised, analysed 
and summarised into content analysis, as shown in the table below. 
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Table 5.12: Percentage of operational failure quality cost in building and infrastructure 
projects 
 
This table shows the estimated costs across the various infrastructure project types 
and project costs (which range from £0.1m to £400m) of quality cost values as judged by 
 Project type: Buildings, water treatment plant and infrastructure 
Project cost: £20m- £77m 
Quality 
Cost  
Elements 
£0-£100k £101k-
£500k 
£501k-
£1m 
£1.1m- 
£5m 
        
>£5.1m 
Range of 
percenta
ge (%) 
1. Insurance Costs 
 
 (A=1) 
14% 
   14% 
2. Latent Defect Costs 
 
(C=2; 
E=1) 
20%,20%
, 
30% 
(E=3) 
8%,8%, 
17% 
(A=1) 
13% 
 (A=1) 
7.8% 
7.8%-
20% 
3. Safety Costs for 
Operators 
 
      
4. Asset Availability 
Costs 
(E=1) 
30% 
 
(C=2; 
D=1) 
40%, 
12%,6% 
(A=1) 
9% 
(C=2) 
7%,9% 
 7%-40% 
5. Energy Use Costs 
 
      
6. Maintenance Costs 
 
(C=2, 
E2) 
20%, 
20%, 
20%, 
20% 
(C=1) 
15% 
(E=1) 
25% 
(A=1, 
C=1, 
E=1) 
18%, 6%, 
9% 
(B=1;C=
1) 
45%, 
21% 
15%-
45% 
6. Environmental Costs 
 
      
8. Lifecycle 
Performance Costs 
 
   (D=1) 
13% 
 13% 
9. Functionality Cost     (B=1) 
50% 
50% 
10. Unadaptable 
 
      
11.Early Obsolescence  
 
      
12.Reputation/ Brand 
Cost/ Indirect 
Consequential Losses 
    (C=2) 
£400m, 
£50m 
£50m-
£400m 
13. Operational 
Training/ Readiness 
Cost  
(A=1) 
10% 
    10% 
14. Rectification 
Cost/New project  
    (A=1) 
10% 
10% 
Value  
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participants from the infrastructure client multi-case study (n= 26). The quantification of 
these costs demonstrates the breath in the percentage of cost incurred that is significant 
and that if managed will reduce operational failure. Most project in the multi-case study 
indicated that costs were shared/exchanged among the owner and the multi-organisational 
supply network. Overall, eight (n=8) quality cost elements were quantified, except ‘safety 
costs for operator’, ‘energy use costs’, ‘environmental costs’, ‘unadaptable costs’ and 
‘early obsolescence costs’. All cost percentages were coded according to the project type: 
A- Building car park, B- Water treatment plant, C- Infrastructure, D- Building escalator 
and E- Infrastructure runway.  
All the captured costs were first categorised into the value of £0-£100k, £101k-
£500k, £501k-£1m, £1.1m- £5m or >5m, then simplified into cost percentage. The 
average percentages were calculated according to [value of quality cost element/project 
cost] x 100. More than five of the costs were quantified by different participants but have 
the same percentage range (i.e. latent defect cost and maintenance cost). This indicates 
that cost was almost certainly acknowledged by all the project participants. ‘Asset 
availability cost’ (7%-40%), ‘maintenance cost’ (15%-45%) and ‘latent defect cost’ 
(7.8%-20%) are the most quantified elements, while ‘operational training and readiness 
cost’ was the lowest, with only 10%, which ranged from £0 to £100m. This was followed 
by ‘insurance cost’ at 14%, ranging from £101 to £500m, and ‘lifecycle performance 
cost’ at 13% and £1.1-£5m of the total project cost. ‘Reputation cost’ was described by 
two participants as a potential cost incurred, and it ranged from £50m- to £400m.  
The additional cost element was described by one of the participants as 
rectification cost/new project cost – element no 14 in Table 5.12. This element was 
described as a new budget for newly set-up projects to rectify the operational failures. In 
project A, a new project with 10% of the total cost was put in as a new budget to rectify 
the operational failure. This shows that COQ was not acknowledged as cost of failure but 
was rather allocated as a new budget to rectify failure. These costs were then fully the 
responsibility of the owner.  
Due to the limitation of the research area, there are many more potential and 
actual costs of quality failure that could not be captured in this second phase of the study. 
However, the data obtained has helped to justify the complexity of capturing operational 
failure quality cost in construction projects. This has further helped the author to 
understand and clarify how operational failure has occurred and impacted the occurrences 
of COQ in the construction industry. The inter-dependency of each element was 
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witnessed as one of the difficulties faced by the construction industry in quantifying 
operational failure and its quality cost. However, this proved the significance of 
quantifying COQ. By clarifying the extent to which the operational failure has impacted 
the supply network, the fair distribution of these COQ will promote an improvement in 
the share of project risk to align the project goal. 
5.8 Chapter summary  
This chapter has shown the development and application of a new COQ framework. 
Framework definitions and categorisations have been tested through an expert workshop. 
Pilot and questionnaire surveys have shown that the maturity and influence with regard to 
COQ is low in current construction projects, but also highly relevant. The preliminary 
findings have shown that there are a range of COQ failure measure that contribute to our 
understanding of operational failures. The estimated percentage of operational failure 
quality cost illustrates the range of quality cost failures that the owner and multi-
organisational supply network could significantly reduce. The reason behind what 
constitutes each quality cost was further mapped through the wider context of project 
management and all of these reasons are illustrated in the following chapter.  
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Phase 1 – Framework 
development 
CHAPTER 1 – Introduction, 
background, aim and objectives 
CHAPTERS 2 and 3 – Literature 
review and acknowledgment of 
gap  
CHAPTER 4 – Methodology  
Study A - Categorising and defining 
Operational failure quality cost 
elements 
Workshop (n=5) 
Steering group discussions (n=6-12) 
Study B (i) - Call to action on 
major project quality failure  
Trial survey (n=25)  
Study B (ii) - Measuring cost of quality in major construction projects post-
handover  
Industry-based Questionnaire (n=17)  
Study C (i) - Exploring the operational issues 
sample 
Delphi review: 
Quality manager (n=1) 
Operational team project selection (n=2) 
Detail knowledge on specific projects (n=4) 
Advance knowledge on potential projects (n=2) 
Final cases selection workshop (n=3) 
Study C (ii) - Identifying project 
sample within specific projects 
Phase 1 interviews (n=7) 
Project managers across projects 
A-E 
Study C (iii) - Identifying the causes and operational outcomes of issues  
Phase 2 interviews (n = 19) 
 
Project A  
(n=4) 
Project B  
(n=2) 
Project C 
(n=5) 
Project D 
(n=2) 
Project E 
(n=6) 
Study C (iv) - Advancing finding from project operational failure  
Phase 3 - Workshop 1 (n=2) 
                 Workshop 2 (n=2) 
Study B (iii) - Quantifying quality cost failure in major construction projects 
post-handover  
Project case study  
Aim and Objectives 
Quality management, COQ 
and failure literature  
Project-based, project failure and 
capability literature 
Research philosophy, design and methodology  
Study C - Infrastructure client multi-case study  
Operational quality issues within single client organisation  
 
Draw cross-case conclusion, comparison with existing theory 
and development of new theory   
 
Conclusions and contributions    
 
Recommendations    
 
CHAPTER 5 – COQ 
framework development 
and application    
Phase 2 – Developed 
case study 
CHAPTER 6 – 
Infrastructure 
client multi-case 
study  
Phase 3 – Findings and theory 
building  
CHAPTER 7 – Discussions  
CHAPTER 8 – Conclusions  
CHAPTER 9 – Recommendations  
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6 Infrastructure Owner Multi-Case Study   
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter will present, analyse and describe the findings from data collected in the 
fulfilment of this thesis aim. The focus on the exploration of the operational failure within 
complex infrastructure projects is thus presented, illustrated and described based on Phase 
2 – the developed case study from Study C (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv). The multi-case study 
was explored through interviews as follows: 
1.  Study C (i) and (ii)- To understand the knowledge of COQ within an owner 
organisation and its link into operational projects. 
 Five (n= 1-4) one- to two-hour sessions of Delphi review in exploring the 
operational failures sample  
 Stage 1, one-hour interview (n= 7) to identify project sample within project-
specific case study 
2. Study C (iii) – To explore the emergent causes of operational failure 
 Stage 2, one-hour interview (n=19) to identify the causes and operational 
outcomes of issues 
3.  Study C (iv) – To validate and generalise the extent of operational failure  
 Two (n= 2) two- to three-hour workshops to advance findings from 
operational failure 
In other words, the aim of this phase of multi-case study exploration is to understand 
and describe the occurrences of operational failure in terms of: (a) confirming the status 
of operational failure quality costs in relation to the occurrences of operational failures, 
operational failures and their influence on future learning, and (b) the causes behind these 
operational failures. Further, based on the first stage of the methodological framework, as 
ascribed in Chapter 5, the application of the COQ measure in the construction industry 
was also examined and is explained in section 6.2. As such, this chapter establishes a 
framework that is starting to inform the collection of data in characterising the 
capabilities for failure mitigation. Validating and generalising the extent of the 
relationship between operational failure and its quality cost demonstrates the project-
specific nature and content in forming the capabilities for failure mitigation. 
6.2 The status of knowledge about COQ   
6.2.1  Understanding the knowledge of COQ amongst case study participants 
Multi-case study participants showed that COQ is well perceived, but the level of 
understanding differed according to participant role. This shows the breadth of COQ 
maturity amongst the project-based organisation’s participants. A card-sorting approach 
was used to help participants to evaluate their own experience and, as mentioned by 
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Canter et al. (1985) cited in Budhwar (2000), the categories and concepts used in practice 
were elicited to provide a view of an individual’s cognition. During the interviews, 13 
elements of operational failure quality cost elements were used. Each element was written 
on a separate card with a standard definition and represented the initial ‘construct’. The 
participant was asked questions around these cards, and carried out sorting to determine 
priorities and to describe information based on their individual concepts of categories. 
Card sorting describes ‘an outcome of one’s preference, experience, identification, 
memory and learning that can have profound effects upon individual’s inferences and 
behaviours’ (Budhwar, 2000); it provided an understanding of the causal relationship 
between the COQ elements and their outcomes (e.g. measures of operational failure in 
project delivery). The card-sorting process is described in Figure 6.1. 
 
Figure 6.1: The card-sorting process 
 Table 6.1 shows participants’ knowledge of operational failure quality cost and 
operational failure and participants’ perceived level of their influence for future 
improvement. It shows that the quality managers have a range of knowledge of COQ 
elements and the values of the quality cost elements involved as well as the impact of 
operational failure, and this may have a strong influence for future learning. The project 
managers have a high level of understanding of the operational failure, both towards its 
impact and the root cause. However, they are not aware of the quality cost that has been 
incurred due to the failure. The commercial manager could explain the COQ elements 
and values, but could not describe the root cause of operational failure. For the asset 
manager and project engineers, they were better at communicating the operational failure 
issue in terms of its technicality. Lastly, the onsite transformation leads were able to 
explain the COQ and the operational failure, but may have less confidence in influencing 
future learning.  
Every participant was influenced by their contextual setting in describing the 
operational quality issues. This table shows that the information was not consistently 
transferred among the project supply network, due to the immaturity in measuring and 
defining COQ. The quality cost elements were not ascribed constantly and thus were 
unquantifiable by most construction participants. Consequently, the interviews illustrated 
that quality was not well defined and expectations differed between individuals from 
Operational failure 
quality cost 
elements 
Operational quality 
issues 
Root Cause 
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different contexts. Thus, different goals, behaviours and cultures for quality were shown 
to exist in complex multi-organisational supply networks.  
Table 6.1: Case study participants’ knowledge of operational failure cost 
 
Knowledge of operational failure cost 
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Project 
manager 
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Commercial 
manager/ 
contract lead 
1        
Maintenance 
manager 
1        
Asset manager 1        
Project 
engineer 
3        
Onsite 
transformation 
lead 
4        
Total 19        
 
Chapter 5, Table 5.12 showed that most of the operational failure issue costs between 
£0.1 million and £400 million. In study C, all participants showed high awareness of 
operational failure, but the expertise and the responsibility for resolving the quality issues 
to reduce failure was still in doubt. Also, most participants were not aware of who was 
responsible for the quality costs. Table 6.2 demonstrates the number of quality failure 
cost elements selected by the experts during the exploration of multi-case study in Study 
C (ii) and (iii). All elements were selected more than once in almost all projects. One 
element, ‘early obsolescence’, was only selected in two projects (C and E). Energy use 
costs, environmental cost and early obsolesces cost were selected as the least important of 
the elements. A particularly important element is ‘maintenance cost’; overall, this was 
selected 31 times. Different projects show a different range of quality cost incurred with 
different awareness on quality cost selected. Project B shows the lowest selection among 
all quality cost elements and Project A and E has more range on the selected quality cost 
with average 2-7 times on most quality cost elements.  
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Table 6.2: Cost of quality failure elements selected in specific project of the multi-case 
study 
 
Quality cost elements 
Project 
A 
Project 
B 
Project 
C 
Project 
D 
Project 
E 
Total 
no. 
selected 
1. Insurance cost  6 1 1  2 10 
2. Latent defect cost  7 1 6 2 7 23 
3. Safety cost for operator  4 1 3 1 11 20 
4. Asset availability costs 2 2 7 3 7 21 
5. Energy use costs  1  2 1 2 6 
6. Maintenance costs  6 4 9 2 10 31 
7. Environmental costs 3 1 1  1 6 
8. Lifecycle performance 
costs  
4 2 5 2 8 21 
9. Functionality costs 2 2 1 2 2 9 
10. Unadaptable costs  
 
1  2 1 3 7 
11. Early Obsolescence 
costs  
  2  4 6 
12. Reputation/Brand cost/ 
Indirect consequential 
losses 
5 1 5 2 5 18 
13. Operational training/ 
readiness costs  
6 3 6 1 4 20 
  
6.2.2 Benefits and risks in the application of cost of quality 
There was an agreement on the relationship of COQ incurred and the occurrences of 
operational failure in all projects case study. However, there was still lack of 
understanding about its measure and application within project-based organisations. 
Table 6.3 shows a summary of the benefits and risks of the application of COQ observed 
and discussed within the multi-case study and steering group. The findings show there 
were benefits and risks perceived in combination with how COQ was understood by the 
steering group (SG) members, and why it was not understood by the industry through 
exploration of the case study (CS). The combination demonstrates why COQ and 
operational failures were not well understood by owner, contractor, suppliers, facilities 
management or design consultant. This shows the need of integrated approach to align 
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and rationalise the fragility of ‘non-standardisation’, ‘poor definition’ and ‘un-
quantification’ of quality failure cost in construction projects. 
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 Table 6.3: Benefits and risks of the application of COQ 
 Owner/Owner Contractor/Integrator Supplier Facilities Management Designer/Consultant 
Benefits  
of 
understa
nding the 
CoQ 
Increase co-learning from 
operational failures (CS) 
Conformance to specification 
(CS) 
Understanding opportunity for 
improvement (CS, SG) 
Ability to intervene when a 
project is failing (CS, SG) 
Ensured project scope (CS) 
Reducing cost of poor quality 
Increase opportunity for profit 
sharing (CS) 
Maintaining a good and 
collaborative relationship with 
supply network (CS, SG) 
Conformance to specification (CS) 
Understanding opportunities for 
improvement (CS, SG) 
Reducing cost of poor quality (CS) 
Increase profitability (CS) 
Ensured project scope (CS) 
Maintaining a good relationship with 
the owner (CS) 
Create a collaborative relationship 
with the supplier (CS, SG) 
Increase project margin by becoming 
a high-ranking contractor (SG) 
Discovered new opportunity for 
innovation (CS) 
 
 
Conformance to specification 
(SC) 
Understanding opportunities 
for improvement (CS, SG) 
Reducing cost of poor quality 
(CS) 
Increase profitability (CS) 
Managing project 
systematically (CS) 
Ensured project scope (CS) 
Maintaining a good 
relationship with owner (CS, 
SG) 
Discover new opportunity for 
innovation (CS, SG) 
 
 
Improved operation and assets 
delivery (CS, SG) 
Increased competence in response 
to operational failure (SG) 
Improve ability to share knowledge 
for service department in terms of 
action needed (SG) 
 
Understanding opportunities 
for improvement (SG) 
Expedite information 
transferred to delivery 
integrator (CS, SG) 
Strong cooperation with 
delivery team for instant 
response to operational failure 
(SG) 
  
 
Barriers 
to 
understa
nding the 
CoQ  
Exposing organisation weakness 
and loss (CS) 
Reputational damage with 
customers (end users) (CS, SG) 
Friction in the relationship with 
supply network(CS) 
Internal conflicts, creating blame 
culture (CS) 
Exposed internal conflicts, 
creating blame culture (CS, SG) 
Discontinuity with tactical 
operation delivery aim (CS) 
Misalignment with external 
parties (CS, SG) 
 (different organisational process/ 
quality and risk definition) 
 
Exposing weakness (CS) 
Reputational damaged with owner 
(CS, SG) 
Judging and perception by others 
(CS) 
Hinder opportunity for further project 
award (CS) 
Downstream reputation within 
industry (CS) 
Internal conflicts, creating blame 
culture (CS, SG) 
Discontinuity with tactical operation 
delivery aim (CS) 
 
 
Exposing weakness (CS) 
Friction in the relationship with 
owner (CS, SG) 
Downstream reputation within 
industry (CS) 
Internal conflicts, creating 
blame culture (CS) 
Discontinuity with tactical 
operation delivery aim (SG) 
Unsecure product sales (CS, 
SG) 
 
 
Create culture barriers in 
organisation, blaming culture (CS, 
SG) 
Causes and weakness of 
operational failures were not 
understandable (CS, SG) 
Lack of learning (SG) 
Limited ability to plan for future 
prevention and appraisal, dealing 
with uncertainty (SG) 
Poor collaboration with 
project stakeholders (SG) 
Create culture barriers in 
organisation, blaming culture 
(CS, SG) 
Designed to fail (SG) 
Causes and weakness of 
operational failures were not 
understandable (SG) 
Lack of learning (SG) 
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By looking at the operational failures and its quality cost, the data shows that 
more benefits could be achieved. These include: increases co-learning from operational 
failures, ability to intervene when a project is failing, provides conformance and clarity 
on project scope, better understanding of opportunity for improvement, maintaining a 
good and collaborative relationship between supply network, projects are managed more 
systematically, as well as increased profitability and greater opportunity for innovation. 
These are also beneficial for the facility management to increase competency in 
responding to operational failures for better prevention and problem solving. For the 
designers, better understanding of operational failure and its quality cost results in 
stronger cooperation with the delivery team in responding to operational failures, where 
information transferred can be expedited.  
However, quality costs were frequently overshadowed by the negative outcomes 
(barrier of understanding COQ) relating to their application. Participants from the multi-
case study have expressed the barriers in applying COQ as it will have exposed the 
organisation’s weakness and losses that will give reputational damage towards their 
owner for the contractor and towards the customers and user for the owner. Consequently, 
for the project supply network, the discussion on COQ barriers has pointed out further 
friction for the whole multi-organisational relationship, which will create internal conflict 
and a blame culture. For the contractor and suppliers, there was a belief that the supply 
network may have a possibility to ‘discontinue with the tactical operational delivery aim’, 
which will hinder the opportunity for future project awards. This will further lower their 
reputation within the industry. Frequently, there was a fear of what the outcome could be. 
Consequently, the study acknowledged that poor understanding of COQ during operation 
will lead to wrong information delivery, lack of learning from failure and frequently lead 
to designed to fail.  
This data supports the belief that attention is not paid to operational failures and its 
quality cost experienced by the construction industry. This has been validated by the 
steering group meetings, which included construction industry participants who have 
acknowledged the importance of its application.  
6.3 Project context and structure and its influence on operational 
delivery 
Table 6.4 lists all the five project multi-case study and shows the different quality issues 
that were articulated by project managers during the first phase interviews. These quality 
issues were further quantified by all other interviewees. From all the operational failures, 
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not every operational failure has impacted quality cost failure. Some operational failures 
have demonstrated quality cost saving. This has impacted on how the quality issue was 
prevented and appraised.   
Table 6.4: Details of the quality issues experienced by the multi-case study projects 
Project 
type 
Project  
budget  
Project 
cost  
Project 
duration   
Operational failures Cost of 
quality 
failure 
Cost of 
quality 
saving 
 
Project A –
Buildings 
(Car Park) 
£150m £77m 3 years Incomplete ducting for street 
lighting resulted in abortive 
cost from UK power network. 
Poor drainage, design and 
installation. Not cleaned 
appropriately (e.g. asphalt 
blocked)  
Level 50 leaks and patches due 
to poor water tightness.  
Ponding at level 50 due to 
poor quality construction of 
asphalt being laid. 
Floor leaking at forecourt due 
to poor waterproofing.  
Water bubbles at floor decking 
(level 10) due to concrete 
plank system. 
 Emergency exit sign turns off 
during testing 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
Project B –
Water 
Treatment 
Plant 
£10-
20m 
£20m 5 years 
and more 
Non-compliance chemicals 
were used to dilute mixed 
fluid.  
Silt clogging the grip blaster. 
High detergent used causes 
foaming.   
X 
 
 
X 
X 
 
Project C –
Infrastructu
re (Track 
Transit 
System) 
£31m £33m 3 years Vinyl flooring tiles lifting and 
bubbling. 
Adaptable passenger conveyor 
was easy to maintain and 
delivered OPEX saving. 
Changing LED lighting 
specification to one that is 
cheaper to maintain. 
New car and platform to 
support the TTS system 
successfully introduced. 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
Project D –
Buildings 
(Escalator) 
£40m £38m 3 years Introduction of parallel system 
to the security operation. 
Escalator failing on a daily 
 
 
X 
X 
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basis due to difficulty in 
coordination with maintenance 
worker. 
 
 
 
Project E –
Infrastructu
re 
(Runway) 
£50m £50m 2 years  High ambient air temperatures 
and engine blast heating cause 
runway to develop ‘elephant 
feet’. 
Long-term crack treatment 
with asphalt increased life of 
the runway’s overall surface. 
Tungsten lamp changed to 
LED lighting that lasts longer. 
The mud flap laid in together 
with asphalt caused break up 
on the runway. 
Cleaning machine for airplane 
tyre rubber used on the runway 
destroying the asphalt due to 
its high power. 
Old joints underneath runway 
cause cracking because no 
treatment made. 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
6.4 Summaries of the backgrounds to the multi-case study projects 
6.4.1 Project A – Building (car park) 
This project has delivered a multi-storey car park. The project was constructed within 
three years and, at the point when the interviews were conducted, the car park was partly 
handed over. It was not fully handed over due to unresolved technical issues, leading to 
operational failures. The main contractor had a long-term relationship with the owner and 
was involved in all the remedial works, in order to fully hand the project over to the 
owner. 
6.4.2 Project B – Water treatment plant 
This project was initiated in order to offer water treatment capability to the owner as an 
alternative to moving the polluted water off site to be treated. A new water treatment 
facility has been built; however, due to several issues around the operability and handling 
of the system, it has not been possible to use the asset for a few years following 
completion and handover to the owner. There has been difficulty in getting the project 
operationally ready, which has created major COQ failure throughout the years. 
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6.4.3 Project C – Track transit system   
This project was created in response to passenger congestion issues at an airport terminal. 
An underground walkway project was set up to connect three buildings in supporting the 
system to transport people from building to building. Within this project, there are four 
outcomes that were pointed out by the project manager during the first stage of the 
interview. Three of the outcomes were positive (successes), which were linked to cost of 
quality savings, and one outcome has contributed to cost of quality failure. 
6.4.4 Project D – Building escalator  
Project D was delivering an additional escalator at a security area, in order to optimise the 
waiting time in this area. Thus, the project was constructed in a live operational area and 
included structural work between two floors. The works included fitment of the escalator, 
removal of an existing retail shop, creation of a baggage system and a travel escalator for 
people. This project is included as one that had a positive impact on COQ savings. 
Although there was an issue that led to external quality cost failure, this was effectively 
resolved and resulted in long-term cost savings. 
6.4.5 Project E – Infrastructure (runway) 
This project was fundamentally a maintenance project. In airport runways, the 
maintenance work involves removing old asphalt and relaying new asphalt every 10 years 
and conducting major maintenance every 30 years. This project delivered major resurface 
works on two runways. The case study explored the project outcomes, which led to six 
operational failures – four contributed to the quality cost failure and two provided quality 
cost savings. 
6.5 The emergent causes of operational failure 
From the analysis, empirical data shows the distribution of capabilities in a project 
influence the occurrences of operational failures. In this section, the data demonstrates 
what causes the operational failure and when it occurred. Data was translated into three 
cycles of: (1) transferring capability, which explains the transformation of capabilities 
from owner requirement towards the project capability at the initial stage of a project; (2) 
applying capability, which explains the application of capabilities from the project brief 
during execution towards asset operations; and (3) recognising capability, which explains 
the new capabilities acquired to operate an asset and how project teams could improvise 
and learn in mitigating future failure. These three key aspects of the distribution of 
capabilities are described in the following sub-sections. Detailed data was all tabularised 
and is provided in Appendix 3. 
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6.5.1  Transferring capability 
The distribution of capabilities by the owner during the transferring capability phase was 
influenced by four factors, which are: contracted end date, accuracy of project cost, 
relationship with supply network and demanding regulations. Table 6.5 shows the 
evidential examples of triggered factors of failure and their implications for project 
capability from the multi-case study projects.  
Table 6.5: Triggered factors of failure and their implications for project capability during 
the transferring capability phase 
Triggered factor of 
failure 
Evidential examples from the cases 
Contracted end date  “… we had assurance …, [contractor] had assurance and … second tier of supply 
they had assurance [but still] we get into a situation where everybody took a 
picture of something that was wrong… people didn't know what they were doing. 
...some of it is, was time constraint because it was slightly behind and we need to 
get it finished…but if they look back now for the sake of a week or to two weeks 
then they could have finished it right the first time rather than come back and do 
things again."[Project A- A7- Owner project manager] 
“…if we produced a programme of works that went beyond their end date then we 
were unlikely to win that work. So… we would have been influenced by that end 
date. In a competitive world, you want to win the work… would you try and 
achieve something that you couldn’t to win that work?” [Project C- C8-
Contractor’s quality manager]   
 
Allocation of budget 
to fit project 
specification 
“…they’d missed out half the things…we knew it was going to cost more than 
£77 million, so the final account included a number of elements where we added 
scope …" [Project A-A11-client commercial manager] 
“…we needed to get the engineering team to look at how they would maintain 
[and]... its all other contain; like engineering and operations. [to determine] how 
much time they have to spend on it …and the long term contract …” [Project B-
B2- Client project manager] 
 
Relationship with 
supply network to 
integrate project 
capability  
“…[the contractor] are an organisation that have worked with [client] for many 
years. They were part of the joint venture ...for us and they are more than 
interested in supporting us on [other projects] etc. So, they know as an 
organisation that they need to sort this out. To just walk away …wouldn’t be a 
sensible position for them to be in." [Project A-A11-client commercial manager 
“...Because of this relationship that [client] had with [supplier]… they were called 
in…should be at our end of the chain ..[to give] us advice and helping us to do the 
job.  [but]..came in almost like a bullying, … with [client] next to them, there was 
a telling off, which felt completely wrong. And it shows you that the choice was 
made on [client’s] side and we were just the installer.  " [Project C- C9-Contractor 
project manager] 
 
Reflecting project 
scope with 
demanding 
regulations 
"If we do not do this, we will remain non compliant.  Which means Thames 
Water can stop us from operating.  That’s the ultimate penalty to us.  They can 
fine us millions.  I think it’s an unlimited fine…Thames Water, the Environmental 
Agency, came back to us and said, “We want you to exceed our levels and give us 
a better quality of water going into the river beds, into the system”… there’s a 
reputational part there if we can deliver it… We’re doing something for the 
environment.  But if we don’t do it, take away our licence to operate.” [Project B-
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B18-Owner maintenance manager]   
“..due to the life of the tungsten lamp, [they] needed to be changed every 6 
months, so we’ve now stuck LEDs in the whole thing, and they last for 10 years. 
So huge maintenance reduction, and operational cost of changing fittings 
continuously…”[Project E-E16-Owner airfield transformation manager] 
 
 
 
 (i) Contracted end date  
Four out of the five projects showed that critical time for project completion 
significantly influenced operational failures. One project was abandoned while others 
absorbed the high quality cost failure. In the majority of these cases, the project end date 
was described as a fixed date or not moveable. The contractor described working to a 
critical date of completion as a ‘pressurised’ environment with interconnected works 
with multi-organisational, which led to poor work performance. In project A, less focus 
was given to project quality control due to the critical opening date. There was a limited 
time provided for the project team to work towards the anticipated quality in organising 
the programmed work. Thus, project processes were not followed accordingly and the 
project team was more focused on technical assurance rather than looking into the 
quality assurance that the work was focused on the need to complete.  
Additionally, in complex projects C and E, the owner was restricted to project 
interdependency between projects to avoid an operational penalty; delay in one project 
will impact the owner’s other operation system. The contract for project C was 
structured with ‘payment milestone’ as a performance indicator for the contractor to 
ensure work was completed on time. Payment was given when the targeted milestone 
was achieved. However, empirical data showed the contracted end date changed the 
culture and behaviour of the project team. This influenced the contractor’s capability to 
maintain their work performance for the owner rather than performing in accordance to 
effective project quality implementation. Sub-contractors who were appointed late 
followed the initial owner’s work programme; thus, the suppliers’ work programmes 
were similarly in ‘critical time’. Regardless of the operation risk, the appointment of the 
contractor and suppliers was based on the poor work programme, and this impacted the 
execution of works and reworks. Therefore, the procurement process that was driven by 
the project completion date has resulted in poor-quality construction because of the 
project team. In project E, quality implementation was described as being only perceived 
partially or system-by-system basis, rather than being integrated with the whole project 
quality system. Quality was assessed according to part-by-part of the system and 
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location due to the need to meet each system’s critical operational date. In some sections, 
the project proceeded although the project team was aware about the possibility of 
failure implications. Delivery managers made the decision to construct with minimum 
maintenance for a quicker job and to complete more areas. As a result, the lifecycle of 
the asset decreased sooner than expected. Cost was perceived to be higher when the 
project execution covered only minimal works due to extensive reworks.  
Within this factor, the culture and behaviour of the project team appeared to be 
more focused on completing the project, rather than working towards ‘getting it right, 
first time’. Frequently, quality assurance was hindered; technical details and quality were 
given less prominence than project execution of the critical work programme (i.e. quality 
issues were not fixed). Although project A showed that quality issues were reviewed by 
the project technical team, prevention did not occur instantly, which led to quality issues 
at completion. The project was claimed to be poorly constructed. Similarly, in projects C 
and E, work was constructed with the awareness of failure implications, but the project 
teams would rather complete it first then fix the issues later. Therefore, critical time 
frequently had a negative effect on the operation.  
(ii) Allocation of project budget to fit project specification  
Cost was another factor that led to high recurrence of operational failure, as shown in 
projects A, C and E. The project budget was set according to the estimated cost, which 
led to different decisions being made during project execution. This influenced the 
owner’s decisions to appoint a contractor with the lowest cost, buy cheaper material and 
in designing the project. Most of the project quality failure costs were only realised in 
hindsight. In Project A, the owner felt certain that, by appointing the lowest-bid 
contractor, the project would cost more than the project budget. However, the owner still 
assumed that the contractor would have the capability to construct according to the 
promising cost. However, the project required additional input and scope, which resulted 
in quality cost failure during operations. The contractor accepted the project at a low cost 
to secure a good relationship with the owner, but the owner only saw the low cost as a 
benefit to achieve lower project cost. Hence, within the limited cost constraint, the cost 
pressure was mainly adhered to by the contractor during the construction, but not by the 
owner. This has influenced the different quality cultures and expectations of capabilities 
that were transferred to the project. 
In Project C, due to the limited project budget, the owner selected cheaper 
materials and nominated their preferred supplier. This caused some difficulties for the 
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contractor to apply and maintain an unfamiliar product within a complex project 
environment. The unsuitability of the product was not realised by the owner or supplier 
during the planning stage, but the poor performance of the product resulted in high 
maintenance cost and early obsolescence during operations. Project managers may only 
see the functionality of the project but not the cost implications. Also, in project C, there 
was no budget allocated for operational problems; thus, this influenced how the 
contractor provided options on solutions to fix the problems. This has thus increased the 
total quality cost failure when problems are only fixed temporarily.   
Project E showed a limited project budget, which led to limitations in delivering 
project innovations. The project was constructed using the same old design in delivering 
the maintenance programme. Thus, it became apparent that the project had not included 
enough treatment frequency for maintaining the runway, and the treatment was later 
shown to be unsuitable for the project’s recent conditions. This later caused poor quality 
of the asset during the complex operations. Moreover, there was uncertainty about the 
project cost as product costs were frequently changing after years of planning. This 
influenced how the project team made the decision to allocate an appropriate estimate to 
allow for the fluctuation of cost. The cost incurred at operational level was later absorbed 
and borne through reducing other operational elements such as the maintenance cost. This 
again affected the long-term maintenance cost.  
  Empirical data showed that the owner was not aware of the construction failure 
cost but frequently suffered with many costs after the asset was operationalised. Thus, the 
owner needs to better understand both project and operational capability to balance the 
capabilities that drive a better quality culture, as the owner and the multi-organisational 
supply network may share the same failure cost responsibilities. Data also showed that 
the quality costs may not have been realised by the project team during construction but 
were absorbed differently by the owner and the contractor. This shows that the project 
innovation was not fully promoted by the team, who were frequently restricted by the 
budget. Hence, more information should be shared among the project team in making 
different decisions that should incorporate owner and multi-organisational supply 
network knowledge to mitigate failure. Failure mitigation should be based on their own 
experience as well as on the contractor’s experience.  
(iii) Relationship with supply network to integrate project capability 
The owner’s selection of a preferred contractor or suppliers has several implications for 
how a project is procured. This has shown both positive and negative effects on the 
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project performance. Although a long-term relationship helps the owner to save time in 
gaining trust and familiarity with a contractor’s past experience, it does not ensure that 
the contractor has the capability to perform. In project A, the long-term relationship 
between the contractor and owner provided more job opportunities for the contractor but 
did not prevent quality issues from one project to another. When the same contractor was 
selected for two similar projects, although that contractor was comfortable in delivering 
the same project, they had less initiative to provide improvements. This led to the owner 
receiving the same operational failure from the two similar projects. What was evident 
was the long-term relationship provided assurance for the contractor to complete and 
rework the quality issues, but did not prevent or mitigate future failure; thus, quality cost 
failure was still transferred and borne by different parties from one project to the other.  
 Project B showed the need to have a specialist in constructing the new product, 
but the project relied on contractor and supplier capability to provide product innovation. 
However, suppliers who have less understanding of the owner’s operational needs only 
want to sell the product. This makes it difficult for the owner to operate, and the owner 
assumed that the supplier would be responsible for solving the problem. The supplier 
could not cope with the complexity, and thus abandoned the project. The project was 
further continued by the other supplier who provided a warranty to assure that the product 
could be fixed, but the product became more complex. Consequently, this project showed 
that a product warranty does not ensure the initiative will be taken to improve project 
performance, but only ensures that the supplier will stay with the owner to fix the 
problem. The new supplier was still able to leave the project once the warranty was over, 
and the product was still un-operationalised. Project C showed that a stronger relationship 
between the owner and the supplier led to fragmentation of the relationship between the 
contractor and the nominated supplier. The contractor found it difficult to influence the 
selection of material, as the nominated supplier provided greater assurance to the owner. 
This further influenced the project operations when the material was found to be 
unsuitable. Although the contractor had predicted the unsuitability of the material for the 
operational environment, the supplier was confident about the suitability of the product. 
This left the contractor with no ability to intervene in relation to the quality issues and 
they only managed to agree about the installation of the product; to ensure they obtained 
the supplier’s approval for that installation and got the warranty approval. The owner 
perceived that it was the contractor’s responsibility to fix operational failure as a long-
term performance indicator to maintain a good business relationship; hence, the 
contractor had to absorb the quality cost failure to ensure the problem was fixed. Thus, no 
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intervention was made on the unsuitability of the material as the contractor needed to 
comply with the owner’s specifications.   
 Similarly, in Project E, contractor and suppliers were committed to fix the 
operational problem to ensure a good relationship with the owner; thus, the owner 
frequently relied on the suppliers’ capability to fix the operational failure. Although 
operational failure were frequently repeated, the owner presumed it was a temporary 
problem; thus, initiatives were not taken to prevent or appraise the operational failures. 
The case study indicates that, as operational failures were commonly referred back to the 
contractor, the project team was more focused on delivering the asset and put operational 
failures as less important.  
(iv) Reflecting project scope with demanding regulations  
A complex project with demanding regulations needs configurations and innovation on 
project capabilities. Project B demonstrated a high demand on regulations and the need 
for new technology, which led to project abandonment. This caused the project to be 
completed with high asset availability cost. The project was restricted to non-compliance 
towards environmental regulations, which was not resolved due to the need for new 
capability involving a specialist. The project faced non-compliance with environment 
issues such as pollution and also interruption of other system operations. The complexity 
in the regulations caused high COQ for the owner and termination for the contractor who 
is not capable. Although quality issues were acknowledged by the owner early in the 
process, the contractor assured them that the project would not fail. However, during 
execution, the contractor was unable to cope with the complexity. The demanding 
regulations needed the owner to integrate the contractor’s capability with the operational 
technical capability to better understand the capabilities needed for the project. This can 
only be achieved by early involvement from a specialist, to research the feasibilities 
needed for the complex project and provide innovation in the form of new technology.  
 Project E was frequently restricted by airline regulations about not closing the 
runway for more than a few hours; thus, the project was always critical to operations. 
This meant that the project team was less able to provide innovations within the limited 
time. The contractor does not predict the operational problem, only design the project 
based on the critical working window to ensure the project is successfully delivered.   
 163 
6.5.2 Applying capability 
This section illustrates how the application of capabilities from their distribution during 
the project brief has implications for the asset’s operations capability. This study shows 
that the application of capabilities was influenced by the project team’s understanding of 
real-life operational technicalities and constraints in design, contractor expertise and 
resources, and technical competency relating to on-site operations. Table 6.6 below 
shows the evidential examples of triggered factors of failure and their implications for 
operational capability from the project multi-case study.  
Table 6.6: Triggered factors of failure and their implications for operational capability 
during application of the capability phase 
Triggered factor 
of failure 
Evidential examples from the cases 
Understanding of 
real-life 
operational 
technicalities and 
constraints in 
design   
“I would say quite a bit of these are construction related issues, quality control on site. 
Some of it will be design related in terms of the detailing. Sometimes you may get such 
a detail come back from the designer which looks good, but actually when you give it 
to somebody to try and build out on the site you can’t build what they’ve 
drawn."  [Project A-A14-Owner project engineer] 
"…so [client] make the decisions but the designer develops it and says, ‘What do you 
think?’  And they struggle, because they don’t deliver the job, they don’t get the 
learning we’re getting." [Project C-C9-Contractor project manager] 
"I'd imagine it would have been heavily design-related in terms of aesthetics.  I imagine 
it would have been aesthetics over function, because all of us have said numerous times 
that with the benefit of hindsight I think all of us would have just polished the floor." 
[Project C-C10-Owner quality manager]  
 
Trusting the 
contractor’s 
expertise and 
resources 
"In theory if it had been done to the detail provided by the designer it should have 
worked but it wasn’t done…it wasn’t as the designer specified…no top hat detail so the 
water went down the hole." [Project A-A7-Owner project manager] 
“…but when we came to build it they (contractor) didn’t follow that process.”  [Project 
A-A14-Owner project engineer] 
“…then [they repeat] exactly, same design, same specification and then you get the 
same issues.” [Project A-A14-Owner project engineer] 
 
Technical 
competency in 
on-site 
operations 
“ [state] “you’re the builder, you’re the professional, let us know if you’ve got any 
problems”... but that model is completely different to what we do ... we don’t really 
have the technical team to do inspections or anything like that" [Project A-A1-Owner 
project manager]   
"... so we’re going back to projects to try and get that resolved. But again it’s what you 
can see, and with self-certification there’s a lot which we can’t see. " [Project A-A14-
Owner project engineer] 
“But what is interesting is we don’t do the design ourselves.  In anything.  We didn’t do 
the design not even in [other] project.  However, this particular one is so different from 
what we do that we have no expertise at all…if we were to start again, I cannot see 
what we could have done differently.” [Project B-B18-Owner maintenance manager]  
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(i) Understanding of real-life operational technicalities and constraints in design  
Four out of the five projects showed that project design influenced asset operations. 
Designers frequently designed the project according to the owner’s needs, but there was a 
lack of capability to include different knowledge from different phases of the project. 
This was described as designers were only involved during project development and thus 
had limited knowledge about project execution and operations. Project A revealed that the 
complex design detail, which was compounded by not being integrated with the 
contractor’s capability to build, hindered quality control during construction. The 
contractor, who had limited technical competency in on-site operations, was not able to 
build the complex design. Not having the right capability to apply led to the contractor 
constructing the project according to their own experience and knowledge, which resulted 
in a poor-quality presentation. 
 Projects B and C were designed without involving the contractor at the initial 
stage. Project B’s design was developed later by the contractor based on the options 
provided by the owner. The options were designed according to the suppliers’ suggestions 
on how the system could be operated but during execution the contractor could not 
construct the complex system, thus the asset was not workable. Operational failures were 
not resolved and understandable, and the project currently has a high COQ. Thus, the 
system was not designed in the way that it should have been, dealing with the 
construction process and operations environment. The designer sees the need to satisfy 
the owner’s aesthetical requirement but has not reflected it with the owner’s operational 
environment. Project C showed that the designer was limited by the owner’s 
specifications, and so the project suffered due to the wrong selection of material. The 
contractor experienced technical difficulties due to the poor design but had no 
opportunity to influence the selection, which led to quality issues during operations.       
 Projects A and E showed that operational failures were perceived due to the used 
of an old design that did not fit the current operations environment. Also, operational 
failures were fixed and referred to the old design; thus, they were not effectively resolved. 
Therefore, the project faced difficulties in providing continuous understanding based on 
in-operative design; thus, solutions that were compatible with the current conditions 
could not be achieved. Project E suffered from more maintenance costs in less than one 
year after completion than the expected 10-year lifecycle of the asset. The project team 
frequently worked with the supplier to resolve the operational failures without the 
involvement of the designers; thus, the design was not updated to reflect operational 
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failures. Issues were then repeated on similar projects. Project managers always see 
operational issues as the process embedded within their work routine rather than as 
quality problems, as they are only seen after completion. Due to this, operational issues 
were not prevented and appraised to mitigate future failure. 
(ii) Trusting the contractor’s expertise and resources  
Empirical data demonstrated that a project needs the owner’s involvement to carefully 
understand the contractor’s capability as it affects project performance. Data showed that 
the owner’s technical expertise was pertinent in terms of transferring operations input as 
the contractor may not be fully aware of the owner’s unique operations environment. 
Owners were perhaps over-reliant on contractors’ competency, and contractors who had 
limited influence on project procurement did their best to construct the asset according to 
the owner’s requirement. In all projects, the owner trusted the contractor’s capability to 
construct, but projects A and C showed poor performance after the construction, which 
led to the projects’ non-compliance, to their owners’ dissatisfaction. In both projects, the 
owner trusted that the contractor would comply with quality standards, but operational 
complexity needs continuous quality support from all parties to ensure project success. 
Contractors who focus on execution may not be aware of the quality cost for operations; 
thus, project quality was focused on to be delivered at the targeted time and cost. As a 
result, maintenance was difficult due to the poor construction. 
  The build for Project C continued even though the contractor was aware of the 
unsuitability of the selected product, and this led to the asset’s poor quality during 
operations. Quality issues were frequently only notified by the owner’s representatives at 
completion rather than by the contractor’s delivery integrator during execution. 
Contractors always see completing on time as necessary to maintain their good reputation 
and relationship with the owner, while quality issues are commonly resolved as rework 
during operations. This resultant quality cost is absorbed as part of the day-to-day 
operational cost (i.e. maintenance, lifecycle or asset ability cost). The divergence of 
project performance expectation resulted in different quality expectations; thus, quality 
issues were not understood at project execution.  
 Quality control is always placed as the contractor’s responsibility when the owner 
trusts the contractor’s capability. However, in Project E the operating team was 
challenged with continuous quality issues that were difficult to understand because they 
had no knowledge of how the asset had been constructed. Although the project was 
constructed by an experienced contractor, quality issues were not prevented or resolved. 
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In Project D, it was difficult for suppliers to work together to fix the quality issues due to 
their unfamiliarity with the technical aspect. Although the owner provided early 
involvement for suppliers to get to know the material used, there were still discrepancy 
between the project team and the suppliers on technical capability to construct. This led to 
different organisations making different decisions that were not aligned with the whole 
supply and operator network.  
 (iii) Project team’s technical competency in on-site operations  
Empirical data showed the importance of strong capabilities within the project team. In 
most cases, poor competency meant problems were not identified early, which meant 
operational failure was not prevented and appraised at the right time. Owners assume 
contractors are more responsible, thus the owner’s technical expertise was less valued by 
the project team, who assumed that the contractor had full understanding of the owner’s 
operational environment. In some cases, the owner did not have the technical expertise, 
and thus fully relied on the contractor’s technical competency. In other way, contractors 
believed owners should provide some insight when they needed that as, through 
integration of technical expectations, operational failures could be better prevented.  
 In Project B, the project team faced difficulties in operating the new asset due to 
demanding requirements in the operational environment that required more information 
and higher knowledge. Projects C and D showed complex design and technical problems 
that were not understood and resolved by the contractor due to limited capabilities. The 
projects indicated that operational capabilities were not integrated during the project 
execution, which led to the project not performing. Moreover, in some cases, less 
emphasis on the technical expertise role created a low level of motivation among the 
technical experts. Quality issues were not critically solved and thus indirectly resulted in 
poor learning capabilities, because each specialist tended to work according to their 
individual assignment rather than integrating the systems.  
 Project A was also a complex project that experienced difficulties during 
operations due to the limited technical capabilities from the owner’s technical 
perceptions. Although the technical aspect was reviewed by engineers, the comments 
were not appreciated and there was no coordination in the delivery of the project. The 
supply network found it difficult to explain the importance of the technical specifications 
during execution, because the management may not fully understand the technical 
language, thus affecting different decision; as a result, the quality issues were only 
realised when they caused a failure. In Project E, operational failures were repeated from 
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one project to another, similar project due to the same contractor being involved in both 
projects. This is because the owner, who was less involved during project execution, was 
not aware of the root cause of failure and needed the same contractor to resolve the issue. 
This provided an opportunity for the contractor to obtain more work, but quality failure 
costs increased.  
6.5.3  Recognising capability 
This section illustrates how the capabilities acquired during transferring and applying the 
capability phases are used to operate an asset and how, if not recognised, the operational 
capability can influence future failure. This recognising capability phase was influenced 
by the need for technical expertise during operations and because learning was not 
captured on a project, and is described in the following sub-sections. Table 6.7 below 
shows the triggered factors of failure and their implications on operational capability 
within the project multi-case study.  
Table 6.7: Triggered factors of failure and their implications on owner’s capability to 
operate during recognising the capability phase 
Triggered 
factor of 
failure 
Evidential examples from the cases 
The need for 
technical 
expertise 
during 
operations   
" I took it over because it wasn't in a good state, it was behind program and there were 
some quality issues." "All of the things where people have taken their bonuses and sort of 
run for the hills and said it is all working. Basically I have to make it function as it should 
do for the next forty years. " [Project A-A7-Owner project manager] 
" In the fact it’s been leaking so the previous guy tried to resolve it in a number of ways 
but we never really got to the cause of the issues.” [Project A-A7-Owner project 
manager] 
 
Learning not 
captured on 
project  
"… so you’d have [numbers of] technical engineer[s] come out and look; whereas a field 
engineer, or clerk of works role, tends to be a bit more of a master of all…the technical 
experts or technical team would critique something, but because of the nature of the 
schedule, would almost pale into insignificance because “yeah whatever we’ve got to get 
it done.”  [Project A-A1-Owner project manager]   
“…two different contract models… that has a big influence. So, every time the regulator 
says, “You are going to deliver that’ and we create a new model, we are kind of resetting, 
so, in a way, we cannot learn long-term.” [Project E-E16- Owner airfield transformation 
manager] 
 
 
(i) The need of technical aspects for operations    
The projects cases showed that the project managers (PMs) from all projects were 
appointed due to the operational failures, and none of the PMs were the initial PMs who 
were involved with the project from the beginning, which resulted is operational failures 
that were not understandable. In projects A, C and E, operational failures were difficult to 
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resolve as the root cause was not fully understood. The projects indicate that project 
execution relies heavily on the contractor and its supplier but they were less involved by 
the operations team. The project team may not have the opportunity to share capabilities, 
as complex projects were always constructed towards the critical time and cost, which 
leads to less involvement in operational requirements. People who were involved during 
project execution frequently left for other important projects, which led to knowledge not 
being fully transferred. New PMs struggled to meet the critical time and thus made 
different decisions based on their experience, putting projects at operational risk. 
Operational failures were thus difficult to understand in relation to how projects were 
constructed and what was causing the problems as it involved different people and 
methods.  
 As an example, the PM in Project B mentioned that the project was only taken 
over when it was in a poor state, thus it was difficult to reduce the quality costs. Quality 
issues were recognised as design faults, but, due to the number of attempts to resolve the 
issues, the project became more complex. Causes were described differently by people 
who had been involved, thus involving high quality cost failure due to the different 
attempts to resolve the issues. The operational maintenance team worked with the 
suppliers to find the best solutions but quality issues were frequently concealed by the 
project team and contractor to avoid responsibility for faults. The operational team found 
discrepancy between the project specification on-site operations and the original scope 
but the technical experts who made different decisions due to some complexity (i.e. time 
or cost) were now needed for a new project. This left the operations team with an 
unresolved problem. Operators who needed to maintain the asset could only understand 
the operational failures at the operational stage; this increased the whole maintenance 
costs due to their unfamiliarity with the project history.  
 The owner wants to deliver a project with the best innovations, but it is difficult 
for the operational team to adhere to project innovations. Technical aspects distributed 
during operations were different to those proposed by the technical team at the project 
stage. This discrepancy increases the operational complexity involved in management and 
maintenance. Project D showed that the operational manager made an effort in providing 
information to avoid operational failures but this was not fully recognised by the project 
team. The project team commonly sees operational failure as frequently unpredictable, 
which needs interplay by the operational technical engineer. However, complex projects 
need instant solutions, thus operational failures were not recognised as a priority. 
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Unresolved operational failures frequently create a blaming culture due to the cost and 
reputational impact. Hence, technical aspects were not always willingly understood by 
different professions. Often, operational failures were perceived as another’s (operational 
team) responsibility, which indirectly led to non-appreciation of technical expertise in 
relation to the operational aspect.   
(ii) Learning not captured from projects  
The empirical data shows that operational failures were frequently not captured and 
learned, while operational success was almost forgotten because it was overshadowed by 
the project quality issues. In Project A, operational failures were repeated by the same 
contractor in another, similar project. Although the owner recognised the increased 
quality costs failure, the lesson was not captured. The operational failure was always 
acknowledged by different team (i.e. the operational team) and was resolved by the 
operational team; this experience was not being taught to the people who were involved 
earlier (i.e. the construction team). Hence, the lesson was not realised and acknowledged 
by the whole multi-organisational supply network. People try to avoid responsibility for 
failure; thus, project teams always see that learning is from others (different organisations 
and projects) rather than their own project.  
 The owner managed their project-based organisation (contract model) within a 
five-year programme cycle as an incentive for their competitive improvements. However, 
long-term learning was difficult to capture as the whole governance changed at the start 
of every new project due to the length of the project. Thus, the lesson learnt from the 
previous contract model was not transferred to the new contract model because, 
frequently, this model was developed whilst the project was being executed. Lessons 
were only learnt at the end of a project. In Project C, the project team was integrated with 
the operational maintenance team to reduce the operational risk, which led to project 
success. The project team had critically integrated with a different supply network to 
ensure that the operational system was not interrupted, which resulted in project success. 
Project collaboration helped the identification of mitigation in project planning to prevent 
operational failures. There was realisation about the shared risk of failing to deliver, and 
thus those involved in the project collaborated to prevent failure.   
 In Project D, operational failures were treated early, at the beginning of the 
project, which showed great improvement in its operations. The initiative resulted in 
better coordination between project teams and operations and thus achieved savings on 
maintenance cost. The predicted operational difficulties foreseen by the project team were 
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appraised and prevented. Integrated solutions were made with collaboration, which drove 
the project’s success. This was learned from a similar project that had huge maintenance 
and reduction of lifecycle costs due to poor project execution. Although, frequently, it is 
difficult to stop projects and work on the operational failures, this made a big difference 
to the project’s long-term savings.  
 However, information on a successful project was commonly not shared in terms 
of how this could provide benefits as people moved to another project with a different 
focus, and assumed that every project is unique and different. Therefore, a project was 
perceived to be a success only with on-time completion or within the project budget, but 
the operational failures was seen as a different project. The full benefits of the project’s 
success or failure thus were not realised. People maintain their good reputation by 
supressing failure, and project governance is always perceived as starting a new project 
with different procurement procedures.  
6.6 Integrated capabilities in failure mitigation   
The realisation of these factors during data collection has led to efforts looking into the 
mitigation of these failures. Although the research is predominantly looking at 
operational failures, this section describes data where mitigating capabilities are 
emerging. In this section, data from the project case study describes why integrated 
capabilities in failure mitigation are needed and how these failure issues can be mitigated. 
Within the selection of project multi-case study (Table 6.4) there were some operational 
failures that demonstrated operational quality cost saving. This data is described in the 
sub-section below and is tabularised in Appendix 4.  
6.6.1 Why integrated capabilities in failure mitigation are needed 
In most cases, operational failure was not measured and acknowledged, which led to 
projects losing the opportunity to capture the value of developing integrated capabilities 
to mitigate failure. As the majority of project cases were deliberately delivered with the 
focus on getting the project operational ready, most operational failure was not known by 
the top management, i.e. the owner. The operational failure were only brought to their 
attention when they involved massive quality costs for failures. Frequently, when the 
project team recognised potential failure, each organisation only focused on completing 
its own task. As an example, in projects C and D, the contractors were provided with an 
indemnity to secure project completion on time. This shows that projects need to develop 
the integrated capabilities in failure mitigation for the project team to ensure the projects 
can be stopped prevent potential failures.    
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 In certain contexts, because operational failures were only realised at the end of 
the project, quality costs for operational failures were only recognised by the operational 
team. The capabilities for failure mitigation were then not captured by the rest of the 
project chain. The quantification of operational failure and its quality costs helps teams to 
visualise the benefits and failure generated from the operational issues. As shown in 
Project C, most of the project team only recognised the operational issues that caused 
poor quality cost but not the operational issues that resulted in quality cost savings. 
Consequently, the project team acknowledged that measuring quality cost of the 
operational failure helps to provide a clearer view on recognising the project benefits, and 
thus helps in generating the integrated capabilities to mitigate failure. This is because, 
although there is uncertainty on the project lifecycle, some operational failure could be 
predicted based on experience. 
 Also, all projects showed poor judgement on the quality management provided 
during the delivering and operational stages. Thus, project teams recognised that there is a 
need to improve quality management within the project management. By identifying the 
failures, projects could be easier to stop and deal with the problem and thus reduce the 
operational failures and its quality cost. Project teams agreed that measuring COQ could 
act as a performance indicator to integrated capabilities in failure mitigation; which will 
show whether the project is lagging or advanced in delivering the desired operational 
quality expectations.   
6.6.2 How operational failure could be mitigated  
A project needs the integration of capabilities among owner, contractor and supplier to 
select what is best for the project and its alignment with the nature of the owner’s 
operations. Project A showed that a long-term relationship helped to incentivise the 
contractor to continuously fix the operational failures for the owner. This provided an 
opportunity for the owner and contractor to develop integrated capabilities for failure 
mitigation that could reduce future failures. The owner agreed that selecting the right 
capabilities is important as a project relies on people, but the owner need to integrate their 
in-house capability for the contractor to better understand the owner’s operations 
environment. As in Project B, the owner developed a contractual agreement to ensure that 
the supplier could provide continuous assistance in solving operational failures. However, 
the owner did not capture this capability to prevent future failure; and thus to rely on the 
same supplier. The owner could have better mitigated potential failure if the right 
capability was captured.  
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 The project team needs to integrate the specialist capability with operational team. 
The project team realised the need to rely on specialists and operational capabilities to 
deliver the right capabilities in a project. The multi-organisational supply network needs 
to integrate different capabilities to mitigate failure. Project B showed that early 
involvement from the designer could help to provide better understanding of the drawing 
in visualising the complexity of project operations but the designer needs to incorporate 
operational knowledge. Also, in projects C and D, the project team involved early 
engagement form different stakeholders, which led to some successful operations. The 
project team was integrated with operational capability in developing the drawing as well 
as testing the project; thus, smooth delivery of operations was achieved. Project D 
described that early engagement from project stakeholders provided clear information as 
to what quality needed to be delivered. Thus, the project team had worked together with 
the operational team to reduce the risk of failure.  
 Additionally, front-end management should not only involve planning on the 
design of the project, but needs to incorporate the technical knowledge. As described in 
Project A, the owner’s lack of technical inspection at the front end caused difficulty in 
understanding the drawing. Thus, the design team should work together with the 
operational team to mitigate the failures. Quality expectation could be aligned at the 
beginning of the project through contractual agreement that included both design and 
technical aspects. As a successful operation, Project D showed that the heavy planning at 
the beginning of the project helped to mitigate the failures. This project was planned and 
designed together with different stakeholders to reduce the risk. The visualisation of 
project failure drove different behaviours of the project team to ensure that the project did 
not fail. Also, in Project E, the learning from previous failure was captured and 
recognised during the beginning of another, similar project, which helped the projects to 
mitigate the operational failure and resulted in quality cost savings in relation to 
maintenance.  
 Project D had a different procurement strategy, with a long-term relationship that 
gives the owner the opportunity to understand and capture the right capabilities. The 
long-term collaboration provided the capacity to capture and share the risk of project 
failure with the multi-organisational supply network; thus, failures were mitigated during 
the process rather than affecting the operations. By developing integrated capabilities to 
mitigate failure, project benefits could be realised and help to promote a different culture 
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for achieving better quality. The project teams could then provide proactive actions to 
deal with predicted and potential operational failure, as shown in Project E.  
6.7 Validating and generalising the extent of operational failure  
This chapter has described the emergence of new grounded theories of what constitutes 
the operational failure as well as the emerging data on failure mitigation. The multi-case 
study described the problems of the capabilities cycle in three phases, which are: 
transferring capability, applying capability and recognising capability. The multi-case 
study illustrated how the distribution of capabilities influences the failure and how this 
has impacted project, operation and owner’s capability.  
 This section demonstrates the development of a framework in understanding the 
cause and effect of operational failure. Two focus workshops were conducted following 
the in-depth multi-case study analysis with an owner’s representative expert (n=2) using 
the Delphi review. The workshop representatives involved expert samples with more than 
eight years’ experience in construction strategic and operation management. The 
workshops discussed, analysed and generalised the findings from each project of the 
multi-case study. They also agreed a common set of operational failure trigger factors. 
The workshop discussions lasted between two and three hours and included the 
translation of the experts’ experience into a shared understanding and statement of the 
cause of project team behaviour, organisational elements, design statement and quality 
culture as well as the operational strategies. The outcomes from all the multi-case study 
were combined and framed to gather the factors affecting the operational failures that are 
aligned with their impact on quality cost failure incurred.  
 The workshop compiled and cross-compared all the elements that emerged from 
the multi-case study into a wider mapping of the chain of cause and effect of operational 
failure. All the selective coding from the interviews were used in looking at the cause and 
effect of each project case. This was then re-categorised again to categorised the similar 
code and according to the project stage to see the relationship of each project phase.(i.e. 
from owner capability to project capability and to operational delivery) The discussion 
later generalised, re-defined and quantified the findings from the multi-case study 
analysis. This focus workshop has shown that the volume of data collected in each 
element does not necessarily indicate the importance of the data in generating meaning. 
In some elements, only relative information was provided, but the information in the 
context of the project was important. Thus, the workshop assisted in justifying the 
relationship of that data to other data that can also be important to the meaning it can 
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bring. In summary,  this framework used the selective codes from detailed multi-case 
study to map the cause and effect of each code from one to another. Figure 6.2 shows the 
link of cause and effect during the transferring capability phase of how each factor 
influences the operational failures.  
 This phase shows how owner’s capability during project planning on the 
relationship with the supply network, the budget, time and demanding regulations 
influences the occurrence of operational failure. In a project-based organisation, the 
owner programmes management play a significant role in managing projects, which leads 
to different governance of each project. The framework mapping shows examples of how 
owner’s influence different capability behaviours and cultures in relation to the quality of 
construction, which leads to operational failures. The distribution of capabilities during 
the development phase impacted the different focuses on different organisations, which 
led to different expectations for the project outcome. The supply network only sees the 
owner’s satisfaction as a performance indicator, and thus places less emphasis on other 
stakeholders’ capabilities. This puts projects at risk. 
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Figure 6.2: Framework mapping the cause and effect of how owner’s capability is 
impacting project capability 
Figure 6.2 mapped the applying capability phase of how the different capabilities are 
applied during project execution, which influences the formation of operational 
capability. This shows the performance of operational capabilities is generated through 
the organisation’s decisions and experience held during the transferring capability phase. 
This intervention demonstrates different knowledge and expertise are brought to 
operations, which shows the project and operations are linked one to the other.  
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Figure 6.3: Framework mapping the cause and effect of how project capability is 
impacting operational capability 
Owners need operational capability to operate the product or project. These 
operational capabilities further help owners to plan and execute new projects, thus they 
are recognised as owners’ capability. Figure 6.3 mapped examples from the multi-case 
study that show how operational capabilities influence an owner’s capability to operate.  
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Figure 6.4: Framework mapping the cause and effect of how operational capability is 
impacting owner’s capability to operate 
Operational failures trigger factors were grouped and categorised according to the 
capabilities cycle shown in Figure 6.4. The multi-case study showed that the transferring 
capability phase was triggered by contracted end date, the allocation of budget to fit 
project specifications, owner’s relationship with supply network and investment in 
innovation with demanding regulations.   
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Figure 6.5: The triggered factors of operational failure in capabilities cycle  
In the applying capability phase, project and operational capability were triggered 
by the understanding of real-life operational technicalities and their constraints in design, 
owner trusting the contractor’s expertise and resources, and technical competency in on-
site operations. Finally, the recognising capability phase was triggered by the need for 
technical expertise during operations and learning that was not captured on the project. 
All the events that occurred and emerged from the multi-case study were justified and 
generalised across other relevant incidence to generate a consensus of what influenced the 
operational failures. It was agreed which elements constituted the most projects and 
programmes across the organisations and an understanding of the capabilities cycle was 
agreed on. The distribution of capabilities across an owner and its multi-organisational 
network in the capabilities cycle shows a significant influence on how the owner, from 
the strategic requirement phase, transferred the capability needed to develop technical 
project delivery capability (Figure 6.5). Capabilities that were applied during project 
execution were then developed as functional operations management capability, which 
were later recognised by the owner as the owner’s capability to operate the asset.   
 The workshop provided data for organisation-level understanding on operational 
failures and its causes according to various groups and departments. This analytical 
information was then used in the following discussion of how owners could develop 
integrated capabilities across owner’s strategic requirement, technical project delivery 
and functional operations management to mitigate failure.  
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6.8 Chapter summary  
This chapter has presented an introduction to the identification of a strategic project and 
quality approach to mitigate failure. The developed new strategic project and quality 
approach addressed the problem of the distribution of capabilities in capabilities cycle of 
PBOs. The new project and quality approach specifies the underlying theories of 
operational failure that are embedded throughout the three phases of a project’s lifecycle, 
from owner’s strategic requirement to technical project delivery and functional operations 
management. The causes of operational failures are grouped based on the capabilities 
cycle of the different phases: transferring capability, applying capability and recognising 
capability. A comprehensive list of coding, group of interviews and quotes can be found 
in Appendix 3. 
Following this analysis and findings, the overview of the new project and quality 
management approach is explained in Chapter 7. This can be further understood and 
explored based on the evaluation made on the key elements of quality cost failure that 
contributed to the occurrences of failure. The data analysis in this chapter and the 
previous one are combined and discussed in Chapter 7 in relation to how the new 
approach contributes to the failure mitigation.  
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7 Discussions  
7.1 Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to extend the findings from the exploratory multi-case 
study and discuss the emergent triggered factors of operational failures.  
With a discussion of its general objectives as well as the methodological direction 
taken in its application to this research, this chapter brings together the outputs of all the 
data collection and analysis. It discusses the data collected from all three phases of the 
study and conceptualises and characterises the capabilities for failure mitigation into three 
phases of the capabilities cycle, namely: (1) transferring capability, (2) applying 
capability and (3) recognising capability. All operational failures that triggered factors 
within each phase are elaborated on and discussed. Finally, it presents the evaluation of 
these findings with respect to each other and to existing literature provided in chapters 2 
and 3. By doing so, it contributes to the strategic project and quality management 
approach of integrating capabilities for failure mitigation for owners, multi-organisational 
supply and operator network that could be developed in managing the capabilities cycles 
to reduce quality cost and operational failures.  
7.2 The core purpose of understanding the operational failure COQ 
This research has attempted to understand the causes of operational failure in 
infrastructure projects. It was shown that the low maturity and the fragmentation of the 
construction owners and multi-organisational supply network in measuring and capturing 
COQ failure are the reasons for the high occurrences of operational failures. Empirical 
data confirms quality cost incurred at operational failures are complex, hidden and 
difficult to quantify (Rosenfeld, 2009); therefore, identifying and confirming their 
existence may be necessary. The complexity of construction infrastructure projects is the 
reason why the quality cost is not well captured, involving both the occurrences of the 
quality issues and the procurement process (Hall and Tomkins, 2000). Failure can occur 
in the forms of technicality and functionality, but these also involve the human aspect, 
such as supply network behaviour and culture and work motivation as well as company 
reputation (Love et al., 2018). This has hindered the ability to further quantify all the 
quality cost failures, which in some cases involve issues of commercial confidentiality 
and the potential impact on business reputation. 
 COQ is still in its infancy stage in terms of its application in construction. The 
first phase of the study indicated that maturity within the industry is relatively low and 
suggests the need to understand the contextual and organisational differences between 
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projects with regard to COQ measures, as proposed by Schiffauerova and Thomson 
(2006); it confirmed that there were different ways to capture COQ (Yasamis et al., 
2002), so standardisation through the owner and multi-organisational supply network was 
necessary. Operational failure cost was classified in different ways in different projects 
and sectors, and there are variations in owner and supply network maturity and influence. 
Although Snieska et al. (2013) used quantification steps, there were model variations and 
no overarching or suitable model (Omar & Murgan, 2014) found in construction projects. 
Most of the research effort has focused on identifying quality cost elements, calculating 
COQ, and reducing the costs and the relationship between cost components during the 
prevention and appraisal, but no research has explored the relationship of the construction 
multi-organisational supply network in appraising operational failure cost. An emerging 
theory of what constitutes failures is provided on how operational failure cost could be 
reduced within the complex and dynamic nature of operational failure.  
 There is a known benefit in visualising hidden costs, and in monitoring and 
quantifying (in financial terms) the effects of poor quality (Hwang & Aspinwall, 1996; 
Jafari & Rodchua, 2014), but there is limited knowledge on the risk of quantifying these 
costs. Study C showed that alongside the benefits of quantifying COQ, there are many 
risks perceived by the construction participants in applying COQ. There is a fear of 
reputational impact on quantifying the COQ that will further lead to friction in the whole 
multi-organisational relationship, creating internal conflict and blame culture. This shows 
that there is a need to align the shared responsibility to manage failure; thus, applying the 
COQ will provide equal benefits. However, there are practical difficulties that have 
underlined the specification of COQ and failure cost in construction (Barber et al., 2000); 
hence, the true cost of failure is difficult to quantify. Studies A and B have shown the 
perception on how owners and suppliers influence the occurrences of failure cost is 
judged to be low in maturity and uncertainty. This study demonstrated that information 
was not consistently transferred among the project supply network and that failure cost 
was defined differently depending on the contextual setting of different individuals. This 
has illustrated the need to use a broader management perspective in managing the COQ 
that does not only quantify the failure costs but includes the necessary thought to reduce 
the number of failures.  
  As in Porter and Ryner (1992), it is hoped that this work will facilitate quality 
management improvement and help to eliminate waste, and point out the strengths and 
weaknesses of a quality system (Srivastava, 2008). Although it is agreed that cost may be 
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a good indicator in assessing project performance (Henri et al., 2014) and in assessing 
project quality (Josephson & Chao, 2014), projects needs better understanding on how 
cost and quality are interlinked so that project performance may also be influenced by the 
different capabilities developed within the project lifecycle. As it was demonstrated 
through study A, B and C, all operational failures are linked to the different quality 
capability provided in the project and which will resulted in quality cost. In a broader 
project management perspective, it is hoped that understanding COQ deficiencies will 
help to define the quality programme (Yang, 2008), lead to time and cost savings (Love 
& Li, 2000; Tang et al., 2004), enhance profit sustainability (Palaneeswaran, 2006), 
reduce customer dissatisfaction and reduce lost reputation during the period of 
maintenance and operation (Devi & Chitra, 2013), and allow for immediate corrective 
actions (Love & Irani, 2002). From the owners’ perspective, the interdependency 
amongst the supply network is still lacking in considering how COQ could be of benefit 
to all. The appraisal of operational failure and its quality cost showed that the quality 
management team must work with the whole multi-organisational supply and operator 
network to deliver improvements in quality. Understanding of COQ may help to integrate 
measure to understand the distribution of operational failure cost across the multi-
organisational supply and operator network. It may also allow prevention and appraisal of 
failure to reduce the occurrence of failure. However, this study has shown that a quality 
management system that addresses COQ must be well managed to build strong 
collaborative quality relationships between all parties 
7.3 The distribution of capabilities in a complex infrastructure case 
study  
The case study exploration has shown that the PBO’s management has directly and 
indirectly influenced the occurrences of failure in relation to project operational failure. 
Integration across the project supply and operator network is needed to ensure high-
quality delivery, however, there is a complex mix of quality expectations that must be 
managed by the PBO. These findings can be explained by assuming capabilities are 
distributed in three phases of a temporary project capabilities cycle (see Figure 7.1), 
namely: (1) transferring capability, (2) applying capability and (3) recognising capability. 
Capabilities are intertwined from how organisational owners manage the PBO towards 
project process, operational process and back to how owners capture these capabilities for 
their competitive improvement. The strategic or operational management of these 
capabilities appeared to differ. What is needed for all is the interdisciplinary integration 
 184 
of the owner and their multi-organisational supply network teams with different 
capabilities in failure mitigation.  
 
Figure 7.1: The capabilities cycle in a complex project 
The project multi-case study showed that, based on their experience and learning, 
owners developed their strategic business plan and influenced how projects were 
procured. This is evidence in one of the project case, where project A was build according 
to the similar project plan that was delivered by the same contractor. Also, project B 
showed that the project was plan and improved according to the similar project that has 
constructed few months before. Both projects shows different result of on the project 
performance of how owner used the capabilities in constructing the project. In project 
capabilities cycle, owners procure different capabilities to execute a project. These 
capabilities are generated from their multi-organisational supply network and are 
transferred to the project process in delivering the project. These capabilities are 
distributed in a sequence cycle (from transferring to applying and recognising capability) 
in the completion of the project. Owners assumed the transferred capability will 
consistently be applied to the operational process, thus achieving successful operations. 
Capabilities were then recognised by the owners to generate competitive improvement in 
further projects. The capabilities cycle was dominant in the transferring phase as it 
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influences project culture and behaviour where each unique organisation has individual 
expertise that needs to be integrated into a complex project. At this point, the project team 
should involve owner, contractor and supplier as an early involvement to obtain critical 
technical knowledge needed for each stage of the project. Although Davies and Brady 
(2016) suggested that the relationship between dynamic and operational capabilities 
needs to be reciprocal, recursive and mutually reinforced, the continuous flow of 
technical information will aid the project team to know how and when they need to 
structure the capabilities that influence the operational necessity. However, empirical data 
demonstrated that capabilities within the owner, contractor and its multi-organisational 
supply network were not integrated within the project and operational capabilities, which 
led to poor quality and project performance. An asset that was not workable and a design 
that was not buildable were perhaps the most significant disruption to operational 
readiness. These issues were triggered by different factors at different phases of the 
capabilities cycle and are discussed in the following sections.  
7.3.1 Transferring capability  
The capabilities cycle showed that ‘the contracted end date’, ‘allocation of project 
budget’, ‘owner’s relationship with supply network to integrate project capability’ and 
‘investment in innovation with demanding regulations’ made the owner disregard their 
strategic requirements and the contractor hide their speciality or failures. Thus, the 
capability transferred to the project technical delivery does not meet the desired 
requirement (see Figure 7.2); these are discussed in the sub-sections.  
 
Figure 7.2: Un-integration of transferring capability in capabilities cycle 
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(i) Contracted end date 
Transferring capability requires comprehensive information in the contractual agreement 
for the project team to successful distribute their capabilities. Mostly, operational failure 
was caused by the organisational structure of its procurement and contractual 
management. Multi-case study provided evidence of different behaviour and culture on 
quality issues, and quality failure may not have been fully addressed at the time that it 
occurred due to the contracted end date. The study has indicated that the owner defining 
and managing critical project parameters, such as scope, time, cost, supply network 
relationship and quality criteria, at the initial project planning stage, determined the 
project outcome. Project A, B and c showed a ‘pressurised’ completion environment for 
contractors which have impeded critical quality application across the multi-
organisational supply network. Organisational capability development was impeded by a 
project’s focus. Short-term projects focused demand on a high COQ. A long-term COQ 
focused on saving was harder to accept than short-term, on-site problem solving. The 
quality issue from an innovative implementation perspective was that the site managers 
may be reluctant to try new solutions because they are continuously trying to reduce 
commercial risk for the project. Project team frequently allocate resources to prioritise 
urgent defects (Olanrewaju, 2012), which is the reason why constructors do not see more 
effective solutions in the operational maintenance relations and thus commonly fail to 
allocate maintenance cost. 
The owner in the case study is restricted by the project interdependency, in that 
failure to deliver one project will cause operational penalties, thus they were strict in 
controlling the contractor’s performance. Project E were influenced by the critical 
operations of the runway which must be operated in the next working day. This has 
driven the contractor and project team behaviour that focused on project delivery rather 
than quality to delivery. There are strong owner role implications for project organising to 
enable the delivery of an asset to customers on a continuing basis (Winch, 2014) and 
which allows the functional exploration (Koskela et al., 2006). This shows that the project 
team needs two-way communication, in that the owner who has the entire responsibility 
for providing the project team with a definitive and unchanging account of its purpose 
and values should consider the suitability of the work environment for its multi-
organisational supply and operator network.  
 There is a major challenge for the management of project quality culture and 
behaviour in a complex infrastructure project. There are sometimes legal consequences of 
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decisions and control right allocations that are not present with respect to technical 
description of roles and responsibilities. Project cases described quality manager works as 
a paper based work rather than fully understanding the technical delivery of the quality, 
thus project fails to provide the best quality. The owner and its multi-organisational 
supply network need greater consideration to collaborate and work together in mitigating 
potential operational failures. Agreeing with Mayer and Argyres (2004), there is a need to 
include an extensive description of responsibilities during early contractual agreement, to 
distinguish different responsibilities from different organisations in manging the 
capabilities through contractual agreement (Adam et al., 2014). It is believed that this 
could be a way to mitigate operational failure.  
(ii) Allocation of budget to fit project specification  
Project budget is imperative for the owner and multi-organisational supply network in 
transferring the right capability to fit the project specification, but these capabilities need 
greater consideration in reflecting the operational side of the project. This is because, 
project budget reflects the capabilities needed for the project to be successfully delivered. 
This may have influenced the quality delivered in influencing the operational capability. 
Commonly, the project goal is shared (towards the completion date) but project 
participants differ in what they hope to gain from the construction process, which needs 
proper coordination among project activities (Demirkesen & Ozorhon, 2017). From the 
data, the case study shows that the owner would try to minimise their budget, while the 
designers and the contractors attempted to provide the services and product in the most 
efficient manner to meet the owner’s specification in order to maximise their profit. In 
which, project A appointed contractor with the lowest budget to construct but the project 
was suffered with many operational failures due to contractor providing low quality or 
material and workmanship to meet the limited budget. This has led to the development of 
a critical quality management relationship between parties with different goals 
(Hoonakker et al., 2010). Moreover, the multi-case study show that the implementation of 
quality at project execution is different to what is expected to be delivered at project 
operation but this ‘expectation’ has not been clearly discussed by the owner and the 
supply network when transferring the capabilities.  
The multi-case study has shown that the accuracy of the project budget influenced 
how quality was different at outset and at operations. It was confirmed that a focus on low 
bids, by selecting the lowest-cost contractors, increased the risk of cost and scheduled 
growth (Eriksson & Westerberg, 2011). The multi-case study revealed that the lowest-
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cost contractor may have tried to reduce allocated resources for quality management in 
order to maintain a healthy profit margin for their business, which thus resulted in 
operational quality failure. Therefore, to reduce project risks and mitigate operational 
failure, owners should set a quality standard for the project that reflects the operations in 
allocating the project budget. This should be in line with contractors’ minimum 
requirement for their quality performance capability, which is based on their experiences 
with the owners. Owners should ensure that the project budget includes contractor quality 
management that has minimum requirements for their operational environment.  
 Allocating a limited project budget also influences project decisions in selecting 
suitable material. Therefore, the cost calculation has been proven to be problematic. For 
instance, one contractor faced difficulties in applying and maintaining an unsuitable 
product within a complex project environment. The contractor that followed the owner’s 
specification did their best to comply, but the unsuitable product required much more 
effort from all project participants. Aliverdi et al. (2013) suggested that the project team 
should monitor the budgeted cost of work performed through earned value to indicate 
how efficiently they could utilise the project resources, but the multi-case study indicates 
that the project team does not quantify the quality costs, which results in high cost at 
operations. This indicates that quality cost of work was only absorbed and acknowledged 
by different organisations and not the whole project team. In order to reduce the 
operational failure, the project team should clarify and collaborate in monitoring work 
performance. Although, frequently, the quality management process works differently 
depending on the product and service nature of different organisations (Nilsson et al., 
2001), integrated capability could help different organisations to collaborate in 
monitoring work performance based on the shared risk contract. As a result, the project 
manager will acknowledge the functionality of the project as well as the cost 
implications. This shows that an integrated approach is needed for a more reliable quality 
and cost control for project operations capability.  
Project budget has an indirect impact on how the project team encourages the 
contractor to provide project innovations. New solutions must be negotiated (Winch & 
Merrow, 2012) by the owner with their multi-organisational network within the project 
arrangements, as the perception of degree to change and links to other systems can differ 
among the involved parties (Slaughter, 2000). It is likely that some solutions are good for 
one party but may impact other operational systems. The benefits are split between the 
owner and the participant in a complex project (Bygballe & Ingemansson, 2014), thus a 
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proper incentives system must therefore be in place. However, there are differences 
between owner innovation in this respect: if the owner has no budget allocation to 
improve the existing design that leads to poor operational performance. Thus, 
collaboration between the construction participant and the owner is important in 
determining how new solutions are attempted. To transfer the capability, it will be 
important to incorporate measure from different sources. This will require the project 
team to gather information from multiple organisations on the quality practice and the 
degree of customer satisfaction in obtaining a better objective in relation to financial data 
for project performance capabilities.  
(iii) Relationship with supply network to integrate project capability  
Transferring capability procures an integrated capability from different supply network. 
The supply network in construction is frequently scattered, with different construction 
participants having separate responsibilities, and is separated at different phases of the 
construction lifecycle. The general contractor usually supplies the whole construction 
project, integrating subcontractors and suppliers for the owner (Hu, 2008); the project’s 
effective implementation is perceived as dependent upon strong commitment from the 
owner. The analysis confirmed that the role of the owner and their advisor is to lead and 
champion the effective performance of the contractor in the construction project, but their 
role in the operational stage has not been specified. A long-term relationship between 
owner and contractor shows deep trust and familiarity with the contractor’s capability but 
the multi-case study has indicated inconsistencies in operational quality assurance. 
Although a long-term relationship is perceived to be important, the type of quality 
behaviour does not match the competencies and culture needed in preventing and 
appraising failure in a multi-factor and dynamic operational environment.  
The weakness of the development of a relationship between the owner and the multi-
organisational supply network is that one supplier has a stronger relationship with the 
owner. The case study findings have shown that different levels of relationship will 
influence the complexity of the project process, which leads to operational failure. In 
spite of these multiple relationships, the frame of reference from the owner can serve as 
an important aspect to gain increased value from various stakeholders (Walker, 2000) but 
the efficiency and effectiveness in a project suffers from the greater number of 
participants. From the practical perspective, when the preferred supplier showed 
fragmentation of their relationship within the supply network at the early construction 
stage, they affected the project capability across the supply network and their 
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performance towards the operational context. As shown by the multi-case study, the 
contractor’s capabilities during the project were limited to the preference of the supplier 
but not to the owner. This shows that, although the owner frequently relies on the 
contractor’s capability to perform with the desired quality, the owner needs a better 
strategy to manage the capabilities of the whole supply network (Winch & Leiringer, 
2016) – specifically, in relation to the time of different cycles and to take into 
consideration a wider and greater variety of issues in relation to the impact of operational 
environment and regulations. 
The project contract does not usually govern commercial relationships as different 
organisations have different quality orientation. The owner needs the capability to 
manage the necessary commercial capabilities that are shaped by suppliers’ capabilities to 
deliver specific products (Winch & Merrow, 2012), but the influence on operational 
performance has not been clearly discussed. The empirical cases showed that the owner 
frequently trusts the procurement contract in governing the supply network work 
performance. However, integrating work packages is a major challenge; project teams 
have moved from having a detailed design competence to focus more on process and 
system control, which in turn has clearly affected the procurement and contract strategies. 
An example of this was the development of standardised specifications intended to 
improve design quality and reliability, but this affected the contractor’s capability to 
construct. This strategy impedes the contractors’ ability to influence the design as they 
have limited involvement with the procurement. 
(iv) Investment in innovation with demanding regulations 
Complex projects are triggered with an incentive to invest in innovation to cope with 
demanding regulations. Transferring capability requires specialisations and a reduced 
scope of contractor and supplier’s activities to meet the demanding regulations in project 
delivery. This is regardless of the component product in which the supply network is the 
expertise (Ethiraj et al., 2005), that is to resolve the project constraints and thus 
expanding their capabilities. The data empirically demonstrates that interactions between 
components in a product system need deeper research and design incentives from the 
owner. Contractor and suppliers being unable to visualise the complexity of the project 
with the owner’s operational system caused the system failure. The multi-case study 
project confirmed that a complex system accelerates innovation by promoting 
specialisation but the incentives increase with investment for new capabilities. The 
constraint on innovation has led to operational failures, and showed the technical 
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imbalance during the project execution in constituting an inventive effort from the project 
team with the operations team. The difficulties in quantifying the cost impacts from the 
demanding technical constraints and project changes have resulted in high operational 
costs that were not bearable.  
The complexity of technicality acquired during the project increases the system 
regulations. Owner operational systems are frequently interlinked from one to another 
(Davies & Brady, 2000), which needs allocation of different components in response to 
the unique operational environment. For example, project D was constructed during a 
‘live operations’ where the building escalator has to be fitted in during the operations of 
the airport. This has led the project team to increase the capability to construct in ensuring 
non-disruptions to owner business operations. Also, in project B, a complex system that 
required one-off innovation was restricted by the ‘environmental regulation’ and this led 
to high COQ due to non-compliance. The owner faced continuous difficulties in 
complying with the environmental regulation, which needed greater innovation of the 
specific system. It appears that the owner needed the capability to extend the 
development by investment of choices to create new opportunities. The project team 
struggled to find contractors who understood the technical and schedule constraints raised 
by the owner and the further led to delays in dealing with operational problems. In some 
instances, the contractor had left the project, leaving it in conflict (i.e. new specification 
was required when the original scope was not clear), which again led to an increased 
pressure on maintaining costs and keeping to schedules. These demands caused 
difficulties for the owner to operate and the project suffered from weak team coherence 
and fragmented communication. A complex project requires frequent iterations with the 
owner to help meet the needs of engineers (Hobday, 2000), and requires team ownership 
of the project with good internal communication with both the contractor and its supply 
network (Paiola et al., 2013), which affect the transferred capability development choices. 
By establishing project ground rules at the initial stage, changes to design, project-
operations misunderstanding and other uncertainties could be dealt with in a systematic 
approach in generating the desired capabilities for failure mitigation. 
The different strategies used by the owner in manging projects with demanding 
regulations affect how a project can operate. The owner’s strategy to select a preferred 
contractor and trust the capabilities promised by that contractor provides limited 
understanding of the technical aspect as well as quality assurance. This is because, within 
the new and temporary relationship in a complex project, the project organisation may 
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have little or no prior knowledge of the other organisation’s technical or fiduciary 
standard (Atkinson et al., 2006), thus there is a lack of time to become familiar with each 
other and develop shared experiences to demonstrate non-exploitation of vulnerability in 
mitigating the failure. The need for advanced capability through an integrated solution is 
inherent to the increased nature of construction complexity and specialisation; an 
extension of the capabilities may be needed beyond the original scope of what can be 
developed by the existing contractor. This leads to a mixture of other external 
capabilities’ development with another organisation within the temporary project 
window. Therefore, complex services need strong management from the owner in 
identifying the capabilities needed for the right distribution of capabilities to meet their 
operational environment. Consequently, these different organisations need coordination, 
with respect to the demanding requirements of the project and its operations that should 
be included in the solutions. 
7.3.2  Applying capability  
In the capabilities cycle, problems with ‘lack of understanding real-life operational 
technicalities and constraints in design’, ‘trusting contractor expertise and resources’ and 
‘technical competency in on-site operations’ influence the application of technical project 
delivery to fit with the functional operations management capabilities (see Figure 7.3). 
Thus, issues influencing the distribution of operational technicalities, contractor resources 
and technical competencies must be overcome to mitigate failure.  
 
Figure 7.3: Un-integration of applying capability in capabilities cycle 
(i) Understanding real-life operational technicalities and constraints in design  
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The generation of transferring capability provides comprehensive technical knowledge of 
what is needed for a project’s operational environment as an applying capability for the 
owner to mitigate failures. It is believed that projects need on-going support from the 
beginning of the front-end supply network engagement, through project tendering and 
delivery towards the handover and post-operations lifecycle (Davies & Brady, 2000). In 
the multi-case study, a lack of understanding about operational technicalities 
demonstrated in design has hindered the application of effective quality control during 
construction. Although the project design showed an aesthetic need for the project, less 
emphasis was placed on the technical detail, which hindered the contractors’ capability to 
construct. In a critical, complex project, contractor capability was driven by the complex 
design with limited technical constraints on the operational aspect; thus, the project faced 
operational failure. The multi-case study showed that project design does not reflect the 
operational practice. Project C showed that contractor constructed according to the design 
but during its operations, project could not withstand the complex environment and faced 
operational failure. Frequently, design is shaped by the absence of various required 
technical vocabulary (Daniel et al., 2014) that needs a transformative mediator of 
capability to interpret the operational technicalities and to transform the cognitive 
constraints in the design. In most cases, projects were influenced by the diversity of 
capabilities and owners frequently saw only that different capabilities were needed at 
different cycles, which lead to capabilities not being mutually altered and revised in 
enhancing the project strategy. This shows that the diversity of capability, if integrated 
and distributed in different project lifecycles, could be better applied for owners to 
mitigate failures through using the right capability at the right time.  
Most previous literature describes the nature of practical performance that leads to 
poor performance, but a critical perspective is often missing. The construction activities 
are often mapped with a focus on the stages in the designing phase and execution phase 
(Soderlund & Tell, 2011), but the connection to the operations inbound logistic, e.g. the 
maintenance, functionality and adaptability towards owner operational management in 
general, is almost never included. In project A,B and C, projects were designed by a 
design consultant who had a limited understanding of the owner’s operational 
requirements. This made it difficult for the project team to determine the quality of the 
output. The design was always reflected to the owner’s satisfaction, but the owner needed 
a clearer vision of their operational needs in ensuring the applying capability allowed 
sufficient distribution of capabilities. This is because the features of the permanent 
facility can influence the construction design in both positive or negative ways (Behm, 
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2005), and many construction designers have not yet viewed how the owner’s operation 
management is critical to mitigate failure.  
In a complex project, the process of executing complex development and 
implementation of the project involves different organisations (Söderlund et al., 2008), 
but the articulation of how different capabilities are influenced by the design is not yet 
understood. The cases showed that, in order to apply the right capability, the project 
needs a combination of experience and knowledge to deliver better quality. As an 
example, the data showed the designer designed the project to suit the owner’s 
specification, but, during construction, the design could not withstand the complex 
environment; thus, the product was not fit for operations. Therefore, the design needs 
greater accommodation of operational technical constraints as frequently problems did 
not interact with design and operations, which results in a limited ability to prevent 
quality issues. Capabilities can only be evolved when the problem is faced over time 
(Ulrich & Lake, 1991); this will help the project team to predict different components of 
the project lifecycle impact. However, to integrate the capabilities, a project needs 
stronger owner project and quality management to ensure the right capability is applied 
that reflects any design problems early. This can only be achieved if owners integrate 
with the different multi-organisational supply and operator network. Within all projects in 
the multi-case study, project capabilities were commonly associated with contractors’ 
capability to deliver rather than capabilities to apply the intended operational 
performance. The data showed that quality of execution was one of the major challenges 
involved when delivering a complex project, which frequently contributes to operational 
failure. The study recognised that different organisations applied individual experience 
and knowledge to perform specific tasks; thus, complex problems were not resolved. The 
owner and the multi-organisational supply network need integrated solutions and this 
interdisciplinary shall involve early planning for design, which would provide better 
distribution of applying the right capability during execution.  
(ii) Trusting contractor expertise and resources 
The owner organisation’s culture relied on contractor expertise and resources to deliver 
quality expectations. In integrating a complex system, the owner is responsible for how 
the project establishes a system integrator selected with capabilities to understand the 
whole project system and components (Davies & Mackenzie, 2014), but little has been 
discussed about the influence on complex operational environments. Empirical findings 
showed that owners place trust in the contractors’ capability to execute a project. Yet 
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there is uncertainty about how this is provided in regards to the application of quality 
assurance which then leads to poor project performance. The contractor with limited 
technical understanding of the operational requirements struggled to deliver. The ability 
of a system to respond to its operational environment is a key to its adaptive capability or 
resilience (Lemon et al., 2010); this capability in turn is legally determined by the 
information about that operational environment through an interactive relationship 
between the project’s competitive capability and operational capability (Wook Kim, 
2006). Without a set of detailed operating capabilities, the project team lacked technical 
knowledge and this triggered behaviour that lead to a project focused on relational 
competency aimed at obtaining project completion, thus putting operational quality as 
less important. This indicates that the project team needs a different organisation to 
address all aspects of the project in bringing together experience and capability that is 
developed for each process within the multi-organisational supply and operator network 
to mitigate operational failure.  
 This leads to the organisation losing the value of its own capability to collate and 
integrate project capabilities among the multi-organisational supply network in applying 
the capability for successful project operations. Moreover, any lack of integrative 
capability in managing a project can produce a dynamic that serves different mechanisms 
of project quality expectation, thus preventing operational success. Different teams may 
choose different alternatives that put them on different trajectories for capability 
development, and this may therefore lead to different outcomes (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003). 
As the empirical case demonstrated, the contractor had successfully constructed a few 
projects and delivered them to owner, but the owner realised that the buildings were not 
fit for their operations. Hence, the previous success performance of any organisation is 
not sufficient to ensure the successful operation of another project. To mitigate the 
operational failure, it is necessary for the owner to manage the integration of capabilities 
with their multi-organisational supply and operator network to distribute the project 
capability towards the desired operational performance. 
  Top management relies on strategic capabilities to coordinate and decide what 
needs to be done at lower hierarchical levels (Davies & Brady, 2016), but the multi-case 
study has shown that the operational risk increases with complex operational 
requirements. It is difficult for the whole supply network to work together to construct a 
complex system. COQ has been demonstrated as a useful tool to develop the integration 
between strategic owner, technical delivery and functional operations capabilities. Thus, 
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the project process can only be operated if the improvement action is predictable (Kwak 
et al., 2015), where the concept is that the expected project outcome is affected by the 
extent to which the owner deploys specific practices in its process. With this, the owner 
acknowledges that different organisations may have overemphasised the project aim with 
different organisational values for the project alone, and thus need to manage their 
expectations to deliver the project towards the owner’s operational environment. 
Literature has shown that quality failures may not only affect the owners but could also 
significantly impact the contractors’ profitability (Love et al. 2018), but the multi-case 
study showed that contractors were willing to absorb the quality failure cost to sustain 
their future business. This shows that owners need better management of multi-
organisational supply and operator network capabilities to distribute the applied 
capability that integrates the project and its operation in mitigating failure for long-term 
project operations.  
A different perspective in managing the supply network management is to focus 
on procuring ‘complex performance’ (Caldwell et al., 2009); this suggests that the owner 
and operators should not only procure the asset but also need to secure its performance 
(Winch, 2014). Consequently, how owners could mitigate poor performance has not been 
widely discussed. The multi-case study has shown that, upon completing a project, the 
owner faced difficulties in operating the asset. The project team was struggling with 
complex and demanding regulations in compliance with the requirements, and a 
contractor who was not familiar with the option suggested by the supplier and could only 
manage to deliver the asset but not the quality required for functionality. In particular, 
owners should have clearly specified project objectives in becoming more creditworthy to 
build a trustable relationship within the project supply network (Adam et al., 2014); this 
would help to avoid misbehaviour in terms of the quality perspective. There is a tendency 
for the owner and the project team to confuse the resource and operational practices (Wu 
et al., 2010). Thus, operational capability is difficult to identify. The owner’s operational 
regulations demand a more sophisticated system that acquires new technology 
intervention. This shows that projects need the ability to respond to the dynamic 
environment to configure asset structure, which is accomplished with cooperation with 
the necessary operational environment. This can only be achieved through integrated 
design change and delivery.  
(iii)  Technical competency in on-site operations 
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Putting the right technical competency in place is critical for the owner to apply 
capability for their operations. The delivery of technical capabilities is linked between 
organisations in delivering a one-off project. Products and services in complex projects 
provide the needs to support the owners’ emerging social and economic activities (Brady 
et al., 2005) and should have the ability to meet new demands and improve performance 
through management of innovation (Gann & Salter, 2000). However, this needs 
clarification on the development of technical capability within the PBO, both with regard 
to the form of the technical aspect of the system and the construction knowledge in 
applying the right capability. Empirical data showed that, if the owner placed less 
emphasis on in-house technical expertise, this created low motivation among the 
technical engineers; technical problems were then not easily understood by the 
operational team, but this was not solved by the owner’s technical engineers, who had 
limited knowledge about the construction work. The lack of technical expertise resulted 
in less commitment from the organisation’s actions (Josephson,1998), which may lead to 
the project team having less control over the quality issues. Therefore, the dynamic nature 
of the project environment influenced the supply network in taking different trajectories 
and led to different points of achievement with different capability development.  
Technical engineers should have the necessary information about the operation, 
which needs communication between project team and operational team or between 
different organisations. For instance, insufficient information involves lower motivation 
(Josephson & Saukkoriipi, 2005), in which, in the case study, the project team relied on 
the behaviour and attitude of management which drove the quality culture of the project. 
The operational process needs to be integrated into the project process to ensure 
integrated capabilities to mitigate failures are present. The underlying technical 
knowledge on which a project has been developed over the years has significant 
relevance in the development of the operations process that will enable the owner to 
deliver the asset to the competitive market. The organisation’s operational routine should 
form the foundation of its knowledge basis in either forming or changing the project and 
production process (Cepeda & Vera, 2007). As the case study showed, the owner’s 
operational technical issues were repeated from one project to another but were not fully 
appraised or resolved, which led to continuous maintenance costs. This shows that 
owners should use the experience generated from different projects to develop applying 
capabilities to apply the technical competency in mitigating potential failures. 
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Moreover, the construction supply network commonly depends on the contracted 
agreement to deliver the desired project. Although the owner assumes that the contractor 
and the supply network will provide innovation through interactions and relationship 
between an organisation and its external environment (Saad et al., 2002), empirical data 
illustrated that the contractor only provides what was specified in the contract. However, 
the contractor did show an interest in the owner’s influence and need their interactions for 
feedback mechanism on the development of innovations in order for them to prevent the 
occurrences of quality failures. The key to the performance of complex products and 
systems does not only need the management of projects and management of business 
process (Gann & Salter, 2000), but also needs the integration of project and business 
process within the multi-organisational network. In the multi-case study, the owner 
encouraged the contractor and the supply network to provide incentives for quality 
achievement. However, different organisations perceive quality differently (i.e. 
contractors want to get the job done, suppliers want to sell the products), so that the 
project predominantly focuses on business orientation rather than quality satisfaction. 
Thus, the contractor may have overlooked the deviation from technical specifications due 
to unfamiliarity with the owner’s operational environment due to lack of integration. This 
requires stronger management from owners in specifying the quality specification at the 
project’s front end, which will allow proper planning from the contractor and the multi-
organisational supply and operator network.  
This further shows that the project team needs to agree on mutual benefits which 
will encourage the making of decisions openly and the resolution of quality problems in a 
way that is mutually agreed when failure is expected. Thus, it is important that the project 
sets a functional contracting system to align the specialty knowledge with the owner’s 
expectation. Mostly, the knowledge to design the system in a contract requires tactical 
technicalities (Mayer & Argyres 2004), which articulates the benefits to owners. This 
articulation needs stronger management from owners to better distribute project and 
operational capability. Specifically, when the end-user requirements began to demand 
more than the specifications, the owner’s responsibility to develop the specification 
increases. Suppliers who may not be able to capture the complexity then influence the 
performance of the project. To distribute the right capability, the owner needs to 
continuously ensure that the supplier is aware of the technical aspect of both project and 
operations. The function defined in the brief is cumbersome to communicate and translate 
into production activities (Lindahl & Ryd, 2007), which could result in an insufficient 
definition of what the owner is demanding. In another way, this may explain the 
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significance of technical specialists for owners to develop operational capability at the 
front end of the project in aligning project procurement through the collaboration of 
different interests.   
7.3.3  Recognising capability  
There is a need for the owners and multi-organisational network to recognise the 
capabilities provided during the transferring and applying capability phase in the 
capabilities cycle through all phases of a project to learn from experience and improve 
their capabilities to perform. There appears to be misalignment between the owner’s 
strategic requirement in their project management organisation and the functional 
operations management team (see Figure 7.4), which the functional operations 
management team shows ‘the needs of project technical expertise in a project’s 
operations’ and ‘learning not captured in projects’ and that these have influence the 
operational failures. 
 
Figure 7.4: Un-integration of recognising capability in capabilities cycle 
(i) The needs of project technical expertise in a project’s operations  
Recognising capability allows an owner to capture the right capability of what a project 
needs to include the technical problems experienced during operation in mitigating failure 
for their future projects. The research shows that owners’ asset operations continually 
faced a series of quality issues such as the project not meeting its intended function, high 
maintenance for operations, early obsolescence and continuous defect cost. A project 
needs to continuously revalidate the assumptions made during the past experience (Pillai 
et al., 2002); this will help the project team to highlight the knowledge gained about the 
project during the process of its execution in considering the requirements for mitigating 
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future potential failure. Data showed that operational failures were difficult to resolve due 
to lack of understanding of the causes of the issue, as most operational problems were not 
technically appraised against what was constructed during the project execution. The 
constraint to this was it involved different teams at project and operation. Thus, managing 
the quality cost failure for operations becomes very complex when different organisations 
have fragmented capabilities in mitigating failure, thus the quality issues are resolved in 
different ways and not from understanding the root cause. This means owners could 
strategise how capabilities were distributed to technical project delivery in achieving the 
desired functional operations management through an integrated capabilities approach 
that links various phases of the project lifecycle.  
Owners need to have the ability to acknowledge and understand how project 
capabilities are connected, as the end product may be a challenge for their functioning 
operational management. This is because most organisations exhibit a generic culture 
based on behaviours or conditions (Atkinson et al., 2006), and this is inimical to effective 
quality management such as to recognise an opportunity and plan a change, or continuous 
checking of the result to identify learning or to act on what has been learnt in changing 
the next lifecycle plan. This will eventually avoid the ‘blame culture’ or ‘misdirection’ as 
an approach to integrated capabilities for failure mitigation. Essentially, such capability 
seems to prove the difficulty that project management has in coping with complexity and 
uncertainty to reduce the operational failures. Particularly, these capabilities showed the 
inability and the unwillingness of the managers or supply network to recognise the poor 
performance that will either not be under the control of management or construction 
uncertainty to apply proactive action in mitigating the operational failure. Recognising 
those experiences and learning from failure will eventually need project technical 
experience to share the lesson across different boundaries and time (Styhre et al., 2004), 
in which the case study showed that project technical engineers are always occupied with 
other complex projects and thus left the operations team to resolve the problem. 
Therefore, it is important for owners to manage these capabilities and allow opportunities 
to address such conditions as one of the most significant benefits of mitigating the 
operational failures.  
The temporary context of the project as perceived by the project team frequently 
leads to demarcation of project and operational capability in the capabilities cycle. 
Commonly, operations are difficult when projects teams fail to carry out design and 
planning thoroughly, thus projects proceed with poorly defined specifications for 
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operations (Atkinson et al., 2006). This is recognised when the case study described that 
projects were constructed based on contractors’ capability, which was not reflected in the 
design, thus project problems were frequently hidden and described differently (by 
project and operational teams). This has further reduced the ability for project teams to 
proactively act on resolutions and led to unsolved operational failure. While, when 
managing a PBO, the owner often changes the team members as the project progresses in 
order to pass similar team capability from one project to another (Turner & Keegan, 
2001); this limits the experience shared between operations for them to recognise the 
right capability. Project in multi-case study showed that project managers were 
interchanged from one project to another, leading to difficulty in resolving problems. 
There was a lack of sufficient knowledge about the alternative causes and so different 
managers faced uncertainty about the solution choices. As a result, many performances 
were evaluated based on project manager’s limited knowledge of the project process and 
were not sufficient in reflecting on the present operations of the future asset in the long-
term operational context. In this case, the control of the evolution of these capabilities 
cycles is necessary to have effective communication (Easterby-Smith & Prieto, 2008) and 
the set of parties involved in a project should not be treated as separate to the operations 
(Lee et al., 2006). They should be identified as continuous elements for the owner to be 
able to recognise in detail the capabilities needed to mitigate the failure as well as to 
integrate the capabilities again in the following cycles of different projects.   
Recognising the technical problem faced during the project process will help the 
operational team know what went wrong that has lead the project to face the operational 
failure. This is because an effective operational capability depends on how well the 
strategic perspective and operational details of a project are balanced (Pena-Mora et al., 
2008), although some failures are difficult to predict. Current construction project 
management has often treated project and operations separately, and so the consequent 
impact of operational failure is difficult to understand. Empirical data demonstrated that 
operational failures were impossible for the owner to overcome in complex environments 
without prior project technical knowledge. Organisations fail to collect such data on 
project experience and, even when it is collected, it is often not made available during the 
operational stage or even when new projects are started. Operational failure thus was not 
recognised and, frequently, projects were seen as non-repetitive and organisations tended 
to neglect the context of capabilities presented in the project cycle. COQ measurement 
can increase the integration across owner strategic requirement, technical project delivery 
and functional operations management capabilities to mitigate failure. This will allow for 
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the availability of reliable data in efficiently resolving the operational problem, rather 
than resolving it in a different way without considering its root cause. Thus, a further plan 
could be developed in estimating and planning operational management which will 
contribute to mitigating potential future failure at an earlier stage of construction.  
(ii) Learning not captured in projects  
Project learning as one of the recognising capabilities is important, as the capability for 
future projects lies in how knowledge is coordinated, between obtaining the nature of the 
future work for operations and how experiences from project executions were captured 
within the time-constrained windows of a complex project. Empirical grounded data 
showed that projects are grouped into a development programme where the programme 
takes on the nature of a large project (Turner & Keegan, 2000) that has different forms of 
management, functional, hierarchy and line-management. That focus is on increasing 
efficiency. However, these management strategies impede the long-term learning gained 
during a specific project. Who undertakes projects within long-term programmes and the 
continuous relational strategy are important (see Figure 7.5). Owners who have different 
interfaces with many functional operators may not capture the valuable applying 
capabilities of the supply network. Doing so, it is believed, could provide owners with 
future capabilities to mitigate failure. Owners should adopt different approaches for 
different projects within a larger programme, and not adopt a single management style at 
one lifecycle. This could be achieved through continuously capturing capabilities for 
failure mitigation at different phases and integrate the capability to suit the different 
project environments. Owners frequently missed the learning that was experienced when 
the project-programme strategies changed, due to capabilities for failure mitigation being 
fragmented in managing the project-based organisation. This shows that owners need to 
adopt a versatile project-programme process in adapting to bespoke requirements that 
should be included early on, at the owner strategy and requirement planning stage.   
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Figure 7.5 : Capabilities cycle within a long-term programme 
Project organisations need to promote knowledge-based similarity with the 
functional operator management to develop common knowledge and specialisation 
technicality to extend relationships among similar organisations. Operational success 
needs continuous support from the project organisations’ members (Wang et al., 2013), 
which needs interplays between construction and operational activities to distinguish the 
successful operational delivery (Zerjav et al., 2018). It was seen that, in some of the case, 
project benefits were frequently not fully realised while the operations team faced 
continuous operational failures. But, mainly operational success was often not recognised 
or was forgotten. Multi-case study recognised that project managers were replaced in 
failing projects but that this simply created distance from the impending failures. The 
replacement prevents the original explanation of what causes the failure, but instead 
creates the nature of how failure is often linked to the ‘other’ (Daniel et al., 2014). This 
has then impeded the capability to learn in the sense of exploiting repeated experience 
among the project team (Soderlund & Tell, 2011), which frequently needs stronger owner 
management of capability at the strategic planning stage. This will need the owner to 
bring temporally separated groups into contact with one another to foster the utilisation of 
a new knowledge combination and the establishment of development for project 
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execution to reduce the potential operational difficulty. In this case, operation 
performance criteria are difficult for the owner to quantify and may lead to the negligence 
of the learning capability to understand quality issues and mitigate failure. Owners need 
to manage the associated risks that represent important aspects for future projects’ long-
term learning.  
Quality management helps to ensure the desired project outcome is achievable. 
However, having quality management alone does not improve an organisation’s 
performance (Akgün et al., 2014). Organisations need a valuable way to capture 
knowledge generated during the project process and post-project (Koners & Goffin, 
2007) as a way to learn and to benefit future projects. An emergent finding from the 
multi-case study showed that operational failures treated early in the project provided 
long-term savings in relation to quality cost. However, in most project case, the project 
management practices did not effectively quantify quality costs and quality costs were 
frequently absorbed by different organisations, which led to quality management practice 
often failing to address the basic source of failure that has driven problems in the 
operational lifecycle. This shows that project and quality management need integrated 
management that will allow for a collaborative method in capturing the learning and 
mitigating the failures. In different project-based lifecycles, operation of a complex 
system is dependent on organisational characteristics, in which the project teams needs to 
proactively build critical capabilities before the project is initiated (Sullivan & Beach, 
2009), and this has not been widely understood. Multi-case study showed that full project 
benefits are not always realised as different organisations only deliver the project based 
on different capabilities and this prevents the iterative process of capability distribution in 
developing integrated capabilities for failure mitigation. The result is project management 
is commonly concerned with ensuring things are done properly, assuming there will be a 
well-defined remit of what the operational needs are. This explains why quality issues 
were not collaboratively captured and learned from to recognise how different 
perceptions of responsibility could be upheld by owner organisations in mitigating failure 
in project delivery and operations.  
In recognising the right capability, the owner and its multi-organisational supply 
network need to learn from one project to another. Organisational learning is an important 
element in developing capabilities to influence operational performance (Hussain et al., 
2018) where construction projects are fundamentally distributed between organisations 
comprising different capabilities (Styhre et al., 2004), but this need an increased 
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awareness from owner to manage the distribution of different capabilities in capturing the 
learning and mitigating future failure. The study shows that contractors have claimed they 
had few opportunities to influence the problems during project execution, and any 
interruption might cause the contractor to lose the opportunity to perform, as 
performances were always judged by on-time completion. On the other hand, owners 
believed that the contractor and project team could deliver the project in relation to their 
operational quality expectations, thus maintained a good relationship with the contractors 
to ensure operational success. In the cases, an operational failure was repeated from one 
project to another and the learning capabilities from the construction were not fully 
realised. Hence, the distributed capabilities is dynamic in that owners need a mechanism 
that integrates the various parts of the organisation to reduce and consequently mitigate 
failures.   
7.4 Integration across owner’s strategic requirement, technical project 
delivery and functional operational capabilities 
7.4.1 The complex and emerging interrelationship between capabilities  
It was shown that stakeholders expressed unique definitions and categorisation of quality 
cost incurred due to operational failure that was best described as operational failure 
quality cost by most of the construction participants. This may empirically confirm 
Snieska et al.’s (2013) view that operational failure costs are usually hidden and the 
quantification of these costs requires laborious work involving different departments and 
which leads to different definitions and categorisations. Literature described that 
investigating quality cost and poor quality cost are frequently forgotten (Josephson, 
1998), where the multi-case study showed construction participants’ perception in 
measuring COQ was hindered by the negative implications of quantifying the failures. 
The research showed their concern about exposing weaknesses and reputational damage 
that would hinder opportunities for future business, which was the barrier for the 
application of COQ in mitigating failure. There was a reluctance of exposing the 
operational failure quality costs, in which, these costs if acknowledged and shared will 
generate capabilities for failure mitigation. Quite often, no quantitative estimating method 
was used to understand the failure, and no clear distinction was made between monitoring 
and reporting the quality cost; thus, failure is not being well understood. It is agreed that 
quality failure costs have tended not to be differentiated among those parties who are 
responsible for the cost incurred (Love et al., 2018). This is because PBOs are frequently 
so complex and critical that quality would be the overriding criterion (Atkinson, 1999) for 
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a project to develop capabilities for failure mitigation, with the project organisation 
focusing on individual product delivery.  
 
Figure 7.6: Range of operational failure quality costs shared by the multi-organisational 
supply network in the construction industry 
The analysis provides a collection of percentages for operational quality cost 
within each operational failure cost element (Figure 7.6). There were a number of areas 
where data was likely to be under-reported or was incomplete; for instance, all costs 
described were only partially estimated by participants’ knowledge (ranging from 0.1% to 
20% of total project cost). Therefore, there is a possibility that the findings were an 
underestimation of the ‘true’ operational failure quality cost. Although the quantifications 
of these costs may not cover the ‘total’ cost implications incurred by the supply network 
for all projects in the multi-case study, as Barber et al. (2000) noted, this research process 
may not provide a complete analysis of quality cost over a whole project-operations 
cycle, but an estimate of the percentage of costs associated with quality failures could be 
established in showing the significance of quality failures studied. The estimated figure 
was shared by different parties across the multi-case study and was discussed in the 
workshop with owner representative in analysing the extend of the figures. It was rather 
impossible for the participants to make an entirely accurate assessment of the 
implications of quality issues for other organisations such as the suppliers and 
subcontractors beyond a reasonable estimate. 
It is understood that failures are different from one another, but using the financial 
method helps to promote the significant need for integrated capabilities for failure 
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mitigation in reducing failure by sharing the risk. Research on cost overrun by Adam et 
al. (2015) noted management as the most significant cause of cost overrun and agreed the 
key decision consideration should be at the early planning stage of the project cycle. 
Literature also showed lack of management support or management interest (Sower et al., 
2007; Jafari & Rodchua, 2014) was the most frequent reason for non-quantification of 
quality cost in construction projects, but the nature of quality cost in complex 
infrastructure projects is yet to be understood. Thus, this research justified the complexity 
of capturing the operational failure cost where the inter-dependency of each element was 
witnessed as one of the difficulties faced by complex projects in quantifying operational 
failure quality cost. Developing capabilities to mitigate failure could be a way for 
management to realise the significant amount of quality cost incurred; this further helps in 
promoting the necessity to mitigate the failures. This research shows the need for 
integration across capabilities, which needs high consideration from management to 
promote an improvement in the share of project risk and alignment of the project goal; 
thus, quality cost could be reduced and shared. 
Investment in COQ provides significant benefits in cost saving (Love & Irani, 
2002) and as a tool in identifying failures, but there are many difficulties in introducing a 
measuring system for complex infrastructure projects. The research revealed necessary 
basics for measuring quality cost failures that need different cultures and behaviour in 
considering quality cost failure throughout the organisation. Although the success of 
COQ in implementing quality management is well known within total quality 
management (Dahlgaard et al., 1992), project-based management is still lacking a 
systematic investigation for the implementation and evaluation of the quality failure costs 
in mitigating failures. The systematic analysis requires preventative quality management 
activities to be effectively introduced in project management. Lack of information on the 
project operations may cause a lack of knowledge about how specific tasks fit into these 
operations. This confirmed Love and Josephson’s (2004) perspective that this may hinder 
the creation of an integrated model and may contribute to sub-optimisation of quality 
implementation in projects. The challenge for the owner’s capability is to manage their 
multi-organisational supply and operator network. This will involve all more openly 
admitting mistakes and generating new ideas based on what they have learned from those 
mistakes. Existing knowledge should be used to continuously improve operational failure 
in reducing quality failure cost; thereby the reduced quality cost should be used as 
evidence for encouragement to every other organisation in mitigating operational failure. 
Failure mitigation is therefore a shared team strategic project and quality management 
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approach that aligns capability and incentive for mitigation and is integrated in its 
approach.  
Although data showed that the supply network did measure quality costs, the 
nature of the temporary projects made it difficult. Research has previously shown that, by 
reducing failure cost, projects will reduce prevention and appraisal cost (Hall & Tomkins, 
2000); however, this was achieved over a study through the whole lifecycle of a project. 
In this multi-case study, appraising prevention and appraisal activities could be applied to 
future research; currently, literature shows limited knowledge of the root cause of quality 
cost failure (Love et al., 2002; Molina-Azorín et al., 2015), which needs an exploration of 
its causality. With more knowledge on the mapping of non-value-adding activities such as 
reworks, errors, omission and changes (Burati et al., 1992), it is thus necessary to have 
knowledge of the causes, through examining their chain of events and cost identifications. 
These should be captured in the integration of capabilities across the owner and multi-
organisational network of teams, or in a combined system of learning and sharing in 
integrating these capabilities to mitigate failure. There is a need for collaborative measure 
within the multiple organisations that are involved in all future projects to increase their 
maturity and align different terminologies and definitions of COQ to mitigate operational 
failures and reduce COQ failure.  
7.4.2 A dynamic perspective of the distribution of capabilities in influencing 
operational failure 
The owner and multi-organisational supply and operator network involved in a project 
will most likely increase the complex technical solutions and will provide more options 
for building methods and materials, but the volume and diversity of these capabilities, if 
not managed, will trigger the occurrence of failures. This supports the view of an 
emerging and dynamic development of organisational capabilities.  
Capabilities are distributed within three phases: (1) transferring capability, (2) 
applying capability and (3) recognising capability. These triggered the occurrence of 
operational failures and its quality costs, which must be mitigated through the integration 
of project and operational capabilities. This research has shown the need for a stronger 
management from the owner in transferring the technical capability for a project, and thus 
the project could apply the right capability in executing the project. This will allow for 
more integration with operational management. Failures could be prevented and 
appraised at the right time rather than contributing to post-project operations. Further, the 
research showed that, through recognising capability at operational stage, owners could 
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capture capability to improve future projects by learning through experience and 
continuously improve their capability to mitigate failures.  
Owners need to take the multi-organisational capabilities into account when 
designing procuring strategies to transfer key capabilities that could reduce the project 
complexity. As the multi-case study showed, complex projects procured with critical 
timescale and limited budget may discourage collaborative efforts. The empirical data 
indicated that quality assurance was not multi-organisational and did not have all the 
capabilities to deal with failures and their causes; more could be done (Daniel et al., 
2013) to explain the relative performance of different organisations in influencing failure. 
Hence, capable owners must integrate capabilities through transferring, applying and 
recognising the right capabilities.  
Capabilities are a form of resource that can only be acquired, harvested and 
improved (Adam et al., 2014); therefore, the owner must manage their distribution and 
deployment. Empirical cases showed that the owner’s distribution of capability 
influenced the development of competencies in fostering innovations. This was achieved 
by the owner’s continuous engagement with the multi-organisational supply and operator 
network, thus integrated capabilities could be achieved. Owners need to collaborate with 
the contractor and the suppliers when designing procuring strategies. These long-term 
relationships should help owners to better distribute the right capability, based on past-
experiences of failure mitigation. By distributing and integrating the capabilities of 
various project participants, failures could be foreseen, prevented and addressed at an 
early stage, as opposed to contributing to operational failure. 
In applying the capability phase, the research views how organisational 
capabilities were nested and aligned with broader project capability to deliver the project. 
This explains how the capabilities transferred from the procurement and planning are now 
applied as project capability. The research showed that a lack of understanding about 
operational capability triggers most of the operational failures. Lack of operational 
capabilities in the project team limited the opportunity for the development of mutual 
interest to collaborate in preventing the operational failure. Typically, the supply network 
may see only the owner’s quality expectation or targeted business goals, which cannot be 
compromised, and make sub-optimal collaborative judgement on quality implementation 
as a result. Project team capabilities were driven by different expectations and unique 
quality definitions rather than a combination of experience to share integrated capabilities 
for failure mitigation. As a result, different individual and organisations involved in a 
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project perceived different levels of operational difficulties. Furthermore, late 
involvement from contractors may prevent the expression of capability, so project 
capability may be experienced differently and not align with the project’s wider 
operational integration. Thus, project risk increases in terms of aligning the different 
capabilities needed for delivering a successful operational project, and so does the quality 
cost failure (Figure 7.7).   
 
Figure 7.7: Distribution of un-integrated capabilities shown in the multi-case study 
projects 
By identifying the needed capabilities, the applying capability phase should 
integrate the different capabilities from the multi-organisational supply and operator 
network to share similar information needed for successful operations. This needs owner 
involvement in promoting the shared strategic project and quality management approach 
to failure mitigation and its importance. Owners play a significant role in influencing 
contractors and other supply network members’ performance, and in ensuring that 
culpability should not always be laid on the contractor’s poor performance  (Kometa et 
al., 1996) or that any other organisation involved in the project, but this needs owner and 
multi-organisational supply and operator network collaboration in working towards 
integrated capabilities to avoid failure. Owners should build trusting relationships that 
would aid in achieving a successful project operational outcome that needs a 
collaborative approach with all supply network. The integrated collaborative approach at 
this phase is beneficial to share the same visualisation of risk and responsibilities for the 
operational outcome, as opposed to viewing the project as merely another task to 
complete. 
Project capability
Operational  capability
Quality cost failure
Project starts Operations 
Project risk  
Capabilities 
Quality cost
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 The recognising capability phase should allow owners to capture needed 
knowledge and learning in increasing their experience for competitive improvement. This 
phase should allow owners to modify capabilities distributed in the following cycle of 
owner programme direction. As agreed by Teece (2007) and Zollo and Sidney (2002), 
organisations can develop dynamic capabilities through articulation and codification of 
knowledge, so owners should generate effective learning mechanisms during the 
distribution of capabilities in the capabilities cycle of each PBO to mitigate failures. 
Complex projects are always emerging and dynamic, so every experience should be 
captured and learnt in understanding the causes of failures. This will help owners to 
predict and respond to failure in other project lifecycles and thus aid failure mitigation.  
The distribution of capabilities in capabilities cycle differs from one project to 
another depending on the nature or the type of the project and its environment. By 
recognising the capabilities to mitigate failure, the owner and its multi-organisational 
supply and operator network could benefit from the complete process concerning the 
development and implementation of project-operational capabilities, thus the right 
capabilities could be captured. This would further allow for more integrated management 
in changing the culture for quality implementation, where an innovation through 
integrated capability will change the organisational routines required when developing a 
new project (Brady & Davies, 2004). Organisations with systematic repetition (Gann & 
Salter, 2000) may be a problem in project-based activities, as these are frequently non-
routine behaviour; therefore, they need the owners to display continuous capturing 
capabilities to better improve the application of patterns of activities in other projects. 
Projects are referred to as similar when the same capabilities and routines are required for 
repeated executions (Davies & Brady, 2000); however, reliable data will be needed for 
owners to better mitigate failures. Recognising capability provides collaboration and 
proactive approaches for the owner, multi-organisational supply and operator network to 
better identify root causes and cost-effective failure mitigating solutions. This needs 
solutions to be integrated to reduce project risk and balance the responsibility to mitigate 
operational failure.  
In illustrating the point, Figure 7.3 shows the ideal distribution of the integrated 
capabilities cycle within different projects. This alignment of capabilities could help the 
owner and the multi-organisational supply and operator network to better understand and 
capture the whole quality cost failure from one project to another. Thus, it provides 
greater solutions for preventing future failures.   
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Figure 7.8: Cyclic Integration of owner’s strategic requirement, technical project delivery 
and functional operations delivery capabilities in reducing the operational failure and its 
quality cost 
Capabilities theories agree that firm use of resources and capabilities is needed to 
create competitive advantage (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003). Thus, organisational project 
management uses capabilities to achieve the organisation’s aims through projects 
(Davies, 2004), but little is known about how project capabilities influence the 
operational outcome in different cycles, and specifically in relation to failure. The 
empirical grounded studies of the multi-case study demonstrated a lack of operational 
capabilities, which creates failure in the project-based organisation’s management. 
Operational capabilities (routines, skills and process) are developed over a long-term 
cycle (Thoo et al., 2015), but, in a temporary project, operational capabilities need to be 
embedded project by project (Hobday et al., 2005). As such, the capabilities in failure 
mitigation need integration from both project and operational capabilities. Although the 
research has shown that operational capabilities are difficult to attain in temporary 
projects due to such projects involving a diversity of capabilities from the multi-
organisational supply network, integration of the technical aspect between the owner and 
multi-organisational supply and operator network in transferring the capability phase 
could better prevent the occurrence of potential failure. What this research has shown is 
the need for integration capabilities between the owner and multi-organisational supply 
and operator network, to mutually support and share capabilities in fully understanding 
the project process and plan according to operational technical necessity, thus providing 
the right capability to apply.  
Capable owners must integrate the contractor’s capability across the whole supply 
and operator network in making sure the project is executed and operationalised. 
Understanding the complete cycle of capabilities is a fundamental source to understand 
owner  capability
Quality cost failure
Owner project-based planning
Project a Project b Project c
Project risk 
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diversity in a project. Helfat and Peteraf (2003); however, prioritisation of the right 
distribution of capabilities from owner to project and the operations capability in the 
capabilities cycle may compromise the quality of the interface with its complex 
environments to mitigate failure. Commonly, every project measure quality differently 
depending on the project environment. Construction needs to be delivered through the 
logic of the permanent organisation that uses the asset but not according to the ‘project-by 
project’ view frequently utilised by the construction sector (Lindahl & Ryd, 2007); this 
describes that the owner’s capability should be considered together with the capabilities 
of the different supply and operator network members rather than only focusing on the 
project capability. Integrating contractor capabilities with project operations will reduce 
failure, as contractors will share the responsibility for project risk and thus will have more 
opportunity to provide greater quality realisation by working together with designers and 
suppliers in mitigating the failures. The integration of capabilities between owner and 
supply network shows the equal value of balancing and distributing project risk among 
the project stakeholders. System integration creates a stable and consistent process to 
coordinate the development of multiple systems (Davies & Mackenzie, 2014), in 
minimising unexpected interactions and responding flexibly to problems that might 
hinder the project’s progress and owner’s overall programme. This work has shown that 
integrating capabilities across owner’s strategic requirement, technical project delivery 
and functional operations could provide clear solutions in response to failure that are 
integrated from the owner and multi-organisational supply and operator network. 
Quality capability is lost as an organisation moves from one one-off project to 
another one-off project. What is evident is that early engagement of the contractor could 
help to achieve greater understanding of project capabilities that respond to project 
operations, and thus increase the competencies among the project team to provide fair 
quality solutions and prevent failure. The multi-case study showed that failure in the 
system was influenced by the late design, which is not integrated early enough with the 
contractor and other supply and operator network members. Greater integration from the 
operational capability with the designer and contractor helps to align the project 
expectations. It is argued that, instead of providing clear roles for project management to 
engage in a wider range of tasks and activities (Lindahl & Ryd, 2007), there is a need for 
owners to better understand the capabilities that lie in their multi-organisational supply 
and operator network before distributing them (i.e., the capabilities) in the project. This 
will help owners to mitigate and improve competency during project operations when the 
benefit of these capabilities was learned and captured at the different phase of the 
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capabilities cycle. As suggested by Winch and Leiringer (2016), owners need to capture 
the capabilities to identify and acquire externally generated knowledge that is critical to 
operations, whilst learning from past experience. Through providing stronger 
management to integrate capabilities, project risk will be shared among the owner and 
multi-organisational supply and operator network, thus quality execution will be more 
assured.  
Construction projects generally do not have a mechanism to learn from the 
mistakes (e.g. causes of failure) that they have made (Love & Edwards, 2004) and that 
capabilities for failure mitigation is still fragmented within construction participants. By 
rightly distributing owner’s strategic requirement, technical project delivery and 
functional operations capabilities, it will almost certainly help management to override 
certain ‘dysfunctional’ features through better establishment of project and operations 
capability, besides exploring new possibilities and exploiting what is already known from 
project capabilities. This research provides knowledge about the emergent causes of 
operational failure and presents a dynamic perspective of the distribution of capabilities 
in the capabilities cycle to develop a new strategic approach for the owner and multi-
organisational supply and operator network to mitigate failure. This strategic approach 
will enable owners to fairly transfer capability, apply the right capability and recognise 
the capability to mitigate failure. Accordingly, this strategic project and quality approach 
needs integrated capabilities across the owner and multi-organisational supply and 
operator network. The integration of capabilities needs collaborative efforts among all 
stakeholders so that project failure could be effectively foreseen, prevented and addressed 
at an early stage, rather than contributing to operational failure. 
7.5 Chapter summary  
In summary, this chapter has discussed and presented the overall findings from the 
evaluation studies of failure mitigation through integration of owner’s strategic 
requirement, technical project delivery and functional operations capabilities to address 
the problem of the distribution of capabilities in capabilities cycle based on the data 
analysis. It presents the causes of operational failure and discusses the findings in relation 
to the literature in developing the owner’s and its multi-organisational supply chain and 
operator network capabilities to mitigate unforeseen events (unintended) as well as 
predictable contingencies (intended) of operational failure. The findings contribute to the 
development of a new strategic project and quality management approach in failure 
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mitigation and demonstrate the potential of advanced integrated management of 
capabilities in mitigating failures.  
Next, the conclusions and recommendations of this research are presented in chapters 8 
and 9. In Chapter 8, the research aim and objectives are re-visited and summaries of the 
conclusions reached are elaborated on accordingly. This chapter also further explains the 
research limitations as well as the contributions to knowledge as the conclusion of this 
study, whilst Chapter 9 presents the recommendations for future research. 
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8 Conclusions 
8.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, the key conclusions that are reflected on throughout the thesis are 
presented. The conclusions are linked back to the research aim and objectives, and the 
findings that have been derived from the literature review and all the three phases of the 
study. The research limitations are also explained, to give an overview of the constraints 
faced in conducting this research.  
8.2 Achievement of the research aim and objectives 
Based on the research problem, this research’s aim is to investigate why assets handed 
over to owners have failed during operation and how the complex interrelationship of an 
owner and its multi-organisational supply network members may influence the existence 
of operational failure and its quality costs.   
In conclusion, this thesis has raised the importance of quantifying COQ in 
construction project management. Through study A and B, It delivers a quality cost 
framework that suit the construction scope, Study C described the process and theory to 
support the understanding on the dynamic and emergent owners and multi-organisational 
supply network capabilities’ influence on the project lifecycle. In achieving the main aim, 
these thesis objectives were achieved and are detailed in Table 8.1. 
Table 8.1: Achievement of the objectives 
Research Objectives Achievement of Research Objectives  
1. To explore the existing 
COQ and investigate its 
empirical application 
within an overarching 
TQM system.  
The literature provided a basic understanding of the existing costs 
of quality that are limited to the construction sector. COQ can be 
said to have established itself as one of the quality management 
tools used to achieve competitive advantage. COQ provides an 
improved strategic context for services, where both effectiveness 
and efficiency are achieved. Generally, as the literature showed, 
COQ is understood as being for organisations to reduce 
unnecessary costs and create a better-quality output. However, the 
complex nature of construction makes it difficult for the project 
team to quantify the COQ within the project management context. 
Therefore, construction failures are growing with non-
quantification of their costs. COQ can continuously support both 
the short- and long-term quality achievement with a new 
definition and standardisation within the construction context. 
This can be achieved by embedding the concept of COQ into 
 218 
project and operational delivery management.  
2. To investigate the status of 
operational failure cost and 
COQ within the 
construction supply 
network. 
An abductive with grounded theory approach using literature, a 
pilot survey, a design workshop and multiple steering group 
discussions led to a new extended COQ and operational failure 
quality cost framework that integrates owner and supply network 
judgement into the set of quality cost elements that suits the 
construction scope. The framework elicited language and 
structure that enabled the definition and assessment of general 
construction-specific elements. The owner and supply network 
showed different perceptions in dealing with quality cost failures 
with different level of maturity judged but were confident in 
influencing the failures. The framework proved useful in 
developing understanding of its relations to the occurrences of 
failures. Furthermore, this framework provides a useful tool in 
developing theory to further understand the conceptual elements 
in reducing failures.  
 
3. To investigate the causes 
of operational failure 
within an owner and its 
multi-organisational supply 
network capabilities. 
Five projects provided detailed multi-case study for the abductive, 
grounded theory research. The COQ framework was used 
alongside questionnaire surveys, workshops, interviews and 
steering meetings. It was used to elicit and measure the owner and 
multi-organisational supply network perspectives on the 
occurrences of operational failures retrospectively. Owner and 
multi-organisational supply network also defined their 
understanding of each quality cost element and estimated the cost 
incurred within each one. An understanding of the causes of 
failures from the emergent and dynamic process is provided 
which describes the diversity of capabilities involved. Expert 
workshops provided a useful way to define, deliver and evaluate 
the emergent findings from understanding the diversity of 
capabilities as a cause of failure and its link to owner PBO 
management. The different behaviours and cultures in applying 
quality were expressed and the understanding of integrating 
capabilities as an approach to align the owner and multi-
organisational supply and operator network quality expectations 
was proposed. The capabilities cycle in different phases was 
further shown and mapped, illustrating the link between different 
occurrences of failures. The capabilities cycle model between 
owner’s strategic requirement, technical project delivery and 
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functional operations capabilities was developed to further 
generate new theory. 
 
4. To develop a new strategic 
project and quality 
management approach in 
failure mitigation to 
integrate capabilities 
between the owner and 
multi-organisational supply 
and operator network.  
Appraising the COQ framework through a grounded theory 
approach revealed an empirical relationship between the quality 
cost incurred, distribution of capabilities and quality failures. This 
data was compared to literature using theoretical triangulation 
(Chapter 7) to understand the emergent findings. The relationship 
between owner, project and operational capabilities was 
summarised in a capabilities cycle. The model illustrated the need 
for the owner to integrate the distribution of capabilities within 
each phase of a project. This is for the organisation to be able to 
inwardly integrate and outwardly collaborate on the capabilities to 
change quality behaviour in reducing failures and quality cost 
failure.  
 
Integrating capabilities across owner’s strategic requirement, 
technical project delivery and functional operations management 
is proposed for owner, multi-organisational supply and operator 
network address the problem of the capabilities cycle in PBO. The 
integration of capabilities will allow owners and their multi-
organisational supply and operator network to equally share 
project risk and quality cost, thus mitigating the failures. Further 
research is required to test these findings.  
 
8.3 Summary of conclusions  
Based on the achievement of the objectives, the conclusions were devised based on the 
adoption of an abductive mixed-methods research design and the incorporation of the 
literature review and findings from all phases of data collection. Based on the empirical 
findings, this study makes the following propositions:  
8.3.1  Conclusion 1 
COQ in the construction industry is still at its infancy and the implementation of 
measuring the COQ needs a stronger approach from top management.  
Literature, steering group discussions and data analysis from study A, B and C findings 
indicated that the perception of the construction industry towards COQ is still at its 
infancy and the implementation of COQ in construction is still low. It is understood that 
COQ can be a key tool in providing competitive improvement as it identifies the 
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influences required for change in the project environment and to develop prevention and 
appraisal activities to accommodate it; thus, the application of COQ may provide 
improvement for a PBO if well applied. Generally, the nature of the construction industry 
makes it difficult for COQ to be quantified but the benefits of applying COQ in reducing 
unnecessary costs are apparent. Although the literature shows that some organisations 
have attempted to measure and quantify the COQ, it was emphasised that the COQ was 
not measured as a whole but only covered certain elements in the construction context. 
Thus, this needs a stronger management approach to better emphasise the quantification. 
There is no standardisation and definition of COQ that suits the construction context as 
each project is believed to be unique within its own environment.  
To quantify the COQ in a project, the project needs systematic alignment between 
the multiple organisations involved. A standardisation using COQ framework that is 
developed to suit the construction scope would help to align the different definitions of 
quality by different organisations. The quantification could provide timely, relevant and 
accurate feedback for both short- and long-term benefits. However, the implementation of 
COQ measure would require a high level of support from the top management and 
commitment from the organisation involved within the project to understand the cost 
elements that will generate the input or outcome of implementing the quality process. The 
owner needs to explore in which phase (project or operations) the project frequently 
incurred the most cost; in this way, COQ could be better understood in relation to the 
significant differences of each category and how each element is impacting on another. 
Therefore, top management should set a parameter of how a construction project could 
have synchronised the quantification of quality cost within the multi-organisational 
network. An effective process will thus help project organisations to develop a standard 
framework which constitutes a range of quality cost elements to suit the capability needed 
in constructing a project and in successfully delivering its operations. It is believed that 
using a standard framework could offer a better implementation of quality measure 
through a clear identification of quality elements that reflect on the project strategy and 
need. In general, the study summarised that the COQ in the construction industry needs to 
be promoted for better quantification in relation to improving the quality performance.  
8.3.2 Conclusion 2 
Operational failure quality cost could be reduced through understanding the causes of 
operational failure.  
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Studies show that operational failure quality cost is still highly recurrent within 
construction projects. The COQ was understood to be absorbed differently by different 
organisations; this is because COQ and failure costs were not frequently quantified. The 
research shows that construction participants were confident that they could influence the 
occurrences of failures depending on their context, but this needs integrated management. 
They believed that quality failures could be predicted or foreseen if quality costs were 
acknowledged. In the main, the multi-organisational supply network was not aware of the 
implications of the incurred cost, as they were driven by different aims in delivering the 
project. The organisation believed that quantifying the quality cost would impact the 
relationship among the project chain, as well as with the owner. Analysis of the multi-
case study has demonstrated that the project team were aware of the operational failure 
costs incurred due to failures, but lacked the ability to demonstrate the relationship of 
who bears the costs. Frequently, operational failure cost is assumed to be absorbed by the 
owner who operates the asset, but research showed that COQ is shared among the multi-
organisational supply network members. 
Quality failure was perceived differently by different organisations, thus 
operational failure costs were difficult to justify. With this knowledge, the focus of 
operational failure quality cost helped the research to generate further understanding upon 
what constitutes the occurrences of failures to reduce the quality failure cost. The 
research findings have suggested that, in order to mitigate and reduce failure, the owner 
and the multi-organisational supply and operator network need to understand the causes 
of these quality failures. It can be concluded that operational failure cost can be reduced if 
the owner and its multi-organisational supply network could tightly define quality and 
share the operational risk. Thus, the COQ framework indicates proven elements that are 
exemplary and could be used to develop the quality failure cost measure.  
8.3.3 Conclusion 3 
The diversity of capabilities that are distributed in a complex infrastructure project leads 
to operational failure and result in high cost of quality failure.  
Findings from the Phase 2 analysis have demonstrated that the operational failures were 
triggered by the different capabilities that are distributed across the different phases of the 
project lifecycle. The cycle begins with the owner at the initial stage developing the 
strategic planning and procurement capabilities needed to execute the project. 
Capabilities are then transferred to the project through the multi-organisational supply 
network. The project team applies these different capabilities needed to complete the 
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project aim and deliver the expected operations. Capabilities during project operation 
were recognised by the project and operation team; this provides competitive 
improvement for future projects. The diversity of these capabilities was triggered by 
different factors at different phases.   
The transferring capability was triggered by the contracted end date, the allocation 
of project budget to fit project specification, the relationship with the multi-organisational 
supply and operator network in integrating project capability, and the reflection of a 
project scope with demanding specifications. The capabilities transferred at this stage 
showed the importance of early formation of the capabilities set at the beginning of each 
project in streamlining the management structure and procedures for quality 
implementation. Quality is set differently by different organisations; a procurement 
method that focuses on quality measure at the outset of a project would be useful in 
making sure the quality of the operational side of the project is successfully achieved. 
Project capability needs a clearer paradigm to achieve optimal efficiency in delivering a 
high-quality performance.  
Applying capability was influenced by the imperative factors of how the 
understanding of real-life operational technicalities and constraints was placed in the 
design, trusting the contractor’s expertise and resources, and the technical competency in 
on-site operations to influence the operational capability. Project capabilities lacked 
consideration of operational technicalities and constraints, which thus resulted in 
operational failures. Projects need to develop capabilities that reflect both the quality to 
execute and quality for operations. Thus, applying the right capabilities could generate 
relevant and effective capabilities in obtaining successful quality operations.  
Lastly, the recognising capability seeks to foster the owner’s capability by 
developing the lesson learnt from the project and the operationalisation of the asset. It is 
anticipated that operational capability, if recognised, can contribute significantly by 
comprehensively calibrating the effectiveness of the operations, which will improve the 
owner’s future project performance and mitigate failures. The comprehensive set of 
capabilities distributed from the beginning of the project lifecycle should help the owner 
to evaluate the capabilities needed in terms of achievement and improvement. Lack of 
technical experience during the operations stage could prolong the operational failures 
and thus increase the COQ failure. Projects need to capture the operational failure to 
prevent the repetition of failures. This can only be achieved through recognising 
capabilities developed from past experience.   
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8.3.4  Conclusion 4  
The owner and multi-organisational supply and operator network need to integrate 
capabilities across owner’s strategic requirement, technical project delivery and 
functional operations management in different phases of the capabilities cycle to mitigate 
failure and thus reduce quality cost failure.  
Analysis from Phase 3 draws a cross-case conclusion, theoretical triangulation and 
development of new theory that has indicated capabilities are distributed across different 
phases of the capabilities cycle. The overall distribution of capabilities shows significant 
implications if integration is achieved; this will further help the owner and multi-
organisational supply and operator network to mitigate the failures and thus reduce the 
quality cost failure. The research claims that the integration of capabilities is needed 
across owner’s strategic requirement, technical project delivery and functional operations 
management to balance the risk and share the responsibilities across the multi-
organisational supply network through the use of the COQ measure.  
By promoting the COQ measure, the owner and its multi-organisational supply 
and operator network could anticipate the risks and costs that could be incurred if 
integrated capabilities are not achieved. Therefore, integrating the capabilities will assist 
the owner and multi-organisational supply and operator network to collaborate in 
delivering a project towards successful operations. In this way, the owner and multi-
organisational supply network could share and balance the possible COQ incurred 
throughout the project lifecycle. By integrating the capabilities, it is possible for the 
owner to obtain the required quality behaviour and culture when the right capability to 
execute and operate a project is achieved. A project team that integrates the different 
capabilities will demonstrate quality behaviour if the implication on COQ is known and 
shared. Moreover, there was a high need for the multi-organisational supply and operator 
network to openly discuss and quantify the quality failure cost as an enhancement tool for 
implementing the quality cost and taking full control of the capabilities provided to 
perform.  
A few challenges are that it might not be possible to quantify the total COQ, as it 
is always absorbed differently by different parties; and the nature of the project is always 
dynamic and emergent, where the project might be changing at any time due to certain 
conditions or failures that are not always expected. There were also expectations that, by 
effectively implementing quality management as one of the commitments in delivering 
project management, quality failure could be reduced. But this needs alignment of the 
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quality tool definition as a common language for different professions and organisations 
to better understand the quality expectation. It is hoped that the framework will help the 
owner and its multi-organisational supply and operator network in considering the 
operational failure and its quality cost, to incorporate those elements at the front end of 
the project. This suggests that the project and operations will have full control of the 
operational performance.   
It is advocated that understanding the different risks and costs borne by different 
parties will encourage different organisations to be willing to cooperate in obtaining equal 
benefits. Failures thus could be learned from and improved in future projects when 
recognised by all construction participants. It was claimed that the incorporation of 
quality management helps a project to perform better, when it had been expected that 
more emphases would fall on the supply network to integrate the capabilities in resolving 
problems. In summary, integrating capabilities creates a collaborative effort among the 
owner and its multi-organisational supply and operator network, and this could help to 
effectively foresee, prevent and address failure at an early stage. Therefore, as a final 
output of this research, it is suggested that the development of a new strategic project and 
quality management approach is needed to mitigate failure. This could be achieved 
through integrating owner’s strategic requirement, technical project delivery and 
functional operations capabilities to address the problem of the distribution of capabilities 
in the capabilities cycle of PBO. By integrating capabilities across different project 
phases, owners and multi-organisational supply and operator network will learn and be 
able to procure more integrated capabilities in failure mitigation to reduce failure 
throughout the project lifecycle. 
8.4 Limitations 
Research is frequently limited due to time and resources. Within this research, the 
research design was not intended to quantify the whole COQ and quality cost failure, or 
to produce results that account for or predict failure as created by people or through 
process predictability. However, it does show that COQ can be quantified and reduced in 
a normative sense, by the reflective, ongoing and well-structured consideration of a 
project and its operation in managing capabilities. In addition, the research explored a 
wider contribution towards how project management could reduce the quality failure. 
However, the study does have some, which include:  
1. All five cases were investigated within one organisation; as such, there is limited 
operationalised generalisability. However, by using a single organisation as a multi-
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case study, the researcher wanted to achieve an explanatory contribution to the 
domain of project-based organisation studies. This study limitation was overcome 
through exploring the inter-organisation context, within different projects, which is 
identified as important for achieving the nature and context of operational failures. 
Focusing on such projects allowed the researcher to achieve the analytical depth 
necessary to reveal the basic features of the phenomenon on which future studies 
should expand.  
2. Within this organisation, this research has shown how operational failures were 
influenced by the distribution of capabilities across the capabilities cycle in a project, 
but are probably limited to major applicability in terms of other major infrastructure 
projects. Multiple cases across different sectors, and types and scales of projects could 
possibly show different results and, if there are wider projects that could be tested, the 
research may be more aware in terms of how the findings could be applied.  
3. The application of grounded theory may have resulted in some researcher-induced 
bias and reapplication difficulties; however, these limitations were minimised by 
strong industry involvement, collaboration and validation. Research samples were all 
identified with an experienced senior manager. This allowed the researcher to provide 
rich data and in-depth arguments on a series of ideas, topics and issues related to the 
operational failures. 
4. Within this research, it was neither practical nor possible to concretely understand all 
the variables that impact on operational failures. The investigation of failures and 
operational failure within the project context is multi-stakeholder, multi-timescale, 
multi-parameter, multi-purpose and multi-setting. The failure is unbounded, with 
often unknown variables and limited initial hypotheses. The results are more 
discursive than conclusive, but it would be possible to re-design, test and verify the 
theory generated in this thesis.  
8.5 Contribution to knowledge  
8.5.1  Academic contributions 
 The COQ framework, as presented in Chapter 5, was developed as part of this 
research. The framework illustrates a range of quality cost elements within the 
categories of prevention, appraisal and failure that suit the construction project scope. 
This research opens up new possibilities for academic research. This study has 
unpacked the narrow study of COQ that was limited to quality management.  
 This research thus offers a new understanding of the complex relationship between 
quality cost and operational failures. It highlights an understanding of failure 
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triggered factors that need to be emphasised in both research and practice. It gives an 
overview of the occurrence of operational failure and its relationship to the quality 
cost incurred, which serves as a good reference for other researchers.  
 The capabilities cycle model integrates new understanding on project and quality 
management. This thesis has made evident the link of project management and quality 
implications. Quality is embedded within the project and operational capability. As 
such, promoting project management alone should not be enough to improve project 
performance; it requires a collective understanding of quality.  
 An advanced strategic project and quality management approach is proposed to 
integrate capabilities to mitigate operational failure. The result of this thesis shows 
failure mitigation needs to be integrated across owner’s strategic requirement, 
technical project delivery and functional operations management capabilities within 
the owner and its multi-organisational supply and operator network, which can be 
achieved through the use of COQ measure.  
8.5.2  Industry contributions 
 The development of the COQ model is set as a quality measure that can be used in 
different organisations to measure the quality cost of construction projects. It is 
anticipated to fill the gap relating to the non-existence of a quality cost framework or 
guidelines for construction projects. The COQ framework would enable construction 
organisations to understand the quality cost elements that could be measured in 
reducing the overall COQ of a project. 
The COQ framework is also anticipated to serve as a platform in bringing up quality 
management tools as an improvement to project performance management. Quality 
and performance have always been compromised in construction projects and the 
quality implementation has been consistently underrated. The emergence of quality 
cost should be able to attract top management’s attention in applying more proactive 
management to improve industry performance and reduce the occurrence of failures.  
 The distribution of capabilities in the capabilities cycle model gives further 
understanding of how capabilities in complex projects should be managed to mitigate 
failure and thus reduce the quality cost failure. This new contribution to the industry 
shows that this research has developed a solution based on establishing new 
understanding of the project and quality management perspective.  
8.5.3  New knowledge 
It can be concluded that this research poses evidences that it has demonstrated a new 
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theoretical concept of integrated capabilities within project and quality management in 
mitigating failure, which has never been established in the project management field, 
especially focusing on the operational quality failure. A set of publications based on this 
research is also the supporting evidence where the knowledge of this research has been 
affirmed in academia. This thesis used abductive reasoning to demonstrate an iterative 
and intertwined relationship between quality cost and operational failure. Appraising the 
quality cost framework through grounded theory revealed an empirical relationship 
between the quality cost incurred, distribution of capabilities and quality failures. The 
overall contribution of this thesis is a new understanding of how capabilities are 
distributed in projects and operations and influence the occurrence of quality failures. The 
capabilities cycle illustrates the need for the owner and multi-organisational supply 
network to integrate capabilities within each phase of a project’s lifecycle. This will help 
organisations to understand the need to integrate capabilities and thus be able to inwardly 
integrate and outwardly collaborate on the capabilities to change quality behaviour in 
mitigating failures and reduce operational failure quality cost. This research is important 
because quality and project management tools often lack identification of the 
organisation’s unique capabilities development, which is frequently limited by the 
functionality of a project outcome. Commonly, the construction industry is narrowly 
focused on the sub-set of supporting project execution, rather than fully understanding the 
implication of the distribution of capabilities towards the asset operations. The 
functionality of a project is perceived as completing the project, thus there is no certainty 
about the operational outcome. Hence, this thesis generates a wider perspective of what 
has constitute the operational failure, and thus provides improvement and solutions in 
failure mitigation.  
8.6 Impact and dissemination  
8.6.1  Impact on construction organisations 
This research applied a grounded theory approach and had a strong collaboration with an 
industry working group (the Chartered Quality Institute) as a means to continuously 
improve the relevance and usefulness of the research for the audience over the period. 
This research informed and subsequently helped to address the recommendations 
made by the quality institution representing the UK construction organisation: that the 
industry needs to develop a set of COQ measure to reduce the failure cost; to educate the 
industry and its supply network in the provision of quality through understanding the 
causes of operational failures; and to develop the means to engage the owner and its 
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multi-organisational supply network in integrating the capabilities that share the project 
risk and quality cost to develop capabilities for failure mitigation.  
Investing in these quality costs that have the highest impact has shown that the 
integration of capabilities can assist the construction industry in mitigating failures. The 
research benefited from strong support by the owner organisation during the research 
process and this organisation has provided an opportunity for further research as a part of 
their quality development process. COQ has been adopted at the strategic level by the 
owner organisation and has formed a new capability focus and highlighted changes in the 
organisational structure. It was highly influential in the project delivery department, 
which has adopted the COQ framework presented in this thesis and worked with 
contractors to collect additional data on COQ. The method developed to understand the 
importance of COQ continues to draw considerable industry-level interest and the 
approach is being discussed further afield. 
The framework has formed a starting point for the Charted Quality Institute to 
further generate empirical understanding from different organisations. The research 
provides an opportunity for other construction companies to learn lessons from it and 
demonstrating the relationship to operation failures and the quality cost incurred. The 
introduction of the capabilities theory has enhanced the explanatory influence of the 
existence of operational failure to further explore how exploration and exploitation 
practices in quantifying COQ in a project can be translated into value in improving 
construction performance. 
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8.6.2  Dissemination of the research findings  
The research has been presented at and published by the three conferences listed below:  
1. Razak, D S A, Mills, G and Roberts, A (2016) External Failure Cost in 
Construction Supply Chains. In: P W Chan and C J Neilson (Eds.) Proceedings of 
the 32nd Annual ARCOM Conference, 5-7 September 2016, Manchester, UK, 
Association of Researchers in Construction Management, Vol 2, 881-890  
 
2. Razak, D S A, Mills, G and Roberts, A (2018) Operational Quality Failure Issues: 
From owner perspective. The Construction, Building and Real Estate Research 
Conference of the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (COBRA RICS), 23-24 
April 2018, RICS HQ, London, in association with University College London., 
rics.org/cobraconferences. 
3. Razak, D S A, Mills, G and Roberts, A (2018) How Do Infrastructure Owners 
Build Capabilities to Reduce Operational Failure? In: Gorse, C and Neilson, C J 
(Eds) Proceeding of the 34th Annual ARCOM Conference, 3-5 September 2018, 
Belfast, UK, Association of Researchers in Construction Management, 756-765.  
One journal paper has been accepted by Project Management Journal Special Issue on 
Project Transitions: Navigating across Strategy, Delivery, Use and Decommissioning 
tittle: “Addressing Operational Failure: A strategic project and quality management 
approach.”  (Accepted with revision on March, 2019) . 
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review and acknowledgement of 
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project quality failure  
Trial survey (n=25)  
Study B (ii) - Measuring cost of quality in major construction projects post-
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Industry-based Questionnaire (n=17)  
Study C (i) - Exploring the operational issues sample 
Delphi review 
Quality manager (n=1) 
Operational team project selection (n=2) 
Detail knowledge on specific projects (n=4) 
Advance knowledge on potential projects (n=2) 
Final cases selection workshop (n=3) 
Study C (ii) - Identifying project 
sample within specific projects 
Phase 1 interviews (n=7)  
Project managers across projects 
A-E 
Study C (iii) – Identifying the causes and operational outcomes of issues  
Phase 2 interviews (n = 19) 
 
Project A  
(n=4) 
Project B  
(n=2) 
Project C 
(n=5) 
Project D 
(n=2) 
Project E 
(n=6) 
Study C (iv)– Advancing finding from project operational failure  
Phase 3 - Workshop 1 (n=2) 
                 Workshop 2 (n=2) 
Study B (iii) - Quantifying quality cost failure in major construction projects post-
handover  
Project case study  
Aim and Objectives 
Quality management, COQ 
and failure literature  
Project-based, project failure and 
capability literature 
Research philosophy, design and methodology  
Study C - Infrastructure client multi-case study  
Operational quality issues within single client organization  
 
Draw cross-case conclusion, comparison with existing theory and 
development of new theory   
 
Conclusions and contributions    
 
Recommendations    
 
CHAPTER 5 – COQ 
framework development and 
application    
Phase 2 – Developed 
case study 
CHAPTER 6 – 
Infrastructure 
client multi-case 
study  
Phase 3 – Findings and theory 
building  
CHAPTER 7 – Discussions  
CHAPTER 8 – Conclusions  
CHAPTER 9 – Recommendations  
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9 Recommendations 
This chapter provides recommendations for future work and practical applications. 
Accordingly, it focuses on future research, and the development of new tools, 
organisational system and cultural system for COQ. These recommendations should be 
carried out to compensate for the limitations to enhance the research findings.  
1. Research studies 
 Other studies could focus on prevention and appraisal categories to better 
understand the relation of these quality cost elements based on the framework 
developed in this study. There is also an opportunity to conduct a specific study 
focusing on the testing of this COQ framework within different projects. Further 
analysis and studies would be beneficial in positioning the tested COQ framework 
in academia, and in the construction and other industries.  
 Work is required to examine the influence of various multi-organisational and 
their involvement at different stages, and different delivery models, such as early 
specialist supplier involvement or level of hierarchical authority (e.g. the planner 
team), could be incorporated in judging quality failures. 
 
2. Development of tools 
 New innovative tools such as a software application to quantify the quality cost 
element can be developed to help construction organisations measure the COQ. 
The COQ can serve as a basis in developing this innovative software application.  
 A PM tool can be generated that combines the quality cost elements in aiding the 
project team to monitor quality work performance, thus providing prevention and 
appraisal of quality failures.  
 
3. Organisational and cultural system for COQ 
 A paradigm shift is needed in leadership to cultivate a culture of positive and 
beneficial interaction in openly discussing and quantifying the quality cost 
between an owner and its multi-organisational supply network. The consideration 
of evidence on quantifying the quality costs during operations could support the 
understanding of the culture to incentivise the behaviour of different actors.  
 Joint or collaborative involvement plays an important role in instilling quality 
culture and awareness of operational failures. Positioning guidelines and research 
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works will provide assistance for projects to comply with the requirements and 
training.  
 Industry needs a change in mindset to go against the conservative and protective 
practice. The perception on quality failure should be shifted towards more 
proactive campaigns such as capabilities to learn in improving construction 
projects.  
 Embracing a broader range of project and operational COQ both at failure and in 
saving cases offers immense possibilities for stakeholders to make collective 
decisions towards a way of improving the whole industry.  
 
There is a need for the researcher to understand both the theoretical and practical 
implications in increasing the validity of the findings. Confirmation of bias is difficult to 
overcome, as creating a change in the environment under investigation will inevitably 
impact on the reliability of the data, and earlier data and later data are inherently from 
different environments. A purely academic exercise to validate the framework and model 
through case study whether using a ‘pure’ interpretative or ‘pure’ positivist stance could 
be carried out. A detailed and in-depth case study could take a deep look into the realities 
of operational failures. In such a case study, a comparison of the outcome, in comparison 
to the final model of theory developed in this thesis, will expose the weakness in the 
closeness of the model to the live practical experiences of those experiencing the 
operational failures.  
While a positivist research approach that looks into qualitative data gathering and 
analysis across a significant number of projects within a complex infrastructure project 
will enable an assessment to be made of the generalisability of the COQ framework 
designed in this case, this research has helped in unpacking both the narrow area of COQ 
and operational failures to understand the relationship of the QM in PM studies. This, it is 
hoped, will help to define a new approach to improve the quality thinking that can be 
added for owners to manage projects effectively and thus mitigate failures. A better 
understanding of the occurrences of operational failure in monetary language can help 
construction organisations in visualising the importance of quality implementation, and 
thus bring significant additional insight and knowledge for greater project delivery.  
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Appendix 1: Sample of Study B (i) - Trial questionnaire survey: call to action on 
major project quality failure  
INTRODUCTION _____________________________________________________________________ 
Some participants will be influenced for the cost of end-product quality issues for a single case of an asset, 
others for a number of assets (e.g. a portfolio) and still others for their whole enterprise. Therefore you 
will first be asked to identify your level of influence in dealing with cost of quality (section I), then in 
section II asked to determine the level of knowledge you have about your asset, portfolio or enterprise) to 
reduce the cost of quality of specific elements.   
 
SECTION I – YOUR EXPERIENCE OF COST OF QUALITY ISSUES  
 
1. At any one time, what is your level of influence in cost of quality failure? (please tick one, and 
then indicate its overall cost)  
 Cost (£) 
 
One assets (e.g. Responsible for failures delivered by a 
project) 
 
□ ___________ 
 
More than one asset (e.g. Responsible for failures delivered 
by a programme or contained in a portfolio), or   
 
□ ___________ 
 
All assets and processes for your enterprise (e.g. Responsible 
for failures for a full asset management or quality 
management system) 
 
□ ___________ 
 
2. Please provide your enterprise type, and the sector or sectors that operational failure most 
frequently occurs (please tick one or more): 
 
Owner / operator: The enterprise that owns and operates the asset 
 
Sector(s): ____________________________________ 
 
 
□ 
Integrator / main contractor: The enterprise that has overall responsibility for 
planning and handing over the asset after design and construction 
 
Sector(s): ____________________________________ 
 
 
□ 
Advisor / consultant / designer: The organisation that provides advice and 
professional services to the owner or integrator. 
 
Sector(s): ____________________________________ 
 
 
□ 
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Supplier / sub-contractor: The organisation that supplies materials, 
components, engineering systems, labour or construction services. 
 
Sector(s): ____________________________________ 
 
 
□ 
 
3. How many years have you worked in this industry? ______________________ 
4. What is your primary role within the organisation? _______________________ 
5. Based on your answer to question 1 and 2. What is the contract type that you most frequently 
use and where you have experienced quality issues? (e.g. PO, NEC, Framework, etc)  
                               _______________________________________ 
 
SECTION II – YOUR ENTERPRISE’S MATURITY IN COST OF QUALITY  
6. Below are the quality cost elements that contribute to quality issues during an operational. of an 
asset. Based on your experience/ involvement (e.g. your answer to Question 1 and 2), please 
select your enterprise’s level of maturity on the awareness and measuring these quality cost 
elements. (Please tick one level of maturity per element) 
 
 
                                                  Level of Maturity 
             
1 2 3 4 5 
Quality Cost Elements 
 
  
Unaware 
 Enterprise 
has little or 
no intention 
to formally 
manage/ 
measure 
this cost 
element 
Aware  
Enterprise is 
aware of 
and has 
intention to 
manage/me
asure this 
cost 
element 
Defined 
Enterprise 
has put in 
place a basic 
infrastructur
e to support 
this cost 
element 
Managed 
This cost 
element is 
well 
managed/ 
measured in 
the 
enterprise  
Optimising  
This cost 
element is 
deeply 
integrated/ 
measure into 
the enterprise 
and is 
continually 
improved 
Insurance 
costs  
The premium paid to 
compensate for a potential 
loss, damage, illness, or death 
after the asset handover (e.g. 
a lift failure). 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Latent 
defect Costs 
Cost of a defect that is 
apparent after the project 
(e.g. a roof leak post 
handover). 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Additional 
safety Costs 
for 
Operators 
Insurance claim or legal 
consequences due to 
underperformance or 
incorrect selection of safety 
product or system failure (e.g. 
malfunctioning safety barrier). 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Asset non-
availability 
Costs 
Cost of a disrupted service as 
a result of asset non-
availability (e.g. school 
□ □ □ □ □ 
 256 
classroom is out of service). 
Excess 
energy Use 
Costs 
Additional energy cost as 
compared to a specified 
requirement or benchmark 
(e.g. low performance of 
energy generators). 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Excess 
maintenanc
e Costs  
Additional costs outside of the 
intended maintenance 
programme that is the result 
of inadequate design 
specification (e.g. correcting 
faulty water pipework). 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Quality Cost 
Elements 
 
   
Unaware 
 Enterprise 
has little or 
no intention 
to formally 
manage/ 
measure 
this cost 
element 
Aware  
Enterprise is 
aware of 
and has 
intention to 
manage/me
asure this 
cost 
element 
Defined 
Enterprise 
has put in 
place a basic 
infrastructur
e to support 
this cost 
element 
Managed 
This cost 
element is 
well 
managed/ 
measured in 
the 
enterprise  
Optimising  
This cost 
element is 
deeply 
integrated/ 
measure into 
the enterprise 
and is 
continually 
improved 
Additional 
Environmen
tal costs 
Cost of tax, levy or credit 
incurred to maintain good 
environmental status due to 
requirement specification 
(e.g. an organisation must buy 
additional carbon credits). 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Lifecycle 
replacemen
t cost  
Excess cost of replacing an 
asset or part to fulfil a 
specified performance 
requirement (e.g. replacing 
underperforming lighting). 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Functionalit
y cost  
Costs due to reduced 
functionality either by failure 
to specify or failure to deliver 
(e.g. operating rooms are too 
small for mobile diagnostic 
equipment). 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Unadaptabl
e cost 
Cost of not having the ability 
to change or be changed to 
accommodate business 
service or product changes 
(e.g. a new production 
process must move to a new 
site)  
□ □ □ □ □ 
Early 
obsolescenc
e cost  
The cost of a product 
becoming outdated or no 
longer used (e.g. a non-used 
laundry chute or lift). 
□ □ □ □ □ 
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7. Please do you believe there to be any other specific contributors to quality issues?  If so, please 
describe here.  
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
SECTION III – INFLUENCE ON QUALITY ISSUES  
8. Overall, how would you rate the level of maturity yourself in relation to the rest of the supply 
chain? (Please tick one per question) 
 
 Very low Low Fair Good Very good 
 
Your enterprise with regards to 
operational failure? 
 
____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 
Your customers with regards to 
operational failure? 
 
____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 
Your suppliers with regards to 
operational failure? 
____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 
      
      
9. How would you rate your enterprise’s overall ability to influence operational quality issues? 
  
 Very low Low Fair Good Very good 
 
Ability to influence  ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 
 
Please reasons for this? 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Reputation/ 
brand cost  
The indirect consequential 
losses / lost opportunities 
that result from a perceived 
weakness (e.g. negative PR as 
a result of some building 
failure).  
□ □ □ □ □ 
Additional 
Operational 
training 
Costs incurred in training staff 
to operate a building while 
that building is in operation 
(e.g. inadequate or ineffective 
hand-over and training in the 
use of a security system). 
□ □ □ □ □ 
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____________________________________________________________________________ 
      
10. How could improvements be made, or measures taken, to prevent or reduce the risk of 
operational quality issues? 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
SECTION IV - RESULTS FEEDBACK _______________________________________________________ 
 
11. Where did you hear about this survey? 
 
___________________________________________________________  
 
 
12. If you would like to receive a summary of the results, or would like to be involved in a follow up 
interview, please provide your e-mail address below:  
 
___________________________________________________________  
 
Thank you for your time in completing this survey.  
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Appendix 2: Sample of Study B (ii) - Focus questionnaire survey: measuring cost of 
quality in major construction projects post-handover  
INTRODUCTION _____________________________________________________________________ 
This questionnaire is to be completed by owners who are responsible for a building operational quality of 
the final asset delivered by a construction project. It investigates the cost of quality, which is known as the 
cost of poor quality, or the price of failing to create a quality product or service.  In this questionnaire the 
CQI are particularly interested in scoping the operational failure cost (the cost incurred by the client after 
a built asset is delivered). For more information please follow this link. UCL will treat the results from this 
questionnaire anonymously. All data will be summarised to produce a final report and papers for scientific 
journals.  
 
 
SECTION I – YOUR EXPERIENCE  
 
1. How many projects are you usually responsible for delivering quality management to? 
 
1-2 building projects 
 
□  
 
3-5 building projects  
 
□  
 
More than 5 building projects 
 
□  
 
2. What would you describe your project/ programme sector as? 
 
Private sector 
 
□  
 
Central government  
 
□  
 
Public private partnership/PFI 
 
□  
 
3. What are the main project/ programme types? (eg Airport, commercial, hospital, etc.)  
___________________________ 
 
4. What is the overall budget of your organisations annual capital programme  
Over £5 billion      □ 
£1 billion - £5 billion                                                   □ 
£500 million - £1 billion                                             □ 
£100 million - £500 million   □ 
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£50million - £100 million    □ 
Under £50 million      □ 
 
Please could you state the approximate capital programme? £_____________________ 
 
5. What is the budget for quality management allocated to each project (as percentage of total 
project spend)? 
No budget       □ 
Less than 0.1%     □ 
0.1% to 0.3%    □ 
0.3% to 0.5%      □ 
Above 0.5%      □ 
 
6. On what types of building have you delivered Quality Management? Please specify. 
____________________________ 
 
7. How many years have you worked as a quality manager? ______________________ 
 
8. How many years has this been in your present organisation? ___________________ 
 
 
SECTION II –MATURITY OF OPERATIONAL QUALITY _________________________ 
9. Below are the quality failure issues that may occur during the operation of an asset. Please select 
your organisations level of maturity in managing these quality failure issues. (Please tick one level 
of maturity per element) 
 
 
                                                  Level of Maturity 
             
1 2 3 4 5 
Quality Cost Elements 
 
Unaware 
Little or no 
awareness 
Aware 
Formal 
intention to 
manage and 
measure 
Partial 
Implementati
on  
Initial 
management 
and 
measurement 
Managed 
Well 
managed 
and 
measured 
Optimising 
Optimised 
and 
integrated for 
continuous 
improvement 
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Insurance costs  The premium paid to 
compensate for a 
potential loss, damage, 
illness, or death after the 
asset handover (e.g. a lift 
failure). 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Latent defect 
Costs 
Cost of a defect that is 
apparent after the project 
(e.g. a roof leak post 
handover). 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Additional 
safety Costs for 
Operators 
Insurance claim or legal 
consequences due to 
underperformance or 
incorrect selection of 
safety product or system 
failure (e.g. 
malfunctioning safety 
barrier). 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Asset non-
availability 
Costs 
Cost of a disrupted service 
as a result of asset non-
availability (e.g. school 
classroom is out of 
service). 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Excess energy 
Use Costs 
Additional energy cost as 
compared to a specified 
requirement or 
benchmark (e.g. low 
performance of energy 
generators). 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Excess 
maintenance 
Costs  
Additional costs outside of 
the intended maintenance 
programme that is the 
result of inadequate 
design specification (e.g. 
correcting faulty water 
pipework). 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Additional 
Environmental 
costs 
Cost of tax, levy or credit 
incurred to maintain good 
environmental status due 
to requirement 
specification (e.g. an 
organisation must buy 
additional carbon credits). 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Lifecycle 
replacement 
cost  
Excess cost of replacing an 
asset or part to fulfil a 
specified performance 
requirement (e.g. 
replacing underperforming 
lighting). 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Functionality 
cost  
Costs due to reduced 
functionality either by 
failure to specify or failure 
to deliver (e.g. operating 
rooms are too small for 
□ □ □ □ □ 
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10. Do you believe there to be any other specific quality cost elements that are not included in 
question 9?  If so, please describe here.  
 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
11. Think back to a project where you experienced the most operational quality issues, and please 
state: 
a. Which quality cost element was most significant? _____________ 
 
b. Please can you describe this operational quality issue? 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
c. What was the approximate cost of correcting this operational quality issue? 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
mobile diagnostic 
equipment). 
Unadaptable 
cost 
Cost of not having the 
ability to change or be 
changed to accommodate 
business service or 
product changes (e.g. a 
new production process 
must move to a new site)  
□ □ □ □ □ 
Early 
obsolescence 
cost  
The cost of a product 
becoming outdated or no 
longer used (e.g. a non-
used laundry chute or lift). 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Reputation/ 
brand cost  
The indirect consequential 
losses / lost opportunities 
that result from a 
perceived weakness (e.g. 
negative PR as a result of 
some building failure).  
□ □ □ □ □ 
Additional 
Operational 
training 
Costs incurred in training 
staff to operate a building 
while that building is in 
operation (e.g. inadequate 
or ineffective hand-over 
and training in the use of a 
security system). 
□ □ □ □ □ 
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12. Please now think back to a project where you experienced the least operational quality issues, 
and state: 
a. Which quality cost element was most significant during operation? _____________ 
 
b. Please can you describe this operational quality issue? 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
c. What was the approximately cost of correcting this operational quality issue? 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
SECTION III – INFLUENCE AND QUANTIFICATION ON QUALITY ISSUES  
 
13. Overall, please select the level of maturity of your contractors (Tier1) with regards to operational 
issues? (Please consider the responses in question 9) 
 
 Unaware Aware Partial 
Implementation 
Managed Optimised 
 
 □ □ □ □ □ 
 
 
14. Overall, please select the level of maturity of your suppliers (Tier 2, 3) with regards to operational 
issues?  
 
 Unaware Aware Partial 
Implementation 
Managed Optimised 
 
 
 
 
 
 
□ □ □ □ □ 
 
15. How would you rate your organisation’s overall ability to influence the optimisation, integration 
and continuous improvement of operational quality issues? 
  
 Very low Low Fair Good Very good 
 
 ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 
 
Please list reasons for this? 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
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16. How could improvements be made, or measures taken, to prevent or reduce the risk of 
operational quality issues? 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
SECTION IV - RESULTS FEEDBACK _______________________________________________________ 
 
17. Where did you hear about this survey? 
 
___________________________________________________________  
 
 
18. If you would like to receive a summary of the results, or would like to be involved in the research, 
please provide your e-mail address below:  
 
___________________________________________________________  
 
Thank you for your time in completing this survey.  
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Appendix 3: Extract examples of triggered factor of operational failure.  
Triggered 
factor of 
Operational 
failure 
Implications 
on project 
capability  
Project A Project B Project C Project D Project E 
how -
Contracted 
end date  
 
lack of 
quality 
culture and 
behaviour  
Quality assurance does not 
ensure do right at the first time  
“… we had assurance …, 
[contractor] had assurance and 
… second tier of supply they 
had assurance [but still] we get 
into a situation where 
everybody took a picture of 
something that was wrong… 
people didn't know what they 
were doing..."[A7-CPM] 
 
Not construct according to 
quality standard  
" ... because it was so late in 
the programme, they had pretty 
much laid the blacktop in the 
last week before [the project] 
opened, and it really was a bit 
of a stereotypical chuck-it-
down … regardless of whether 
the quality of the base layers 
had been done, regardless of 
manholes and whether they’d 
been done correctly or not; and 
the quality ... thrown down in 
was just dire …there’s 
numerous photographs in 
documented inspections 
where… there’s industry 
standard ways of building 
manholes…[but], it’s not going 
to be properly constructed, 
which they were." [A1-[CPM] 
 
 Decision made without quality 
concern 
"Their directors saying it's got to 
be live by this date, and then 
some comments back from the 
point of view of saying, yeah, 
but we've scheduled it to be 
finished here. Oh, no, we need it 
four weeks early... So 
[contractor] had to work 
significantly hard to get that 
done. So, they made some 
decisions which you wouldn’t 
have done with a quality hat on, 
which were, put the floor down 
before they had completed a lot 
of the installation..." [C10-
CQM]  
 
impacting quality performance 
"There was a self-imposed issue 
where we trafficked some heavy 
equipment across ... which 
probably masked the issue 
somewhat. There was the need 
to have it operational the next 
day. So the working window 
was very small and it needed to 
be safe and functional the very 
next morning." [C8-CONQM]  
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 Lack of 
benchmarking 
on quality 
issues 
Quality issues not immediately 
resolved “...some of it is, was 
time constraint because it was 
slightly behind and we need to 
get it finished, we need to get it 
finished but if they look back 
now for the sake of a week or 
to two weeks then they could 
have finished it right the first 
time rather than come back and 
do things again."[A7-CPM] 
 
Quality issues not 
resolved "…this was 
projects that been kick for 
long time and it was 
comes in the end of 
relationship period within 
a year to get this thing 
going on, now the fact that 
it overrun the next 
[programme], the fact that 
the commitment needed to 
be made [and] delivered 
by that period, so there is 
the time pressure off what 
is the surface and...so we 
were very tight 
schedule...” [B2-CPM] 
Quality issues not immediately 
resolved “…In an ideal world 
you would, upon discovering an 
issue such as this, you would 
stop and you would find out 
what’s gone wrong and then put 
the counter-measures in place...” 
[C8-CONQM]  
benchmarking was effectively 
cut thus no quality intervention " 
...That project is another one 
where there was pressure put on 
the project to deliver it earlier. 
Sometimes it's operational… we 
were effectively cutting out 
some of the benchmarking for 
the programme, so some of the 
quality interventions we weren’t 
able to do, because the materials 
were literally being 
manufactured and then delivered 
direct to site and then hung the 
next day. "[C10-CQM] 
 
 Aware on the quality 
implication but no intervention 
made"… the person who made 
the decision knew the 
implications of that decision; 
the big issues [is]...being able 
to get sufficient productivity 
out of the night shift because 
you still need to hand the 
runway back at the end of the 
night shift [and] you can do a 
lot bigger area."[E13-CDM]  
 
 
 limited risk 
assessment  
   
 
 
Cost implication was not 
reflected to operations "But 
a lot of these decisions 
aren’t made by comparing 
things. You’ll get people 
saying, “Well, financially 
we can’t afford that. We 
need to make it £20 million 
cheaper”. I don’t think it 
necessarily goes back to the 
operation, “Well if we’re 
going to do £20 million of 
cost saving which £20 
million do you want to 
save?” I don’t think that 
necessarily happens as well 
as it could. And I think a lot 
Decision made only to get the 
minimum level of detail " ... 
it’s always about having 
enough time and resource to 
get to a point where you can 
make some conscious 
decisions…especially on a big 
project [with] lots of different 
people on it to influence it, 
everything gets pushed down 
the line until you get to an 
artificial decision point...and so 
whether we’re ready or not, and 
truly understand what we need 
or not…that decision needs to 
be made, and [so] it’s making 
sure that early enough we 
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of the time it’s because it is 
time consuming." [D15-
CAM] 
  
understand at least a minimum 
level of detail we need before 
we go to the next 
decision…"[E12-CATM]  
 
 Poor work 
programmed 
  Work programme made 
according to critical time to win 
the job“…if we produced a 
programme of works that went 
beyond their end date then we 
were unlikely to win that work. 
So… we would have been 
influenced by that end date. In a 
competitive world, you want to 
win the work… would you try 
and achieve something that you 
couldn’t to win that work?” [C8-
CONQM]  
 
Sub-contractors were influence 
to deliver project in short period 
"we literally had to do a 
competitive tender again 
everybody else to win that piece 
of work and that always took 
time. So that time was always 
taken out of the delivery time 
and the longer that process went 
on, the end date got nearer and it 
never moved, so I wouldn’t say 
it was particularly fast track but 
there would have been elements 
of, it’s got to be done by this, 
this time scale, can you achieve 
that? The programme, as part of 
our tender, was always critical." 
[C8-CONQM]  
 
To avoid penalty "…if we 
delivered the project late, we 
will pay a penalty back to the 
Limited time drive different 
procurement for  different 
organisation - “The 
procurement of the 
escalator was obviously 
driven by the time 
constraint that we need to 
build these things. Our 
maintenance team were 
calling ... And one of four 
key players in the lift and 
escalator market, their 
schedule didn't allow what 
we wanted from the 
manufacturing 
perspective."[D4-CPM] 
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airlines. And the airlines 
community refuse to sign the 
triggered office complete, 
because of the triggered issue, 
the issues we have with the 
transit system."[C3-CPM] 
 
 
how- 
Allocation of 
project 
budget 
 
Cost more 
than 
contracted 
cost 
Owner knew the project will 
cost more but COQ is expected 
to share with SC 
" they’d missed out half the 
things…we knew it was going 
to cost more than £77 million, 
so the final account included a 
number of elements where we 
added scope..." [A11-CCOM] 
 
Selecting the lowest contractor 
"...So, we always knew at the 
very beginning that whilst he’d 
bid £77 million we would be 
going into pain. We had 
numerous debates as to 
whether or not we were 
actually going to appoint him 
on the technical, but for various 
reasons we won’t necessarily 
go into that was the selection 
that was made..." [A11-
CCOM] 
 
 
 
 Contractor had no influence in 
early budget "Cost were only 
foreseen after. When we’re 
involved, it’s too late, so these 
discussions were had 
definitely..by [owner].” [C9-
CONPM]  
 
COQ failure was absorbed 
differently 
"... unless they're monitoring the 
cost that's following... most of 
these costs should be picked up 
by [supplier] really, because 
they've got the warranty.” [C10-
CQM]  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Uncertainty 
on long-term 
operational 
cost 
  
 
Contractor quality of work 
depends on owner budget to fix 
operational problem - "there was 
no money in our plan, so it was 
a budget constraint projects... 
so, we had to come with the right 
options so we put to [owner] a 
COQ was absorbed to fix 
the problem - "The 
£250,000 was unbudgeted 
so obviously, it’s money 
which we have to find. In 
effect when I say we have to 
find it we either have to try 
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number of option to fix the 
issue…" [C3-CPM] 
 
and get funding from 
elsewhere or we have to 
absorb that within the 
maintenance budget."[E13-
CDM]  
 
 Different 
project goal  
  Project managers were only 
concern on the functionality of 
the project but not cost related 
“the cost pressure, it’s very here 
and now, it really is, and we find 
it all the time, because the 
project managers… all they want 
is their job sheets through and 
they’re not interested in these 
bits really. .” [C9-CONPM] 
 
  
 Influence 
product 
selections  
   Suppliers were using un-
quality material to reduce 
cost "… they said,[the 
product] “These aren’t 
ours” even though they had 
labels. [so] that was done 
off the back of a cost-
saving initiative; [that] we 
bought a few and they’ve 
been nothing but 
trouble..."[D15-CAM] 
“Yeah, we can’t afford to 
change them, they’re too 
expensive…It’s a bit hard 
to swap out an asset 
because it’s bad when it’s 
somewhat usable but it’s 
not as good quality as the 
other ones."[D15-CAM]  
 
Accuracy of project cost is 
difficult to estimate 
" … I’m making decisions 
today about the potential costs 
of a project [that] might want to 
deliver in seven years’ time, 
without any knowledge of 
survey accurate costs. [E16-
CATM] 
 
Relationship 
with supply 
chain  
 
Lack of 
initiative on 
project 
improvement  
same designs and specifications 
were duplicated with 
appointing the same contractor 
“…then [they repeat] exactly, 
keeping the supplier to fix 
the issues by 
warranty"...but. pretty 
more contract less... well 
Supplier are confident with the 
suitability of the product as their 
main driver is to sell the product 
“I think they were quite 
  same designs and 
specifications were duplicated 
with appointing the same 
contractor 
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same design, same 
specification and then you get 
the same issues.” [A14-CPE] 
 
 
actually there is some sort 
of planning that we can 
keep the sub-supplier on 
board. 
[through]...warranty bases 
actually…so there is a 
basis at the back there 
were you actually should 
have." [B2-CPM] 
 
Contractor couldn’t deal 
with the complexity thus 
owner need involvement 
from specialist supplier  
"... the complexity of 
readiness thing is what we 
now have to work out and 
the thing that we need to 
get. So main contractor or 
integrator if you like, did 
that bit.. individual 
elements of that plant em, 
witness- ary acting they 
should have, and I think 
that’s where we have 
taken supplier to tell us 
so,to be very robust or 
there is in a specialist [to] 
all the quality 
treatment." [B2-CPM] 
 
 
confident that it would be 
suitable. They’re going to sell 
their product aren’t they? 
So…the main driver is to sell the 
product." [C8-CONQM]   
 
Difficult for contractor to 
interfere 
"… the supply chain was 
procured, they were the right, 
they were the approved installer 
of that product. They were… 
you know, they had their usual 
control plans in place. The 
method statements, risk 
assessment, everything was 
planned." [C8-CONQM]   
 
"… So [supplier] then came 
along and [owner] were very 
conscious that if [supplier] 
didn’t give it the nod... If the 
manufacturer said, ‘This isn’t 
installed correctly,’ my 12 year 
warranty doesn’t stand, so we’re 
all stuffed.” [C9-CONPM] 
 
“...Because of this relationship 
that [owner] had with [supplier], 
they were called in…they should 
be at our end of the chain ..[to 
give] us advice and helping us to 
do the job. [but]..came in almost 
like a bullying…and it shows 
you that the choice was made on 
[owner] side and we were just 
the installer. " [C9-CONPM] 
 
"(owner) don’t try to do that and 
they just nominate, with a small 
n, as in, ‘Here’s the product we 
 “…they have used that method 
on Sierra C taxiway where they 
did the crack treatment first, 
and it seems to have proved 
relatively successful….Yes, 
same supplier, So, that’s the 
kind of cracks on northern and 
southern. Then you’ve got…old 
joints underneath runway cause 
cracking due to no treatment – 
so that’s what we talked 
about.”[E13-CDM]  
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want,’ effectively, in the tender 
documents, and then you are 
forced, by the virtue of the fact 
that that’s the product they want, 
to buy it from a certain company 
or … certain place….but we 
installed it through the hole in 
the grass in between the runways 
.”[C9-CONPM] 
 
 
 Lack of 
shared risk 
and 
responsibility  
"... it’s costing 
them[contractor] quite a lot of 
money to rectify a defect for 
which I’m not really holding...a 
few hundred thousand is not 
going to cover their cost for 
doing up all of this…"[A11-
CCOM] 
 
reducing responsibility on 
owner " So, we select 
contractors who have got good 
quality processes so that they 
can actually then self-certify to 
say they’ve done the work in 
the right way; rather than 
having a really large project 
management structure. We’ve 
tried to be more of a owner 
than an active project 
manager." [A11-CCOM] 
 
 
supplier is responsible to 
complete the work"… it is 
easy to get someone 
nominated supplier but 
then you are taken lot of 
advantages [to] come to 
them and then made them 
their responsibility to 
make sure it work." [B2-
CPM] 
“They were an unknown 
supplier to us, so they 
were new, we hadn’t 
used them before. We did 
all the usual checks and 
balances, so they have to 
go through our supply 
chain evaluation to even 
become a supplier. So 
financial, safety, quality, 
all the usual stuff; so they 
became approved… then 
we ensured we had their 
control plans for that 
installation… their 
inspection test process 
and such like.[but] I think 
what they probably didn’t 
do was follow that 
process rigorously during 
Risk sharing is the key to a 
successful project  
"that was a key, critical piece of 
work that was very heavily 
planned. I think there was at 
least [more than] one stand-back 
review…where an independent 
came in and checked all the 
plans and preparation for that 
piece of work. It was critical 
because they had to open a hole 
in the runway and drop it in and 
close it before the first aircraft 
landed in the morning…there 
was a lot of planning work went 
into that and it was deemed to be 
very successful..." [C8-
CONQM]   
 
drove different behavior in 
critically plan the work “The 
whole driver around that piece 
of work was the risk. It was the 
risk to not doing it properly. We 
could not close the runway and 
the only way to access that… to 
do that piece of work was to put 
a hole in the runway. So that risk 
drove all the behaviours to plan 
this piece of work to the nth 
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the installation.” [C8-
CONQM]   
 
degree.” [C8-CONQM]   
 
 
 Different 
project goal 
lead to 
different 
quality 
expectation 
Uncertain on contractor project 
goal "Because a contractor has 
got two choices: ...either to 
maximise profit or tries to do 
the right thing, still make a 
profit by actually doing things 
effectively and efficiently, 
recognising that his reputation 
and the opportunity to work 
with a owner comes back again 
and again and again…So, 
selection of the right contractor 
becomes absolutely important 
if you’re going to go down a 
self-certification route. And 
that both in terms of design and 
in terms of construction." 
[A11-CCOM] 
 
Un-alignment of capabilities 
between multi-organisational 
can still cause quality problem. 
"… we are selecting an 
organisation because …they’ve 
got the right people and they’ve 
got the right skills…[but] they 
could still put the wrong person 
on the project. We’ve got the 
opportunity then to swap out… 
if it’s not the right individual. 
But you’re relying on people to 
build projects. It’s the usual 
kind of thing: the bad apple 
spoils the whole barrel." [A11-
CCOM] 
 
 
Suppliers only sell the 
product " … the supplier 
[has left]. But it hasn’t 
been completed. The work 
is not finished. There’s a 
dispute over who’s paying 
to get the auger done…" 
[B18-CAMAIN] 
 
 
Owner is expecting contractor to 
take the responsibility to fix QI 
to keep good relationship 
“I don’t imagine they would 
have charged less for any of that 
on the basis that it was instigated 
by themselves…their behaviour 
has been very good…if they'd 
turned their back and said, we 
can't afford that, and walk away, 
then clearly they wouldn’t be 
getting any more business from 
us.” [C10-CQM] 
 
Contractor want more future 
project thus follows owner 
preferred supplier “…We needed 
the warranty for more work to 
go up the chain.. so it was really 
important that we got 
[supplier]down." [C9-CONPM] 
 
 Owner is expecting contractor 
to take the responsibility to fix 
QI to keep good relationship 
“…it depends if we’ve got an 
existing relationship with them 
[contractor]. A lot of our key 
suppliers are still here… 
basically want to be here in the 
future because of the amount of 
work which is coming out ... 
So, yes we’d look at a starter 
for ten to always go back to the 
contractor who was responsible 
for building it…we’ve got a 
number of issues there which 
relate back to construction 
quality...” [E13-CDM]  
 
Demanding Need new  “… you’re left with pretty   “…we installed … LED 
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regulations  
 
technology clear liquid coming 
out..that was in the design. 
[or] we didn’t design it in 
the way we should 
have…“[B18-CAMAIN] 
 
"So we should have gone 
live probably about 2 
years ago (2014). And it 
was ready, but…[not] 
fully operation readiness 
... the early trials and to 
get in operation using 
it...isn’t getting in 
expect[so] this system that 
take the soil out... didn’t 
have the level of its 
workability.." [B2-CPM] 
 
 
 
runway lights, previously they 
were all tungsten, sitting on 
both of the runways; …, 
effectively every tungsten 
lamp, due to the life of the 
tungsten lamp, needed to be 
changed every 6 months, so 
we’ve now stuck LEDs in the 
whole thing, and they last for 
10 years. So huge maintenance 
reduction, and operational cost 
of changing fittings 
continuously…”[E16-CATM] 
 
 Non-
compliance to 
regulation 
 "Because the drivers pop 
landside, to a landside 
sweeper tip, they then 
have to abide by driving 
rules and regulations, and 
we have to have an 
operator license to cover 
that. Which means they 
must follow certain rules 
and regulations and 
compliance.” [B18-
CAMAIN] 
 
 "If we do not do this, we 
will remain non-
compliant…can stop us 
from operating. That’s the 
ultimate penalty to us. 
They can fine us millions. 
I think it’s an unlimited 
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fine." [B18-CAMAIN] 
 
 “…We want you to 
exceed our levels and give 
us a better quality of water 
going into the river beds, 
into the system”… there’s 
a reputational part there if 
we can deliver it… We’re 
doing something for the 
environment. But if we 
don’t do it, take away our 
licence to operate.” [B18-
CAMAIN]  
 
 
 Insufficient 
technical 
knowledge  
 "… it wasn’t very 
voluntary tip process and 
therefore they need more 
intervention of the 
engineering team...there is 
different detergent been 
used normally and kind of 
give impact on 
operation..." [B2-CPM] 
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Triggered 
factor of 
failure 
Implications 
on 
operational 
capability 
Project A Project B Project C Project D Project E 
Understanding 
on real life 
operational 
technicalities 
and 
constraints in 
design to 
owner 
specification 
Complex 
design not 
buildable  
detail design was only look 
good on the drawing but was 
not buildable by the builder  
“… these are construction 
related issues, quality control 
on site…it will be design 
related in terms of the 
detailing. Sometimes you may 
get such a detail come back 
from the designer which looks 
good, but actually when you 
give it to somebody to try and 
build out on the site you can’t 
build what they’ve drawn." 
[A14-CPE] 
"No. It’s not a surprise at 
all. I knew about that. We 
said that from day one. 
That silt would always be 
a problem. And they 
[supplier] assured us silt 
would not be a problem. 
But we’ve always known 
it’s going to be a 
problem.” [B18-
CAMAIN] 
 
Designer are not getting the 
same learning  
" so [owner] make the decisions 
but the designer develops it and 
says, ‘What do you think?’ And 
they struggle, because they 
don’t deliver the job, they don’t 
get the learning we’re 
getting." [C9-CONPM] 
 
Different perception on quality 
"... to an architect who likes 
design; “this is horrific, you 
need music, you need pictures.. 
you need..” so this is the answer 
when your conversation around, 
what is the appropriate level of 
fixtures and fittings for the 
walkway. So we looked at 
number of options...." [C3-
CPM] 
 
 Operational issues was not 
consulted with the early 
involve designer/ making more 
design complex 
"so at that time there wasn’t a 
designer on board" "we were 
doing design, then we gave the 
design to a supplier to deliver. 
."[E12-CATM]  
 
Operational team had to trust 
on the design as they not 
involve early " it wasn’t 
expected by us, engine 
operation definitely didn’t 
expect that they were going to 
get a new runway with cracks 
in it and the designers 
assumption was that it 
wouldn’t happen…"[E6-CPM] 
 
Design not 
reflecting 
operation 
technical 
and 
environment.  
 
 The system was not 
designed in the way it 
should have to deal with 
the waste 
“…you’re left with pretty 
clear liquid coming out. 
So maybe that was in the 
design ... [or] we didn’t 
design it in the way we 
should have. We should 
have designed it into an 
interceptor way of dealing 
with waste. “[B18-
CAMAIN] 
 
Designer was being specified on 
product selection thus has no 
opportunity to select a product 
"... [owner] has own design 
standards, [so] they specify that 
it is, what it needs to look like, 
and also products that you’re not 
allowed to use… If that 
information was available 
within those standards then a 
designer wouldn’t select it. So 
all the time you’ve got a set of 
parameters for a designer, he 
has the opportunity to select that 
product. It may not be the best 
 “…so this wasn’t designed by 
[owner] in our team, this was 
done by an external 
company...” [E12-CATM] 
Scope not suitable to 
operations condition 
increases maintenance cost 
"it’s become an ongoing 
maintenance issue with 
attached costs, because of, in 
this case, not reduced scope, 
but not expanding the scope to 
suit the ground conditions that 
we found during the 
works." [E16-CATM] 
 278 
product but he has the 
opportunity to select it." [C8-
CONQM] 
 
the benefits of the hindsight not 
realis e  
"I'd imagine it would have been 
heavily design-related in terms 
of aesthetics. I imagine it would 
have been aesthetics over 
function, because all of us have 
said numerous times that with 
the benefit of hindsight I think 
all of us would have just 
polished the floor." [C10-
CQM]  
 
 
Designer does not reflex on the 
operational impact 
"...it was a perception by the 
designers that at the time that 
we didn’t need to do anything 
to treat those joints...because 
we we’re just doing a thin layer 
on the top but … those joints 
have reflected upon and cause 
cracking in the surface 
…means the operation in there 
[will have] more maintenance 
than what they had originally 
planned to and we had a brand 
new runway." [E6-CPM] 
 
 
 
Operational 
issues not 
resolved/ 
hindered 
quality 
control  
Quality control is extremely 
difficult when you have a 
complex design which then 
poorly detailed and constructed  
 "The problem is the quality 
control to make sure, and 
making something watertight is 
extremely difficult... the issue 
there was that whether it be 
part of a design decision in 
terms of having so many holes 
and then poorly detailed and 
constructed sealing of those 
penetrations resulted in an 
issue where we’ve got a lot of 
water coming through the top 
slab into the underlying car 
park... that has multiple 
impacts.”[A14-CPE] 
 
" I think we had four or 
five different ideas out 
there who almost as 
reversal basis system 
[and]..., it has options, and 
[the supplier]and the 
designer took that and 
develop[to] skim design... 
variable solution was 
proposed but not 
worked…” [B2-CPM] 
 
 
  Additional work has to be done  
"as an indirect impact of poor 
design, poor planning, poor 
delivery, because we say a 
project is going to take one 
month to build, in effect, it 
takes six months to build. Well, 
one, it will cost more because 
you’re spending more time on 
it, but, two, even from a 
smaller level, there’s a 
significant amount of re-work 
that’s going on, so in terms of 
the labour that it takes to do all 
the planning, the approvals, the 
design...will be a period where 
we’ve then got to do additional 
work... purely because it hasn’t 
been delivered on time to 
plan." [E16-CATM] 
 
Trusting on 
contractor 
Poor quality 
performance  
work was done regardless of 
the correct method or quality 
“So we’ve always known 
that would be an issue. 
"What didn’t go so well was the 
application of that product. So… 
  
Owner has limited project 
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expertise and 
resources  
 acquire 
"... because it was so late in the 
programme, they had pretty 
much laid the blacktop in the 
last week before [project].. 
opened, and it really was a bit 
of a stereotypical chuck-it-
down regardless of what’s the 
quality of the base layers … of 
manholes and whether they’d 
been done correctly or not; and 
the quality… thrown down in 
was just dire… an issues with 
poor quality of construction; 
there’s numerous photographs 
in documented inspections… 
it’s not going to be properly 
constructed…" [A1-[CPM] 
 
 
Was not done according to 
designer specified detail 
"In theory if it had been done 
to the detail provided by the 
designer it should have worked 
but it wasn’t done, so the 
waterproofing detail for 
instance wasn’t as the designer 
specified. It should have been 
the top hand which would have 
stop the water, the water 
wouldn’t have been collected 
in the drainage system. No top 
hat detail so the water went 
down the hole." [A7-CPM] 
 
Contractor did not implement 
what is on the design  
"... no they held their hands 
down because the survey 
covered exactly what was 
Because that was an issue 
we faced…” [B18-
CMAIN] 
 
"... the complexity of 
readiness thing is what we 
now have to work out and 
the thing that we need to 
get. So main contractor or 
integrator if you like, did 
that bit.. individual 
elements of that plant em, 
witness- ary acting they 
should have, and I think 
that’s where we have 
taken supplier to tell us 
so,to be very robust or 
there is in a specialist [to] 
all the quality 
treatment." [B2-CPM] 
 
and I’m not sure… not entirely 
sure what the influences on that 
were. It may have been the short 
working window and the fact 
that things were trafficked the 
very next day because it was a 
vinyl floor at the end of the day. 
But we found that there were 
issues with workmanship, so the 
application of that wasn’t the 
best."[C8-CONQM]  
 
"I always had that feeling that it 
would gradually start to 
deteriorate over time, because 
the original installation, I was 
never very comfortable with the 
quality of the installation really. 
The corners were starting to lift 
and the edges were starting to 
lift quite early on in areas that 
were not impacted by the 
escalator delivery. So that told 
me that there was a problem 
with the installation really rather 
than just the external issues." 
[C10-CQM] 
 
 "That was in relation to I think 
poor quality install, water 
ingress or the escalator 
issues." [C10-CQM] 
 
engineers who attend site 
because of self-certify , owners 
are relying on contractor  
" With projects they’re self-
certified and managed by the 
contractor, so the DI, delivery 
integrators…[owner] do have 
project engineers who attend 
site to kind of keep a bit of a 
watching brief, but quite 
limited in terms of how many 
we have and what their role is 
and whether they can be 
everywhere at the same time. 
But in theory quality control 
and sign off sits with the DI 
under the contract which we 
have in place. They self-certify 
their work so we rely on them. 
"[E13-CDM]  
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wrong and all of the things that 
went through, when you at 
what the fault was against the 
design, the design was clear 
and the intent was what they 
should have done was right 
problem is they didn’t 
implement what should had 
been or what on the design." 
[A7-CPM] 
 
the right process was not 
follow during the construction 
process  
“…they knew that potentially 
there would be waterproofing 
there was a solution about how 
you do the waterproofing that 
should have mitigated that, but 
when we came to build it we 
didn’t follow that process.” 
[A14-CPE] 
 
 
 Different 
project goal 
lead to 
different 
quality 
expectation 
Lack of quality in 
implementation, based on 
document "... if the delivery 
integrators are educated in 
getting sufficient resource 
probably, or knowing their 
responsibilities in actually 
undertaking that role, that’s 
what they should be doing, the 
(contractor) quality manager 
was just dire. It was just 
paperwork and process based 
and spending their week 
putting trackers 
together…[they should].. go 
outside and have a look at 
something …they’d be too 
As the project become 
more difficult, some 
elements have been de-
scope when the early 
purposed of the facility 
then become unclear 
"… As they started 
coming through the 
project and got into the 
too difficult…We’re 
trying de-scope them. The 
purpose of building the 
facility was because in a 
hot summers day, [it] will 
vent a lot of fuel on the 
taxi ways. And we would 
go behind and sweep up 
Contractor could not interfere 
because the supply chain was 
procured and the supplier was 
specified "Hindsight is a 
wonderful thing and maybe if 
that had been thought through 
better we would have put our 
hand up and said, this isn’t the 
best solution for that location. 
The fact that there was … you 
know, the supply chain were 
procured, they were the right, 
they were the approved installer 
of that product. They were… 
you know, they had their usual 
control plans in place. The 
method statements, risk 
"I mean, I have the two-
week period after we went 
live. We had a third party 
called out this. So, the 
process been, if there’s a 
fault with asset, they called 
the maintenance guy... if 
this guys couldn't solve and 
actually was different 
brand… However, because 
they are all the same, but if 
that was a brand they 
couldn't sort it out,... they 
will call Thyssen and I 
have Thyssen on standby 
for 24/7 for fortnight"[D4-
CPM] 
 “Quite often it will be maybe 
the project engineers who work 
for Heathrow who may come 
across the issue. They may be 
checking the quality of the 
work on site and pick up 
something which they’re not 
happy with...review some of 
the test data, whether that be 
for concrete acute strengths and 
things like that which they’ll 
check, and if that comes back 
with low results then ... look to 
pick up those issues with the 
DI...So, quite often a lot of the 
issues get flagged up more by 
owner’s project engineers than 
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happy to just sit in the office in 
admin roles…"[A1-CPM] 
 
 
Builders build everywhere and 
they have limited knowledge 
on airport operation; pm’s are 
heavily relies on specialist 
"So I was the Delivery Project 
Manager…] [who knew] 
...operations need, ... what to 
build, because obviously 
you’ve got builders and 
builders build anywhere and 
they’ve got a limited 
knowledge and understanding 
of airport operations, as do 
project managers as a whole as 
well, when you’re working on 
an airport you do heavily rely 
on the specialists and 
operational team to tell you 
what’s acceptable and what’s 
not acceptable..." [A1-CPM]  
 
same designs and 
specifications were duplicated 
with appointing the same 
contractor thus repeating the 
problem 
“Everybody forgets or they 
say,”We’ll do another, oh well 
we’ve got a design already for 
a multi-storey car park. You 
like [multi-story car park], 
we’ll give you another… or 
you like multi-storey car park 
5…then [they repeat] exactly, 
same design, same 
specification and then you get 
the same issues.”[A14-CPE] 
the fuel and suck the fuel 
up… Hence a lot of 
disposal costs for the 
product." [B18-
CAMAIN] 
 
The benefit of the 
treatment plant has cause 
a neglecting in terms of it 
operational side of using 
the system  
“And I think at some 
point we’ve got carried 
away with the benefits of 
a treatment plant, 
neglecting the operational 
side of using the treatment 
plant. And I think there 
was that shift of focus." 
[B18-CAMAIN] 
 
assessment, everything was 
planned." [C8-CONQM]  
 
Quality manager was not 
involved during the risk 
review instead was done by 
other team “…we have our 
own team as you know, I have 
my own team and we do our 
own risk-based discussions on 
projects and where we think we 
need to pay attention. [but] 
when there is the risk review of 
the project I’m never involved.” 
[C8-CONQM]  
 
Quality was the least 
important in the pecking 
order “We’re forth on the 
pecking order of importance… 
we’ll we’re probably fifth now 
actually. Safety, programme, 
cost, environmental, 
quality…”[C8-CONQM]  
 
"People don’t like change, they 
don’t like different products. It’s 
very hard to combat because 
they were involved early and the 
guys that came early were the 
ones who wanted to be 
involved, but the ones later were 
the ones who didn’t want to be 
and they’re the ones that caused 
the issues.”[C9-CONPM] 
 
Quality manager was not 
involved during the risk 
review instead was done by 
other team “…we have our 
own team as you know, I have 
 
project team are de-
scoping the project 
according to their values 
and project aim without 
collaborative decision -" 
“The problem is when 
you’ve got a company with 
departments [they]... are 
making decisions for their 
own goals, not for the 
overall...[when]they’re 
supposed to tie up with the 
top…”[D15-CAM] 
 
maybe the DI’s quality 
managers...which is sad 
because it should be flagged up 
by the DI's and self-certified." 
[E13-CDM]  
 
Failure is not a major issue 
although it is not to the 
standard and quality 
because, as it can still be use 
"At the end of the day it's not a 
major issue; it's not to the 
standard or quality that would 
be expected, and actually it 
should be nice and flat, and 
there is a potential for a 
reduction in the life of that 
area, and that piece of asphalt. 
But actually at the moment it's 
not breaking up, its still fine, it 
just looks a bit funny, and you 
wouldn’t notice it unless you 
were in a vehicle or got out, 
which not many people do, so 
we don’t have to worry about 
that."[E5-CPM]  
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 "We at Heathrow have a 
policy, process, whatever you 
want to call it, whereby it’s 
very much more self-
certification by our first tier 
contractors. So, we select 
contractors who have got good 
quality processes so that they 
can actually then self-certify to 
say they’ve done the work in 
the right way; rather than 
having a really large project 
management structure. We’ve 
tried to be more of a owner 
than an active project 
manager." [A11-CCOM] 
my own team and we do our 
own risk-based discussions on 
projects and where we think we 
need to pay attention. [but] 
when there is the risk review of 
the project I’m never involved.” 
[C8-CONQM]  
 
Difficult to manage quality as 
it Involved different expertise 
“…because the way things cut 
up was different contractors 
doing different parts… the 
walkways weren’t one single 
person. It was numerous, what it 
meant was this that the urgency 
of the project to get approval 
and go through…” [ C4CPM]  
 
 Unresolved 
quality 
issues 
"... then obviously the 
maintenance because while this 
weren't wired correctly the 
maintenance again you can't do 
proper maintenance on them 
because they did not operate as 
they should have done." [A7-
CPM] 
 
 “Water going through and 
getting into the service trades 
which carry all of the electrical 
cables, the comms cables, 
starts to corrode, so then you 
have issues in terms of having 
to maintain that on a much 
shorter lifespan because they 
weren’t designed to have water 
dripping or sitting in it. So, 
there are issues in terms of that 
[also] may have issues in terms 
of failure in the electrical or 
“It’s not a surprise at all. I 
knew about that. We said 
that from day one. That 
silt would always be a 
problem. And they 
assured us silt would not 
be a problem. But we’ve 
always known it’s going 
to be a problem.” [B18-
CMAIN]  
 
 "...When they provided a 
different product…engineers 
had to go through a training 
exercise …providing detailed 
training, not just 
familiarisation… it’s a different 
conveyer altogether, you’ve got 
to show them. It’s like having a 
new car and talking to a 
mechanic, he’s got to learn how 
to maintain it."[C9-CONPM] 
 
Limited time to develop 
proper relationship in 
proactive solutions 
"...[we] offered him early 
site of the escalator when it 
came to the building. Site 
has been connected 
together, ready for been 
covered up with the rest of 
the building worked. And 
once it was uncovered, 
frequent site visits to watch 
it be built and 
commissioned, tested… 
They were very 
forthcoming, attending 
those sessions... that 
relationship between those 
two companies would just 
kind of develop and they 
would work hand in hand 
with each other, but they 
“We haven’t fixed it, it's still 
there. We were supposed to, 
we haven’t gone back to it yet. 
We’re waiting for operations to 
kick up a fuss. We haven’t 
really got the facility to be able 
to go and fix it now so it’s a bit 
late for it.” [E16-CATM 
 
 “ it can have a real cost on 
them, and ... I think was never 
really fully understood ... in 
terms of grooves Marshall 
Asphalt, because the grooves 
themselves obviously caused 
quite a lot of rubber to be 
stripped off the tyres and it is 
amazing how much it builds up 
in quick time.[and]... because 
you’ve just put the surface in, 
the use of high pressure 
water...takes away all the 
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comms cables because of the 
water..." [A14-CPE] 
 "... we’re going back to 
projects to try and get that 
resolved. But again it’s what 
you can see, and with self-
certification there’s a lot which 
we can’t see. " [A14-CPE] 
 
didn't quite do that."[ D4-
CPM] 
 
Contractor would like to 
have the ability to stop the 
project when its fail to 
investigate, fix and thus 
learning from on site  
“I would have liked to have 
seen the project have the 
ability to stop when the 
problem first occurred and 
fully investigate why it’s 
happened. I would also like 
the team to have had the 
ability to… influence that 
product selection.to try and 
eliminate that. And learning 
from on site, "[C8-
CONQM] 
 
fines... you end up with a much 
more open texture much earlier 
... so it overall deteriorates the 
surface..." [E12-CATM] 
 
Technical 
competency 
on-site 
operations  
Need new 
technology 
 
 earlier funding for 
research and do prototype 
would cost as much as 
developing the system 
now  
“ Yeah.. so that first stage, 
the option stage , if we did 
that in a longer period of 
time you would have 
probably throw each of 
those in them against 
budget and on time. So to 
actually go fund research 
and do prototype would 
have been quite a 
challenged I 
think..[because] for this 
things coming out 
committing to the 
company, you could have 
  The issues were fixed by the 
maintenance team until it get 
apparent then only it will get 
people form development to 
look and develop it  
“… from a maintenance 
perspective, we’ve done an 
initial repair because it looked 
like it was failing, and then it 
became apparent that there was 
a bigger issue there. So, with 
that I then went back to the 
project manager and said, “I 
think we have an issue, I think 
it’s a build issue…“[E13-
CDM] 
 
 284 
paid that money and 
develop a prototype that is 
as much as develop now 
the thing." [B2-CPM] 
 
 Non-
compliance 
to 
regulation 
Technical expert expertise was 
pale into insignificant due to 
critical time of completion  
"… so you’d have a technical 
engineer come out and look at 
the blacktop, and you’d have a 
technical engineer who’d come 
out and look at the drainage; 
whereas a field engineer, or 
clerk of works role, tends to be 
a bit more of a master of all; 
probably where work fell down 
a little bit was where the 
technical experts or technical 
team would critique something, 
but because of the nature of the 
schedule, would almost pale 
into insignificance because 
“yeah whatever we’ve got to 
get it done.” [A1-CPM]  
Small working window when 
doing construction within live 
operation 
 "because when you’re building 
an (Project A) next to a 
taxiway and you want to put a 
crane up, [make sure]... line of 
sight isn’t interfering with 
actual operations,[so]... lot of 
considerations there, with the 
piling rig in particular, that’s 
quite challenging,... they do 
have issues with them, and you 
have to look at the probability 
of a piling rig going over, 
[which]...you could only pile 
fully operational readiness 
is not achievable because 
the system to take the soil 
out is not workable  
"So we should have gone 
live probably about 2 
years ago (2014). And it 
was ready, but..fully 
operation readiness ... the 
early trials and to get in 
operation using it...isn’t 
getting in expect[so] this 
system that take the soil 
out... didn’t have the level 
of its workability.." [B2-
CPM] 
  the resurfacing the runway 
does not giving what operation 
is expecting as it had more 
problem  
"So that obviously did improve 
it, but obviously what we 
expected and what we hoped is 
that once the resurfacing had 
been done, we’d have a really 
nice runway that was giving us 
really good surface friction, but 
in actual fact, we still had big 
problems because of this issue. 
."[E12-CATM] 
 
the new material has looked a 
lot worse than it was 
 "and they’re two slightly 
different problems, because 
obviously one was on the new 
material and one was on 
existing material, and it’s just 
the fact that new material 
alongside, it suddenly showed 
up that actually it looked a lot 
worse than what it was, and 
especially in certain 
lights"[E12-CATM 
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within certain working 
windows...as you know you do 
get catastrophic failure..." [A1-
CPM] 
 
 Insufficient 
technical 
knowledge 
Technical expert expertise was 
pale into insignificant "we had 
[numbers of] technical team 
[who] come out and review 
things ; whereas a field 
engineer, or clerk of works 
role, tends to be a bit more of a 
master of all; …the technical 
team would critique something, 
but because of the nature of the 
schedule, would almost pale 
into insignificance because 
“yeah whatever we’ve got to 
get it done.” [A1-CPM]  
 
Operational issues was not 
understood by the project team 
"I don’t know whether it was a 
design issue or whether or not 
it was a workmanship issue... 
I’m assuming it was only 
picked up at the very end of the 
actual project. It wasn’t picked 
up at the time because if it had 
been picked up …[contractor] 
or [owner] would have said, 
“Hold on a second, we’ve got a 
problem. You need to sort out 
the waterproofing now rather 
than having to spend all of the 
money to actually strip 
everything off and come back 
and redo it”. [A11-CCOM] 
 
 
" In the fact it’s been leaking 
 “But what is interesting is 
we don’t do the design 
ourselves. In anything. 
We didn’t do the design 
not even in [other] 
project. However, this 
particular one is so 
different from what we do 
that we have no expertise 
at all. Now that’s where 
I’m thinking, if we were 
to start again, I cannot see 
what we could have done 
differently.” [B18-
CAMAIN] 
 
Need other capability to 
innovate “Where actually 
you can have a research 
team to actually create 
something better. And you 
can be the first airport… 
imagine if you can 
manage this. You can 
have a better reputation on 
sustainability airport or 
whatever you’re 
called…Definitely… but 
the reason why, I think, 
we don’t do the first off is 
because it’s so difficult. 
“[B18-CAMAIN] 
 
Innovation with owner are not 
wide-ranging and only if 
contractor was involved early 
they probably get the 
opportunity to influence but it 
would be fortunate if it is to be 
accepted 
"… the opportunities for 
innovation within (owner)... are 
not that wide-ranging. There are 
some [but] you need to be 
involved early as the project 
team..[where] had drawings 
developed, a scheme designed, 
specification, floor chosen, 
conveyor provider chosen. Your 
opportunities are limited, unless 
the provider turns up like this, 
and says, ‘Actually, we’ve 
thought about it and we can do 
this for you,’ but you’re not 
buying that as a service, you’re 
fortunate if it comes along, 
almost..[and] provide ‘Actually, 
if you looked at like this,’ and 
you can give someone an 
opportunity to give you a better 
answer.”[C9-CONPM] 
 
Technical knowledge was 
not put in early 
considerations “… I asked 
for everything I could think 
of and got everything that I 
could think of, told 
everyone that was of 
importance what I thought 
and why. And then 
afterwards they almost 
acted like that didn’t 
happen, which I found a bit 
disappointing to be honest. 
Then they start questioning 
and ..then when it goes 
wrong [they’re] like, ‘that 
didn’t happen’”. ."[D15-
CAM] 
 
Operation are the one who 
suffering at the end to have 
to operate in unfinished 
building site 
 "And the ones that suffer 
are us in the operation that 
have got all this temporary 
stuff everywhere, people 
trying to operate around, 
essentially, a worksite 
that’s never quite finished. 
So that’s the end-game, the 
bit that affects us, is having 
to work around or operate 
in and around building sites 
and unfinished works. 
."[D15-CAM] 
Different knowledge lead to 
different expectations 
“Otherwise there’s no 
knowledge...[say] we’ve 
actually set the scope to say 
want a widget, so we’ve asked 
for a widget and we ideally get 
a widget at the end. Sometimes 
people say, ‘We’re going to 
deliver you something,’ and it 
might be a different 
department, so we like to to say 
that we can influence the 
design to make sure that if 
they’re going to give us a 
widget, it is compliant with our 
airfield 
requirements...[where]they 
delivered you something but 
have not realised the benefits." 
[E16-CATM] 
 
Owner has limited project 
engineers who attend site 
because of self-certify , owners 
are relying on contractor " 
With projects they’re self-
certified and managed by the 
contractor, so the DI, delivery 
integrators…[owner] do have 
project engineers who attend 
site to kind of keep a bit of a 
watching brief, but quite 
limited in terms of how many 
we have and what their role is 
and whether they can be 
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so the previous guy tried to 
resolve it in a number of ways 
but we never really got to the 
cause of the issues.” [A7-
CPM] 
 
 
People want a binary 
answer in short time to 
fixing the issue and thus 
disregard the intelligence 
behind the work; led to 
non-appreciation of quality  
" Yeah, and almost want 
binary black and white 
answers. And people don’t 
appreciate that sometimes 
you’ve got trial and error, 
you can’t necessarily 
simulate faults. It’s easy 
saying, “Why did item x 
stop working for three 
hours and cause all this 
disruption?” if you can’t 
simulate that and prove 
why – people want to hear 
a binary answer within a 
couple of hours of what it 
was, and you can’t do that. 
If you’re being honest 
that’s not always possible. 
People don’t appreciate 
that; they put it down to, 
“Oh bloody engineers um-
ing and ah-ing, can’t give 
me a straight answer”. 
Well, that’s not true. I think 
there’s not an appreciation 
for quality of many things 
these days. People just kind 
of want action. They 
disregard the intelligence 
behind it I think." [D15-
CAM] 
everywhere at the same time. 
But in theory quality control 
and sign off sits with the DI 
under the contract which we 
have in place. They self-certify 
their work so we rely on them. 
"[E13-CDM]  
 
 
Owner was only expecting to 
relies on contractor to deliver 
the project but it can’t be do 
without having the knowledge 
on it and thus becoming more 
contractor resource to ensure 
contractor are delivering 
towards the regulations 
"Yeah, exactly, so we expect to 
basically just give them our 
problem and they come up with 
a great solution for us at a great 
cost and just deliver it without 
us even knowing that they’re 
there. That’s kind of our 
expectation. And my 
experience of it is they say, 
‘You can’t just give us all this 
stuff and no knowledge.’ So 
where I find myself now is 
more and more in that world 
where I’m constantly being 
asked for, ‘Who do I need to 
speak to for this and what 
would I need to do about that?’ 
so you end up being more of a 
contractor resource...where I’m 
trying to make sure they’re 
delivering from an ... a 
regulation point of view."[E12-
CATM] 
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Triggered 
factor of 
failure 
Implications on 
owner capability 
to operate  
Project A Project B Project C Project D Project E 
Technical 
aspect for 
operations 
Technical 
knowledge not 
transferred 
 
 
 
 
PM took over the project 
because it was not in a good 
state 
 " I took it over because it 
wasn't in a good state, it was 
behind program and there 
were some quality issues." 
"All of the things where 
people has taken their bonuses 
and sort of run for the hills 
and said it were all 
working…" [A7-CPM] 
 
 
 
 
 
Involved many different 
PM“…You know what? It’s 
quicker telling me who the 
PM wasn’t… There’s been 
a lot of PMs.” [B18-
CMAIN] 
People left but the 
understanding was not 
transferred “…so my 
involvement was quite early 
on, in terms of 
understanding what the 
actual scope of the work 
was going to be, so some 
early workshops. The guy’s 
left now and I can’t recall 
his name off the top of my 
head…” 
people keep on changing 
thus difficult to find a way 
in reducing cost "...they are 
people changing and we 
also got different barn on 
that where opex is really 
under sweetening. And 
having to find ways of 
reducing … is you know 
can’t be defined,.." [B2-
CPM] 
Attention is needed 
elsewhere “So for the last 
year, year and a half, [other 
PM] has been looking after 
the sweeper tip 
project…Because I’ve 
changed to a different role. 
Operations need to know how to 
maintain the asset "...When they 
provided a different 
product…engineers had to go 
through a training exercise [to] 
not just familiarisation… it’s a 
different conveyer altogether, 
you’ve got to show them…he’s 
got to learn how to maintain 
it."[C9-CONPM] 
 
Contractor experience does not 
take as learning 
“Yeah, and I’ve seen it all too 
frequently, when we are the 
guardians – and it sounds like 
we’re banging our own drums – 
but we are your guardians of this 
stuff, because we’re saying, 
‘We’ve seen it before, and if you 
do that, we’ll be back in six 
years to do it again.’ And they 
go, ‘Oh, well, we can’t afford ...’ 
It’s a hard decision to make. 
And then sometimes we get 
railroaded and get told, ‘You’re 
just a builder and do what we 
tell you. Here’s the price, go and 
do it.’ But if you come and say, 
‘I told you so,’ it doesn’t help, 
and, in fact, it annoys 
people.”[C9-CONPM] 
 
Blame culture to avoid failure 
responsibility 
“But I think that’s a bit of a 
blame culture thing…But 
denying things for other 
reasons I don’t personally think 
is very acceptable." the actual 
impact of that was relatively 
little.” [D15-CAM] 
 
putting the right requirement 
in the contract with operation 
involvement  
"... that was some good 
learning where they said to me, 
“What did you want last time 
you didn’t get because they 
were like that in contracts 
where we have to give it to you 
in contract?” So, I put a long 
list of requirements in their 
contract as asset manager, and 
we started the process of going 
through the product selection. 
And with my knowledge of 
what I’d seen and some other 
people we had factory visits, 
site acceptance tests, and we 
made the best decision we 
could.” [D15-CAM] 
 
Operational consideration was 
not consider but OI was 
questioned back  
“… I asked for everything I 
could think of and got 
PM not involved in early 
decision “I joined [when] 
the runway project was 
already basically in the 
process of being kicked off 
so all pre-g3 pre work was 
being done design was 
being completed and I was 
part of the tender review 
for the project as a whole 
and at the time I was 
working on a sub-section 
… it was an extra piece 
probably of another project 
that we then put into that 
to deliver it at the same 
time. “"[E5-CPM]  
 
"I came to the project after 
the previous project 
manager had been thrown 
and the task was to get it 
back on track and deliver 
to the time scale that were 
required.." [E6-CPM] 
 
The decision was made to 
do exactly as the scope 
that were design four years 
before that led to 112 
crack after a year of 
completion 
“The design was done 
based upon a survey which 
was completed three or 
four years before 
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So, my attention is needed 
elsewhere now. He has 
picked up all of that. ..They 
can’t resolve that problem. 
They’ve found a lot of 
design faults in the design 
of it" [B18-CAMAIN] 
 
everything that I could think of, 
told everyone that was of 
importance what I thought and 
why. And then afterwards they 
almost acted like that didn’t 
happen, which I found a bit 
disappointing to be honest. 
Then they start questioning and 
…then when it goes wrong 
[they’re] like, ‘that didn’t 
happen’”. ."[D15-CAM] 
 
construction started, so the 
design stated...owner 
approved the design, that 
said, ‘Let’s just do a top 
course.’ So on the southern 
runway, when we were 
very conscious of cost, the 
decision was made to do 
exactly as the scope was 
done, and within a year, 
you started to see some 
underlying causes coming 
through, i.e., these 112 
reflective cracks that came 
through, which we had to 
go back and do stuff 
in." [E16-CATM] 
 
 Unclear on 
quality issues 
root cause 
 
cause was not really 
understood although attempt 
to resolved has been made 
previously  
" In the fact it’s been leaking 
so the previous guy tried to 
resolve it in a number of ways 
but we never really got to the 
cause of the issues.” [A7-
CPM] 
 
 
Avoiding responsibility on 
QI “and some 
people…were saying, “No, 
we didn’t. That was never 
intended”. [B18-CMAIN] 
  
 Maintenance get difficult with 
non involvement of product 
selection  
"…if there’s a fault with asset, 
they called the maintenance 
guy... these guys couldn't solve 
and actually was different 
brand… "[D4-CPM] 
 
The reduce of asset life 
cannot be quantified 
makes a difficult decision  
"we can’t quantify, 
obviously we can quantity 
the 
maintenance/intervention 
costs, but what we can’t 
quantify at this stage is 
will it reduce the asset life 
of that runway. So instead 
of resurfacing in 15 years’ 
time, will we be 
resurfacing in ten years’ 
time? .."[E16-CATM] 
 
cracking is obviously a 
quality issues that was due 
to lots old joints 
underneath the runway  
-"... since the runway been 
in a operation... now we 
have had some cracking 
 289 
along the runway which is 
obviously due to a quality 
issue...I think I haven't 
really been part of a lot of 
discussion as to how that 
one kind of panned out and 
what the route cause of it 
is but as I kind of 
understood it we got a lot 
of... old joints underneath 
the runway. "[E6-CPM] 
 
 Uncertainty on 
project scope 
 Confused on the project 
scope “…And people will 
tell you it doesn’t. I can 
assure you, I was one of the 
original concepts on 
this…the first people 
involved. [we] wrote the 
scope, we sent…”[B18-
CMAIN] 
   
Learning 
not 
captured 
on project  
Different contract 
model impedes 
long-term 
learning 
Lesson learnt at the end of 
project was then forgotten “I 
think what used to happen 
was that you may get a 
lessons learnt session at the 
end of a project, which was 
useful, but then after that 
meeting where did that go? It 
just got filed away.” [A14-
CPE]  
 
Avoiding responsibilities to 
learn “We need to get 
someone that has 
experience with it ..Yeah… 
We want other people to 
have the problems and we 
learn from the 
mistakes.”[B18-CAMAIN] 
 
COQ failure if captured provides 
greater benefits in early 
intervention to prevention 
"Hindsight is a wonderful thing 
and maybe if that had been 
thought through better we would 
have put our hand up and said, 
this isn’t the best solution for 
that location.” [C8-CONQM]  
information on success was not 
available  
“Well that was very 
successful…that passenger 
conveyor was easy to maintain 
and delivered… [but] I don’t 
know about that because we 
don’t get to see that 
information..” [C8-CONQM]  
 
 No flexibility in delivering 
project which prevented 
the learning "as we’ve 
identified here, with 
hindsight, there are always 
going to be issues and bits 
and pieces. There needs to 
be a certain amount of 
flexibility within any 
project when it comes to 
the delivery phase, and 
that’s the bit that is often 
quite a struggle. ."[E12-
CATM]  
 
Different contract model 
influence project delivery 
thus long-term learning 
can’t be made  
"two different contracted 
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models,... That has a big 
influence.  So every time 
the regulator says, ‘You 
are going to deliver that’ 
and we create a new 
model, we are kind of 
resetting, so, in a way, we 
cannot learn long-term." 
[E16-CATM] 
 
 
 Full benefits of 
project not 
realised  
  Project complete on time, but 
reputational damaged with poor 
quality “The project was handed 
over on time, and it went 
operational, so the benefit was 
realised. It's more frustration, I 
think, and embarrassment, I 
suppose, where operation go 
down there and they see there's 
something else bubbling and 
something lifting, and there are 
concerns around safety and all 
this sort of stuff." [C10-CQM]  
 
Contractor willing to influence 
to interrupt and fix the 
problem 
“I would have liked to have seen 
the project have the ability to 
stop when the problem first 
occurred and fully investigate 
why it’s happened. I would also 
like the team to have had the 
ability to… influence that 
product selection.to try and 
eliminate that. And learning 
from on site, "[C8-CONQM] 
 
Project success was not 
remembered as it was shadowed 
People are keeping their 
reputations thus not share the 
learning 
“... people don’t like talking 
about it..[even] it was from the 
people [that] heavily involved 
in it…they got very defensive 
about it, because obviously 
they’d spent a hell of a lot of 
money and made a poor 
decision. So, company wise 
people don’t like tarnishing 
their name.” [D15-CAM] 
 
different expertise has different 
value judgement 
“There was a discussion about 
how do we make a sensible 
decision and pitch them against 
each other for their individual 
value. And I think they 
probably kind of do that, but a 
lot of it is still opinion because 
it’s easier to give an opinion 
rather than set people off to 
work and find it out.” [D15-
CAM] 
 
 
Project governance 
influence the poor quality 
"…you might have 
finished a bit of works 
early, which is poor 
quality, poor planning, so 
you’ve not realised the full 
benefits, because you 
might not be able to use 
that asset... So there’s this 
whole unwritten resource, 
impact, loss of benefits, 
indirect benefits, indirect 
impact, indirect cost, 
indirect administration, 
around poor planning time 
and reworks, which I see 
as a quality issue around 
the project governance." 
[E16-CATM] 
 
the issues has becoming an 
ongoing maintenance 
issues due to not 
expanding the scope to suit 
the ground condition 
"it’s become an ongoing 
maintenance issue with 
attached costs, because of, 
in this case, not reduced 
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by other issue "One of the things 
that we have found in this 
project is, although it had some 
successes, nobody remembers 
them. They only remember the 
floor, which is interesting." 
[C10-CQM]  
“So it's interesting that the 
operation known about the floor 
and the additional cost of opex 
to fix the unclear tiles whereas 
what they haven’t done is they 
haven’t realised benefits of the 
conveyors and lighting." [C3-
CPM] 
 
scope, but not expanding 
the scope to suit the 
ground conditions that we 
found during the 
works." [E16-CATM] 
 
the runway has been 
closed numbers of time 
although it was built for 
25year  
"because we only built it 
eight years ago and it’s 
failed, so we had to close it 
a number of times, even 
though it had a 25-year 
design life." [E16-CATM] 
 
 Quality issues 
repeated  
COQ were acknowledged but 
issues were still repeated to 
another project 
"Yeah, what you find is 
something which we kind of 
touched on before, we 
replicate the same issues so 
we don’t learn. One of the big 
issues which we have with 
multi-storey car parks are the 
expansion joints…it’s an issue 
we have on pretty much all of 
our multi-storey car parks. 
And it feels like we know it’s 
an issue, we then moan about 
it and have to pay to 
undertake maintenance works 
to try and stop water getting 
through them, but each time 
we’ve built a new car park we 
have the same issue. "[A14-
CPE] 
 
same designs and 
   Project need to learn at the 
beginning to avoid failure 
"it was not actually the 
fact that we did the lessons 
learnt at the end of the 
southern, it was the fact 
that we did the lessons 
learnt at the beginning of 
the northern; that made the 
difference..[and] is 
actually where they were 
two projects they were two 
projects doing exactly the 
same thing, basically one 
finished and the other one 
started, so actually it was a 
linear process...whereas 
with a multi-storey car 
park you build one now 
and the next one you may 
build maybe in three years, 
five years’ time.So, 
everybody forgets about 
it."[E13-CDM]  
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specifications were duplicated 
with appointing the same 
contractor 
“Everybody forgets or they 
say,”We’ll do another, oh well 
we’ve got a design already for 
a multi-storey car park. You 
like [multi-story car park], 
we’ll give you another… or 
you like multi-storey car park 
5…then [they repeat] exactly, 
same design, same 
specification and then you get 
the same issues.”[A14-CPE] 
 
Quality issues were 
prevented before repeat to 
another project bring 
success "... there was an 
element of learning which 
came out of the southern 
runway...both runways 
were meant to have the 
same remediation…With 
northern they were a little 
bit more proactive... of 
how they recorded [and] 
identified [then] 
implement the crack 
repairs. On the southern it 
was slightly different... 
and that makes a big 
difference…” [E13-CDM]  
 
“…it seems to have proved 
relatively 
successful….Yes, same 
supplier, So, that’s the 
kind of cracks on northern 
and southern..”[E13-
CDM]  
 
"In respect of the N we did 
more work, learning from 
the south, mainly because 
we thought that the North 
was in a worse state, but 
actually we took a 
different approach on the 
North than we did on the 
South, and as a result of 
that it’s in a better state. 
"[E5-CPM]  
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Appendix 4: Extract examples of the need for integrated capabilities in failure mitigation.  
Why need-
integrated 
capabilities in 
failure mitigation  
Project A Project B Project C Project D Project E 
Operational 
failure was not 
acknowledged, 
and measured  
Focused on operational 
readiness/ reputational impact - " 
It would have still happened; and 
the reason being, the Queen’s 
coming." [A1-CPM] 
 
“We could turn around and say, 
“We need to go and spend half a 
million pounds at multi-storey 
car park one to keep it in 
service” only to find that 
actually it then gets knocked 
down in a year and a half’s time. 
The question is, is that money 
well spent?" [A14PE]  
 
"This is something in as much as 
I don’t think it can be 
quantified…and that is 
something which we talk an 
awful lot about and we do 
actually use this as a kind of key 
card in terms of quality, in terms 
of reputation…but very, very 
difficult to put a cost against it" 
[A14PE] 
 
 
 Interrelated to other complex 
operations - “…because that end 
date doesn’t move, you will 
eventually end up with quality 
issues that will impact operations 
and nobody has any real influence 
over them. They don’t know...not 
even the owner I think... because 
there’s a much bigger picture.” 
[C8-CONQM]  
 
Controlling contractor work 
performance - “I changed the way 
that we paid them, so that there 
was more money held, retained, 
from their fix price contract until 
they got the final bit of 
commissioning done… we are 
holding on to indicate 
money..[and] … didn't get their 
final fee until… All the works been 
completed …So...it wasn't as if any 
department can close the projects, 
but they also had the best interest 
until the handed the job. "[C3-
CPM] 
 
"because the way things cut up was 
different contractors doing 
different parts ... The walkways 
weren’t one single person. It was 
numerous. what it meant was this 
that the urgency of the project to 
get approval and go through, [and] 
Project worked through 
indemnity losing the value - 
"you continually attract ... for 
people to just keep up project 
live from financial reporting, 
processing payment because 
[supplier] will be paid every 
week… Every month. So, you 
need indemnity, for a year and 
the project could be close down 
in the right time." [D4-CPM] 
 
Collaborative decision is hard to 
achieve as people does not see 
the actual lost/ saving - " The 
problem is when you’ve got a 
company with departments 
[they]... are making decisions 
for their own goals, not for the 
overall...[when]they’re supposed 
to tie up with the top ....They 
won’t go, “Let’s de-scope 
everything by 10% and then take 
the quality down from perfect to 
a little bit less than perfect but 
across the field” because that’s 
complicated to do... against 
every single type of asset you’re 
buying…That’s complicated and 
people don’t do that here. I’ve 
never seen that happen." [D15-
CAM] 
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it led to us having a triggered 
payment... "[C3-CPM] 
 
Governs by complex interrelations 
(system of system) - “Well 
generally the installation 
programmes are tight… and 
there’s lots of drivers for that. The 
[owner] has lots of reasons why 
they need things to be operational 
at certain times and they’re 
generally… a piece of work is 
generally part of a much bigger 
picture. So… our piece of work 
may have enabled some other 
things to happen …that were 
critical …so that end date never 
moves.” [C8-CONQM]  
 
 
 
 
Operational 
failure costs were 
only realised at 
operations  
"so 18 months after [project] 
finished, we started to see this 
issue's; bubbles appearing and 
the deck actually crack.."... then 
obviously the maintenance 
because while this weren't wired 
correctly the maintenance again 
you can't do proper maintenance 
on them because they did not 
operate as they should have 
done." [A1CPM] " 
 
Project life is uncertain 
“One of the big issues which we 
have here is knowing what 
design life we require, and that 
links into master planning, and 
master planning is a little bit 
uncertain..." [A14PE]  
 COQf help to visualised the 
benefits of either saving or failure, 
thus promoting the learning - "So 
it's interesting that the operation 
known about the floor and the 
additional cost of opex to fix the 
unclear tiles whereas what they 
haven’t done is they haven’t 
realised benefits of the conveyors 
and lighting."(C4CPM) 
 
"as an indirect impact of poor 
design, poor planning, poor 
delivery, because we say a project 
is going to take one month to build, 
in effect, it takes six months to 
build. Well, one, it will cost more 
because you’re spending more time 
on it, but, two, even from a smaller 
Measuring COQF provides 
clearer view on the benefits of 
the project - " I think probably 
part of that, though, needs to be 
really clearly identified what the 
benefits are, what the purpose of 
this project is, and the reasons 
they’re spending hundreds of 
millions isn’t just to get a shiny, 
new building, and that’s part of 
it." [D15-CAM] 
 
There is an saving to other 
operations costs - "the 
capital cost of the project 
was increased to do the extra 
crack treatment; but 
effectively the increased 
benefit we get from doing the 
extra crack treatment is a 
reduction in maintenance, 
reduction in whole lifecycle 
costs etc…"[E12-CATM]  
 
Operational failure can be 
predicted - "runway 
cracking is one way is a 
hidden defect but became 
apparent over time" 
[E6CPM]  
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 level, there’s a significant amount 
of re-work that’s going on, so in 
terms of the labour that it takes to 
do all the planning, the approvals, 
the design. Every time that we do a 
project we write to the CAA for 
approval...will be a period where 
we’ve then got to do additional 
work... purely because it hasn’t 
been delivered on time to plan." 
(CAIR1) 
 
 
 
To improve 
quality 
management 
within project 
team  
"...the quality management needs 
to be so strong within the 
builder, and that’s the bit that’s 
falling down because the quality 
management in (main 
contractor) isn’t strong, it’s 
desktop exercises, they rely on 
the site managers to say that it’s 
good enough. The quality 
manager doesn’t put his boots on 
and go and look at stuff on-site, 
it’s all paperwork, desktop, make 
sure that the templates are filled 
in, that the process is followed 
and the eventual delivery of it, 
it’s all process based."[A1CPM] 
 
"... it’s my opinion ..., if you have 
a project manager who good at 
managing project then that’s 
where his expertise is, if you 
have somebody who leads a 
   Identifying the failure will 
provide more flexibility for 
the project to stop and 
change- 
"as we’ve identified here, 
with hindsight, there are 
always going to be issues 
and bits and pieces. There 
needs to be a certain amount 
of flexibility within any 
project when it comes to the 
delivery phase, and that’s the 
bit that is often quite a 
struggle. People talk about 
changed management, but 
nobody ever seems to want to 
go through changed 
management... representing 
the operating world, the 
people that get left with it 
after the projects gone, it 
seems to me that common 
 297 
project to understand whether it 
be civil work or labor work, life 
safety or whatever it is. That 
person is going to have a better 
understanding otherwise what 
your dependent on is people part 
of your team, people providing 
you without assurance that is the 
right quality…”[A7CPM] 
sense goes out of the window 
sometimes and ‘We’ll just 
deliver this because that’s 
what I’ve been told to deliver 
by somebody,’ when they 
were looking at something 
three years ago and made 
the best decision they could 
then!". 
 
As a performance indicator 
or lagging indicator - “ I 
think from a QMS 
perspective, if you look at 
what advantages QMS gives 
you, even from this model, 
from looking forward to your 
planning use, if you’re using 
consistent processes, if 
you’re providing consistent 
information, if you’re asking 
people to quote against 
works in a consistent 
method, ... so you’ve almost 
got an element of 
performance indicators to 
demonstrate that this is a 
lagging indicator that shows 
us that we are consistently 
below where we need to be 
or we’re consistently- 
Whether that’s a cost 
element..." 
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How failure could 
be mitigated 
     
Long-term 
relationship  
Owner and contractor long term 
relationship helps in incentivised 
contractor to fixed the issues - 
"... But equally [the contractor] 
are an organisation that have 
worked with [us-owner] for 
many years. They were part of 
the joint venture ...for us and 
they are more than interested in 
supporting us on [other 
project]…So, they know as an 
organisation that they need to 
sort this out. To just walk away 
… wouldn’t be a sensible 
position for them to be in." [A11-
CCOM] 
 
 
 
 
“…also the long term 
contract with the treatment 
company, so monitoring the 
system remotely and how they 
would do their long term 
maintenance. So we did do 
that whole lifecycle cost of 
the project. [B2CPM] 
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Integrating 
capabilities  
There is a need to integrate with 
specialist and operation team - 
“… when you’re working on an 
[infrastructure projects] you do 
heavily rely on the specialists 
and operational team to tell you 
what’s acceptable and what’s 
not acceptable..." [A1CPM]  
 
Project need integrations 
between different organisations - 
"People build projects. People 
who want to build a successful 
project and want to work 
together with the other members 
of the project team will build a 
successful project. One person 
cannot do it on their own…” 
[A11COM]  
 
 
There is a need to include 
operational knowledge  
"…we needed to get the 
engineering team to look at 
how they would maintain 
[and]… like engineering and 
operations [to determine] 
how much time they have to 
spend on it …” [B2-CPM] 
 
Early involvement of the 
designer with consideration 
on operational need provides 
better understanding on the 
drawings - "Designers need 
to get down to site with your 
tape and measure it.." 
"Designer need to spend time 
with the operation/ user to 
understand how it can be 
function, not only to transfer 
information into 
drawings.."[B18CMAIN]  
 
Integrating operational capability 
help smoothen operational delivery 
- “…and what I did on this job is 
actually brought the operation in 
to do that. So, it was the engineers 
that were checking the cars, it was 
the engineers were agree testing 
procedure. Which made it 
easier…" (C4CPM) 
 
"through the job that I have lot of 
movement of operational team. 
And I managed to secure lead 
engineer in about end of 2010 and 
who then stayed with me until the 
end of the job. " (C4CPM) 
 
 
Early involvement for different 
stakeholders to better understand 
the project - "...[we] offered him 
early site of the escalator when 
it came to the building. Site has 
been connected together, ready 
for been covered up with the rest 
of the building worked. And once 
it was uncovered, frequent site 
visits to watch it be built and 
commissioned, tested… They 
were very forthcoming, 
attending those sessions…."[C3-
CPM] 
 
"Getting the scope right is 
key to quality of cost, quality 
of finish". (E12CAIR) 
 
Front end 
management that 
include technical 
expertise  
"Something which should have 
been targeted better was 
construction on the front end, the 
schedule management; we took 
quite a “you’re the builder, 
you’re the professional, let us 
know if you’ve got any 
problems” approach to things; 
whereas there’s a few different 
owner models for how to manage 
contractors; especially in a 
heavy asset orientated 
environment, so for example [to 
have] field engineers; ... but that 
model is completely different to 
what we do ... we don’t really 
have the technical team to do 
Aligning quality through 
contract - "...but. pretty more 
contract less... well actually 
there is some sort of planning 
that we can keep the sub-
supplier on board. 
[through]...warranty bases 
actually…so there is a basis 
at the back there were you 
actually should have." 
[B2CPM]  
 
 
 Front end planning that involve 
different stakeholder to mitigate 
the risk - “…It was critical 
because they had to open a hole 
in the runway and drop it in and 
close it before the first aircraft 
landed in the morning. So 
everything had to go exactly to 
plan. So there was a lot of 
planning work went into that 
and it was deemed to be very 
successful; lots of back-
slapping..." "And lots of 
meetings, planning it, lots of 
detail, lots of reviews, 
independent people coming in – 
all of the stakeholders 
Learning that was captured 
from on project and 
implemented at the 
beginning of project make 
greater impact - “it was not 
actually the fact that we did 
the lessons learnt at the end 
of the southern, it was the 
fact that we did the lessons 
learnt at the beginning of the 
northern; that made the 
difference..[and] is actually 
where they were two projects 
they were two projects doing 
exactly the same thing, 
basically one finished and 
the other one started, so 
 300 
inspections or anything like that" 
[A1CPM] 
 
"…understanding how long the 
assets are going to be there for 
to inform the right decision in 
terms of whether it be a short-
term intervention or a long-term 
intervention, and quite often 
we’re guessing that. So, that has 
big cost implications…” 
[A14PE]  
 
"… what we do ...[is] actually is 
reducing the design life because 
it maybe more cost effective to 
actually deliver something which 
will perform for five years or ten 
years rather than 15, and say 
after five or ten we’ll come back 
and do another intervention. But 
if you get that wrong, either in 
terms of quality what’s been 
delivered or actually under-
delivering, that can cost you an 
awful lot...." [A14PE]  
involved…, everybody involved 
and the mitigation plans that 
were put in place meant that 
piece of work did…it’s about 
identifying what the risks are 
and putting the right level of 
mitigation in place "[ 
C8CONQM) 
 
"The whole driver around that 
piece of work was the risk. It 
was the risk to not doing it 
properly. We could not close the 
runway and the only way to 
access that… to do that piece of 
work was to put a hole in the 
runway. So that risk drove all 
the behaviours to plan this piece 
of work to the nth degree. (3-
C8CONQM)  
 
 
 
 
actually it was a linear 
process...whereas with a 
multi-storey car park you 
build one now and the next 
one you may build maybe in 
three years, five years’ time. 
So, everybody forgets about 
it. " (E12CAIR) 
) 
 
 
Collaborative 
work environment  
  help in realisation of the benefits - 
"it’s all about team for me. The 
legacy is that, I grabbed 
everybody, operation, security, 
engineering, (contractor and 
suppliers)… And we were all in 
creative environment, we were all 
in together. If I fail, security 
couldn't operate properly. If they 
were failing, there’s no blame 
culture.” C3-CPM] 
 Provide proactive action on 
dealings with the problem -  
“... we spent another half a 
million on the southern, 
whereas to probably do it as 
we go along might have cost 
us a quarter of a million 
pounds on the northern. So 
dealing with the problem at 
the time, so getting the scope 
right was the right thing to 
do."[E13-CDM]  
 
